Eudaimonia

What constitutes as the good life, or the good soul? The question of what eudaimonia encompasses has been contemplated for centuries, and there are still new perspectives emerging. In one way or another, all of the Greek schools of thought base their conception of eudaimonia on the importance of virtue, though they disagree on the relationship between the two. The concept of eudaimonia has also influenced contemporary psychology, in particular the fields of positive, humanistic, and existential psychology as well as logotherapy, which emphasize "human flourishing" and having a purpose or sense of meaning in life as essential to eudaimonic living. Beneath it"s function as a form of psychotherapy, logotherapy is first and foremost a philosophy of life and of the human person, just as the Greek schools are. In this paper I will compare and contrast the Aristotelians", Epicureans", Stoics", and Logotherapists" conceptions of eudaimonia and apply them to Wong"s philosophical mindset theory. I will utilize logotherapy"s expanded definition of eudaimonia to critique the ancient Greek schools" conceptions, and establish that "the good life" requires more than mere moral virtue and goods, but also a sense of meaning, and a healthy mindset which instead of calculating ways to maximize pleasure, views hardships as learning experiences. I begin by explaining eudaimonia and virtue, followed by a comparison of Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, and logotherapy. Finally, I will provide a critique of the Greek schools" theories of eudaimonia in contrast to logotherapy, and a conclusion confirming that the Greek schools" theories of eudaimonia must be expanded.

Je mehr Möglichkeiten der Lebensführung wir erkennen, desto dringlicher wird die Frage: Wie lebe ich gut? Wer allerdings in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie die Klärung seiner Frage erwartet, wird zunächst enttäuscht. Er wird ein Nebeneinander gegensätzlicher Gründe eines guten Lebens vorfinden: Verwirklichung der menschlichen Natur, Erfüllung aller Wünsche, vernünftige Pflichterfüllung.
Diese Abhandlung sucht nach einem Ausweg, nach einer rationalen Grundlage für die persönliche Lebensentscheidung. Die Hauptpositionen der gegenwärtigen Debatte werden auf ihre Vordenker – Kant, Aristoteles und Sokrates – zurückgeführt und nach dem Vorbild der sokratischen Prüfung immanent entfaltet, um sie schließlich an ihren eigenen Voraussetzungen zu messen.
Der Nachvollzug des jeweiligen Denkens verdeutlicht Begründungsstrukturen, die auch in der Gegenwartsdebatte herangezogen werden: Aristoteles sieht den Grund des guten Lebens im richtigen Ziel der menschlichen Tätigkeiten; Kant hingegen im zwecksetzenden Vernunftvermögen. Bei beiden Konzeptionen zeigen sich immanente Schwierigkeiten. Die sokratische Prüfung in Platons Tugenddialogen eröffnet eine nichtskeptische Alternative jenseits dieser Dichotomie.

Research on well-being can be thought of as falling into two traditions. In one-the hedonistic tradition-the focus is on happiness, generally defined as the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. In the other-the eudaimonic tradition-the focus is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. Recognizing that much recent research on wellbeing has been more closely aligned with the hedonistic tradition, this special issue presents discussions and research reviews from the eudaimonic tradition, making clear how the concept of eudaimonia adds an important perspective to our understanding of well-being.

Accompanied by a new translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics X, this volume presents a hybrid between a traditional commentary and a scholarly monograph. Aristotle's text is divided into one hundred lemmata which not only explore comprehensively the content and strength of each of these units of thought, but also emphasise their continuity, showing how the smaller units feed into the larger structure. The Commentary illuminates what Aristotle thinks in each lemma (and why), and also shows how he thinks. In order to bring Aristotle alive as a thinker, it often explores several possible ways of reading the text to enable the reader to make up their own mind about the best interpretation of a given passage. The relevant background in Plato's dialogues is discussed, and a substantial Introduction sets out the philosophical framework necessary for understanding Book X, the final and most arresting section of the Ethics.

En el presente trabajo estudiaremos las reflexiones planteadas por Aristóteles respecto a la justicia, empezando por su comprensión como virtud. Para ello, escaparemos momentáneamente del libro V y daremos lectura de los libros I y II a fin de captar someramente el significado de virtud (areté) y su división. Dicho esto, retornaremos al libro V y observaremos en qué radica la perfección de la justicia como virtud, asimismo, analizaremos sus manifestaciones particulares: distributiva, correctiva y como reciprocidad. Luego mostraremos las relaciones entre la justicia y otros conceptos, tales como la equidad y la amistad. Y finalmente incluiremos en el último acápite una reflexión a modo de conclusión.

