International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Jan 2, 2024
This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with pre... more This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with presentism. After summarizing both the PSA and presentism, we address two major objections to the coherence of these two doctrines working together, namely that 1) there is no reality of the future sins that are atoned for, and 2) that since the past no longer exists, there no longer exists anything for which atonement is needed. We demonstrate that these objections are easily overcome by the PSA-affirming presentist. Lastly, we further argue that PSA seems to require presentism in order for such an atonement to obtain.
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2020
In contemporary debates, one is presented with temporal and timeless conceptions of divine eterna... more In contemporary debates, one is presented with temporal and timeless conceptions of divine eternality. Each conception is said to have various consequences for understanding divine perfection and providence. In this paper, I shall consider a pair of arguments against divine temporality that suggest that a temporal God could potentially make mistakes, thus making the temporal God less than perfect. I shall develop these objections, and discuss various ways for the temporalist to reply.
Have you ever wondered what God’s inner emotional life might be like? Within Christian thought, t... more Have you ever wondered what God’s inner emotional life might be like? Within Christian thought, there are conflicting answers to this question. The majority of Christian theologians throughout history have said that God cannot be moved by creatures to feel anything. God does not literally have empathy, mercy, or compassion. Instead, God only feels pure undisturbed happiness. This view is called divine impassibility. In the 20th Century, Christian theologians by and large came to reject this understanding of God in favour of divine passibility which affirms that God can be moved by creatures, and God can literally have empathy, mercy, and compassion. Yet the 21st Century has seen a renewed interest in this more historical understanding of God. How Christianity came to have two radically different portrayals of God is a puzzle, to be sure, but that is not one that I shall try to address here. Instead, my interest is in unpacking these two different conceptions of God, and briefly offe...
Christian theism claims that God is in some sense responsible for the existence and nature of tim... more Christian theism claims that God is in some sense responsible for the existence and nature of time. There are at least two options for understanding this claim. First, the creationist option, which says that God creates time. Second, the identification view, which says that time is to be identified with God. Both options will answer the question, “what is time?” differently. I shall consider different versions of the creationist option, and offer several objections that the view faces. I will also consider different versions of the identification view, and argue that the objections it faces can be refuted.
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically connected to divine att... more According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically connected to divine attributes like timelessness, immutability, simplicity, aseity, and self-sufficiency. In some interesting way, these attributes are meant to explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. I shall argue that these attributes do not explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. In order to understand why the impassible God cannot suffer, one must examine the emotional life of the impassible God. I shall argue that the necessarily happy emotional life of the classical God explains why the impassible God cannot suffer.
Amos Yong claims that persons with disabilities like Down Syndrome will retain their disability a... more Amos Yong claims that persons with disabilities like Down Syndrome will retain their disability at the resurrection. In section I, I will make some preliminary remarks in order to properly frame the discussion. In section II, I will lay out Yong's account of the resurrection and offer some difficulties along the way. Section III will examine what appears to be the main source of justification for Yong's claim. It is what I shall call Stanley Hauerwas' dictum which states that to 'eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject.' In this section, I shall draw out three sets of bizarre entailments and difficulties that arise from Hauerwas' dictum. Section IV will offer some concluding remarks and suggestions for further development on the doctrine of the resurrection from a disability perspective.
Over the past century, divine passibility has become the majority view within Christian theology ... more Over the past century, divine passibility has become the majority view within Christian theology and philosophy of religion. Yet it faces a serious objection from proponents of impassibility that I shall call the Problem of Creepy Emotions. In this article, I shall develop the objection in detail, and explore two ways for divine passibilists to answer this objection. I shall do this in several steps. First, I will offer some brief historical remarks to help readers understand that divine empathy is the watershed issue in the debate over impassibility and passibility. In particular, impassibility denies that God has empathy, whereas passibility affirms that God has empathy. Second, I provide definitions of important concepts for this debate such as impassibility, passibility, emotions, and empathy. I shall articulate Linda Zagzebski's recent account of passibility called omnisubjectivity, or perfect empathy. Third, I shall examine the Problem of Creepy Emotions that arises from t...
