John Rawls's theory of justice

John Rawls argues that the Original Position’s veil of ignorance makes it rational for anyone to opt for the Difference Principle, which ensures that social inequalities maximizes benefits for the worst-off . However, critics assert that to make such a strong commitment to the Difference Principle, one must be extremely risk-averse to take the possibility of being the worst-off seriously. This is not necessarily so since the Difference Principle is likely to produce instrumental goods, which even those with greater risk-appetite will want, but this will be an inadequate defence. Rawls also claims that we do not deserve deserts since the distribution of talent is a natural lottery but nonetheless entitled to incentives to achieve maximin . While I agree with the critics that “worst-off by choice” present issues of moral hazard, this is not a significant challenge to the difference principle. Finally, I will argue that those who are well-off are both deserving and entitled to desert, so the Difference Principle can still hold. Overall, the Difference Principle can be defended to a large extent.

This study will focus on general remarks about Rawlsian conception of justice and what he calls "justice as fairness". It will explain the core ideas behind Rawls’s social contract theory, such social cooperation applicable among all members of the society and elaborate on two most significant contributions of Rawls’s theory, namely ‘a veil of ignorance’, behind which the principles of justice are chosen and his famous ‘original position’. The paper will conclude on remarks on scholars aims at developing a theory that could serve as the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.

Rawls champions the cause of the poor because of his strong moral sentiments about the eradication of poverty. I present these sentiments that he converts into normative elements of his theory of justice. However, the conceptual framework and intellectual resources that he uses to articulate these sentiments are inadequate. His sentiments against poverty cannot be accommodated neatly, simply, and coherently in his liberal theoretical framework. Also, I point out that his definition for the identification of poor people as the least advantaged members of society is not adequate. I therefore refashion his theory so that it can properly account for the fundamental interests of poor people. I present an alternative conception to revise Rawlsian liberalism to enable it to adequately champion the cause of the poor. I provide an alternative definition of poverty and apply Mill’s analysis of the relation between justice and utility to Rawls’ theory of justice.

Society progresses not through acceptance of injustices, in contrary, it progresses through
the courage of few men and women who oppose discrimination and challenge hateful bureaucracies. In the following analysis, three distinctive leaders will be used to understand the difference between non-violent civil disobedience and violent resistance. Following this, they will be used to determine, if ever, an individual faced with an unjust law in moving from non- violent disobedience to violent action is deemed justifiable. Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, and Captain John Brown all share the fundamental experience of being an African American in the United States. Malcolm X and Martin Luther King’s fight for liberty was to not only end the racial segregation in everyday life, but to eliminate the systemic disadvantages the African American community experienced. In contrast, Captain John Brown’s advocacy, justified by leading transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau, relied solely on portraying the “willful and wicked” (Thoreau, 1859) violent oppression against African Americans in the United States. This paper will reveal that there is a difference in degree between non-violent civil disobedience and violent resistance. Moreover, that in moving from non-violent to violent action is not a question “about the weapon, but the spirit [and situation] in which you use it” (Thoreau, 1859). Through comparing Martin Luther King’s diplomatic approach for justice with Captain John Brown’s violent resistance, it will become clear that Brown’s violence was required and unavoidable. Revealing that Martin Luther King’s philosophy was not applicable within the society Brown was in. This paper will then compare Malcolm X’s Ballots or the Bullets with Thoreau’s Plea for Captain John Brown. Through using A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, it will become clear that violent resistance was not justifiable in Malcolm X’s case, and that the degree of injustice and consequences of violent action must first be evaluated.

E galitarian theories of justice must answer two basic questions: (1) to what extent (and for what reasons) is inequality justi®ed, and (2) insofar as one cares about equality, what does one care about? What is the proper target of egalitarian concern? 1 Two answers to the second question are the most common: resources and well-being. John Rawls, perhaps the leading defender of a resources-metric, argues that justice requires equality in the distribution of (social) primary goods except where inequality is to everyone's advantage (and especially to the advantage of the least advantaged). Defenders of the alternative metric generally de®ne well-being either subjectively (for example, as welfare, utility, preference-satisfaction) or objectively (for example, in terms of functioning). But what unites the critics of a resources-metric is the belief that what matters, for a theory of distributive justice, is not simply the quantity or extent of the resources people have, but how they are bene®ted by their share of resources. How much utility or welfare are they able to derive from their resources? To what extent does their share of resources enable them to function in ways that are crucial for living well? A resources-metric is therefore said to be unfair to people with expensive preferences and plans of life. Resources (for example, Rawlsian primary goods) arè`differentially useful'' to people with different preferences and ends. 2 Because a resources-metric ignores the ways in which individuals vary in the ef®ciency with which they are able to convert resources into well-being (however that is de®ned), it is said to be in¯exible and overly rigid. 3 I shall discuss the welfare-egalitarian critique of a resource-metric by considering Richard Arneson's criticisms of John Rawls's theory of justice. In both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, Rawls defends the use of a resources-metric for addressing questions of distributive justice. Whether one person is more (or less) advantaged than another person is to be determined by the index of resources (in particular, primary goods) each person has (or can reasonably expect) over a lifetime. Rawls explicitly rejects welfare as the proper metric for equality. The fact that some

Published in 1964, James Meade’s *Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property* packs an incredible concentration of insightful analysis and provocative policy ideas in under 100 pages. The book is a brilliant exploration of what a more egalitarian society might look like, and of what measures might help us to get there.

