Internet Governance

In recent years, the dynamics of international cooperation and conflict in the cyber domain have become the focus of intense interest on the part of national governments and expert communities around the world.  Russia and the United States have often been at odds even in defining the nature of the problem: Russia emphasizes “international information security,” whereas the United States believes that cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberterrorism are the main threats in this domain and so prefers the term “cybersecurity” and a focus on the protection of computer networks and resources. It is encouraging, therefore, that the two countries reached agreement in June 2013 on the need for cooperation over “threats to or in the use of ICTs [Information Communications Technologies] in the context of international security.” Subsequent events have inhibited further progress toward cooperation.

In this working paper, we seek to outline some of the challenges as well as the opportunities for bilateral U.S.-Russia cooperation in the sphere of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity poses certain unique difficulties where cooperation is  concerned. Theories of strategic conflict and security drawn from the nuclear arms race do not carry over readily into the cyber domain. Some experts, for example, question whether doctrines of deterrence and verification of compliance with agreements are applicable to the cyber domain. The problem of attributing an attack to its source is far greater. An attack can be nearly instantaneous and without warning.

Moreover, the Russian and U.S. sides tend to approach the problem of cybersecurity from different perspectives. The Russian government generally emphasizes the principle of sovereign control over the entire information and communications domain. Russia regards cyberweapons as inherently first-strike weapons, useless if they are not used in the early stages of a conflict. The United States, in contrast, rejects “information security” as a foundational principle and champions the idea that the Internet should be “open, secure, interoperable, and reliable.” The United States distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate operations in the cyber domain; forms it considers illegitimate include espionage by governments and corporations to obtain commercial secrets and efforts by criminal (including terrorist) organizations to damage ICT infrastructure. It accepts that governments will conduct espionage in the interest of national security as well as operations to influence public opinion in target countries, even to the point of attempting to overthrow those countries’ regimes. The United States, which favors international cooperation to prevent and defend against criminal attacks on critical ICT infrastructure and to ban commercially motivated espionage, has found common ground with Russia and other states in reaching agreements in these areas.

Both countries recognize the potential danger posed by cyberattacks to national infrastructure, such as electric power grids, dams, water supply, sanitation, oil and gas extraction equipment, and telecommunications networks. The dangers of a large-scale and effective attack on critical infrastructure are thus extremely severe. For this reason, the cyber domain is not entirely virtual; it includes the physical and human infrastructure linked to it.

The Russian government is also concerned about the possibility that the U.S. government could interfere with the management of the core infrastructure of the Internet, even to the point of disrupting Russia’s access to it. Although the reform of the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to take effect in mid-2016 will move ICANN’s technical functions away from the U.S. government’s stewardship and to a selfregulating, independent international body, Russia’s concerns about the governance of the Internet may not be entirely allayed.

We believe that these characteristics of the cyber domain should be addressed both bilaterally and multilaterally. We offer six recommendations for bilateral U.S.-Russia cooperation in the sphere of cybersecurity:

a. agreement on an explicit definition of the thresholds for attacks on critical infrastructure such that an attack would trigger a counterattack using either cyber or other types of weapons;
b. agreement on the types of information that would be shared in the event of a cyberattack, for example along the lines of a response to a bio-weapons attack;
c. prohibition of automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks;
d. prohibition of attacks on elements of another nation’s core Internet
infrastructure;
e. joint evaluation of the Internet Core Governance (UIS, IANA, DNS RZM)
infrastructure to assess whether stakeholders feel that their interests and contributions are being given adequate consideration following the reform of ICANN’s governance; and
f. broader international discussion of cybersecurity beyond the bilateral U.S.- Russia framework, for example under the auspices of the UN Group of Government Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE).

For the longer-term future, we believe a formal, binding international treaty is needed to ensure full compliance with these norms. The bilateral norms we propose can serve as a model for such a multilateral agreement.

CANABARRO, D. R. ; BORNE, T. ; CEPIK, M. A. C. . Three Controversies on Cyberwar: a Critical Perspective. In: MPSA Annual Conference, 2013, Chicago - IL - Estados Unidos. MPSA Conference Paper Archive, 2013, on line.

The spread of contemporary information and communication technologies among state and non-state actors adds new dimensions to the study of diffusion in global politics. The Digital Era brings about different challenges for national and international security policymaking, heating up academic and political debate surrounding the scope and the implications of the term cyberwar. This paper surveys the evolution of academic and technical production on cyberwar with the intention of providing background for the critical evaluation of the Brazilian case. Finally, it details the prospective research agenda that follows from the evaluation of the Brazilian case.

The Report “Global Internet Governance and International Security in the Field of ICT Use” was prepared by the PIR Center’s Consultant Oleg Demidov with contribution from the Working Group on International Information Security and Global Internet Governance under the PIR Center’s Advisory Board. The PIR Center is a leading nongovernmental think tank conducting research in the field of global security, and a partner organization of PIR Press.

The Report aims to identify the key challenges to international security in the field of the use of ICTs at global and national level, and to highlight the interests and goals of the international community including nation states and other relevant stakeholders in the field of Internet governance.

Target audience of the Report includes representatives of organizations engaged in iscussions and policy making on the issues of information society, cybersecurity, Internet governance, critical infrastructure protection and cyber governance.

The Report was also designed for and oriented to serve academic institutions, including universities and think tanks with a focus on international law, foreign policy and global security. The Report’s materials could be of interest for graduate and postgraduate students with relevant specialization, as well as for experts from technical organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to present a set of well-investigated Internet of Things (IoT) security guidelines and best practices that others can use as a basis for future standards, certifications, laws, policies and/or product ratings. Most, if not all, of these guidelines would apply to any Internet- connected device; however, this paper focuses on security and privacy measures either peculiar to the IoT or especially relevant to the IoT. This paper assumes the end-to-end processing model of the Internet, in which application features such as security are handled by end nodes of the network, client and server hardware. It focuses on security mechanisms, including patching and updating, that should be considered at the manufacturing design phase rather than after devices have already been built or deployed.

Die sozialen Medien haben sich zu einem Raum des Hasses und der Unwahrheit entwickelt. Ohne diese digitalen Brandbeschleuniger sind die rechtsextremen Wahlerfolge ebenso wenig zu verstehen wie die jüngste Welle rechter Gewalt. Maik Fielitz und Holger Marcks gehen dieser fatalen Entwicklung und ihren Ursachen auf den Grund. Eindrücklich zeigen sie, mit welchen manipulativen Techniken rechtsextreme Akteure in den sozialen Medien versuchen, Ängste zu verstärken, Verwirrung zu stiften und Mehrheitsverhältnisse zu verzerren. Dass ihr Wirken dabei eine solche Dynamik entfalten kann, hat wiederum mit der Funktionsweise der sozialen Medien selbst zu tun. Denn sie begünstigen die Entstehung und Verbreitung von Bedrohungsmythen, die der führungslosen Masse der Wutbürger eine Richtung geben. Wie aber ließe sich dieser »digitale Faschismus« bändigen, ohne die Werte der offenen Gesellschaft in Mitleidenschaft zu ziehen?

Siehe auch: www.digitaler-faschismus.de