RESUMO: Este artigo científico sistematizou a concepção do psicólogo sino-canadense Paul T. P. Wong sobre as felicidades prudencial, eudaimonística e cairônica, no âmbito da sua proposta de Psicologia Positiva 2.0. A fim de contextualizar a sua visão da PP 2.0, teceram-se considerações propedêuticas sobre as facetas existencialista e indigenista da PP 2.0. Após, capítulos específicos se dedicaram a aprofundar a concepção de Wong acerca das felicidades autêntica, eudaimonística e cairônica, articulando esses constructos com a literatura contemporânea de PP 2.0, sejam as pesquisas científicas qualitativas, sejam as problematizações teoréticas, em diálogo com aportes do movimento transpessoal e do movimento existencial e humanista em Psicologia. 

ABSTRACT: This scientific article systematized the conception Sino-Canadian psychologist Paul T. P. Wong has of prudential, eudaimonic and chaironic happiness, within the scope of his proposal for Positive Psychology 2.0. In order to contextualize his vision of PP 2.0, propaedeutic considerations were made about the existentialist and indigenous facets of PP 2.0. Afterward, specific chapters were dedicated to deepening Wong's conception of authentic, eudaimonic, and chaironic happiness, articulating these constructs with contemporary PP 2.0 literature, be it qualitative scientific research or theoretical problems, in a dialogue with contributions from the transpersonal movement and the existential and humanist movement in Psychology.

Death is a bad thing by virtue of its ability to frustrate the subjectively valuable projects that shape our identities and render our lives meaningful. While the presumption that immortality would necessarily result in boredom worse than death proves unwarranted, if the constraint of mortality is a necessary element for virtues, relationships, and motivation to pursue our life-projects, then death might nevertheless be a necessary evil. Mortal or immortal, it’s clear that the value of one’s life depends on its subjectively determined quality, rather than its quantity. Thus, it is imperative to live forever in the present, with flourishing always in mind.

In this position paper the author presents a perspective on rock drumming and music education. The author is a drummer and university professor who combines an autoethnographic account with consideration of theoretical frameworks including authenticity, flow and the autotelic personality. Through illustrative vignettes of rock drumming and music teaching, the author appeals to the essentially somatic experience of rock drumming. He argues that educators and educational institutions need to allow for rock's inherent, authentic loudness or else risk misrepresenting the music and treating drummers unjustly. This means that the physical movements and resulting high volumes germane to much rock drumming in performance must be accommodated in rehearsals and practice. This article does not seek to privilege rock drumming over other forms, but argues that to include rock drumming authentically in education contexts means to acknowledge and celebrate its essence.

_The Physiology of Love and Other Writings_ is the first English annotated collection of Mantegazza’s selected works. In my extensive introductory essay, Mantegazza’s hybrid contributions from fiction, travel-writing, and ethnography to physiology, medicine, and politics are reevaluated as instances of a proto-cultural-studies approach attuned to the cross-fertilization of disciplines and the circulation of ideas in a period of European intellectual history that defied the notion of specialization.
Table of contents:
The Physiology of Love
And Selections from:
On The Hygienic and Medicinal Virtues of the Coca Plant and on Nervine Nourishment in General
One Day in Madeira
A Voyage to Lapland with my Friend Stephen Sommier
India
Epicurus: Essay in a Physiology of the Beautiful
The Neurosic Century
The Tartuffe Century
Head: Or, Sowing Ideas to Create New Deeds
Political Memoirs of a Foot Soldier in the Italian Parliament
The Year 3000: A Dream
The Psychology of Translation

The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, displays a sadly illiberal form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a distortion in Jesse Prinz's recent discussion of the "Normativity Challenge" to Aristotelian virtue ethics, thus highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully move beyond.