As a work that went on to exert a deep influence on both the economists Thomas Piketty and Tony Atkinson, and the philosopher John Rawls, it does not merit the relative neglect in which it now rests. Time is ripe for its rediscovery.

Online at Policy Network here: https://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4909&title=James-Meade-and-predistribution-50-years-before-his-time

The tax system is central to the operation of states and to the ways in which states interact with individual citizens. Taxes are used by states to fund the provision of public goods and public services, to engage in direct or indirect forms of redistribution, and to mould the behaviour of individual citizens through incentivizing certain activities (such as charitable giving, or investment in new technology) through tax breaks, or to dissuade people from engaging in other activities by means of Pigouvian taxes, including ‘sin taxes’ (such as those associated with the consumption of alcohol or tobacco). Given the absolute centrality of the tax system to some of the main functions of the state, the analysis of conceptual and normative issues relating to taxation should be at the heart of political philosophy. The shape of the tax system is
an unavoidably and irreducibly normative matter, and one which implicates a number of core concerns of social justice.² When we think about issues of social justice in practice, we cannot avoid thinking at the same time about tax.

Given that taxation is one of the most significant mechanisms for interaction between states and individual citizens, it is perhaps surprising that there has not been as much work on taxation within political philosophy as one might have expected. This is not, of course, to say that political philosophy has been silent about tax. But as the chapters in this volume show, there are a number of pressing and significant
philosophical issues relating to the tax system, and these issues often connect in fascinating ways with foundational questions regarding property rights, democracy, public justification, state neutrality, stability, political psychology, and a range of other issues. Many of these deep and fascinating philosophical questions about tax have not always received as much sustained attention as they clearly merit. Our hope
is that this book will advance the debate along a number of these philosophical fronts, and be a welcome spur to further work.
 
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Este artículo intenta analizar, mediante un juego de lenguaje, las interacciones de Rawls (como proponente de una teoría de la justicia distributiva) con Nozick y Harsanyi. Aunque sus dos contradictores creyeron haber encontrado estrategias ganadoras en el juego propuesto por Rawls, intentamos mostrar que el ultimo, mediante su definición de racionalidad en la posición original, logró construir una estrategia ganadora.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Atualmente, existem dois modelos distintos e antagônicos para as negociações dos direitos de transmissão televisiva e a distribuição dos recursos advindos destas vendas entre os principais campeonatos nacionais de futebol da Europa e o Campeonato Brasileiro. De um lado, há os exemplos de ligas que decidiram negociar de modo coletivo e adotar um modelo igualitário na divisão dos recursos, como é o caso da Premier League (Inglaterra), Bundesliga (Alemanha) e Ligue 1 (França). Mais recentemente, Serie A (Itália) e La Liga (Espanha) seguiram o mesmo modelo. Em ambos os casos, entretanto, foram necessárias intervenções dos respectivos governos nacionais (Estado) para que se implementasse um modelo coletivo de negociação e se regulamentasse uma divisão que buscasse a preservação da isonomia competitiva através de uma distribuição mais equânime. No Brasil, até 2011, os direitos de transmissão televisiva do Campeonato Brasileiro eram negociados pelo Clube dos Treze, uma entidade privada, que concentrava os recursos sob os interesses de seus associados. Situação que criava, então, um pequeno e privilegiado grupo de elite (um “clube de ricos”, como diria Noam Chomsky). Situação que gerava brutal desigualdade. Fazendo surgir o que Leite Júnior definiu como “apartheid futebolístico”. Entretanto, após o imbróglio envolvendo as negociações dos contratos referentes ao período de 2012-2014, o Clube dos Treze viu parte de seus associados boicotarem a negociação coletiva imposta pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), uma vez que Globo e C13 haviam firmado acordo (Termo de Compromisso de Cessação - TCC) para que fosse encerrada uma investigação por formação de cartel, referente a contrato de 1997-1999. Os clubes partiram, então, para negociações individuais com a Rede Globo – modelo que tende a concentrar o poder nas mãos de poucos clubes, no caso brasileiro, com maior ênfase, em Flamengo e Corinthians. O modelo de negociação individual também é adotado no futebol português. A experiência portuguesa tem demonstrado – como nos últimos contratos celebrados por Benfica, Porto e Sporting – que este modelo tende a aprofundar as desigualdades entre os clubes. A partir destes estudos comparados e tendo como base referências teóricas que fundamentam o Estado Democrático de Direito e a garantia da equidade, “Cotas de televisão do Campeonato Brasileiro” busca compreender qual dos modelos de negociação das vendas dos direitos de transmissão e distribuição dos recursos se aproxima mais dos ideais da Isonomia, princípio basilar do sistema democrático, e da “justiça como equidade” como preconizada por John Rawls. O material deste livro serviu de base para a fundamentação e justificação dos projetos de lei 7681/14 e 755/15, que objetivavam regulamentar a questão dos direitos de TV no futebol brasileiro.

