Videos by Ben Page
In this video I outline the argument from divine hiddenness that has been constructed by J L Sche... more In this video I outline the argument from divine hiddenness that has been constructed by J L Schellenberg against the existence of God. 12 views
In this video I outline some of the different problems of evil which have been given to argue aga... more In this video I outline some of the different problems of evil which have been given to argue against theism. 14 views
In this video I set out the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism about mental phenomena and the... more In this video I set out the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism about mental phenomena and then outline some responses that physicalists have given to the argument. This argument is also known as 'May in the black-and-white room', 'Mary the super-scientist', or 'Black and White Mary'. 88 views
In this video I share with you a useful visual tool that I learned from the philosopher John Hawt... more In this video I share with you a useful visual tool that I learned from the philosopher John Hawthorne for thinking about probabilistic reasoning, called the Bayesian Bar. 16 views
This video introduces the special composition question and responses that philosophers have given... more This video introduces the special composition question and responses that philosophers have given to it. The video's content also outlines, implicitly, a number of different accounts that philosophers give when thinking about ordinary objects. 45 views
In this video I explain how the Bayesian Bar relates to Bayes Theorem.
5 views
In this video I explain Professor Brian Leftow's model of the Trinity, which attempts to show tha... more In this video I explain Professor Brian Leftow's model of the Trinity, which attempts to show that what the doctrine of the Trinity claims is possible. 167 views
In this video I explain different modal concepts, such as possible and impossible, necessary and ... more In this video I explain different modal concepts, such as possible and impossible, necessary and contingent; different types of modality, such logical, metaphysical, and nomological; and the difference between de dicto and de re modality. I also illustrate how these different concepts can be illustrated by using possible worlds. 104 views
Books by Ben Page
That something may be ‘present’ or ‘located’ at or in every place is a view that many thinkers, p... more That something may be ‘present’ or ‘located’ at or in every place is a view that many thinkers, past and present, have held. Typically omnipresence is thought to be a divine attribute, but the question as to how some thing can be omnipresent has not been historically confined to the status of a divine being. This book offers an insight into historical accounts of omnipresence and its developments in Ancient, Medieval, Modern, and Contemporary thought. It further widens the study of omnipresence by including less widely studied strand of thought on this topic from mystical, process theological, feminist theological, and phenomenological perspectives. Additionally, whilst the study of omnipresence has typically focused on Christian thinkers, the volume broadens the range of voices on this attribute further, through including Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Sanskrit, and Donghak accounts. The volume also includes chapters outlying different views of location, of interest for but also beyond our understanding of omnipresence. Overall, the Handbook provides an introduction to the main facets of omnipresence, both historical and contemporary, and opens up new avenues for research that are yet to be fully explored.
Peer-Review Published Papers by Ben Page
Faith and Philosophy
Power metaphysicians are concerned with, well, powers. Theists claim interest in the most powerfu... more Power metaphysicians are concerned with, well, powers. Theists claim interest in the most powerful entity there is, God. As such, recent work on the ontology of powers may well have much to offer theists when thinking about God's power. In this paper I start to provide a metaphysics of God's 'power', something many definitions of omnipotence make reference to. In particular I will be interested in explicating how a power ontology can account for the strength and range of God's power, as well as showing how this account of divine power can fit with a timeless conception of God.
Religious Studies, 2024
There is this view propounded by some theorists which claims that some conceptions of the nature ... more There is this view propounded by some theorists which claims that some conceptions of the nature of time are incompatible with the Christian position on the defeat of evil (Craig, 2001a, 66-67; 2001b, 214; 2008, 609-610; Copan & Craig, 2004, 162, n.29; Peckham, 2021, 108; Mullins, 2014, 127-132; 2021, 107; Hollingsworth, 2024). The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to clarify exactly which thesis about time’s nature is taken to be problematic for the defeat of evil. And secondly, to show that scriptural support for understanding the defeat of evil as requiring that evil not be in the range of the existential quantifier, something implicitly contended by those who put forward this problem, is weak and that these passages can be read in plausible ways which are affirmable by those who endorse the ‘problematic’ thesis.