Recently, tourism scholars have recognized that travel can create transformation, including (1) personal benefits such as improved wellbeing and personal growth and (2) societal benefits such as increased open-mindedness and more positive pro-environmental attitudes, motivations, and behaviors. Expanding and integrating this research, this experimental study tests whether travel experiences, with eudaimonic elements of self-discovery and a sense of meaning, lead to these benefits and tests a proposed process where these experiences influence personal changes that subsequently create societal benefits. Specifically, using an online MTurk sample (n = 481) with a broad range of recent vacation experiences, we test whether (1) post-trip self-reflection on eudaimonic travel experiences (2) creates affective responses (3) that lead to self-transcendent changes and (4) subsequent post-trip philanthropy among recent travelers. Results of structural equation modeling indicate that philanthropic effects of travel were initiated by the eudaimonic self-reflections via eudaimonic affect and self-transcendent outcomes. This study contributes to the research linking eudaimonia and travel and provides insights into the ways that the travel industry can be harnessed as a potent tool for promoting personal meaning, self-transcendence, and prosocial outcomes. ARTICLE HISTORY

"This study gathers and interprets the earliest extant references to architects in ancient Greek philosophy, as found in select works of Plato and Aristotle.  Throughout this review, Plato and Aristotle [are] shown to consistently present architectonic agents as exemplary civic and intellectual leaders, acting in awareness of their own (and others’) limits, with knowledge of the most appropriate archē, and with a view to the most comprehensive aims—the common good. This discloses an alternative and more accurate etymology of architects: not as master-builders but as leaders and makers of beginnings (archai). The aim of this essay has been not only to rediscover the discursive beginnings for a renewed philosophy of architecture, but to suggest how these philosophical 'archai' might help present-day architects reimagine the full relevance of their still contested role."

Tradução do Sermão 150, de Santo Agostinho, sobre as palavras do Apóstolo Paulo no Areópago aos filósofos estoicos e epicureus. Esta tradução compunha o capítulo 2 do Trabalho de Conclusão do Curso da Licenciatura em Letras no Centro Universitário São Camilo apresentado em 2006.

The concept of eudaimonia put forward by Aristotle in the first Book of his Nicomachean Ethics reflects an attempt to synthesize and clarify a well known concept in the Greek society, in popular as well as in more restricted intellectual circles, giving it a new scope and conceptual consistency. Ordinarily translated as happiness, well-being or prosperity, this concept frequently had a subjective sense, describing the lives of those who lived well or were eudaimon; but it also had an objective sense, establishing a life conducting rule for everyone who wanted to be happy or eudaimon. In the present paper we give an account of the meaning and operative range of the concept of eudaimonia and show the eudaimonia's guiding role in the Aristotelian ethical project, namely as its founding principle and final horizon, its relations with the good and virtue, as well as with the nature of man and the generation of a new modality of being. Finally, we establish that the concept of eudaimonia is central to an ethics seen as a life project.

Citation: Houge Mackenzie, S. & Hodge, K. (2019). Adventure recreation and subjective well-being: A conceptual framework. Leisure Studies. doi: 10.1080/02614367.2019.1577478.  Despite the documented positive outcomes of adventure experiences, subjective well-being (SWB) frameworks have been largely absent from discourse and analyses in adventure studies. This conceptual paper proposes a framework for understanding how adventure recreation experiences promote eudaimonic SWB. In our framework we propose that adventure recreation fosters eudaimonic aspects of SWB by supporting satisfaction of basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, relatedness and beneficence. The framework also integrates contact with nature as an important mechanism through which adventure recreation fosters eudaimonic SWB. Analysis of research and practice across diverse aspects of adventure recreation (leisure, tourism, and education contexts) is used to support the proposed framework and to critically evaluate howpsychological models, such as SDT and SWB, can advance theory and practice in adventure recreation. We conclude by offering a number of suggestions for future research directions and practical implications.

Søren Kierkegaard is well-known as an original philosophical thinker, but less known is his reliance upon and development of the Christian tradition of the Seven Deadly Sins, in particular the vice of acedia, or sloth. As acedia has enjoyed renewed interest in the past century or so, commentators have attempted to pin down one or another Kierkegaardian concept (e.g., despair, heavy-mindedness, boredom, etc.) as the embodiment of the vice, but these attempts have yet to achieve any consensus. In our estimation, the complicated reality is that, in using slightly different but related concepts, Kierkegaard is providing a unique look at acedia as it manifests differently at different stages on life’s way. Thus, on this “perspectival account”, acedia will manifest differently according to whether an individual inhabits the aesthetic, ethical, or religious sphere. We propose two axes for this perspectival account. Such descriptions of how acedia manifests make up the first, phenomenal axi...