Distributive justice assumes a morally critical judgment of nature, which typically contradicts providential conceptions. Hence, simple conceptions of divine Providence cannot support distributive justice. This essay analyzes and develops a complex strand of theorizing about Providence within Jewish philosophy that is compatible with distributive justice. According to this conception, the actions of divine Providence express different and mutually exclusive considerations of justice. Therefore, the moral value of outcomes is intransitive between the situations of different people. And while each providential action is justified from an ethical perspective, the total outcome is distinct from God's ultimate desire. Human ethics responds to this disparity by redistribution. This conception of Providence also contributes to the additional issue of inter-generational justice through the concomitant idea of life missions. The classical rendering of missions creates problems, however, for distributive justice. I conclude by formulating a conception of life missions that is compatible with both distributive and intergenerational justice.

John Rawls ve Hayek Sarmalında Adalet Karşılaştırması Üzerine Bir İnceleme " Adalet toplumsal kurumların ilk erdemidir " Adalet kavramı siyaset felsefesi alanındaki ana tartışma konularından biridir. Adil toplumun ne olduğu ve nasıl düzenlenmesi gerektiği yönündeki tartışmalar binlerce yıl öncesinde olduğu gibi günümüzde de güncelliğini korumaktadır. Bu çalışmada Adalet üzerine iki önemli düşünürün yaklaşımları ele alınacak ve açıklanacaktır. John Rawls Bir Adalet Teorisi (A Theory of Justice)'nde doğrunun iyi olana öncüllüğünden hareketle adalet ilkelerinin herhangi bir ahlakî, dinî ya da metafiziksel iyi anlayışından bağımsız olarak herkesin kabul edeceği normlara göre belirlemiştir. Çünkü ona göre, ahlâkın en temel formda muhakemeyi yapana göre değişmeyeceğidir. Bu durumda ahlâkın haklılaştırması muhâkemesinde Tanrı'ya gerek yoktur. Tanrı varlığı, ahlâki gerekçelendirmenin gerekli kurallarını belirleyemez. Dolayısıyla adâlet ve ahlâk, Tanrı'nın onaylamasına gerek olmaksızın yeryüzündeki insanların makul muhakemesiyle gerçekleştirilebilir. Rawls'un teorisinde-Kantçı yapısalcılıktan yola çıkarak-liberal rasyonel birey sadece kendi çıkarları peşinde koşarken, makul olan birey ise diğerlerinin çıkarını ya da düşünceleri dikkate alan bireydir. Klasik liberallerin David Hume'dan bu yana terk ettiği toplumsal sözleşme kuramı Rawls'un Bir Adalet Teorisi'nde tekrardan canlanırken, bu toplum sözleşmesine göre, bireyler rasyonel olarak kendi çıkarları peşinde koşarken birbirinin kurdu olmalarını engelleyen, bireyin amaç olarak kabul edildiği bir ahlâk ile sınırlıdırlar. Rawls'un ulaşmaya çalıştığı yapısalcılık formu diğer etik konuları dışlayan fakat adâlet üzerine odaklanan siyasal bir yaklaşımdır. Bu yaklaşım, evrensel ya da kozmopolit bir toplumdan ziyâde, kapalı bir toplum içinde savunulmaktadır. Bu savunma demokrasiyi ve sınırlarını benimsememiş, marjinalize olmuş, vatandaş olmayan diğerlerine hitap etmez. Teori aslen yerel olana aittir. Onun düşüncesine göre ise, tüm değerlerin âdil dağıtılmasıyla ilgili bir yapısalcı form oluşturmak vardır. Sadece basit olarak gelir ve refah ile sınırlı değildir; özgürlükler, siyasal güç, fırsatlar olmak üzere bir çok değeri içermektedir. Rawls'un adalet teorisi doğrunun iyi karşısında öncelikli olduğundan hareketle adım adım Orjinal Pozisyon, Bilgisizlik Peçesi, Düşünümsel Denge, Maximin Kuralı, Pareto Optimumu, Adaletin İki İlkesi, İki İlke Arasındaki Lexical Düzen'den Oluşan Düşünsel halkalardan soyut bir zincir oluşturulmasına ve böylece adalet teorisinin inşa edilmesine imkan vermektedir. Rawsl'un amaçlarından bir tanesi her zaman, her yerde kabul görecek olan evrensel adalet ilkelerini kabul gördürmeye çalışmaktır. Bu yüzden, belli bir iyiyi maksimize etmek amacıyla bir doğruyu tanımlayan etik teorilerinin ahlâki olarak geçersiz olduğunu savunmaktadır. Çünkü insanların iyileri farklıdır ve çeşitlidir. Ona göre, ilk doğru olan bulunmalı, daha sonra doğruya dair ilkeler farklı ahlâki iyileri tanımlamak için kullanılmalıdır. Rawls'un teorisinde, birey toplumsal yapı içine gömülüdür ve toplumsal kurumlar tarafından belirlendiği açık şekilde kabul edilmektedir. Doğrunun iyiye önceliği bireyin iyisini, belirlenmiş doğru çerçevesinde sınırlamaktadır. Doğrunun iyi karşısında öncelikli olması, hakkaniyet olarak adalet teorisinin farklı hayat planları arasında nötr olmasını garanti etmektedir. İnşa edilecek adalet teorisinin kamusal bir haklılaştırmaya dayanması gereklidir. Adaletin iki ilkesi, orjinal pozisyondaki taraflarca belirlenmektedir. Rawls'un düşünsel yolculuğunda orjinal pozisyon, metodolojik olarak ilk uğraktır.