Within contemporary evangelical theology, a peculiar controversy has been brewing over the past f... more Within contemporary evangelical theology, a peculiar controversy has been brewing over the past few decades with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. A good number of prominent evangelical theologians and philosophers are rejecting the doctrine of divine processions within the eternal life of the Trinity. In William Hasker’s recent Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, Hasker laments this rejection and seeks to offer a defense of this doctrine. This paper shall seek to accomplish a few things. In section I, I shall first set the stage for a proper understanding of the discussion. Section II will articulate the basic Trinitarian desiderata that must be satisfied by any model of the doctrine of the Trinity. This will help one understand the debate between Hasker and the procession deniers. Section III will offer an articulation of what the doctrine of divine processions teaches. Section IV will examine Hasker’s defense of the doctrine point by point. I shall argue that his defense o...
In a series of papers, Thomas P. Flint has posited that God the Son could become incarnate in any... more In a series of papers, Thomas P. Flint has posited that God the Son could become incarnate in any human person as long as certain conditions are met (Flint 2001a, 2001b). In a recent paper, he has argued that all saved human persons will one day become incarnated by the Son (Flint 2011). Flint claims that this is motivated by a combination of Molinism and orthodox Christology. I shall argue that this is unmotivated because it is condemned by orthodox Christology. Flint has unknowingly articulated a version of the heresy called Origenism that is condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council. After arguing that Flint’s account is unmotivated because it is condemned, I shall offer some reflections and prolegomena on the relationship between contemporary analytic theology and the ecumenical creeds.
I greatly appreciate Thomas Flint's reply to my paper, "Flint's 'Molinism and the Incarnation' is... more I greatly appreciate Thomas Flint's reply to my paper, "Flint's 'Molinism and the Incarnation' is too Radical." 1 In my original paper, I argue that the Christology and eschatology of Flint's paper "Molinism and the Incarnation" is too radical to be considered orthodox. I consider it an honor that a senior scholar, such as Flint, would concern himself with my work in the first place. In this response to Flint's reply I will explain why I still find Flint's Christology and eschatology to be too radical. Below I shall attempt to address various issues raised by Flint in his reply.
Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and persistence. Contemporary Ch... more Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and persistence. Contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians have adopted four-dimensionalism and eternalism for various reasons. Many find it to be derived from certain interpretations of the special theory of relativity. Others hold it because it is said to comport well with truth-maker theory. In recent literature one can find Christians adopting four-dimensionalism and eternalism for explicitly theological reasons as well as using it to explicate Christian doctrine. For instance, Katherin Rogers and T. J. Mawson have used it to defend divine omniscience and timelessness, Oliver Crisp has used it to articulate the doctrine of atonement, and Michael Rea has deployed it to make sense of original sin. 1 It would seem, then, that four-dimensional eternalism is a fruitful metaphysical doctrine. But should Christians be four-dimensional eternalists? There appear to be various areas of Christian thought that conflict with four-dimensional eternalism, and these conflicts have not been fully considered.
In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious diff... more In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation. Keywords Panentheism. Classical theism. Neo-classical theism. Open theism. Pantheism In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. Though the term 'panentheism' was coined in the nineteenth century, its contemporary proponents claim that it is an ancient concept of God that rivals more classical understandings of God and the God-world relationship. 1 Proponents claim that panentheism offers a more theologically adequate understanding of God than other models of God because it is relational and dynamic. Many of its proponents further claim that panentheism is more apt at interacting with science than other models of God and the God-world relationship. 2 However, these claims from panentheists might be premature. One of the most notorious difficulties for panentheism is its vagueness. 3 It is incredibly difficult to pin down exactly what panentheism is and how it differs from rival models of God.
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, ... more The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but the classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibil...