Background Aristotle (384-322BCE) was perhaps the most influential philosopher in Ancient Greece. He tutored Alexander the Great after studying under Plato for twenty years. During his life, he revolutionized science, ethics, and metaphysics by presenting a framing mechanism which allowed him to take up difficult questions and resolve them, often by consulting the work of other philosophers and evaluating it for strengths and weaknesses. Dubbed the "Philosopher" with a capital-P by St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle has maintained a large following for millennia after his death. This essay will focus upon his notion of happiness, known as eudaimonia, and how the great philosopher believed we could reach it. Aristotelian ethics is frequently called virtue ethics due to its emphasis on the ancient notion of excellence (arête) or virtue of character. However, Aristotle's goal seems to have been to examine the good life and the types of people who were able to live well so he could extract certain qualities from these to then teach to others. Aside from possessing virtues of character, people who lived the good life seemed to Aristotle to also be able to engage in a certain thoughtful, reminiscent activity, which Aristotle likened unto the activity of a god who contemplates his situation. Sometimes translated as "happiness" or "blessedness," Aristotle's concept of happiness is known in the Greek as Eudaimonia. To experience eudaimonia, a sort of contemplative activity which takes place when we reflect upon our deeds from the standpoint of accomplishment and achievement, we must be skilled in practical reason and virtuous as a result of our repeated application of this skill. 1 This is a simple enough concept: human happiness is based upon excellence in rationality. The purpose of a human being is to be rational (i.e., man is a rational animal), and by reasoning well we are able to acquire virtues of character through our habit-building individual actions. Essentially, we want to build good character so that we tend to do good deeds which are said to be in accord with reason because this makes us the best way for us to be; when we have come far enough down this path we experience pleasure simply by contemplating ourselves-we have become what we are supposed to be and eudaimonia is our reward, when we choose to engage in it.

O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar e contextualizar a ideia estóica a respeito da felicidade, ou eudaimonia, como era conhecida pelos gregos antigos. Para conseguir tal objetivo, será feita uma contextualização histórica, seguida por uma apresentação de seus filósofos mais importantes e um resumo de toda a filosofia estóica, passando pela física, lógica e ética. A ideia defendida por este artigo é a visão de felicidade como tranquilidade da alma, como aceitação do destino, de que há coisas que não estão sob o controle do indivíduo. A tranquilidade da alma, segundo os estóicos, será conseguida através do desenvolvimento humano, do aperfeiçoamento do que os gregos viam como excelência ou virtudes do homem. É preciso viver de acordo com a natureza, sendo a razão humana vista como uma extensão da razão natural.

This research examines relationships regarding moral foundations and moral deci- sions in the Mass Effect video game series. The findings suggest that moral foundation predicts what type of moral decisions a player will make during play. This research reports an online survey (N=138) that asked participants the salience of their moral foundations, along with the moral path, either traditionally heroic (paragon) or traditionally antiheroic (renegade), they chose in their first time playing through the Mass Effect series. The results indicate that moral foundations predict the extent to which game path players choose, but only with regard to the harm/ care moral foundation. These findings are discussed in light of game design and the potential for game designers to use morality as a game mechanic beyond the harm foundation and into realms of more nuanced moral situations in game narratives.

In this paper I will discuss the problematic relationship between individual and community in Aristotle's Politics from the point of view of happiness, as a key concept in the political and already ethical thought of the Stagirian philosopher. After having gone through the argument leading, in the Nicomachean Ethics, to the statement of a definition of happiness, we will ask ourselves if man shall attain it as an individual. We will therefore investigate the notion of individual, attempting firstly to define it according to the cultural parameters of classical Greece, and secondly to test if Aristotle's doctrine leaves the individual the possibility to reach happiness. The result of both our investigations being negative, we will be forced to ascend from the individual level to that of the community, and to enquire about the conditions of common happiness. We will thus be able, at last, to describe the relationship between the latter and the happiness of a single man.

In both the Eudemian Ethics (EE) and the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle undertakes the task of seeking a systematic answer to the question of "What is the best life?" How he proceeds in answering this question of practical inquiry has given rise to many interpretational issues concerning his conception of eudaimonia as the highest good and choice worthy in itself.