Those who criticize as well as those who nowadays defend constructivism in metaethics consider John Rawls’s constructivism to be incomplete. According to them, his ontological agnosticism makes evident this incompleteness; I question this widely accepted charge. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Rawls’s agnosticism is the effect of his metaethics rather than a lack of metaethics. Thanks to this interpretation, I question the originality and attractiveness of Rawls’s metaethics. My claim is that Rawls’s metaethics adequately captures the specific historical nature of political norms.

Les critiques aussi bien que les défenseurs contemporains du constructivisme métaéthique jugent incomplet le constructivisme développé par John Rawls. Ils considèrent que son agnosticisme ontologique est un signe évident de l’incomplétude de sa position métaéthique. L’ambition de cet article est de contester ce verdict généralement accepté, en produisant une interprétation alternative de l’agnosticisme ontologique de Rawls, selon laquelle cet agnosticisme est l’effet de sa position métaéthique plutôt qu’un défaut de position métaéthique. Sur cette base, je pose à nouveaux frais la question de l’originalité et de l’attractivité de la métaéthique rawlsienne. Je montre que
l’attractivité de la métaéthique rawlsienne se situe dans sa capacité à saisir l’historicité spécifique des normes de justice.

It is rare to find a book in political philosophy whose arguments successfully utilize both
ideal and non-ideal theory. Rarer still does one find a book in political philosophy that
takes seriously the proposition that the oppressed are not merely passive victims to injustice, but rather rational and moral agents, capable of making meaningful and informed choices concerning those things they have reason to value. Dark Ghettos does both. In this book, Tommie Shelby develops a number of new and provocative arguments for establishing a more just society. His unremitting focus on the ‘basic structure’ puts him firmly in the Rawlsian camp. But Shelby is no ordinary Rawlsian, and Dark Ghettos is no ordinary political analysis. Labeling himself an ‘egalitarian pluralist’, he examines
the challenges of ghetto poverty through a very hybrid theoretical lens, one incorporating
feminist, Black nationalist, and Marxist principles. And, in addressing his principled
arguments to the concerns of Black people, Shelby continues a long conversation among
Black intellectuals dating back to the nineteenth century. Indeed, one hears echoes of
DuBois but also Delany, Garvey, Newton, Boxill, and Wilson among others.

This chapter examines what Rawls says in A Theory of Justice about friendship  as an interpersonal relationship. Section I contends that Rawls is thinking of friendship as well as the family as one of society’s smaller associations or social unions, even if he does not always state this. Section II observes that he numbers friendship among the human goods and I advance friendship as the clearest of his examples of a complementary good. Section III looks at the role of friendship in TJ’s analyses of guilt and shame. Section IV uncovers the central role that friendship plays in the morality of association stage of moral development. Section V shows that a focus on friendship brings the more Aristotelian features of Rawls’ thinking to light. The Conclusion points to some of the ways in which this depiction of friendship dovetails with some of the other strands of Rawls scholarship. Although friendship is not synonymous with the common good, it is a common or shared good that also requires a shared understanding of its goodness.

Abstract
This essay examines the significantly different approaches of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt to the problem of judgment in democratic theory and practice.
Keywords
Rawls, Arendt, judgment, Wittgenstein, democratic theory, Frederick Douglass

Liberalism is a term employed in a dizzying variety of ways across the humanities and social sciences. This essay seeks to reframe how the liberal tradition is understood. I start by delineating different types of response – prescriptive, comprehensive, explanatory – that are frequently conflated in answering the question “what is liberalism?” I then discuss assorted methodological strategies employed in the existing literature: after rejecting “stipulative” and “canonical” approaches, I outline a contextualist alternative. On this (comprehensive) account, liberalism is best characterised as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, over time. In the remainder of the article I present an historical analysis of shifts in the meaning of liberalism in Anglo-American political thought between 1850 and 1950, focusing in particular on how John Locke came to be seen as a liberal. I also explore the emergence of the category of "liberal democracy". I argue that the scope of the liberal tradition was massively expanded during the middle decades of the twentieth century, such that it came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West. This capacious (and deeply confusing) understanding of liberalism was produced by a conjunction of the ideological wars fought against “totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences. Today we both inherit and inhabit it.

Bu çalışma, John Rawls'un adalet teorisinin tarihi ve felsefi bağlamda eleştirel bir analizidir. Bu amaçla Bir Adalet Teorisi'nden (1971) İnsaf olarak Adalet: Yeni bir İfade (2001)'ye kadar olan eserleri incelenmiştir. Sadece Rawls'un adalet teorisi değil, aynı zamanda metafizik ve metaetiğe olan yaklaşımı da insaf olarak adaleti derinlemesine anlamak için ele alınmıştır. Rawls'un ana argümanları ve tezlerini ortaya koyarken, en önde gelen eleştirmenleriyle birlikte eleştirel bir yaklaşım benimsenmiştir. Bunun için bu çalışma, Rawls'un teorisinin çalışılabilir olup olmadığı, tam olarak neyi savunduğu, insaf olarak adalet ile neyi hedeflediği ve tutarlı olup olmadığı gibi soruların cevabını aramaktadır. Maalesef, Rawls'un tutarlı bir eşitlikçi ve aynı zamanda liberal bir adalet teorisi öneremediği görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, o özgürlük ve eşitlik fikirlerini uzlaştıramamıştır.