In contemporary discussions it is often assumed that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true... more In contemporary discussions it is often assumed that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true, but that God can be timeless if four-dimensional eternalism is true. I argue that the Christian God cannot be timeless on either ontology of time. Contemporary atemporalists have not fully grasped the details of eternalism, nor fleshed out the implications of eternalism for understanding the Christian doctrines of creation, conservation, and incarnation. Once the details are developed, it can be shown that eternalism is not compatible with divine timelessness. Instead, the Christian God would be temporal as understood on eternalism. In order to demonstrate this, I shall do the following in this thesis. In chapter 1 I shall lay out the relevant desiderata and methods for assessing the doctrine of divine timelessness. Chapter 2 will give an up-to-date discussion of the philosophy of time, and lay out the theories that are needed to understand the doctrine of divine timelessness. Chapter ...
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, ... more The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Jan 2, 2024
This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with pre... more This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with presentism. After summarizing both the PSA and presentism, we address two major objections to the coherence of these two doctrines working together, namely that 1) there is no reality of the future sins that are atoned for, and 2) that since the past no longer exists, there no longer exists anything for which atonement is needed. We demonstrate that these objections are easily overcome by the PSA-affirming presentist. Lastly, we further argue that PSA seems to require presentism in order for such an atonement to obtain.
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2020
In contemporary debates, one is presented with temporal and timeless conceptions of divine eterna... more In contemporary debates, one is presented with temporal and timeless conceptions of divine eternality. Each conception is said to have various consequences for understanding divine perfection and providence. In this paper, I shall consider a pair of arguments against divine temporality that suggest that a temporal God could potentially make mistakes, thus making the temporal God less than perfect. I shall develop these objections, and discuss various ways for the temporalist to reply.
Have you ever wondered what God’s inner emotional life might be like? Within Christian thought, t... more Have you ever wondered what God’s inner emotional life might be like? Within Christian thought, there are conflicting answers to this question. The majority of Christian theologians throughout history have said that God cannot be moved by creatures to feel anything. God does not literally have empathy, mercy, or compassion. Instead, God only feels pure undisturbed happiness. This view is called divine impassibility. In the 20th Century, Christian theologians by and large came to reject this understanding of God in favour of divine passibility which affirms that God can be moved by creatures, and God can literally have empathy, mercy, and compassion. Yet the 21st Century has seen a renewed interest in this more historical understanding of God. How Christianity came to have two radically different portrayals of God is a puzzle, to be sure, but that is not one that I shall try to address here. Instead, my interest is in unpacking these two different conceptions of God, and briefly offe...
Christian theism claims that God is in some sense responsible for the existence and nature of tim... more Christian theism claims that God is in some sense responsible for the existence and nature of time. There are at least two options for understanding this claim. First, the creationist option, which says that God creates time. Second, the identification view, which says that time is to be identified with God. Both options will answer the question, “what is time?” differently. I shall consider different versions of the creationist option, and offer several objections that the view faces. I will also consider different versions of the identification view, and argue that the objections it faces can be refuted.
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically connected to divine att... more According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically connected to divine attributes like timelessness, immutability, simplicity, aseity, and self-sufficiency. In some interesting way, these attributes are meant to explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. I shall argue that these attributes do not explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. In order to understand why the impassible God cannot suffer, one must examine the emotional life of the impassible God. I shall argue that the necessarily happy emotional life of the classical God explains why the impassible God cannot suffer.
Amos Yong claims that persons with disabilities like Down Syndrome will retain their disability a... more Amos Yong claims that persons with disabilities like Down Syndrome will retain their disability at the resurrection. In section I, I will make some preliminary remarks in order to properly frame the discussion. In section II, I will lay out Yong's account of the resurrection and offer some difficulties along the way. Section III will examine what appears to be the main source of justification for Yong's claim. It is what I shall call Stanley Hauerwas' dictum which states that to 'eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject.' In this section, I shall draw out three sets of bizarre entailments and difficulties that arise from Hauerwas' dictum. Section IV will offer some concluding remarks and suggestions for further development on the doctrine of the resurrection from a disability perspective.