La felicità ha da sempre interessato i filosofi, ma negli ultimi sessant’anni se ne stanno occupando anche gli psicologi. Il benessere, il funzionamento ottimale e altri argomenti simili interessano studiosi di vari ambiti, ma anche il pubblico in generale, che ormai ha acquistato una certa familiarità con tali discussioni, tramite internet e i libri di autoaiuto.
Questa ricerca intende esaminare come il discorso eudaimonico si sviluppi oggi anche al di fuori dell’ambito della filosofia morale. Dopo una breve considerazione sul ruolo dell’eudaimonia nel pensiero filosofico dell’antichità e all’interno della teorizzazione etica, si passa allo studio del pensiero di Martin Seligman fino ad arrivare alla nascita della psicologia positiva e alla nozione di felicità intesa come flourishing. L’eudaimonia nel pensiero di quest’autore è paragonata alla concezione classica, allo scopo di mettere in luce alcune similitudini e, al tempo stesso, rilevare delle differenze. Infatti, il presente saggio svolge, innanzitutto, un lavoro esplorativo sulla psicologia positiva, mettendo a disposizione del lettore le due teorie di Seligman sulla felicità e le principali tematiche empirico-esistenziali da lui esposte: le emozioni positive, la resilienza, le virtù, le esercitazioni, il carattere e i suoi punti di forza. Il focus non è tanto quello della “novità” della proposta, bensì quello di valutarne la formulazione, i limiti e gli sviluppi in corso. L’interlocuzione filosofica è sostenuta da elementi presenti all’interno del pensiero classico, sullo sfondo della teoria etica delle virtù che parte dal punto di vista del soggetto agente e lo considera in modo prioritario ma non esclusivo.

Resumo: Este artigo científico mapeou os pontos de convergência entre a Psicologia Espírita de Joanna de Ângelis e a Psicologia Positiva no tocante à questão da felicidade, desdobrada nestes eixos: (1) a felicidade e a faceta sombria da existência; (2) a felicidade e a resignação dinâmica; (3) a felicidade e a diversidade da subjetividade; (4) as felicidades autêntica, eudaimônica e cairônica; (5) a felicidade e a ressignificação do hedonismo; (6) o diálogo entre as felicidades eudaimônica e cairônica. Em cada tópico desta pesquisa, estabeleceu-se uma interface, de um lado, entre o conteúdo de obras espíritas sobre temáticas psicológicas cuja autoria se atribui ao espírito Joanna de Ângelis, escritas por meio da psicografia do médium baiano Divaldo Pereira Franco, dando-se destaque ao conjunto de livros que compõem a denominada Série Psicológica, e, de outro lado, a literatura especializada em Psicologia Positiva, mediante a remissão a livros-texto, artigos científicos e capítulos de obras coletivas, em particular os aportes colhidos da chamada Segunda Onda da Psicologia Positiva. Abstract: This paper ascertained the points where the Spiritist Psychology of Joanna de Ângelis and Positive Psychology converge on the matter of happiness, broken down into the following core aspects: (1) happiness and the darkside of existence; (2) happiness and dynamic resignation; (3) happiness and the diversity of subjectivity; (4) authentic, eudaimonic, and chaironic happiness; (5) happiness and the resignification of hedonism; (6) the interaction between eudaimonic and chaironic happiness. Each topic of this research established an interface across the contents found in spiritist works on psychological themes whose authorship is attributed to the spirit of Joanna de Ângelis, penned by the Brazilian medium Divaldo Pereira Franco through automatic writing. Special focus is given to the series of books that make up de Ângelis’ Psychological Series and to specialized Positive Psychology literature by referring to textbooks, scientific articles, and chapters from collective works, particularly the contributions made by what is called the Second Wave of Positive Psychology.

Chapter 1 of Epicurus' Ethical Theory.  The Pleasures of Invulnerability (1988)
This paper was written forty years ago and it is online here as part of a book published in the '80s.  I have changed my mind about many things which I think were wrong including the question of whether Epicurus is a eudaimonist.  For more recent thoughts I have posted in drafts "Epicurus on Desire and Pleasure".

What is the relationship between friendship and human flourishing? This is a central topic in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and one to which Maimonides also returned throughout his career. Despite the relative neglect of this topic in recent scholarship, I argue that friendship (philia) was an important link between moral and intellectual perfection for Maimonides. He identified Aristotle’s virtue friendship with the love between students and teachers and also interpreted many of the divine commandments as efforts to promote both family and virtue friendship among the Jewish people. Friendship was aligned thematically in Maimonides’ writings with topics like kinship and sexuality, circumcision, and the ethics of speech, all of which point in different ways to the unresolved tension between rational and sensual aspects of our human condition. This article therefore contributes to the investigation of the relationship between Maimonides’ legal and philosophical writing on social themes. While Aristotle clearly influenced his reading of biblical and rabbinic texts for example, I will also argue that Maimonides’ religious and communal commitments helped to push his reading of Aristotle in a broadly inclusive direction— both with respect to the range of different goods that are appropriate to an ideal human life as well as the potential accessibility of those goods to different classes of persons. I offer this article as a corrective to the exaggerated focus on seclusion and solitary contemplation that has characterized academic scholarship on Maimonides.