J. RAWLS'IN İKTİSADİ ADALET TEORİSİ VE TÜRKİYE EKONOMİSİ YAŞAR ALKAN DANIŞMAN PROF. DR. BÜNYAMİN DURAN MANİSA 2018 T.C. MANİSA CELAL BAYAR ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ DOKTORA TEZİ İKTİSAT ANABİLİM DALI İKTİSAT PROGRAMI J. RAWLS'IN İKTİSADİ ADALET TEORİSİ VE TÜRKİYE EKONOMİSİ YAŞAR ALKAN DANIŞMAN PROF. DR. BÜNYAMİN DURAN MANİSA 2018 iv v vi ÖZET J. RAWLS'IN İKTİSADİ ADALET TEORİSİ VE TÜRKİYE EKONOMİSİ Bu çalışmada adaletin iktisadi boyutu ele alınmaktadır. Adalet Aristo'dan beri 'değerlerin değeri' olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu konuda hem Tevrat'ta ve Kur'an'da hem de Doğulu ve Batılı düşünürlerin eserlerinde adaletin içeriği hakkında görüşler sunulmuştur. Yirminci yüzyılda adalet konusunda en kapsamlı çalışmayı J. Rawls yapmıştır. O da adaleti Aristo gibi diğer değerlere öncelemiş, her şeyin faydacılık uğruna feda edildiği bir ortamda adaleti vurgulayıp faydacılığa karşı çıkmıştır. Rawls, Kantçı geleneğe tabi olarak insanın başkalarının çıkarı için araçsallaştırılamayacağını, amaç olarak görülmesi gerektiğini vurgulamıştır. Rawls, yaşadığı çağdaki aşırı pozitivizmin baskısı altında adaleti temellendirirken Kant'tan farklı bir yöntem seçmiştir. Kant'ın numenal-aşkınmetafizik boyutlu yöntemi yerine Rawls, ampirik 'fıtrat durumu' (orginal pozition) analojisinden hareket etmiştir. Sandel'in ifadesiyle 'metafiziksiz bir liberalizm' kurmaya çalışmıştır. Rawls insan beni ile niteliklerini birbirinden ayırarak değişmelerden etkilenmeyen bir ben'i savunmuştur. Bu yaklaşım iktisadi adalet açısından kişinin niteliklerinin ortak sosyal bir değer olduğu, kişiyi ödüllendirme ya da cezalandırma aracı olarak görülmemesi sonucunu doğurmaktadır. Dolayısıyla gelir ve servet, toplumdaki en dezavantajlı durumda olanların en avantajlı çıkacağı şekilde dağıtılmalıdır. Ona göre liberal özgürlükçülerin ve meritokratik fırsat eşitlikçilerinin önerdiği sosyal politikalar yeterli değildir. Eşitsizlikleri ortadan kaldırmadan salt fırsat eşitliğinin sağlanması sonucu düzeltmeyecektir. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde adaletin ve iktisadi adaletin tanımları verilecektir. İkinci bölümde modern öncesi, üçüncü bölümde İslam'da, dördüncü bölümde Batı'da iktisadi adalet ele alınacaktır. Beşinci bölümde çalışmanın ana hattını oluşturan J. Rawls'ın iktisadi adalet açıklamaları analiz edilecektir. Nozick, Sandel ve MacIntyre'ın eleştirileri verilecektir. Altıncı bölümde ise Türkiye Ekonomisi çeşitli veriler ve endekslerle ekonomik adalete uygunluğu bakımından irdelenecektir. vii ABSTRACT J. RAWLS' THEORY OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND TURKISH ECONOMY This study deals with the economic dimension of justice. Justice has been accepted as the 'value of values' since Aristotle. In this regard, opinions were presented about the content of justice both in the Torah and the Qur'an, and in the works of Eastern and Western thinkers. J. Rawls did the most comprehensive work on justice in the 20th century. He also advocated justice like Aristotle and opposed utilitarianism by emphasizing justice in an environment where everything was sacrificed for the sake of utilitarianism. Rawls emphasized that, subject to the Kantian tradition, one should not be instrumentalized for the sake of others, but should be seen as a goal. Rawls chose a different method from Kant when he was grounded justice under the pressures of extreme positivism in the time he lived. Instead of Kant's numenal-transcendental-metaphysical dimension, Rawls moved from the empirical 'original position' analogy. He tried to establish 'liberalism without metaphysics' by Sandel's statement. Rawls has defended a self that is not affected by changes by separating qualities from self. This approach results in the fact that in terms of economic justice the qualities of a person are a common social value and are not seen as a means of rewarding or punishing a person. Therefore, income and wealth should be distributed in such a way that the in those most disadvantaged situation in society will be most advantageous. For him, the social policies proposed by liberal libertarians and meritocratic opportunists are not enough. Achieving equal opportunity without removing absolute inequalities will not fix the end result.