Over the past century, divine passibility has become the majority view within Christian theology ... more Over the past century, divine passibility has become the majority view within Christian theology and philosophy of religion. Yet it faces a serious objection from proponents of impassibility that I shall call the Problem of Creepy Emotions. In this article, I shall develop the objection in detail, and explore two ways for divine passibilists to answer this objection. I shall do this in several steps. First, I will offer some brief historical remarks to help readers understand that divine empathy is the watershed issue in the debate over impassibility and passibility. In particular, impassibility denies that God has empathy, whereas passibility affirms that God has empathy. Second, I provide definitions of important concepts for this debate such as impassibility, passibility, emotions, and empathy. I shall articulate Linda Zagzebski's recent account of passibility called omnisubjectivity, or perfect empathy. Third, I shall examine the Problem of Creepy Emotions that arises from t...
Within contemporary evangelical theology, a peculiar controversy has been brewing over the past f... more Within contemporary evangelical theology, a peculiar controversy has been brewing over the past few decades with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. A good number of prominent evangelical theologians and philosophers are rejecting the doctrine of divine processions within the eternal life of the Trinity. In William Hasker’s recent Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, Hasker laments this rejection and seeks to offer a defense of this doctrine. This paper shall seek to accomplish a few things. In section I, I shall first set the stage for a proper understanding of the discussion. Section II will articulate the basic Trinitarian desiderata that must be satisfied by any model of the doctrine of the Trinity. This will help one understand the debate between Hasker and the procession deniers. Section III will offer an articulation of what the doctrine of divine processions teaches. Section IV will examine Hasker’s defense of the doctrine point by point. I shall argue that his defense o...
In a series of papers, Thomas P. Flint has posited that God the Son could become incarnate in any... more In a series of papers, Thomas P. Flint has posited that God the Son could become incarnate in any human person as long as certain conditions are met (Flint 2001a, 2001b). In a recent paper, he has argued that all saved human persons will one day become incarnated by the Son (Flint 2011). Flint claims that this is motivated by a combination of Molinism and orthodox Christology. I shall argue that this is unmotivated because it is condemned by orthodox Christology. Flint has unknowingly articulated a version of the heresy called Origenism that is condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council. After arguing that Flint’s account is unmotivated because it is condemned, I shall offer some reflections and prolegomena on the relationship between contemporary analytic theology and the ecumenical creeds.
I greatly appreciate Thomas Flint's reply to my paper, "Flint's 'Molinism and the Incarnation' is... more I greatly appreciate Thomas Flint's reply to my paper, "Flint's 'Molinism and the Incarnation' is too Radical." 1 In my original paper, I argue that the Christology and eschatology of Flint's paper "Molinism and the Incarnation" is too radical to be considered orthodox. I consider it an honor that a senior scholar, such as Flint, would concern himself with my work in the first place. In this response to Flint's reply I will explain why I still find Flint's Christology and eschatology to be too radical. Below I shall attempt to address various issues raised by Flint in his reply.
Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and persistence. Contemporary Ch... more Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and persistence. Contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians have adopted four-dimensionalism and eternalism for various reasons. Many find it to be derived from certain interpretations of the special theory of relativity. Others hold it because it is said to comport well with truth-maker theory. In recent literature one can find Christians adopting four-dimensionalism and eternalism for explicitly theological reasons as well as using it to explicate Christian doctrine. For instance, Katherin Rogers and T. J. Mawson have used it to defend divine omniscience and timelessness, Oliver Crisp has used it to articulate the doctrine of atonement, and Michael Rea has deployed it to make sense of original sin. 1 It would seem, then, that four-dimensional eternalism is a fruitful metaphysical doctrine. But should Christians be four-dimensional eternalists? There appear to be various areas of Christian thought that conflict with four-dimensional eternalism, and these conflicts have not been fully considered.
