Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics X

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Index More Information Index activity activation of capacity 131–2 best 167–9, 182 chosen for itself 67–8, 113–14, 152–3, 176–8, 209 complete 108 continuity of 122–4, 159, 169–71, 173, 183, 211 incomplete 108 individuation of 94, 132–5, 137–8 audience, Aristotle’s 2, 6–7, 27–8, 60–1, 97, 199, 222–3, 229–30 akribeia see precision Alexander of Aphrodisias 62 amusement (paidia) 158–9, 179 Anacharsis 158–9 Anaxagoras 218–20, 225–6 animals 13–14, 55, 62–6, 71–3, 114, 128, 142–4, 210–11 authority authoritative element determines whole 189–90 of a father 239, 244–6, 250–1 of judgement 156–7 of the law 244–6, 251 bios see life bloom (hôra) 119–20 book ancient division xi ‘common books’ 30–1, 53–4 Callicles 17, 90–3 character 18–19, 56, 92–4, 124–6, 232–2; see also virtue of character childhood 96 choice see also activity, chosen for itself, kalon, to de dicto vs de re 126–7 motive 235 ‘package’ view of choice 92, 126–7, 178 community, political (koinônia) 230, 247–8 completeness see teleios contemplation see theôria desire 14, 17, 20, 124–7, 138–9, 223, 245 divine activity 183–4, 205–10, 212 benefit 224–7 element 165–7, 169, 171, 184–5, 187 human beings as 188–90 influence on happiness 7, 216–17, 224–7, 233 280 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Index More Information Index development, ethical 158–9; see also virtue, acquisition of doctor 115–16, 231, 254, 264–6 education 55–6, 229, 236–7; see also teaching general vs particular knowledge required 254–6 private 246–53 public 246–8, 252 Empedocles 188 energeia see activity endoxa see method enquiry, the goal of 27–8, 228–9; see also audience, Aristotle’s ergon 13–17, 101, 128–9, 142–4, 147–8, 166, 264 argument 13–15, 148, 164 human 13–15, 142–4, 148, 191–2 eudaimonia see happiness Eudoxus his argument from addition 68–71 his argument from opposites 65–8, 73–5 his argument from universal pursuit 61–4, 71–3, 142 his character 64–5 exactness see precision excellence see virtue experience 234–6, 240, 255, 260–7, 269 expert 254–6, 261–2, 264 father 243–4, 250–1, 253 finality see teleios fine see kalon flatterer 95–6 friend 95–6, 120 function see ergon © in this web service Cambridge University Press 281 genesis see pleasure, not a process of coming to be god(s) 205–9, 216, 224–7 see also divine good, the highest 4–7, 10–12, 16, 24–6, 27–8, 68–71, 150, 152–3, 158, 174–5, 193, 258; see also happiness goods as qualities 75–6 as something limited/ determinate 77–80 common 247, 258 conditional 69–70, 93 good for 17, 62–3, 72–3, 91–3 intrinsic / in themselves 11, 24–6, 68–70, 80–3, 152–3, 223 habituation 233–8, 240, 259 happiness 24–7 activity of happiness 152–3, 164, 182, 209 acquisition of 233 aggregative conception of 211–12 as translating eudaimonia 7–8 as what makes life happy 10, 70–1, 153, 209 complete/perfect/final (teleia) 148, 164–7, 181–3, 207–9 criteria for 10–11; see also self-sufficiency, teleios divine 7, 184–5, 197, 207–12 found in leisure see leisure extension of 210–13 in virtue of resemblance 212–13, 215, 231 level of determinateness of 175 outline of 7–17, 150–2 pleasures of 171–3 stability of 170 superlative 191–2, 209 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Index More Information 282 Index health 80, 90–2, 94, 115–16, 145, 250, 253–5 hedonism see also Eudoxus culture hedonism 154–5 normative 57, 62–4, 65–8 psychological 62–4, 65–6 ‘sober’ hedonism 64–5 sybaritic hedonism 155–9 Heraclitus 142 Herodotus 216 Homer 247 honour 9–10, 68, 152, 180, 200–1 household 239–40, 248, 258, 270 human beings as compound 184–5, 188, 198 human nature 14, 22, 55, 58, 65, 97, 142–4, 147–8, 166–7, 183–92, 194, 214, 234, 236, 250 human needs 181, 199–200, 202, 214; see also self-sufficiency human soul 14, 18–19, 161–2, 166, 185, 189–90, 197–8 illness 90–3, 145, 255 immortality 186–8, 244 inclusivism 11–12, 16, 24–7, 69, 203–4 intellectualism see monism intelligence see nous Isocrates 262 kalon, to (the fine) see also teleios chosen for its own sake 68, 113–14, 127, 153–4, 176, 178–9, 189, 210, 236–7, 258 love for 232, 235–6 orientation towards 236–7, 240–1 Kant 56, 93 kinêsis see Movement and Pleasure not a movement © in this web service Cambridge University Press law 237–46, 249–51, 257 law-giving 249–51, 254, 256–9 how to become expert at 259–70 learning 125–6, 144, 172, 232–6, 240–2, 259, 261–7 leisure 155–6, 163, 178–83, 188, 202, 204 life of frivolous pleasure 9–10, 152, 155, 161–4, 193, 201 of practical virtue 9–10, 161, 184–6, 192–202, 207, 213–14 of reflection 184–8, 193, 201, 216, 218–20, 221 political 9–10, 152, 201–2 translating zôê or bios 163, 193 limit 77–9 liturgy 203 locomotion 106–7 logos (word, talk, reason) 232–3, 241, 244 love 124–6, 172, 176–7, 189, 224–6, 235–6, 251 malista (most of all) 189–92, 207–8 many, the 58–60, 218–20, 223, 232–3, 240–2 measure, the good man as 144–9, 156–7, 160 medicine 242–3, 255, 264–6 method Aristotle’s method 2, 8–9, 60–1, 74–5, 89–90, 100, 150, 214, 268–9 genus et differentiae 100–2 match between word and deed 58–60, 64–5, 220–3 pragmatic considerations 57–9 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Index More Information Index monism 11–12, 16–18, 24–7, 70–1, 203–4 mortality 183, 186–8, 203, 207 movement completion of 103–4, 107–8 definition of 108 difference in form 106–7 divisible into subprocesses 105–6, 131–2 taking time 109–10 nature 63, 85–6, 146–7, 233, 244 see also