The ethical values and behaviors are not only abstract terms, but they are refined and conceptualized by real life experiences. The societal context where the actions of humans can be analyzed by ethical decision-making is entirely relevant to deliberate on what is the right thing to do, and what the moral agent should do, since the ethical values and principles response to the actual practices of life and to the needs of humans in the society. This elaboration takes us to the realm of social ethics.
This article reviews the definition and contextual meaning of social ethics at a broader level by giving special emphasis to the ethical theories and principles, focusing on the societal and public setting. Ethics will be deliberated with social and community aspects. Based on the principle of justice and public health ethics, the concept of social ethics has been investigated concisely through the relationship between man, as a moral person, and the society in exemplification of the issues of healthcare ethics. It is argued that the tension between individualism and communitarian needs can be reconciled with the perspective of social ethics by respecting the individual autonomy without disregarding the common good and social justice. By promoting the values of social responsibility, solidarity, social utility, social ethics has been proposed as the basis of a rational, moral, egalitarian, pluralistic, democratic society rising on the pillars of human rights and human dignity.

Keywords
Ethics, ethical theories, ethical principles, beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, common good, distributive justice, equality, individual freedom, public health ethics, public reason, social rights, social utility, solidarity, social responsibility.

In questo saggio confronterò alcuni aspetti della teoria della giustizia come equità di John Rawls con la teoria delle capacità di Amartya K. Sen. In particolare, tenterò di presentare un'analisi del concetto di "bene principale" rawlsiano comparandolo con quello seniano di "capacità" al fine di dimostrare che si tratta di una distinzione tradizionalmente delineata in termini eccessivi. La tesi centrale di questo lavoro, infatti, è che beni principali e capacità non siano concetti alternativi, ma diverse declinazioni di uno stesso argomento. I beni principali, infatti, possono essere correttamente intesi come elementi che concorrono alla realizzazione di capacità. Al fine di dimostrare ciò, proporrò una parziale ridefinizione dei due concetti e presenterò una lettura dei beni principali come "capacitazioni". Infine, affronterò il problema dell'indice dei beni principali e delle capacità fondamentali, per sostenere che la molteplicità delle istanze di giustizia è meglio garantita da una sua redazione in termini non specifici.

This article aims to trace back some of the theoretical foundations of medical ethics that stem from the philosophies of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and John Rawls. The four philosophers had in mind rational and autonomous human beings who are able to decide their destiny, who pave for themselves the path for their own happiness. It is argued that their philosophies have influenced the field of medical ethics as they crafted some very important principles of the field. I discuss the concept of autonomy according to Kant and JS Mill, Kant's concepts of dignity, benevolence and beneficence, Mill's Harm Principle (nonmaleficence), the concept of justice according to Aristotle, Mill and Rawls, and Aristotle's concept of responsibility.

Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives is the first edited collection devoted to addressing philosophical issues relating to tax. The tax system is central to the operation of states and to the ways in which states interact with individual citizens. Taxes are used by states to fund the provision of public goods and public services, to engage in direct or indirect forms of redistribution, and to mould the behaviour of individual citizens. As the chapters in this volume show, there are a number of pressing and significant philosophical issues relating to the tax system, and these issues often connect in fascinating ways with foundational questions regarding property rights, democracy, public justification, state neutrality, stability, political psychology, and a range of other issues. Many of these deep and challenging philosophical questions about tax have not always received as much sustained attention as they clearly merit. Our hope is that this book will advance the debate along a number of these philosophical fronts, and be a welcome spur to further work. The book’s aim of advancing the debate about tax in political philosophy has both general and more specific aspects, involving both overarching issues regarding the tax system as a whole and more specific issues relating to particular forms of tax policy. Serious philosophical work on the tax system requires an interdisciplinary approach—the discussion in this volume therefore includes contributions from a number of scholars whose expertise spans neighbouring disciplines, including political science, economics, public policy, and law.

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Ketika berbicara tentang konsep keadilan, tentunya para pakar ilmu filsafat, hukum, ekonomi, dan politik di seluruh belahan dunia tidak akan melewati pelbagai teori yang dikemukakan oleh John Rawls. Melalui karya-karyanya, seperti 'A Theory of Justice', 'Political Liberalism', 'The Law of Peoples', John Rawls dikenal sebagai salah satu seorang filsuf Amerika kenamaan di akhir abd ke-20. Tulisan ini akan mengulasi seputar teori keadilan John Rawls dan relevansinya dengan Konstitusi Indonesia.

Dalam makalah ini menjelaskan bagaimana konsep teori keadilan menurut sudut pandang John Rawls yang dikenal dengan justice as fairness, yang dianggap sebagai suatu jawaban terhadap kritik yang dibuat oleh penentang aliran utilitis. Ada dua prinsip keadilan menurut Rawls, yaitu prinsip kebebasan dan prinsip bahwa perbedaan sosial ekonomi harus menolong seluruh masyarakat serta para pejabat tinggi harus terbuka bagi semuanya.