In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious diff... more In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation. Keywords Panentheism. Classical theism. Neo-classical theism. Open theism. Pantheism In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. Though the term 'panentheism' was coined in the nineteenth century, its contemporary proponents claim that it is an ancient concept of God that rivals more classical understandings of God and the God-world relationship. 1 Proponents claim that panentheism offers a more theologically adequate understanding of God than other models of God because it is relational and dynamic. Many of its proponents further claim that panentheism is more apt at interacting with science than other models of God and the God-world relationship. 2 However, these claims from panentheists might be premature. One of the most notorious difficulties for panentheism is its vagueness. 3 It is incredibly difficult to pin down exactly what panentheism is and how it differs from rival models of God.
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, ... more The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but the classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibil...
In contemporary discussions it is often assumed that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true... more In contemporary discussions it is often assumed that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true, but that God can be timeless if four-dimensional eternalism is true. I argue that the Christian God cannot be timeless on either ontology of time. Contemporary atemporalists have not fully grasped the details of eternalism, nor fleshed out the implications of eternalism for understanding the Christian doctrines of creation, conservation, and incarnation. Once the details are developed, it can be shown that eternalism is not compatible with divine timelessness. Instead, the Christian God would be temporal as understood on eternalism. In order to demonstrate this, I shall do the following in this thesis. In chapter 1 I shall lay out the relevant desiderata and methods for assessing the doctrine of divine timelessness. Chapter 2 will give an up-to-date discussion of the philosophy of time, and lay out the theories that are needed to understand the doctrine of divine timelessness. Chapter ...
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, ... more The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
In recent years the doctrine of divine simplicity has become a topic of interest in the philosoph... more In recent years the doctrine of divine simplicity has become a topic of interest in the philosophical theological community. In particular, the modal collapse argument against divine simplicity has garnered various responses from proponents of divine simplicity. Some even claiming that the modal collapse argument is invalid. It is our contention that these responses have either misunderstood or misstated the argument, and have thus missed the force of the objection. Our main aim is to clarify what the modal collapse argument in fact says, and explain why the recent responses do not succeed. In order to argue our case, we will proceed in several steps. First, we aim to systematically articulate the doctrine of divine simplicity. Second, articulate the Christian conviction that God is free to create any feasible world or no world at all. Third, argue that divine simplicity suffers a modal collapse and thus undermines God's freedom. Fourth, respond to potential objections to modal collapse. Fifth, we offer some concluding remarks.
I shall argue that the combination of classical theism and a traditional three-part dyothelite Ch... more I shall argue that the combination of classical theism and a traditional three-part dyothelite Christology runs afoul of the Two Sons Worry because it cannot offer an account of the hypostatic union. After offering some preliminary remarks, I shall discuss the details of classical theism. Then I shall explain the Two Sons Worry that plagued the traditional three-part dyothelite Christology. After explaining the Two Sons Worry, I shall consider two accounts of the hypostatic union. I shall argue that each account of the hypostatic union fails to avoid the Two Sons Worry.
This paper will be in a volume on God and time across the world religions. In my paper, I examine... more This paper will be in a volume on God and time across the world religions. In my paper, I examine two ways that God might be responsible for the existence of time. I would greatly appreciate any feedback on this draft before finalizing the manuscript.
This is a short story that I presented at the Innsbruck "Personal and A-Personal Conceptions of G... more This is a short story that I presented at the Innsbruck "Personal and A-Personal Conceptions of God" workshop on 8 August, 2018. I wrote a short story version of my paper at the suggestion of my little sister who did not want to read the long, boring version of the paper. In the story, and the boring forthcoming paper, I argue that Linda Zagzebski's doctrine of omnisubjectivity is incompatible with divine timelessness.
Call for papers "Theological Explorations in Time and Space".
Special Issue on " TheoLogica. An ... more Call for papers "Theological Explorations in Time and Space".
Special Issue on " TheoLogica. An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology"
Deadline for submissions: May 31st 2020.
We invite papers that offer a theological or religious engagement with philosophical issues related to time and space. Papers can be from any religious, theological, or atheological tradition. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the following:
1) God’s relationship to time and space. Defences of traditional understandings of timelessness and omnipresence using recent work in temporal ontology, such as the moving spotlight. Alternative models of the God-world relationship that engage with the metaphysics of time and space.