Political philosophy was once dominated by discussion of the virtues of character and their importance to the good life and the good society. Contemporary political philosophers, however, following the towering influence of John Rawls, have primarily focused on a single virtue of institutions: justice, while mostly avoiding discussions of the good life. As a result, political philosophy lacks a unified account of the virtues of institutions and the virtues of character. More importantly, we lack an understanding of the connection between the just society and the good life. This article begins to mend this broken seam. The central argument is that the virtues of character require institutions, while good institutions enable persons to live together virtuously. Institutions are a necessary precondition for the moral agency required by the virtues. But good institutions enable virtue to grow, while helping to constrain the moral excesses of vice. On this view, justice emerges primarily as a virtue of character, not institutions. The just person balances conformity to existing institutional norms with practically wise reforms that serve the common good. The just society and the good life are linked through the common good of virtuous activity within the shared institutions of a political community.

La filosofia di Aristotele è sempre stata una filosofia molto pratica, non da meno lo è nell'Etica Nicomachea, testo fondamentale per la nascita della civiltà occidentale come la conosciamo oggi. Nel chiedersi come una persona giusta debba comportarsi per raggiungere la felicità, però, Aristotele lascia adito a dubbi che vengono risolti in due posizioni divergenti. Le esauriremo nei primi paragrafi, citando direttamente dal testo, e cercheremo una sintesi nell'opinione di J.L. Ackrill. Illustreremo poi il pensiero di San Tommaso d'Aquino, noto commentatore aristotelico e concluderemo con un pensiero di chi scrive.

Come vivere felici? Non c'è problema piú sentito fra i Greci e non c'è filosofo che non abbia offerto la sua soluzione. Ma nessuno può raggiungere Plotino quanto a originalità e radicalità. Impegnandosi in un confronto serrato con la filosofia dei secoli precedenti (Epicuro, gli stoici), il trattato Sulla felicità offre una sintesi delle migliori soluzioni proposte dalle scuole greche e si avvia lungo una strada che molti altri avrebbero in seguito percorso, rivelando la linea di continuità che unisce la filosofia greca e il pensiero dei secoli successivi. Da Platone a Dante, da Aristotele a Spinoza e oltre, la filosofia ha l'ambizione di comprendere il senso ultimo delle cose, realizzando cosí la natura profonda di quell'animale razionale che è l'uomo. Perché è solo se sapremo appagare il nostro desiderio di conoscenza che potremo capire chi veramente siamo. Ed è solo capendo chi siamo, riscoprendo la nostra origine divina e il nostro legame con il tutto, che potremo finalmente trovare la strada che conduce alla felicità, una meta che solo l'ignoranza fa sembrare lontana.

This paper aims to resolve the inconsistencies found in Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficiency of happiness and its dependency on other people. I present these inconsistencies in Section I, and then propose a solution. I suggest that the key to untangling the issue is Aristotle’s construal of happiness as a property that the agent has intrinsically. This entails that the agent’s happiness cannot be had in virtue of her relationship with others, and that others cannot constitute the sources of her happiness; but it does allow that others can play a more rudimentary role in one’s happiness, in setting the context for its exercise. I articulate this proposal in Section II, where I also illustrate how it can be used to accommodate Aristotle’s conflicting comments on the dependency of the agent’s happiness on others. In Section III, I demonstrate that my proposal can also reconcile Aristotle’s conflicting comments on the self-sufficiency of the agent’s happiness.

Asking how post-crisis countercultural formations compose new means of resisting an unjust economic order, this essay centers the tiny homes movement, which takes the financialization and commodification of housing as a warrant for radically downsized dwellings. As I argue, the campaign to displace (from) big homes and emplace tiny homes relies on coordinating rhetorical modalities: the parrhēsiastic case against dominant but flawed materializations of “good living” and the eudaimonic envisioning of an alternative “good living” less beholden to capital. I conclude by reviewing both problematics and possibilities that emerge from this inventive play for social and economic change.