Philosophische Bachelorarbeit über John Rawls Konzeption des zivilen Ungehorsams anhand seiner Gedanken in "A Theory of Justice" und "The Justification of Civil Disobedience". Geschrieben im Jahr 2021 an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Endnote: 1,0.

Methodological nationalism assumes that, to understand a phenomenon, nation-states are the relevant units of analysis. This assumption has been recognized as a source of bias in most of the social sciences. Does it bias Rawls’ understanding of justice, too? This paper argues that it does for at least two reasons. Firstly, what Rawls thinks justice requires on a global scale falls short of what states and international organisations actually do. Secondly, framing the difference principle in national terms, as Rawls did, is a way to increase the “citizenship rent”, or the revenue a person receives just by being citizen of a rich country . The paper argues that methodological nationalism biases Rawls’ understanding of justice by affecting both the plausibility and the coherence of his theory.

Se analiza en este libro una obra esencial para la filosofía política contemporánea como es «Las Esferas de la Justicia» (1983), del reconocido académico estadounidense Michael Walzer, profesor emérito del Institute for Advanced Study de la Universidad de Princeton.

En el capítulo I se comienza contextualizando dicha obra a partir de tres corrientes de pensamiento: el liberalismo, el neoliberalismo y el comunitarismo. Luego, se exhibe llanamente la concepción del autor acerca de ideales como la justicia, el pluralismo y la igualdad compleja. Se concluye que bienes sociales distintos deberían ser distribuidos por razones distintas, en arreglo a diferentes criterios y por distintos agentes; y que todas estas diferencias derivan de la comprensión de los bienes sociales como productos inevitables del particularismo histórico y cultural de una comunidad dada.

En el capítulo II se estudia específicamente la esfera de la justicia referida a la educación, concebida por Walzer como un bien social autónomo y cuyos muros deben impedir la influencia de factores externos, tales como el dinero o el poder. ¿Cómo se plantea la tiranía en la esfera de la educación? ¿Los vouchers o vales educativos de Friedman contribuyen al pluralismo? ¿Cuál es el papel de la escuela en una democracia? Interrogantes de este tipo son las que se pretende responder, teniendo como horizonte una sociedad igualitaria libre de dominación.

Arguments for public ownership come in many different forms. Some appeal to the potential efficiency gains if a specific firm or industry is in public hands. Others appeal to the distributional benefits of public ownership. One version of this distributional argument is that if assets are publicly-owned then the return to these assets, including capital gains, can be more readily shared with the citizenry at large rather than flowing to a privileged few. In this article we explore the way this argument is developed in the work of the Nobel Laureate economist James Meade and sketch a case for the continuing relevance of Meade’s ideas.

Because of the original position and the veil of ignorance, the theory of justice as fairness permits justice to be indeed fair. It shows why people want a fair and equal spread of rights and duties, and also an equal distribution of benefits, to value a place in society. Any variation in the distribution of benefits will only be acceptable because they are within acceptable limits of tolerance, or because some inequality of distribution benefits everyone, especially those whose abilities and assets are below average. So, some members of society can be privileged as long as all others benefit—usually because they undertake onerous duties on behalf of society—but the reverse is not just—that some people can be exploited to the benefit of others. Any such exploitation must lead to social discontent and offer the potential for revolution.

Religious freedom, and the status of religion in the public square, is presently a matter of worldwide debate. However, it is necessary to clarify the terms of the debate. This dissertation will offer a challenging invitation to deepen our understanding of the fundamental meaning of religious freedom by analyzing and challenging the notions of "religion," "freedom," and the "public square" as they have been commonly employed in discussions related to religious freedom and the place of religion in the public square in the works of Richard John Neuhaus, John Rawls, Robert Audi, José Casanovas, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor. It will also challenge the notion of "religious freedom" employed by international and legal documents, and in the work of David Schlinder, John Courtney Murray, and Martha Nussbaum. Following the work of Rainer Forst, it will also show why religious freedom should not be understood as "tolerance."
The goal of the book, then, is to provide a more effective way of dealing with issues of religious freedom and the place of religion in the public square. My investigation will be centered on Thomas Aquinas' notion of religion as a moral virtue, and Hanna Arendt's notion of political freedom. The novelty of this investigation will be in that the virtue of religion will be analyzed in connection to the proper place for the performance of its acts, namely, the private or the public sphere. The book will also show how Aquinas' notion of religion and its deviations (vices) offers a valuable guideline insofar as the public is concerned.
As a consequence, a new meaning will be offered on the notion of religious freedom, based on Aquinas' view of religion as virtue, and Arendt's notion of political freedom as a stage for virtue, which will help clarify the debate on religious freedom and the place of religion in the public square.

Desde el comienzo de Una Teoría de la Justicia, Rawls deja claro que su objetivo es ofrecer una explicación sistemática que sea superior al utilitarismo dominante. Contrario a este último, la filosofía rawlsiana no admite que los sacrificios impuestos a unos sean compensados por la mayor cantidad de ventajas disfrutadas por muchos. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, sin embargo, considera que Rawls no soluciona el problema del sacrificio, por lo que entre él y el Utilitarismo se conserva un parentesco de hermanos enemigos. En palabras de Jean- Pierre Dupuy, siendo ésta su tesis principal: “aplicados a una situación sacrificial, los principios de justicia de John Ralws justifican la lógica sacrificial”.