human nature neutralism 76 nous (intelligence) 156, 165–9, 186–2, 198–9, 224–7, 243–5 now, the 109–10 nutrition 89, 146 outline (tupos) 24, 27, 150–2, 175, 228 pain 66–7, 73–5, 88–9, 237–8 perception as end in itself 113–14, 209 norms of 118, 145 perfection see teleios and Pleasure and completion/perfection Pericles 245, 261 philosopher 199, 200, 202–4, 215, 218–20, 225–6, 272 philosophy 2, 172–3, 199, 225, 227, 268, 272; see also theôria phronêsis 18–21, 153–4, 167–9, 185–7, 190, 195–8, 205, 213–15, 219–20, 230, 234–5, 263 piety 225 Plato extent of background knowledge required 2–3 © in this web service Cambridge University Press 283 on the role of the highest good 11, 69–71 Apology 225 Euthydemus 93 Euthyphro 225 Gorgias 90 Meno 233 Laws 227, 242–5 Phaedo 181 Philebus 69–71, 77–9, 81–3, 86–9, 99, 134, 140–1, 170, 189, 227 Protagoras 243, 245, 260–1 Republic 87, 97, 140–1, 157, 170, 177 Timaeus 188, 227 pleasure alien (allotrios) 135–8 and virtue 98, 235 and completion/perfection 22–3, 113–20, 128–30 and fit 120–4 as superadded end 118–20 bad pleasures 89–94 bodily pleasure 88–9, 155–7, 162–3, 232 conditions of 113–22 continuity of 122–4 desire for 124–6, 138 dim when too familiar 122–4 enjoyment 91–3, 121, 124–6, 136, 139 functional definition of 101–2 human 142–9 kinds of 93–6, 127–38 likened to seeing 102–3 metaphysics of 75–6, 80–3, 102–3 not a movement 83–4, 103–12, 131–2 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Index More Information 284 Index pleasure (cont.) not a process of coming to be 84–9, 111–12 object of 139–40 proper (oikeion) 130–8, 142–4, 191–2 proximity to activity 126–7, 139 pure 79, 89, 140–1, 148–9 response-(in)dependence of 146–7 source of 91–4, 98 subject of 84–8 translation 23–4 uniformity of 131–3 value of 57–8, 68–71, 75–6, 89–100, 136–40, 142 pluralism see inclusivism politician 6–7, 200–1, 229–31, 257–8, 260–1 politics goal of 180, 229, 257–8 political life 199–202; see also life of practical virtue political science 229, 264 practical wisdom see phronêsis praxis see virtuous action precision of activities 136 of exposition 150 of prescriptions 252 purity 79, 140–1, 148–9, 172–3 reason as human characteristic 14, 15–16; see also human nature as authoritative element 165–8, 184–5, 187–92, 241, 244 practical vs theoretical 19–21, 166, 168–9; see also theôria and phronêsis © in this web service Cambridge University Press reflection (theoretical) see theôria resources 200, 202–4, 213–20, 225–6 response–dependence 146–7 Sardanapallus 155 self-sufficiency 11, 153, 173–6, 214, 217 seriousness 159–62, 179, 182–3 sign 210 slave 162–3 Solon 216–18 sophia 20–1, 167–9, 172, 219; see also theôria sophist s 260–3 Speusippus 75 statesman see politician spoudaios see measure, good man as taste 90–1, 145 teaching 231–2, 234–5, 255–6, 259–61, 263 teleios 10–11, 28–9, 81, 113–14, 129, 152–3 Theognis 231–2 theoretical wisdom see sophia theôria 168–9, 170–1, 183, 202, 212–13 time 110, 211–12 Thales 219 tyrant 154–7, 163 virtue as measure 91 acquisition of 231–41, 254–6; see also habituation characteristically human 195–9 of character 18–19, 56, 195, 206–7, 233–5 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Index More Information Index of intellect 19–21 political dimension of 258, 270 proper virtue of intelligence 166 rest of 184–5, 193, 196–7 stability of 170 virtuous action see also kalon, to lack of leisure 179–81, 204 resources required for 200–2 self-sufficiency of 174–6 © in this web service Cambridge University Press 285 the internal and external goal(s) of 153–4, 176–8, 179–80, 219, 258 war 179–80, 182–3, 240 wealth 91–3, 200, 216, 218–19 wise, the 219 work see ergon young, the 55, 236–40, 242, 251 zôê see life www.cambridge.org 

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information Introduction 0. The Commentary That a reader benefits from a commentary on Aristotle’s dense writing should be obvious to anyone who has tried to read Aristotle. Precisely because there exist excellent commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics already (on which, see the Preface), why have a commentary on Book X? First, many readers rightly regard Book X as the pinnacle of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is here that he puts the coping-stone on the edifice so artfully constructed in EN I–IX. Other readers, by contrast, find Book X incongruent with the rest of the EN because it seems to propagate an amoral ideal, that of a thinker who flies high above the common run of people and is not subject to their human concerns. So Book X is controversial and will, for this reason, benefit from a fresh discussion.1 Second, none of the commentaries I have consulted are comprehensive in the sense that they aspire to comment on the whole of the text of Book X. Usually, they leave out the bits that seem too clear, too boring, or too obscure. While I also do not comment on every single word or line, I nevertheless try to be comprehensive, insofar as I divide the whole text into units of thought, and then go through every unit in the corresponding entry of the commentary. I call the entries by their traditional name, lemma (plural lemmata, from the Greek lêmma: assumption, premise, or argument). Dividing the text comprehensively into lemmata, however, yields more than mere comprehensiveness. It also allows the commentary to trace the flow of Aristotle’s thought, to emphasise the continuity of his arguments, and to show how the smaller units feed into the larger structure. So, the commentary tries not only to illuminate what Aristotle thinks in each lemma, but also how he thinks. 