Time to make a choice: Life! Not extinction!
As Kate Raworth said at the 2019 Reporting 3.0 Conference,
"We have an economy that is degenerative by design. It is literally running down the living planet, on which we depend. We have to completely reinvent that to make it regenerative by design, so that we work with and within the cycles of the living world."
As Greta Thunberg said at the 2019 United Nations Climate Action Summit, "You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I'm one of the lucky ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!
You are failing us. But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you.
We will not let you get away with this. Right here, right now is where we draw the line. The world is waking up. And change is coming, whether you like it or not."
Our choice here is life!
What can we do to reduce, stop, and eventually reverse global warming?
In our response, we attempt to envision and explore an Integrative Climate Emergency Plan.
Preferably sooner, rather than later, we need to learn to live and work with each other to reduce, stop, and eventually reverse anthropogenic (human-induced) global warming by transforming our current dysfunctional global capitalism and our inadequate triple bottom line multi-capitalisms into an integrative, multi-dimensional, multi-capitalism.
In their responses to global warming, the IPCC, and other climate change activists, like the Club of Rome and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, tend to propose mainly eco-social pathways for rapid decarbonisation in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
But, in the context of our integrative multi-dimensional multi-capitalism, many of these eco-social pathways miss much too much in waking up the heart-spirit and in growing up the body-mind in personal choices, interpersonal relations, and eco-social organisations in human beings.
To overcome global capitalism’s current excesses in undermining societies with its exclusive focus on making profits, with its constant promotion of overconsuming greed, and with its mindless marginalisation of its destructive impacts on people and planet with anthropogenic global warming and an intensifying biodiversity extinction crisis – which looks like, given recent scientific (IPCC and IPBES) reports on our increasingly dire climate and biodiversity crises, if we continue with our current business as usual practices, that it will include the human species – we need to establish, at personal, interpersonal, household, local, regional, national, and global scales, an integrative, open, inclusive, green, regenerative, cyclical, transparent, agile, finely tuned, multi-dimensional multi-capitalism that functions to serve the thriveability of each and all human and living beings within our planet's natural limits as soon as possible. 
In doing all of this, we will need to learn to live, grow, and work with each other within various habitats with various horizons on Mount Thriveability.
Also, if you are curious, Exploring Mount Thriveability is part 2 of Towards Integrative Thriveability. Part 1 is called An Integrative Climate Emergency Plan.
For the latest developments in my understanding see From Our Global Pandemic in 2020 to Our Many Transformations in the 2020s: Transforming Out of Our Current Suffering into Wise Compassion and Compassionate Wisdom for Everybody.
We ask you to support our children in their efforts to secure their futures in their Global and Local Climate Actions.

Part 1 of the book examines happiness in scripture and Christian theology.
Part 2 argues for a new perspective on divine commands that is not voluntarist requiring blind obedience to the divine will but as _asherist_ commands, divine guidelines for a flourishing life in community. It concludes with several examples of how the asherist construal of divine commands enhances character and self-confidence in obedience to God.

(Penultimate proof version; page numbers differ from final version). Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics is compared to another important work of moral philosophy published ten years earlier: Charles De Koninck’s On the Primacy of the Common Good: Against the Personalists. It is argued that there are important points of convergence between Hildebrand’s and De Koninck’s work, as well as certain divergences. The first point might seem counter-intuitive: Hildebrand’s Ethics is often considered a foundational text of Catholic personalism, whereas De Koninck (a Thomist of the strict observance) wrote against the personalists. Both thinkers were, however, trying to correct similar errors, and to defend similar insights into the objectivity of ethical categories. This shows itself primarily in the convergences between Hildebrand’s understanding of “value” in his Ethics and De Koninck’s understanding of the primacy of the good. Hildebrand’s understanding of the unifying power of values (hinted at in Ethics, but more fully explored in Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft), also converges in some respects with De Koninck’s understanding of the unifying power of the common good.

This essay analyzed the media effects of the candidacy proclamation speeches of presidential aspirants Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Vice President Maria Leonor G. Robredo uploaded online. Using Aristotle's eudaimonia — "the good" and "the ultimate goal of human life" — this argued that the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a condition for a particular type of campaigning for the 2022 national elections: hope. This includes inspirational and encouraging words as well as a well-thought program of government. Robredo's speech is backed by her track record and current performance and projects in the Office of the Vice President while Marcos, Jr. dwelt on generalities and vague pronouncements. This essay concluded and suggested that eudaimonic effects in media are not created out of thin air but have some bases on reality.