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From the beginning of A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes it clear that his aim is to offer a systematic explanation that is superior to the prevailing utilitarianism. In contrast to the latter, Rawlsian philosophy rejects the idea that the sacrifices imposed on some can be compensated for by the larger number of advantages enjoyed by many. According to Jean-Pierre Dupuy, however, Rawls does not solve the issue of sacrifice. Therefore, there remains between him and utilitarianism a relationship of enemy brothers. Dupuy's main thesis, in his own words, is that "applied to a sacrificial situation, John Rawls's principles of justice justify the sacrificial logic."

John Rawls was the most eminent political philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century and one who achieved canonical status within the tradition of western political thought for his theory of justice. According to many, he almost single-handedly revived political philosophy as a reputable field, at least among analytical philosophers. A part of the reason for his eminence is the sheer ambition of his undertaking. His first great work, A Theory of Justice, not only drew together in a single study all the major questions with which moral and political theorists had grappled but also deployed a dizzying array of methodological techniques drawn from economics, game theory, sociology, and philosophy, as well as from the history of moral and political thought. The motivation behind Rawls's enterprise, we now know, was not simply that of a scholar interested in abstract or technical puzzles but rather a genuine concern about matters of morality in a world that had just come out of war, and in a country-the United States-that was in the midst of a civil rights movement that questioned the legitimacy of its fundamental institutions, arising as they had out of a long and bitter history of slavery. Though these topics are not touched upon explicitly in Rawls's philosophical writings, they were very much at the back of his mind as he tried to craft a theory that he hoped would not merely engage academic philosophers but serve as a foundation for moral and political renewal.

The theory of justice as laid down by John Rawls has left an indelible impression in the field of law and politics. He has focused on the ideologies of liberty, equality and fair opportunity to all. He advocated the etiquettes of equality and social welfare. His theory encompassed the concept of redistributive justice with the analogy of original position and veil of ignorance. His theory was somehow foreshadowed by the framers of the Indian Constitution. It is very relevant in the current scenario specifically in underdeveloped and developing nations like India. In India, we have that the concept of redistributive justice which has been incorporated in the Preamble, the articles of the Constitution and many of the Indian laws. It helps us narrow the gap between the rich and the poor by meeting the needs of social and economic justice. In this research project, we will explore how Rawls' theory is adopted by the Indian legislators and the judges, and how far it has been successful in solving the pressing social, political and economic issues in India.

This work examines the role of caregivers in maintaining the autonomy of the vulnerable person at the end of life, taking into account respect for their dignity. The vulnerability of the Other necessarily involves the caregiver’s responsibility. Its paradigmatic values are defined in caregiving and its ‘mothering’ dimension.

The aim of this study, therefore, is to address vulnerability within nursing care and caregiving in the ethical and philosophical light of Ricœur and Lévinas. We will see that a nurse’s work with the person at the end of life is carried out thanks to an empowering form of care which makes it possible to maintain the autonomy of the person at the end of life as a drive ‘to act’.

The present qualitative-oriented research work is based on semi-directive interviews conducted in focus groups. The study was carried out at various health centres – in different hospital units, our population sampling is based on nurses’ professional experience.
The result of our research confirms that the nurse plays a leading role with the person at the end of life since he/she participates in maintaining the patient’s physical and moral autonomy. In addition, the nurse offers the person relational skills, which provide the patient with reassurance, information and decision-making support, if need be. The nurse thus intervenes as a factor of conversion and participates in the elaboration of empowering.

To sum up, we understand the importance of nursing metaparadigms which provide a foundation for building care within the caregiver-care receiver relationship, especially in an end-of-life context. This type of caregiving or care is fundamental in our relationship to others and in the recognition of an ethic of solicitude. Since this ethical aim builds our future caregiver identity, we can then form the hypothesis that a paradigm of recognition must be developed, in order to preserve this brand of care, especially within the current medical context, governed as it is by ever increasing profit seeking.

This essay is concerned with the question of what kind of economic system would be needed in order to realise Rawls’s principles of social justice. Hitherto, debates about ‘property-owning democracy’ and ‘liberal socialism’ have been overly schematic, in various respects, and have therefore missed some of the most important issues regarding the relationships between social justice and economic institutions and systems. What is at stake between broadly capitalist or socialist economic systems is not in fact a simple choice in a single dimension, but rather a range of choices across a range of different dimensions. This essay, then, has a dual objective: firstly, it aims to provide a richer account of this normative territory, while showing how issues of economic democracy, decommodification and the limits of markets, and the role of democratic economic planning, all raise questions of justice that are not well-captured by focussing only on questions of ownership. Secondly, it aims to show how the case for democratic socialism can be developed from Rawlsian foundations, in a way that is sensitive to the normative affinities between Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism and themes in socialist political thought, and which attends carefully to the different kinds of institutional elements which a stable, just, and democratic society would require. Taking these aims together, the hope is that we can move onwards to a richer debate about the ways in which the realisation of democratic socialist institutions may be seen as a requirement of social justice.