2) Divine foreknowledge, providence, and temporal logic. This could include theological explorations of the open or closed future, or alternative ontologies such as fragmentalism.
3) Religious perspectives on personal identity over time. Papers could include discussions on the doctrines of the resurrection, salvation and enlightenment, Samsāra, and eschatology.
4) Theological explorations of hypertime and hyperspace.
5) Time, space, and the incarnation.
6) Does time have a beginning? Papers could debate rival doctrines of creation, the kalpas, or Sunyata.
This is a multi-views book on one of Christianity’s most central doctrines: the doctrine of the I... more This is a multi-views book on one of Christianity’s most central doctrines: the doctrine of the Incarnation. Since the early church, Christian’s have wrestled to make sense of Jesus of Nazareth as the God-Man, that he is both 100% God and 100% human. Not only has the doctrine of the Incarnation been one of the primary focuses of Christian theology throughout its history, it has also been a primary focus of analytic philosophers of religion and analytic theologians in the last few decades. Many articles and books have been written in these fields developing models of the Incarnation that are logically coherent and/or defend the logical coherence of the Christology enshrined in the ecumenical councils and creeds of the church. Some have even argued that the Incarnation is a contradiction but a contradiction that is true nonetheless. Indeed, analytic treatments of the Incarnation have resulted in rigorous and exciting developments in the area of Christology.
This book aims to bring together four widely discussed models of the Incarnation amongst analytic theologians and philosophers of religion. These are the Traditionalist Model (Timothy J. Pawl), the Preconscious Model (Andrew Ter Ern Loke), the Kenotic Model (C. Stephen Evans), and the Relative-Identity Model (Joseph Jedwab). Each contributor offers an explanation and defense of their model, the other three contributors write responses to said model, and the initial author will write a single rejoinder to the three responders.
Join us for our second Digital Open Day on April 11th at 6 pm (CEST) on
zoom.
Ryan Mullins will... more Join us for our second Digital Open Day on April 11th at 6 pm (CEST) on zoom. Ryan Mullins will hold a lecture on “God, Freedom and Evil” followed by an introduction to the program’s curriculum and a Q&A..
Philosophy study programmes are often designed in an agnostic way – as if God didn’t exist - and do not consider the documented growing interest in religion, both globally and among philosophy students in particular. In those rare cases where religion is indeed considered, only the relationship between philosophy and Christianity is delved into, as if other religions, especially Judaism and Islam, did not exist and played little to no role in the history of philosophy. The PhilTeR Master's fills these gaps with an international, interreligious and high quality fully online study programme in Philosophy, Theology and Religions.
The courses are taught by the following professors:
Peter Adamson (LMU Munich / King’s College London) Jehoschua Ahrens (Lucerne) Maria Rosa Antognazza (King’s College, London) David Giuseppe Arie Anzalone (Lucerne) Marienza Benedetto (Bari) Paul Richard Blum (Loyola University, Maryland) Charles Burnett (Warburg Institute, London) Emanuele Colombo (Chicago) Richard Cross (Notre Dame, Indiana) Simon Erlanger (Lucerne) David Falessi (Lucerne) Tyron Goldschmidt (Rochester, New York) Warren Zev Harvey (Jerusalem) Christoph Helmig (Cologne) Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (Basel) Anthony Kenny (Oxford) Gyula Klima (Fordham University, New York) Marco Lamanna (Lucerne) Gary Carl (Muhammad) Legenhausen (Qom) Olga Lizzini (Aix-Marseille) Winfried Löffler (Innsbruck) Maria Evelina Malgieri (Turin) Ryan Mullins (Helsinki) Mostafa Najafi (Lucerne) Pasquale Porro (Turin) Santiago Ramos (Rockhurst, Kansas) Ulrich Rudolph (Zürich) Ferenc Ruzsa (Budapest) Ursula Schumacher (Karlsruhe) Roman Seidel (FU Berlin) Erdal Toprakyaran (Tübingen / Lucerne) Giovanni Ventimiglia (Lucerne).