Questo lavoro intende analizzare i concetti di sorte e buona sorte per comprendere meglio il loro peso nel percorso per raggiungere la felicità più perfetta e durevole secondo Aristotele. La sorte assume indubbiamente un grande peso nella vita dell’uomo, e la virtù e la saggezza sono insufficienti a garantire il mantenimento della condizione di felicità senza un aiuto di quest’ultima. La felicità è però considerata da Aristotele come una attività, non come uno stato. In quanto attività può essere esercitata costantemente e può fornire un ottimo scudo contro la cattiva sorte e generalmente contro l’imprevedibilità della sorte. Inoltre, la felicità può essere raggiunta e acquisita solo esercitando le proprie virtù etiche. Più queste sono esercitate, più possono resistere anche ai più duri capovolgimenti della sorte. Certo fino a un limite: come nei casi di Priamo o Edipo, certe volte la cattiva sorte è semplicemente troppa anche per l’uomo più buono o più saggio o più felice del mondo.

One of the main goals of work and organisational psychology is to promote the well-being and performance of employees. However, the different authors do not agree on the fundamental concept of happiness. The objectives of this paper are to present the enormous contribution of positive psychology and philosophy to the subject of happiness and its influence on labour and productivity, to review several scholars in this field, to highlight the differences among them, and, especially, to find a consensus on the fundamentals of happiness. In fact, the major difference among all the contributions is that there is no unanimity on the fundamental concept of happiness. Whereas some authors see happiness as “pleasure”, others prefer the concept of happiness as  a  mixture  of  “pleasure”,  “engagement”  and  “meaning”,  avoiding  the  definition  of  happiness,  and  hiding  it  behind  the concept of well-being. However, if a consensus were reached, it would represent a concept that could be better managed from the psychological perspective.

Both academic and popular discussions of the pursuit of happiness tend to downplay its relative importance in the trinity of unalienable rights listed in the Declaration of Independence. Its inclusion is often treated as little more than a curiosity or a rhetorical flourish. Investigation of the personal and public writings of the founders of the United States and their intellectual forebears reveals that the founding generation held as a fundamental assumption that the primary purpose of government and the main criterion for measuring its worth was the extent to which it facilitated the pursuit and promoted the obtainment of happiness among its people. This "Founding Assumption" was a natural outgrowth of the Enlightenment, and was the one idea that united the founding generation even in the midst of passionate disagreement about the proper size, scope and powers of government. The conception of happiness held by the Founders had deep historical roots and included elements of enjoyment, fulfillment and civic virtue.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

This article presents phenomenological findings from Stephen Strasser’s eidetic study of human happiness. Happiness was found to be an experience of incomplete completion implicating the total being-becoming of the person upon having attained a perceived good affiliated with the highest levels of personal existence. As an exceptional mode of personal fulfillment, happiness relates to determinate subject-world interactions, yet always transcends them in its infinitely meaningful
quality. In addition to explicating the qualitative meanings that structure the experience of happiness, Strasser identified 6 manifestations of the phenomenon: contentment, good fortune, harmony, rapture, release, and transcending anticipation. Moreover, happiness is distinguished from several phenomena that are closely related to happiness, but do not share its eidos: pleasure, enjoyment, joy, and serenity.

In this contribution I argue that the beatitudes are the key to a proper understanding of the entire prima secundae of the Summa Theologiae as a discussion of the pursuit of happiness. In order to do so, we need to consider them in relation to the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the fruits of the Holy Spirit. First, I will briefly argue why it is important to have discussions about the structure of the Summa at all. Second, I will present a number of valuable interpretations of the place of the Beatitudes in the prima secundae. These works of Eleonore Stump, Andrew Pinsent, Pinckaers, and William Mattison contribute to our understanding of the matter, but I believe they still fall short in important aspects. Third, I will offer my own interpretation of the structure, which is a development of the proposals of Pinckaers and Mattison. In my proposal the notion of merit is key to reading the prima secundae as a unified discussion Merit is a term that describes acting toward the final end with the help of grace, as I will argue with reference to Aquinas’s commentary on Matthew. When we follow this understanding of merit we find a way of speaking of the value of human action without diminishing the necessity of God’s grace for the attainment of the final end. Fourth and finally I will provide a brief sketch of the implications of my proposal for our understanding of prima secundae and thus for the moral life of the Christian.