1 I use the traditional acronym ‘EN’ (which stems from the Latin Ethica Nicomachea) instead of the now common ‘NE’. 1 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information 2 Introduction But how do we find out what he thinks? What would help us to understand the point of each unit of thought? One influential line, adopted by many of the ancient commentators, is to explain ‘Aristotle through Aristotle’. That is, we adduce other passages from the same author to illuminate the passage over which we puzzle. However, whether, and to what extent, a commentary should rely on this time-tried hermeneutical principle depends on how we understand it. I have eschewed the version employed by many of the ancient commentators, because it seems to rest on shaky ground. In particular, I reject inferences of the type ‘Aristotle must mean … in this passage in the EN, because he says XYZ in the Physics.’ This approach seems to presuppose a more or less rigid system of thought in which one can simply use the building-blocks from one work to patch up apparent holes in another. But his thinking seems more flexible and interesting, as the many signs of reworking the material show (cf. §4). A more promising approach takes into account some flexibility in Aristotle’s thought, but nevertheless assumes that the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy remain intact throughout his works. This approach, too, suggests that he expected his readers to know his non-ethical treatises well enough to understand the points made in the EN – even if the transferred building-blocks may need to be cut to size to make them fit. If his ethical philosophy is built in part on non-ethical foundations, it would be the task of the commentary to guide the reader to the relevant passages in the non-ethical works. But there is also an alternative that rejects the common assumption of the first two approaches, namely that the EN rests on principles that are justified in works other than those concerning ethics. This more circumspect approach derives some support from the methodological claim in EN I.3 that an ethical enquiry has its own kind of precision, differing from mathematics and, though not stated here, from first philosophy (what we would call ‘metaphysics’) and natural science. Indeed, in the same chapter, Aristotle makes demands on the character and age of a suitable audience, but he does not seem to require previous knowledge of Aristotelian logic, natural philosophy, or metaphysics. This might indicate that he takes the latter qualification to be irrelevant to the successful study of ethics.2 The goal of this commentary is to bring Aristotle alive as a thinker. To this end, each lemma raises and discusses what seem to me philosophically the most pertinent questions. Usually this requires having an eye on what went 2 Scholars differ over the three hermeneutical approaches. For the latest examples of approaches one and two, see the introduction in Henry and Nielsen 2015. For a trenchant critique, and a staunch defence of the separability of ethics, see Polansky 2017. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information The Commentary 3 on before, both in the immediate context, but also in the larger argument of the EN. So, I whole-heartedly endorse ‘Aristotle through Aristotle’ as long as the scope is confined to the EN. Of course, where relevant (and perhaps necessary), I also refer the reader to Aristotle’s other works – but primarily by way of background illustration. While most lemmata are self-contained, in the sense that they do not rely on other texts to be intelligible, a number of lemmata come properly to life only when read in the light of the Platonic subtext. But does Plato really play this important role, given that the EN contains less than a handful of direct references to Plato? And if he did play that kind of role, why does Aristotle not say that his students must know Plato’s philosophical writings? One way of answering the question is to assume that Plato’s dialogues are aimed at a wider audience, and that one might expect that a student wanting to study with Aristotle should be sufficiently interested in philosophy to know at least the most important dialogues of Plato.3 But perhaps one can modify the answer to dispense with the questionable assumption that dialogues such as the Philebus and the Laws were widely known, and do so in two ways. Very few of the lemmata are self-contained in the sense that they could be understood by just anyone. So, i), some training in, or experience with, philosophical thinking is clearly required. This training may suffice to ‘get’ the argument on the page. But Aristotle may also expect a specific type of philosophical training, ii), training that partly consists of familiarity with Plato’s dialogues. Probably, like Plato, Aristotle wrote the EN for a ‘mixed audience’, one having some background in i) or ii). Those who discern the Platonic subtext will philosophically get more out of the text, but those who do not may still reach the goal of the EN (on which §3.3). So, to make reading EN X as rewarding as possible, the commentary provides the Platonic background where it is especially fruitful for understanding the philosophical point at issue. Upshot. The commentary focuses on the philosophical issues that arise in the course of working through the text. Leaving aside philological niceties, the commentary will often explore several possible ways of reading the text to enable the reader to make up her own mind about the best interpretation of a given passage. It concentrates on conceptual questions, individual arguments, and clusters thereof, and their contribution to the overall arch of the argument in EN X. But the enquiry does not take place 3 Robb 1994, 233 suggests that ‘some of Plato’s dialogues were read aloud with success to sophisticated groups of Athenians’. Cf. Harris 1989, 86 who notes that the works of Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and Isocrates were published in Athens, at least partially, by being read out loud. So, one could pick up some philosophy outside the specialised schools. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information 4 Introduction in a vacuum, conceptual or historical. To bring out the best in Aristotle’s arguments, the commentary places Aristotle’s thought in a wider framework. The philosophical framework of the EN on which the commentary relies is sketched in the introduction. The relevant background in Plato’s philosophy is given in the commentary. 1. The Guiding Principle of the Nicomachean Ethics The Nicomachean Ethics (EN) is a well-organised work on ethics. It begins, in Book I, with the fairly indeterminate notion of ‘the highest good’, which it subsequently spells out as happiness. How the highest good structures the whole treatise becomes clear from a postcard-sketch of the EN’s content. In an effort to spell out the highest good as happiness, Aristotle identifies living in accordance with excellence or virtue (aretê) as the key to a happy life. The concept of virtue dominates the subsequent discussion. Book II provides a general, almost abstract, treatment of virtue, while Books III and VII contain perceptive treatises on the conditions for acting virtuously. The individual virtues are discussed in Books III–VI; Books VIII–IX deal with the social aspect of virtue. Book X returns more explicitly to happiness as the highest good. A) The discussion of pleasure (X.1–5) is geared towards connecting pleasure with the happy life, i.e. a life in accordance with virtue. B) The study of three prominent kinds of lives in X.6–8 seeks to determine, finally, the virtue in accordance with which we should live in order to live a completely or perfectly happy life. C) The end of the EN (X.9) examines how we ourselves and others may acquire virtue. Since happiness as the highest good structures not only the whole EN, but also Book X in particular, I shall discuss both the highest good and happiness in some detail (§§1.1–5) before turning to a briefer sketch of virtue (§§2.1–2) and an outline of EN X (§§3.1–3). . The Highest Good The Nicomachean Ethics centres on the notion of the highest good. More specifically, it deals with the highest practicable good, the highest human good, or simply the human good. Goodness, Aristotle maintains, plays a crucial role in all directed human endeavours, as the beginning of the EN illustrates: ‘every craft and every enquiry, and similarly every action and planned undertaking seems to aim at some good’ (1094a1–2). © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information The Guiding Principle of the Nicomachean Ethics 5 Of course, the goods attained through the various undertakings and even the notion of goodness at play in different domains will differ. Nevertheless, all pursuits and their goods are organised into hierarchies. To take Aristotle’s example, bridle-making and other crafts that produce gear for horsemanship do so for the sake of horsemanship. In turn, horsemanship and other pursuits belonging to war are subordinate to generalship. Although both bridle-making and horsemanship are subordinate to generalship, they relate to it in different ways. We can see this by considering how they relate to the goal of generalship, i.e. winning the battle. While bridle-making is purely instrumental in attaining the goal, excellent horsemanship can be more than an instrument. The latter can be part of winning the battle in the sense that excellent horsemanship can constitute (wholly or partially) winning the battle (I.1.1094a9–14). Although the cavalry is employed for the sake of winning the battle, they will not be mere instruments. The example seeks to illustrate the general relationship between subordinate and superordinate pursuits: ‘in all pursuits, the ends of all the ruling pursuits are more choice-worthy than the ends under them, because it is for the sake of the former that the latter too are pursued’ (1094a14–16). The superordinate pursuit rules or controls the subordinate in either of two ways.4 It can a) prescribe the norms internal to the pursuit. For instance, the practice of riding will determine what counts as a good bridle – which would seem appropriate, given the bridle’s role as an instrument that facilitates riding. Alternatively, b), the superordinate pursuit can externally regulate the subordinate pursuit. A general need not tell the cavalry how to ride well. That is, the general does not pronounce on the norms internal to horsemanship. Rather, the general decides on how many riders comprise a unit, where to employ them, and when to send them into battle. In this case, the externally regulated pursuit has its own notion of excellence, whereas the internally regulated one does not. As the former has a goal worth pursuing for its own sake (from this pursuit’s perspective), it occupies a higher place in the hierarchy of ends. Introducing planned pursuits as nested hierarchies raises the question of what makes for a complete hierarchy of goals and pursuits. Aristotle argues that there must be end-points that complete the hierarchical structure. In the absence of suitable end-points, we would have to admit to unending hierarchies: 4 Lear 2004, 17–19 distinguishes the two ways of subordination well. See Meyer 2011 for further illuminating discussion. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information Introduction 6 If, then, there is some end in our practical pursuits for which we wish for its own sake, and we wish for the others because of it, and we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for in this way, it will go on to infinity, making our desire empty and vain), it is clear that this is the good, i.e. the best good. (a–) The goal that ends the regress is the good because the good subordinates all other goals. Aristotle takes care to posit a single good that subsumes all other goods. While ‘the good’ may plausibly refer to the good of a certain domain, the best good towers over and controls all other goods. The proposal has wide-ranging consequences for Aristotle’s thinking about goods. Of course, it does not follow from the observation that all planned pursuits aim at some good (1094a1–2) that every good is (to be) aimed at by some pursuit. There may be goods that cannot be attained through action. But, as the beginning of the EN makes clear, Aristotle focuses entirely on practicable goods. And here it is plausible to maintain that any practical good is the good of a practical domain that can be mastered by some kind of practical knowledge. So, corresponding to the hierarchies of goals, Aristotle posits a hierarchy of (kinds of ) practical knowledge that govern the practical spheres. If so, the highest good will be the goal of the highest and most controlling kind of practical knowledge. He plausibly identifies the most controlling with the most authoritative practical knowledge. He uses examples to cast political expertise (politikê) in this role. Political expertise governs directly or indirectly all aspects of life in a city-state (polis): which crafts are needed, how many craftsmen for each, when to wage war; it also legislates what one should and should not do. So, the best practical good will be the goal of political expertise (1094a29–b6). To identify the most controlling knowledge with political expertise raises the question of the EN’s audience. Does Aristotle merely address aspiring politicians? Or does he cast his net more widely? The answer, as so often, is a qualified ‘both’. The EN addresses those who seem to lack knowledge of the highest good. Since this knowledge belongs to political expertise, and since the Nicomachean Ethics seeks the highest good, it will itself in a way be political (politikê tis, 1094b11). However, Aristotle does not seem to address only would-be statesmen.5 Achieving and preserving the highest good for the city-state is greater, more complete, finer, and more divine than doing the same for an individual. However, the latter 5 Pace Bodéüs 1993. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information The Guiding Principle of the Nicomachean Ethics 7 should also be welcomed, because the goal is the same in both cases: the human good (1094b7–11). While he ranks the political expertise successfully exercised by the politician higher than the equivalent on the private level, Aristotle nevertheless seems to acknowledge the private equivalent of political expertise – without seeing the need to find a new name for it. Indeed, he spells out much later in the EN the sameness between political expertise and the expertise required to run a private life well (VI.8). For now, however, the important point is that we as private individuals can acquire a kind of knowledge, discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics, which aims at the highest good. This knowledge will have a great impact on our lives because, just as every pursuit in the city is subordinate to the highest good, so is every pursuit for a private individual. . Happiness Having identified political expertise as the knowledge of the highest practical good, Aristotle seeks to identify its goal more precisely: ‘in name, it is agreed pretty much by the majority, for both the many and the distinguished call it “happiness” (eudaimonia), and they take living well and doing well to be the same as being happy’ (I.4.1095a17–20). The passage raises two important issues, one about happiness, the other about method. First, ‘happiness’ does not translate the Greek term eudaimonia perfectly. But it is preferable to ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being’, or to leaving it untranslated. All of the translations fail to convey the connection to the divine, clearly present in eudaimonia. The word is after all the abstract composite of two words, eu and daimôn. The former is the adverb for ‘good’; the latter means ‘god’ or ‘deity’, or, more barbarically, ‘higher-than-human-being’. Aristotle cites the tragic playwright Euripides (ca 485–407/6 bc) to connect the two: a person is happy ‘when the god gives well’ (hotan ho daimôn eu didô(i), IX.9.1169b7–8). While Aristotle and his contemporaries did not necessarily take the god to mete out happiness – this would have to be investigated (cf. I.9.1099b11–13) – the quote