AGATHEOS
There is an objection posed against Brian Leftow’s conception of a timeless God which claims that... more There is an objection posed against Brian Leftow’s conception of a timeless God which claims that God cannot know the temporal order of events, with Craig going so far as to assert that on Leftow’s view God’s life will be chaotic. If this objection is right then Leftow’s God cannot know the end from the beginning. This paper sets out the objection, describing how it arises from Leftow’s Anselmian view of God’s relationship to Creation and then shows several ways in which the objection can be overcome. Much of this centres around discussions of the direction of time and how Leftow’s God could know this direction. The paper then concludes by noting that what has come before can be modified so that other conceptions of divine timelessness can also explain how God knows the temporal order of Creation’s events.
The Oxford Handbook of Omnipresence
Whilst God is said to be omnipresent, some religions also claim that God is specially present, or... more Whilst God is said to be omnipresent, some religions also claim that God is specially present, or more present at/in certain locations. For example, a claim of special presence shared by Christians and Jews is that God was specially present at/in the first Temple. The chapter canvases various ways in which one can make sense of this claim whilst still affirming the omnipresence of God. This includes offering different accounts of special presence relying on derivative notions of presence, and offering other views of special presence that rely upon fundamental accounts of presence. The chapter itself does not argue for one view in particular, but instead offers a map of possible options and future areas for research.
TheoLogica, 2024
Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work... more Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work has been interacted with less than one might expect, especially given that some have contended that divine timelessness should be put to death and buried. Further, the work that has critically interacted with Leftow does a very poor job at discrediting it, or so I will contend. As we shall see, the main reason for this is either because what is central to Leftow's view is not affected by the objection, or because Leftow provides another way of getting his theory off the ground. Why, then, do so many objections miss the mark? I suspect it's because many struggle to understand Leftow's view and what is central to it. As such, one of the main goals of this paper will be to make Leftow's account more accessible and to elucidate the main elements of the theory, whilst also providing responses to the main objections raised against his view. The overall result of this, I hope, will be a more fruitful examination of Leftow's view in the future.
TheoLogica, 2023
There is an objection to divine timelessness which claims that timelessness shouldn’t be adopted ... more There is an objection to divine timelessness which claims that timelessness shouldn’t be adopted since on this view evil is never “destroyed,” “vanquished,” “eradicated” or defeated. By contrast, some divine temporalists think that presentism is the key that allows evil to be destroyed/vanquished/eradicated/defeated. However, since presentism is often considered to be inconsistent with timelessness, it is thought that the presentist solution is not available for defenders of timelessness. In this paper I first show how divine timelessness is consistent with a presentist view of time and then how defenders of Presentist-Timelessness can adopt the presentist solution to the removal of evil. After this, I conclude the paper by showing that it’s far from clear that the presentist solution is successful and that unless one weakens what is meant by the destruction/vanquishing/eradication/defeat of evil, one can only make the presentist solution work by adopting a number of additional assumptions that many will find unattractive.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
In recent years Mullins and Craig have argued that there is a problem for a timeless God creating... more In recent years Mullins and Craig have argued that there is a problem for a timeless God creating, with Mullins formulating the argument as follows:
(1) If God begins to be related to creation, then God changes.
(2) God begins to be related to creation.
(3) Therefore, God changes.
(4) If God changes, then God is neither immutable nor timeless.
(5) Therefore, God is neither immutable nor timeless.
In this paper I argue that all the premises, (1), (2), and (4) are false, and then provide a revised formulation of the argument which more clearly represents what Mullins and Craig wish to argue, given the explication and commentary they give when discussing this objection to timelessness. I then call into question this argument, and conclude by stating what I think Mullins and Craig should really be arguing given the specific views they have about creation ex nihilo and in virtue of what timelessness requires.
