Mark Raymond
Mark Raymond (@ProfMarkRaymond) is the Wick Cary Associate Professor of International Relations. In addition to his faculty appointment, he is the Associate Editor of International Theory, the Associate Director for International Security Policy at the Oklahoma Aerospace and Defense Innovation Institute (OADII), and the Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of Social Practices of Rule-Making in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). His work appears in various academic journals including International Theory, Contemporary Security Policy, the Journal of Global Security Studies, Strategic Studies Quarterly, The Cyber Defense Review, the UC Davis Law Review, the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. He has contributed policy commentary to outlets including Lawfare and The Monkey Cage. He was a Senior Advisor with the United States Cyberspace Solarium Commission, and has testified before the United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development, and participated in the Internet Governance Forum. He is an External Affiliate of the Ostrom Workshop at Indiana University, and was previously a Fellow with the Center for Democracy and Technology as well as a Carnegie Fellow at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.
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Papers by Mark Raymond
Even if a global prohibition regime were adopted, there would be good reasons to ensure the existence of a robust set of institutionalized mechanisms for mitigating and remediating various kinds of intended and unintended disruptions to Internet stability and interoperability. While prohibition may be worth pursuing, it is clearly insufficient. At least for the foreseeable future, previously agreed upon mitigation and management processes will also be required.
area of governance to one characterized by considerable
contention. This shift is unprecedented among the large
and increasing number of technocratic regimes essential
to contemporary global governance and is, therefore,
of broader interest and significance beyond Internet
governance scholars and practitioners. This paper draws
on international relations (IR) theory to argue that the
emergence of contention in Internet governance entails
a twofold shift in the nature of the problems posed by
Internet governance. First, cooperation problems have
emerged where few previously existed. Second, existing
coordination problems have become increasingly difficult
to manage as a result of a rapidly increasing number of
players and heightened distributional consequences. The
paper further provides four complementary explanations
for the shift in the underlying problem structure: extrinsic
uncertainty, changing market conditions, declining US
dominance in the Internet governance system and social
processes of institutional change and regime complex
formation.
Even if a global prohibition regime were adopted, there would be good reasons to ensure the existence of a robust set of institutionalized mechanisms for mitigating and remediating various kinds of intended and unintended disruptions to Internet stability and interoperability. While prohibition may be worth pursuing, it is clearly insufficient. At least for the foreseeable future, previously agreed upon mitigation and management processes will also be required.
area of governance to one characterized by considerable
contention. This shift is unprecedented among the large
and increasing number of technocratic regimes essential
to contemporary global governance and is, therefore,
of broader interest and significance beyond Internet
governance scholars and practitioners. This paper draws
on international relations (IR) theory to argue that the
emergence of contention in Internet governance entails
a twofold shift in the nature of the problems posed by
Internet governance. First, cooperation problems have
emerged where few previously existed. Second, existing
coordination problems have become increasingly difficult
to manage as a result of a rapidly increasing number of
players and heightened distributional consequences. The
paper further provides four complementary explanations
for the shift in the underlying problem structure: extrinsic
uncertainty, changing market conditions, declining US
dominance in the Internet governance system and social
processes of institutional change and regime complex
formation.
By identifying and explaining the social practice of rule-making in the international system, this book clarifies why global norms change at particular moments and why particular attempts to change norms might succeed or fail at any given time. Mark Raymond looks at four cases: the social construction of great power management in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars; the creation of a rule against the use of force, except in cases of self-defense and collective security; contestation of the international system by al Qaeda in the period immediately following the 9/11 attacks; and United Nations efforts to establish norms for state conduct in the cyber domain. The book also shows that practices of global governance are centrally concerned with making, interpreting, and applying rules, and argues for placing global governance at the heart of the study of the international system and its dynamics. Finally, it demonstrates the utility of the book's approach for the study of global governance, the international system, and for emerging efforts to identify forms and sites of authority and hierarchy in world politics.