from Euripides indicates two points: a) a connection between the divine and human happiness, however ossified, and b) the absence of determinate content of happiness conceived abstractly. Our concept of happiness, I think, captures the second aspect better than does ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being’. Like its Greek counterpart, ‘happiness’ does not have a fixed referent, nor a fixed range of applications. Ordinary people, Aristotle reports, equate eudaimonia with pleasure, wealth, or honour. Some do not even settle for a single goal, but adopt © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information 8 Introduction a different goal depending on their circumstances. For instance, to those who are ill, health might seem to be happiness. By contrast, philosophers such as Plato distinguish between these ordinary goods and the highest good existing by itself, making the latter the cause of the former (1095a20– 8). While we rarely speak about happiness abstractly outside of academic contexts, we do speak a lot about being or feeling happy. Although ‘being happy’ does not mean ‘being in an elated mood’ or ‘feeling pleasure’, this common usage fits the conception of happiness employed by the many. For them, being pleased amounts to being happy, because they take happiness to be pleasure. However, eudaimonia can also be understood as pointing to a more stable or enduring condition (than fleeting happiness). And while being happy may be conceived of as momentary, living well and doing well appear to be more enduring conditions – as if being eudaimôn is something more stable than an elated feeling. ‘Flourishing’ in particular seems more apt for catering for this aspect of the concept of eudaimonia, because doing well and living well can plausibly be understood in terms of prosperity – which we can readily capture as flourishing.6 But ‘happiness’ and its cognates can also indicate a stable state. Think of the formulaic endings of fairy-tales. ‘They lived happily ever after’, usually because they have surmounted some obstacle, have found each other, have been rewarded with, say, half a kingdom, and are generally happy. ‘Living happily’ conveys the stability that being eudaimôn can connote, but it stresses the psychological dimension more than ‘flourishing’ does, for the Prince and the Princess naturally also feel happy when they prosper. So, our concept of happiness mirrors the versatility of the concept of eudaimonia with which Aristotle begins his enquiry. Why should we not choose our translation of eudaimonia merely for its capacity to capture Aristotle’s conception of it?7 We can answer the question by attending to the second point that the passage from I.4 (quoted above) raises. It begins by noting how the word eudaimonia is used, and what people think about it. The case of happiness illustrates how Aristotle often operates in the EN. He raises a difficult question, notes either what people of repute and the many say about it (where relevant), and then examines more thoroughly where the existing opinions go right and wrong. He is not usually content with pointing out the mistakes of previous thinkers. In addition, he tries to diagnose what was (or is) attractive about the view, 6 7 Indeed, this was a widespread use of the term: see Herodotus, Histories, V.28; cf. VII.220. Most scholars focus on Aristotle’s own conception of eudaimonia and assess its affinity to our conceptions. See especially Kraut 1979. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information The Guiding Principle of the Nicomachean Ethics 9 and often he acknowledges that the other thinkers got something right. It would otherwise be a mystery why he would engage with his predecessors at all. So, by dwelling on the views of others, and distilling what truth they contain, he can develop his own view while keeping an eye on the desiderata the examination of others has revealed. This technique seems sensible for anyone who tries to answer difficult philosophical questions – and philosophers still employ it today. But many scholars see an ‘endoxic method’ in Aristotle’s approach, articulated at EN VII.1.1145b2–7, which serves to justify ethical propositions.8 However, the passage in Book VII seems tailored to its specific context and should not be generalised.9 And examining how he in fact proceeds in the EN outside of the Book VII passage casts further doubt on the assumption that a set endoxic method is used throughout the EN.10 In any case, it is clear that Aristotle sees himself in a tradition of theorising about eudaimonia. Even when he corrects the mistakes of others and advances his own substantial account, he nevertheless takes himself to be talking about the same thing, eudaimonia. Therefore, the translation should be sufficiently wide to accommodate the various accounts, even if only Aristotle’s is the correct one. He begins to think properly about the highest good as happiness by discussing, briefly, three prominent contenders for happy lives in EN I.5: i) the life of consumption (apolaustikos), ii) the political life (politikos), and iii) the reflective life (theôrêtikos). He does so because one’s conception of happiness (articulated or not) does influence how one lives – after all, it is the overarching goal of all one’s pursuits. The first two lives are plausible candidates because of their wide support. The life of pleasure is compelling because living happily requires pleasure and thus goes hand in