Metaethics

In THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY Nietzsche assess the value of the value judgments of morality from the perspective of human flourishing. His positive descriptions of the “higher men” he hopes for and the negative descriptions of the decadent humans he thinks morality unfortunately supports both point to a particular substantive conception of what such flourishing comes to. The Genealogy, however, presents us with a puzzle: why does Nietzsche’s own evaluative standard not receive a genealogical critique? The answer to this puzzle, I argue, lies in recognizing the centrality of the notion of “life”, and its connection to power, in Nietzsche’s overall account. Leiter has argued that his “Millian Model” provides the most charitable reconstruction of appeals to a privileged evaluative standard of power; this model ascribes an inference from a strong doctrine of the will to power according to which only power can be desired. I propose a “Benthamite Model” that ascribes an inference from the inescapability of a tendency towards power, a tendency that is essential to life. I argue that this model avoids the objections Leiter directs at the Millian Model.

This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon's meta-metaphysical view (about his notion of a domain, his criterion of existence, his ambition to remain ontologically thin, and on the role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon's pictures), showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view - to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys.

Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman's formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer-Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer-Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer-Landau's response is implausible as it stands, and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch's response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.

Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable to conditionalise all our moral commitments on the question of whether there are non-natural facts. Non-natural facts are causally inefficacious, and so make no difference to the world of our experience. And to be a realist about such facts is to hold that they are mind-independent. It is compatible with our experiences that there are no non-natural facts, or that they are very different from what we think. As Nagel says, realism makes scepticism intelligible. So the non-naturalist must hold that you might be wrong that your partner (for example) matters, even if you are correct about every natural, causal fact about your history and relationship. But to hold that conditional attitude to your partner would be a moral betrayal. So believing non-naturalist realism involves doing something immoral.

It has been often pointed out that one problem, perhaps the furthest reaching problem, of the constitutive primordiality of the manner in which Levinas uses the term ethics is the apparent impossibility of formulating a theory of action. If all is ethics, what is unethical? However, the author has a number of works in which he discusses the nature of prescription and its substantive contents at some length, these are his Talmudic Readings. In this paper, I will try to build a conceptual bridge between the apparently inert metaphysical primacy of ethics in the major works and the elucidation of norms and prescriptions in Levinas' account of the uptake of the law. In the next few pages, I will argue that it is possible to find in Levinas' account of what I shall call the performative uptake 1 of the law, the conditions necessary for the formulation of a theory of action-guiding principles without thus providing a substantive account of those principles. That is to say, we can infer from Levinas' account of the law, an account of the manner in which principles of adjudication and action-guidance take hold without thus committing to a substantive account of laws, that is of what the specific principles, in one or other system of law actually are. In arguing this position, I will make a few substantive claims. The first one is that according to Levinas the acceptance of law—not of any one law in particular but rather a primordial susceptibility to law—is the most radical expression of the constitutive primacy of ethics and that this acceptance is not deliberate but rather insurmountable and perhaps natural. The second one is that it is precisely within the scope of the articulation of this insurmountable susceptibility to law that the deliberate adjudication of particular laws and 1 The term uptake I borrow from J.L. Austin, who makes this form of active receptivity a central mechanism of his account of linguistic praxis in How to Do Things with Words.

Much of the best recent work in the normative areas in which Ethics publishes has resulted from advances made in other fields, both within philosophy (metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, for example) and without (economics, evolutionary biology, and theology, for example). With this issue Ethics offers the initial review in "From Outside of Ethics," an occasional series of reviews of books outside the bounds of moral, political, legal, and social philosophy that may nevertheless be of deep interest to people working in those fields. Richard, Mark. When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 184. $55.00 (cloth).

What is the right thing to do? This subject of normative inquiry seems to have pervaded into all echelons of theoretical academic circles. While debating a life time about what moral stands we ought to pursue and what beliefs to proscribe, we seem to have forgotten to question the genesis of the concept of morality itself. What is "the good"? And, thus, subsequently, what is "the bad"? This paper attempts to understand the notion of morality by analysing incest, as a practice of master morality. By applying a Nietzschean lens, this paper seeks to understand how morality has changed in the course of time and what it has meant in different epochs that have passed by. More importantly, incest is simply an entry point here to a larger discussion on the meta-ethics of it all. While engaging in a genealogy of morality, we must stop and raise questions about how are we to govern ourselves: by standards of morality prescribed by the times or by a larger understanding of ...