Powers, Time and Free Will, 2022
My students sometimes worry that if eternalism is true then they can’t have libertarian freedom. ... more My students sometimes worry that if eternalism is true then they can’t have libertarian freedom. They aren’t alone, as this sentiment is also expressed, albeit typically briefly, by various philosophers. However, somewhat surprisingly, those working within the free will literature have largely had nothing to say about libertarianism’s relationship to time, with this also being similar in the case of those working in the philosophy of time, apart from some work which has mainly focused on non-libertarian views of freedom. In this short paper I note why I’m currently unconvinced that there’s an incompatibility between eternalism and libertarianism, and in doing so one will see why I think they are compatible.
In order to do this I will first outline what I take to be the central tenets of both eternalism and libertarianism. I then begin to explore potential avenues of incompatibility, discussing firstly whether an eternalist can make sense of the principle of alternative possibilities, and then if fixity, the fact that how I act in the future is fixed, is an issue for libertarians. After arguing that the libertarian need not be too concerned by these difficulties, I turn to two further potential issues, namely that eternalism cannot allow for a type of causation that libertarianism requires, and also that it fails to allow for a view of change libertarians may favour. Once more, I find both of these supposed difficulties wanting.
Given my discussion of the issues, I conclude that there are some plausible reasons to think that libertarian views of freedom are compatible with eternalism, or at the very least some variants of libertarianism are. As such, I take it that my students, and those like them who worry that there is such an incompatibility, are wrong to do so.
Sapientia, 2020
How easy is it to construct life and consciousness from the building blocks of reality? Some phil... more How easy is it to construct life and consciousness from the building blocks of reality? Some philosophers seem to think both are pretty easy, whilst others take consciousness to be difficult but life to be no problem. In this paper I question whether we should in fact think this, could life after all be difficult to construct? I contend that the answer to this, much like the answer to how hard consciousness is to construct, largely depends on the nature of life and the building blocks of reality. I will show that many of the considerations as to whether consciousness is hard to construct can be paralleled when thinking about the construction of life, and that given one prominent definition of life, it does in fact seem difficult to construct. I will conclude by offering a few suggestions for future research, and suggest that philosophers should be more hesitant in their affirmation that life is easy to construct.
Philosophical Studies, 2021
Something is good insofar as it achieves its end, so says a neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. Po... more Something is good insofar as it achieves its end, so says a neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. Powers/dispositions are paradigm cases of entities that have an end, so say many metaphysicians. A question therefore arises, namely, can one account for neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of an ontology of powers? This is what I shall begin to explore in this paper. I will first provide a brief explication of both neo-Aristotelian goodness and the metaphysics of powers, before turning to investigate whether one can give an account of neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of powers. I will suggest that the answer to this question is yes.
Theologica, 2021
Several philosophers of religion have used contemporary work on the metaphysics of space to disma... more Several philosophers of religion have used contemporary work on the metaphysics of space to dismantle objections to Christian doctrine. In this paper I shall also make use of work in the metaphysics of space to explore a topic in Christian thought that has received little attention by philosophers, namely inaugurated eschatology. My aim will be to take the conclusions of some biblical scholars who have written on this topic, and then begin to provide some metaphysical models of this doctrine, so as to overcome objections against inaugurated eschatology based on metaphysical concerns.
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Videos by Ben Page
Books by Ben Page
Peer-Review Published Papers by Ben Page
(1) If God begins to be related to creation, then God changes.
(2) God begins to be related to creation.
(3) Therefore, God changes.
(4) If God changes, then God is neither immutable nor timeless.
(5) Therefore, God is neither immutable nor timeless.
In this paper I argue that all the premises, (1), (2), and (4) are false, and then provide a revised formulation of the argument which more clearly represents what Mullins and Craig wish to argue, given the explication and commentary they give when discussing this objection to timelessness. I then call into question this argument, and conclude by stating what I think Mullins and Craig should really be arguing given the specific views they have about creation ex nihilo and in virtue of what timelessness requires.