hand with living a pleasant life (VII.11.1152b6–7). The political life becomes a serious contender if we do not understand it merely as living the life of a citizen in a Greek city-state, but as a more elevated kind of life. Indeed, Aristotle posits honour as the highest good pursued by people living this kind of life (timê, 1095b22–3). This goal suggests that the political activity in question should go beyond the ordinary political participation in the assembly or in the jury. Since so many citizens engage in an ordinary way in politics, no one will be especially honoured or deemed especially happy for doing only that. Citizens merit honour only in high office, and it is no accident that offices which involve ruling others (archai, e.g. like 8 9 10 For a clear statement and defence of this view, see Kraut 2006. Cooper 2009. See Frede 2012 for a nice corrective to this assumption. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Excerpt More Information 10 Introduction those of military leaders) were also called ‘honours’ (timai, e.g. Politics, II.8.1268a21; III.5.1278a20; III.10.1281a31). The happy political life envisaged in I.5 will, therefore, be a life of political distinction, not merely one of political participation.11 Both lives home in on important values, but they assign to them a role too important. By judging the life of pleasure as fit only for cattle, Aristotle intimates that pleasure is not a suitable goal for political expertise, the knowledge that enables us to strive at the human good (I.5.1095b19–20). By contrast, honour seems all too human, because it requires other people to honour us (I.5.1095b23–6). It is really what people are honoured for, their virtue, that people want. So, neither of the accounts posits a good suitable as the object of a branch of knowledge,12 nor does either one capture the elevated status of the highest good as something divine. Both pleasure and honour should be concomitants of happiness, but fail to capture its essential character. As it turns out, the discussion of lives only provides a preliminary assessment – evident not least by the choice not to discuss the philosophical life in Book I. Book X fittingly contains the final discussion of potentially happy lives. Having re-examined the life of frivolous pleasure in X.6, Aristotle assesses the happiness of the life in accordance with theoretical wisdom vis-à-vis a thoroughly practical life. Although these lives do not come with the labels ‘political’ and ‘philosophical’, they seem to correspond to the lives sketched in I.5, as a close reading of the relevant text (provided in the commentary) suggests. . Happiness as the Highest Good Having discussed what people say about happiness in I.4–6, Aristotle turns in I.7 to establishing happiness as the highest human good on less dialectical grounds. In particular, he stresses two criteria for the highest good. i) The highest good must be teleios. The Greek word forms the adjective of the more familiar telos, which we can render as ‘goal’ or ‘end’. The adjective conveys ‘endyness’ (or, better, ‘finality’), but also ‘perfection’ and ‘completeness’. We can use teleios to rank goods in a hierarchy. A higher good will be more teleios (complete/perfect/final) than a subordinate good. The highest good, naturally, will be most so, or, as Aristotle puts it, it will be teleios ‘without qualification’, because it is not subordinate to anything 11 12 Happiness based on political engagement stems from a sustained and successful effort to shape the city-state’s fortunes. Although the offices often lasted only for a year at a time, those who excelled nevertheless managed to be re-elected and to shape the state through their political activity. Establishing this conclusion is an important task of Plato’s Gorgias. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org 

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Table of Contents More Information Contents Preface xi Introduction Translation 1 32 Commentary: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book X I Pleasure (X.–) X.1 Introduction to the Topic of Pleasure How Pleasure Relates to Life (1172a19–26) Controversy about the Value of Pleasure (1172a26–33) Truth Should Be the Goal of Our Enquiry (1172b3–8) X.2–3 Examining What Has Been Said about Pleasure Pleasure Is the Good: Eudoxus’ Hedonism The Argument from Universal Pursuit (1172b9–15) Eudoxus’ Character Supports His Views (1172b15–18) The Argument from Opposites (1172b18–23) The Argument from Addition Tells against Hedonism (1172b23–35) Pleasure Is Not Good: Academic Arguments against Pleasure The Argument from Universal Pursuit Revisited (1172b35–1173a5) The Argument from Opposites Revisited (1173a5–13) Refuting the Argument That Goods Must Be Qualities (1173a13–15) Refuting the Argument That Goods Must Be Determinate (1173a15–28) Refuting the Argument That Pleasure As Movement Is Incomplete and Therefore Not a Good (1173a28–31) Quick/Slow Applies to Movements, But Not to Pleasure (1173a31–b4) 53 53 53 57 59 61 61 64 65 68 71 73 75 77 80 83 v © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Table of Contents More Information vi Contents What Is the Subject of Pleasure and Pain? (1173b4–13) The Pleasures of Eating Are the Wrong Paradigm (1173b13–20) 84 88 Not All Pleasure Is Good: General Arguments against Pleasure Deflecting the Argument from Bad Pleasures (1173b20–31) The Pleasures of Flattery Are Not Good (1173b31–1174a1) Some Pleasures Are Not