Papers by Tristan J Rogers
Philosophers since John Stuart Mill have long dismissed conservatism for its attachment to tradit... more Philosophers since John Stuart Mill have long dismissed conservatism for its attachment to tradition and neglect of reason. Meanwhile, conservatives since Edmund Burke have been suspicious of philosophical reasoning for its tendency to destroy tradition. Breaching this divide, philosophical conservatism seeks to conserve and promote the good expressed in tradition, understood as the constituents of human happiness and political arrangements that have proven conducive to human happiness. Far from a license to destroy tradition, however, the epistemic and moral limits of human nature constrain our promotion of the good. Neither must we abandon reason in deference to the status quo. Rather, by reasoning through the moral ideals of existing traditions, philosophical conservatism best promotes the human good.
Reason Papers, 2023
A formidable challenge to neo-Aristotelian political philosophy is to account for modern politica... more A formidable challenge to neo-Aristotelian political philosophy is to account for modern political innovations such as individual rights. In his landmark study, Fred Miller Jr. performs this considerable service by uncovering the concept of rights in Aristotle’s Politics. Rights, for Aristotle, are not moral claims attaching to human beings as such, e.g., in a state of nature; rather, rights attach to human beings as members of political communities that secure natural justice; these are rights based on nature, not in nature. Aristotle’s conception of natural rights marks a sharp break with the liberal Enlightenment thought opposed by Edmund Burke. It is no surprise, then, that commentators have questioned whether Burke too lacks the concept of rights. In fact, Burke believes in natural rights in a similar sense to the one Miller Jr. attributes to Aristotle. Like Aristotle, Burke rejects the state of nature model, and instead maintains that we can discern natural rights in human nature, where the conventions of society ultimately interpret and implement such rights. But unlike Miller Jr., who sees the potential for a liberal neo-Aristotelianism grounded in the importance of freedom (or autonomy) for the good life, Burke takes the natural law tradition in a conservative direction. This is so, first, because Burke emphasizes the need for restraints alongside freedom, and, second, because he insists that natural rights must be mediated by the existing institutions of society, not set up ab initio. Consequently, the conservative Burke continues the earlier natural rights tradition begun by Aristotle, which modern liberalism—to its great detriment—rejects.
Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2023
Law and justice are near synonyms in common speech. We expect the law to deliver justice, and we ... more Law and justice are near synonyms in common speech. We expect the law to deliver justice, and we cannot imagine justice existing without some system of law. In Justice before the Law (2021), Michael Huemer challenges this view of law and justice, arguing that we ought to affirm the primacy of justice over the law. This paper argues that Huemer errs in his understanding of what justice is, and the means through which it is best achieved. Since what justice requires is almost always uncertain to those who come before the law, the legal system must rely on procedures that assign roles to agents, the proper performance of which may sometimes appear to conflict with what some regard as the just outcome. But this is not a license to raise individual moral judgment above the law. For justice, properly understood, requires law. True justice must be justice under law.
Symposion, 2022
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in Stoic ethics among the general public. Bu... more Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in Stoic ethics among the general public. But Stoic approaches to politics are comparatively rare. What might a Stoic approach to politics look like? David Goodhart aptly describes the political divide pervading Western societies in terms of the "somewheres," who are communitarian, rooted in particular places, and resistant to social and political change, versus the "anywheres," who are cosmopolitan, mobile, and enthusiastic embracers of change. Stoicism recognizes a similar distinction. "My city and state are Rome," Marcus Aurelius writes, "But as a human being? The world." This paper defends a conservative interpretation of Stoic politics. According to 'Stoic conservatism,' cosmopolitanism is an ethical ideal through which we perform the obligations assigned by our communitarian role(s) in society. The view is 'conservative' in the sense that there is an assumption in favor of existing institutions as the starting point for virtue, instead of reasoning a priori about what virtue requires. Stoic politics consists neither in the cosmopolitan transcendence of particular attachments, nor in passive acceptance of the communitarian status quo, but in ethical improvement toward virtue within the political structure of society.
Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020
Political philosophy was once dominated by discussion of the virtues of character and their impor... more Political philosophy was once dominated by discussion of the virtues of character and their importance to the good life and the good society. Contemporary political philosophers, however, following the towering influence of John Rawls, have primarily focused on a single virtue of institutions: justice, while mostly avoiding discussions of the good life. As a result, political philosophy lacks a unified account of the virtues of institutions and the virtues of character. More importantly, we lack an understanding of the connection between the just society and the good life. This article begins to mend this broken seam. The central argument is that the virtues of character require institutions, while good institutions enable persons to live together virtuously. Institutions are a necessary precondition for the moral agency required by the virtues. But good institutions enable virtue to grow, while helping to constrain the moral excesses of vice. On this view, justice emerges primarily as a virtue of character, not institutions. The just person balances conformity to existing institutional norms with practically wise reforms that serve the common good. The just society and the good life are linked through the common good of virtuous activity within the shared institutions of a political community.
Journal of Social Philosophy
It is often observed that the resurgence of virtue ethics in the latter half of the 20th century ... more It is often observed that the resurgence of virtue ethics in the latter half of the 20th century reintroduced formerly neglected insights into moral philosophy. But despite a few tentative attempts, those insights have not yet arrived on the scene of political philosophy. Most glaringly, there has been little engagement by virtue ethicists on the fundamental question of political philosophy, which is whether political states have a right to coerce citizens and whether citizens have a corresponding moral obligation to obey the law: the problem of political authority. This paper formulates a virtue ethics account of political authority. While there are many versions of virtue ethics, I follow the ancient eudaimonist tradition in holding that ethics is fundamentally about leading a good life (eudaimonia), and that the purpose of politics, in some sense, is to make such a life possible. More specifically, I argue that political authority is a necessary precondition for the kind of moral agency virtue requires. The development and exercise of virtue requires an institutional context partially defined by political authority. There is no tension, I will argue, between political authority and the demands of virtue because the former is a prerequisite for the latter.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2018
What is the relationship between justice as an individual virtue and justice as an institutional ... more What is the relationship between justice as an individual virtue and justice as an institutional virtue? The latter has been exhaustively explored by political philosophers, whereas the former remains underexplored in the literature on virtue ethics. This article defends the view that individual justice is logically prior to institutional justice, and argues that this view requires a conception of individual justice I call ‘justice as lawfulness’. The resulting view consists of three claims. First, just institutions are composed of the relations between just persons. Second, the just person has a disposition to act in accordance with the legal and social norms (collectively, the nomoi) of the existing political tradition. Third, departures from the nomoi require that the just person act with practical wisdom to reform the nomoi according to an implicit standard of justice in the political tradition.
Books by Tristan J Rogers
Conservatism is many things to many people. Historically, it is a set of loosely connected ideas,... more Conservatism is many things to many people. Historically, it is a set of loosely connected ideas, usually dated to the reaction against the French Revolution. Philosophically, many have doubted whether any of this amounts to a coherent political theory. Instead, conservatism has been characterized as a kind of disposition or instinct in favor of the status quo. Presently, conservatism is associated with those who oppose the political left. But what is conservatism? Is it a coherent philosophy? What are conservatives for? And how is today’s conservatism related to its past?
In Conservatism, Past and Present: A Philosophical Introduction, Tristan J. Rogers argues that philosophical conservatism is a coherent set of historically rooted ideas about conserving and promoting the human good. Part I, “Conservatism Past,” presents a history of conservative ideas, exploring themes of the search for wisdom, the limits of philosophy, reform in preference to revolution, the relationship between authority and freedom, and the tradition of liberty. Major figures include Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Edmund Burke, G.W.F. Hegel, and Roger Scruton. Part II, “Conservatism Present,” applies philosophical conservatism to contemporary conservative politics, focusing on issues such as nationalism, populism, the family, education, and personal responsibility.
Routledge, 2020
Political philosophy was once dominated by discussion of the virtues of character and their impor... more Political philosophy was once dominated by discussion of the virtues of character and their importance to the good life and the good society. Contemporary political philosophers, however, following the towering influence of John Rawls, have primarily focused on a single virtue of institutions: justice, while largely avoiding controversial claims about the good life. As a result, political philosophy lacks a unified account of the virtues of institutions and the virtues of character. More importantly, we lack an understanding of the connection between the just society and the good life.