The Euthyphro objection is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the king objection to theistic meta-ethics. This paper proposes a response that hasn't been much explored within the contemporary literature, based on the metaphysics of dispositions and natural law theory. The paper will first contend that there is a parallel between ways theists conceptualise God's role in creating laws of nature and the ways God creates goods. Drawing upon these parallels I propose a possible response to the dilemma, where this response parallels the dispositionalist response as to how God creates laws of nature. I do this by first explicating a natural law theory of goodness, then I suggest how the ontology of dispositions can be used in a novel way to account for goods, and finally I explain how this all relates to the dilemma. I conclude the paper by posing some objections to myself and providing some replies.

This thesis investigates whether the epistemology of ethical intuitionism successfully accounts for moral knowledge in particular with regards to the following two questions: Do moral intuitions justify basic moral beliefs? Do moral intuitions count toward the truth of basic moral beliefs? I have four central goals. My first goal is to show that Robert Audi’s intuitionistic epistemology is mistaken with regards to what justifies a moral belief and what an intuition is (chapters 1-2.2). My second goal is to defend a revised version of Audi’s intuitionistic epistemology (chapter 2.3). My third goal is to show that intuitions are reliable cognitive deliverances that aim at truth, that is, having an intuition in support of a basic moral belief increases the epistemic probability of the belief (chapter 3.4-3.5). My fourth goal is to support the thesis that intuitions establish a direct awareness of basic moral truths (chapter 3.1-3.3 and 4)

Quali sono le implicazioni dell’evoluzionismo per l’etica? Il volume esplora la relazione tra l’evoluzionismo e la riflessione filosofica sull’etica, ricostruendo e facendo il punto su un dibattito tutt’ora in corso. In particolare, l’evoluzionismo viene preso in considerazione nelle varie declinazioni che esso ha attraversato, ossia a partire dalla formulazione originaria di Darwin, a quella della Sintesi moderna, fino ai suoi sviluppi più recenti. Ciò che si intende mostrare è che, sebbene rendere conto dell’etica in termini evolutivi sia spesso risultata un’operazione controversa, indagare la natura dell’etica a partire dalle sue basi biologiche, comprendere la sua origine e la sua evoluzione è un passo fondamentale per elaborare nuove e più proficue prospettive etiche e filosofiche.

What is the evaluative (or the normative -I will here run these things together)? There are two questions here. One is what it is for a property or a fact to be evaluative (as opposed to, e.g., simply being something we value or disvalue). Another is what it is for a linguistic expression or a concept to be evaluative (again as opposed to, e.g., simply being something which stands for something we value or disvalue, or being something we use to recommend or warn). Let us call the former question metaphysical and the latter conceptual.

Samuel Scheffler has argued that people value tradition for its own sake because they view it as accumulated experience, and as playing an important role in forming their personal integrity, structuring their lives, and providing them with a sense of belonging. These reasons, according to Scheffler, are de facto justifications that people offer for choosing to act on purely traditional grounds. In this essay, I argue that these de facto reasons must be supplemented if they are to be seen as de jure rational grounds for valuing tradition for its own sake. Such a supplementation would open up the possibility of articulating a coherent theory of moderate cosmopolitanism.

Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim "you ought to help others" is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the prudential maxim "you ought to brush your teeth twice a day". But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, to explain the difference. In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (nonnormative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures the key differences between morality and rationality.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Charles L. Stevenson’s metaethical view. Since his metaethical view is a form of emotivism, I will start by explaining what the core claims of emotivism are. I will then explore and comment on the specific claims of Stevenson’s proposal. Last, I will offer an overview of the objections that have traditionally been raised against emotivism.