In order to do this I will first outline what I take to be the central tenets of both eternalism and libertarianism. I then begin to explore potential avenues of incompatibility, discussing firstly whether an eternalist can make sense of the principle of alternative possibilities, and then if fixity, the fact that how I act in the future is fixed, is an issue for libertarians. After arguing that the libertarian need not be too concerned by these difficulties, I turn to two further potential issues, namely that eternalism cannot allow for a type of causation that libertarianism requires, and also that it fails to allow for a view of change libertarians may favour. Once more, I find both of these supposed difficulties wanting.
Given my discussion of the issues, I conclude that there are some plausible reasons to think that libertarian views of freedom are compatible with eternalism, or at the very least some variants of libertarianism are. As such, I take it that my students, and those like them who worry that there is such an incompatibility, are wrong to do so.
(1) If God begins to be related to creation, then God changes.
(2) God begins to be related to creation.
(3) Therefore, God changes.
(4) If God changes, then God is neither immutable nor timeless.
(5) Therefore, God is neither immutable nor timeless.
In this paper I argue that all the premises, (1), (2), and (4) are false, and then provide a revised formulation of the argument which more clearly represents what Mullins and Craig wish to argue, given the explication and commentary they give when discussing this objection to timelessness. I then call into question this argument, and conclude by stating what I think Mullins and Craig should really be arguing given the specific views they have about creation ex nihilo and in virtue of what timelessness requires.
In order to do this I will first outline what I take to be the central tenets of both eternalism and libertarianism. I then begin to explore potential avenues of incompatibility, discussing firstly whether an eternalist can make sense of the principle of alternative possibilities, and then if fixity, the fact that how I act in the future is fixed, is an issue for libertarians. After arguing that the libertarian need not be too concerned by these difficulties, I turn to two further potential issues, namely that eternalism cannot allow for a type of causation that libertarianism requires, and also that it fails to allow for a view of change libertarians may favour. Once more, I find both of these supposed difficulties wanting.
Given my discussion of the issues, I conclude that there are some plausible reasons to think that libertarian views of freedom are compatible with eternalism, or at the very least some variants of libertarianism are. As such, I take it that my students, and those like them who worry that there is such an incompatibility, are wrong to do so.
1.God is a person and so personal (PP)
2.God is non-personal, and so is not a person (NPNP)
3.God is a personal non-person (PNP)
The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with (PP) held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and (NPNP) mainly by those who are pantheists. (PNP), however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past. However, within recent times (PNP) has become more popular. On the face of it, it might not be clear what the difference between (PP) and (PNP) is, and whether debate had between the two positions is substantive. The goal of this paper is therefore to clarify the debate and assess whether the many claims advocates of (PNP) make as to why God cannot be a person (PP) stand up to scrutiny or are persuasive. My suggestion will be that on the whole they do and are not. As such, defenders of (PNP) will either need to defend these reasons in more detail or focus on the area I suggest the debate really rests on.
Special Issue on " TheoLogica. An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology"
Deadline for submissions: May 31st 2020.
We invite papers that offer a theological or religious engagement with philosophical issues related to time and space. Papers can be from any religious, theological, or atheological tradition. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the following:
1) God’s relationship to time and space. Defences of traditional understandings of timelessness and omnipresence using recent work in temporal ontology, such as the moving spotlight. Alternative models of the God-world relationship that engage with the metaphysics of time and space.
2) Divine foreknowledge, providence, and temporal logic. This could include theological explorations of the open or closed future, or alternative ontologies such as fragmentalism.
3) Religious perspectives on personal identity over time. Papers could include discussions on the doctrines of the resurrection, salvation and enlightenment, Samsāra, and eschatology.
4) Theological explorations of hypertime and hyperspace.
5) Time, space, and the incarnation.
6) Does time have a beginning? Papers could debate rival doctrines of creation, the kalpas, or Sunyata.