Choice-Worthy (1174a1–4) Some Things Are More Important Than Pleasure (1174a4–8) Upshot: Some Pleasures Are Good, and Some Are Not (1174a8–12) X.4–5 Aristotle’s Account of Pleasure Pleasure Is Something Complete and Whole Pleasure Is Like Seeing (1174a14–19) Pleasure Is Not a Movement (1174a19–b9) There Is Not Even a Coming to Be of Pleasure (1174b9–14) Pleasure Completes/Perfects the Activity The Most Complete/Perfect Activity of the Senses Is Most Pleasant (1174b14–31) Pleasure As the Bloom on Those in Their Prime (1174b31–3) The Conditions under Which Pleasure Arises (1174b33–1175a3) Corollaries Reasonable Questions about Pleasure Answered 89 95 96 98 99 100 102 103 111 113 118 120 Why Do We Not Take Pleasure Continuously? (1175a3–10) Why Does Everyone Desire Pleasure? (1175a10–21) 122 124 There Are Different Kinds of Pleasure Pleasures Differ in Kind Because They Complete/Perfect Activities Different in Kind (1175a21–8) A Kind of Pleasure Increases the Kind of Activity to Which It Belongs Properly (1175a29–1175b1) A Kind of Pleasure Impedes Any Kind of Activity to Which It Does Not Belong Properly (1175b1–13) The Pleasure Proper to One Activity Acts on Another Activity to Which It Does Not Belong Like the Pain Proper to That Activity (1175b13–24) 127 130 132 135 Pleasures Differ in Value Pleasure Mirrors the Value of the Activity to Which It Belongs (1175b24–36) Pleasures Differ in Purity (1175b36–1176a3) © in this web service Cambridge University Press 138 140 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Table of Contents More Information Contents vii Different Kinds of Pleasure Belong Properly to Different Kinds of Animal Non-Human Kinds of Animal Show Uniformity in the Pleasures Pursued (1176a3–12) Despite the Variety among Human Pleasures, There Is a Pleasure That Is Characteristic of Human Beings (1176a12–29) 142 144 II Happy Lives (X.–) X.6 The Life of Pleasure Revisited Pleasure as a Candidate for Happiness The Hallmarks of Happiness (1176a33–b6) Pleasure Is Chosen for Its Own Sake (1176b6–16) Against the Life of Pleasant Amusements Those Who Live the Life of Pleasure Do Not Know about Happiness (1176b16–27) Pleasure Is Subordinate to Serious Pursuits (1176b27–1177a1) Pleasant Amusements Do Not Require Our Best Elements (1177a1–6) Anyone, Even a Slave, Could Live Happily (1177a6–11) X.7–8 The Theoretical and the Practical Life Complete/Perfect/Final Happiness Stems from the Excellent Activity of Our Best Element (1177a12–17) Complete/Perfect/Final Happiness Is Theoretical Reflection Because It Is:  150 152 153 155 157 160 162 164 164 Our Best Activity (1177a17–21) Most Continuous (1177a21–3) Most Pleasant (1177a23–7) Most Self-Sufficient (1177a27–b1) Loved for Its Own Sake (1177b1–4) Found in Leisure (Unlike the Activities of Practical Virtue) (1177b4–15) Summary of the Preceding Arguments in Favour of Reflection (1177b16–26) The Happy Life Must Be Humanly Achievable Our Divine Element Enables Us to Lead the Theoretical Life (1177b26–31) One Should Live in Accordance with the Divine Element Because Each Person Most of All Is This Element (1177b31–1178a8) © in this web service Cambridge University Press 167 169 171 173 176 178 181 184 186 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Table of Contents More Information viii Contents The Life in Accordance with the Practical Virtues Is Human and Affords Human Happiness (1178a9–23) The Practical vs the Theoretical Life Theoretical Reflection Needs Fewer Resources than Virtuous Practical Action (1178a23–b7) The Gods’ Happiness Does Not Stem from Virtuous Practical Action, but from Theoretical Reflection (1178b7–23) A Sign: We Attribute Happiness As Far As Reflection Extends (1178b24–32) Living Happily Does Not Require Many Resources Doing What One Should Can Be Done with Moderate Resources (1178b33–1179a9) The Views of the Wise (Solon and Anaxagoras) Confirm This (1179a9–17) Lives and Deeds Must Agree (1179a17–22) The Theoretically Wise Person Is Dearest to the Gods (1179a22–32) III Becoming Good (X.) X.9 The End of the EN The Goal of the EN Is Practical, Not Merely Theoretical: We Become Good by Using Virtue (1179a33–b4) How Do We Become Good? Presuppositions Words Alone Do Not Make People Good (1179b4–20) Good Character Must Exist Beforehand (1179b20–31) 192 199 205 210 213 215 220 224  228 228 231 233 In Favour of Law-Based Education Law Helps Educate the Young towards Virtue (1179b31–1180a1) Laws Should Also Govern the Behaviour of Grown-Ups (1180a1–14) Summary: Reasons for a Law-Based Education (1180a14–24) Private Individuals Must Become Proficient in Law-Giving Because Most Cities Do Not Provide for It (1180a24–b7) The Benefits of Individualised, Law-Based Education (1180b7–13) How to Become Proficient in Law-Giving (1180b13–23) © in this web service Cambridge University Press 236 239 243 246 251 253 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10440-2 — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X Edited and translated by Joachim Aufderheide Table of Contents More Information Contents Conclusion: An Educator Should Become Proficient in Law-Giving (1180b23–8) Politicians Cannot Teach It (1180b28–1181a9) Sophists Cannot Teach It (1181a9–23) Learning from Texts Is Not Ideal (1181a23–b12) Studying a Collection of Laws and Political Theory in General Is the Best Feasible Option (1181b12–24) Epilogue List of References Index © in this web service Cambridge University Press ix 256 259 261 264 267 271 273 280 www.cambridge.org