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2024
This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with pre... more This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with presentism. After summarizing both the PSA and presentism, we address two major objections to the coherence of these two doctrines working together, namely that 1) there is no reality of the future sins that are atoned for, and 2) that since the past no longer exists, there no longer exists anything for which atonement is needed. We demonstrate that these objections are easily overcome by the PSA-affirming presentist. Lastly, we further argue that PSA seems to require presentism in order for such an atonement to obtain.
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Papers by Ryan Mullins
partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural
Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but he classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural
Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.
Special Issue on " TheoLogica. An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology"
Deadline for submissions: May 31st 2020.
We invite papers that offer a theological or religious engagement with philosophical issues related to time and space. Papers can be from any religious, theological, or atheological tradition. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the following:
1) God’s relationship to time and space. Defences of traditional understandings of timelessness and omnipresence using recent work in temporal ontology, such as the moving spotlight. Alternative models of the God-world relationship that engage with the metaphysics of time and space.
2) Divine foreknowledge, providence, and temporal logic. This could include theological explorations of the open or closed future, or alternative ontologies such as fragmentalism.
3) Religious perspectives on personal identity over time. Papers could include discussions on the doctrines of the resurrection, salvation and enlightenment, Samsāra, and eschatology.
4) Theological explorations of hypertime and hyperspace.
5) Time, space, and the incarnation.
6) Does time have a beginning? Papers could debate rival doctrines of creation, the kalpas, or Sunyata.
This book aims to bring together four widely discussed models of the Incarnation amongst analytic theologians and philosophers of religion. These are the Traditionalist Model (Timothy J. Pawl), the Preconscious Model (Andrew Ter Ern Loke), the Kenotic Model (C. Stephen Evans), and the Relative-Identity Model (Joseph Jedwab). Each contributor offers an explanation and defense of their model, the other three contributors write responses to said model, and the initial author will write a single rejoinder to the three responders.
zoom.
Ryan Mullins will hold a lecture on “God, Freedom and Evil” followed by an introduction to the program’s curriculum and a Q&A..
Register now for the event: https://www.unilu.ch/.../theirs/forms/digital-open-day/
About the Master's programme:
Philosophy study programmes are often designed in an agnostic way – as if God didn’t exist - and do not consider the documented growing interest in religion, both globally and among philosophy students in particular. In those rare cases where religion is indeed considered, only the relationship between philosophy and Christianity is delved into, as if other religions, especially Judaism and Islam, did not exist and played little to no role in the history of philosophy. The PhilTeR Master's fills these gaps with an international, interreligious and high quality fully online study programme in Philosophy, Theology and Religions.
The courses are taught by the following professors:
Peter Adamson (LMU Munich / King’s College London) Jehoschua Ahrens (Lucerne) Maria Rosa Antognazza (King’s College, London) David Giuseppe Arie Anzalone (Lucerne) Marienza Benedetto (Bari) Paul Richard Blum (Loyola University, Maryland) Charles Burnett (Warburg Institute, London) Emanuele Colombo (Chicago) Richard Cross (Notre Dame, Indiana) Simon Erlanger (Lucerne) David Falessi (Lucerne) Tyron Goldschmidt (Rochester, New York) Warren Zev Harvey (Jerusalem) Christoph Helmig (Cologne) Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (Basel) Anthony Kenny (Oxford) Gyula Klima (Fordham University, New York) Marco Lamanna (Lucerne) Gary Carl (Muhammad) Legenhausen (Qom) Olga Lizzini (Aix-Marseille) Winfried Löffler (Innsbruck) Maria Evelina Malgieri (Turin) Ryan Mullins (Helsinki) Mostafa Najafi (Lucerne) Pasquale Porro (Turin) Santiago Ramos (Rockhurst, Kansas) Ulrich Rudolph (Zürich) Ferenc Ruzsa (Budapest) Ursula Schumacher (Karlsruhe) Roman Seidel (FU Berlin) Erdal Toprakyaran (Tübingen / Lucerne) Giovanni Ventimiglia (Lucerne).
Scolarships are available!
contact: [email protected]
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