The Authority of Virtue begins to mend this broken seam, which, on reflection, lies at the heart of our deepest political problems. The book’s central argument is that the virtues of character require institutions, while good institutions enable persons to live together virtuously. Political institutions are a necessary precondition for the moral agency exhibited by the virtues. But good institutions enable virtue to grow, while helping to constrain the excesses of vice. Justice emerges primarily as a virtue of character, not institutions. The just person balances conformity to existing institutional norms with practically wise reforms. Ultimately, then, the just society and the good life are linked through the common good of virtuous activity within the shared institutions of a political community.
Drafts by Tristan J Rogers
The Virtues: Civility, 2022
It is now routine to decry the lack of civility recently witnessed in the tumultuous politics of ... more It is now routine to decry the lack of civility recently witnessed in the tumultuous politics of liberal democracies. One imagines, if only citizens would treat each other civilly, we could work out our differences amicably and restore the health of political society. But what if the depth of these differences themselves are the cause of our present discontent? For, our underlying value differences seem to reliably produce ill-will, tribal instincts, and a corresponding willingness to violate basic civility norms. To counter these symptoms, fellow citizens must view each other as bound together in a civic friendship. While often conceived as an ideal of mutual respect based on shared values, properly understood, civic friendship is simply the daily resolution to live together within the bounds of a shared constitution and territory. Thus, in a liberal democracy, civic friendship is defined by a commitment to equality and liberty under the law of the land. Without this commitment, mounting incivility must eventually degenerate into outright hostility and violence. But if we can reawaken to the importance of civic friendship fellow citizens may reunite and be civil in their disagreements, yet resolute in their overarching commitment to the civitas as the source of their friendship.
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Papers by Tristan J Rogers
Books by Tristan J Rogers
In Conservatism, Past and Present: A Philosophical Introduction, Tristan J. Rogers argues that philosophical conservatism is a coherent set of historically rooted ideas about conserving and promoting the human good. Part I, “Conservatism Past,” presents a history of conservative ideas, exploring themes of the search for wisdom, the limits of philosophy, reform in preference to revolution, the relationship between authority and freedom, and the tradition of liberty. Major figures include Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Edmund Burke, G.W.F. Hegel, and Roger Scruton. Part II, “Conservatism Present,” applies philosophical conservatism to contemporary conservative politics, focusing on issues such as nationalism, populism, the family, education, and personal responsibility.
The Authority of Virtue begins to mend this broken seam, which, on reflection, lies at the heart of our deepest political problems. The book’s central argument is that the virtues of character require institutions, while good institutions enable persons to live together virtuously. Political institutions are a necessary precondition for the moral agency exhibited by the virtues. But good institutions enable virtue to grow, while helping to constrain the excesses of vice. Justice emerges primarily as a virtue of character, not institutions. The just person balances conformity to existing institutional norms with practically wise reforms. Ultimately, then, the just society and the good life are linked through the common good of virtuous activity within the shared institutions of a political community.
Drafts by Tristan J Rogers
In Conservatism, Past and Present: A Philosophical Introduction, Tristan J. Rogers argues that philosophical conservatism is a coherent set of historically rooted ideas about conserving and promoting the human good. Part I, “Conservatism Past,” presents a history of conservative ideas, exploring themes of the search for wisdom, the limits of philosophy, reform in preference to revolution, the relationship between authority and freedom, and the tradition of liberty. Major figures include Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Edmund Burke, G.W.F. Hegel, and Roger Scruton. Part II, “Conservatism Present,” applies philosophical conservatism to contemporary conservative politics, focusing on issues such as nationalism, populism, the family, education, and personal responsibility.
The Authority of Virtue begins to mend this broken seam, which, on reflection, lies at the heart of our deepest political problems. The book’s central argument is that the virtues of character require institutions, while good institutions enable persons to live together virtuously. Political institutions are a necessary precondition for the moral agency exhibited by the virtues. But good institutions enable virtue to grow, while helping to constrain the excesses of vice. Justice emerges primarily as a virtue of character, not institutions. The just person balances conformity to existing institutional norms with practically wise reforms. Ultimately, then, the just society and the good life are linked through the common good of virtuous activity within the shared institutions of a political community.