A number of Christian theologians and philosophers have been critical of overly moralizing approaches to the doctrine of sin, but nearly all Christian thinkers maintain that moral fault is necessary or sufficient for sin to obtain. Call this the “Moral Consensus.” I begin by clarifying the relevance of impurities to the biblical cataloguing of sins. I then present four extensional problems for the Moral Consensus on sin, based on the biblical catalogue of sins: (1) moral over-demandingness, (2) agential unfairness, (3) moral repugnance, and (4) moral atrocity. Next, I survey several partial solutions to these problems, suggested by the recent philosophical literature. Then I evaluate two largely unexplored solutions: (a) genuine sin dilemmas and (b) defeasible sinfulness. I argue that (a) creates more problems than it solves and that, while (b) is well-motivated and solves or eases each of the above problems, (b) leaves many biblical ordinances about sin morally misleading, creating (5) a pedagogical problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that (5) places hefty explanatory burdens on those who would appeal to (b) to resolve the four extensional problems discussed in this paper. So Christian thinkers may need to consider a more radical separation of sin and moral fault.

"A maxim or rule of ethical conduct advocating reciprocal  relationship. Stated as “Do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets” (Matt 7:12 NIV;cf. Luke 6:31). Its negative formulation (also known as the Silver Rule) was prominent in early Judaism as formulated by Hillel the Elder ( הלל ) (c. 32 BC–AD 7), “That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and learn” (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a).

Jesus states that both the Golden Rule and the two greatest commandments are a summary of the law and prophets. In echoing Matthew 5:17, Jesus is calling the disciples to a righteousness greater than the Pharisee adherence to the letter of the Law. In 22:34–40 Jesus is challenged to summarize the law in a single greatest commandment. The quest for such a summary was common among Jewish teachers. The summary Jesus provides is of the intent rather than the letter of the law (France, 282). Jesus’ Greatest Commandment to “love your neighbor as yourself” is a restatement of Leviticus 19:18 and 34 (Matt 22:39, cf. Rom 13:8–10; Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8). The roughly contemporary rabbi Hillel the Elder, unlike his rival Shammai (50 BC–AD 30), also accepts the challenge to summarize the law. His formulation of the Golden Rule, however, is negatively focused. Other parallels are found throughout Jewish and pagan literature, but the focus is primarily negative. Jesus’ positive formulation is a stronger interpretation of the command to love one’s neighbor.

The description of this phrase as the “Golden Rule” is attributed to the Roman Emperor Alexander Severus (AD 22235), who had it inscribed in gold on the wall of his chamber. Similar references to this ethical principle are found throughout other cultures and religions. Confucius (551–479 BC) famously said, “Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you" (Analects 15:23). It may be found in ancient Babylon, China, Egypt, Persia, Rome, Greece, and India. It may be seen in Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Taoism, Scientology, Wicca, and others. In philosophical traditions it has a presence in Existentialism, Humanism, Platonism, modern psychology, and countless others. In comparing different formulations of the Golden Rule, one should note that each articulation has its cultural nuances. Reciprocity does not equal the love of the Golden Rule and oversimplified comparison should be avoided. Some forms of reciprocity amount to a debtor’s ethic or unrestrained self interest, where one seeks to ensure good treatment by others.

Criticisms of the Golden Rule have arisen in response to its sweeping reciprocity. George Bernard Shaw states that one should not do as they would be done by because “their tastes may not be the same” (“Maxims for Revolutionists”; 1903). Often referred to as the “Platinum Rule” Karl Popper wrote "The golden rule is a good standard which is further improved by doing unto others, wherever reasonable, as they want to be done by" (The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 1945). This critique, offered by many philosophers, highlights that different people want to be treated differently. Immanuel Kant critiqued it on the grounds that it does not sufficiently consider different situations. The rebuttal to these critiques is that the Golden Rule implies a consideration for how the other person wants to be treated. Marcus George Singer observed that the rule can be interpreted in one of two ways: One can take the rule as advocating one to do specific actions to others that one wants others to do to oneself, or one can govern their actions towards by general principles that one would like others to apply when acting toward oneself (The Ideal of a Rational Morality, 270). Jeffrey Wattles advocates applying the Golden Rule to one’s own method of using it (The Golden Rule, 6). In effect, the rule is self correcting and one should ask if they want others to apply the rule toward them in the same way they are applying it toward others.""

Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of making such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical implications than reflections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to a particularly important matter, namely climate change. First, I establish general conditions for when a moral judgement has any effect on those who accept it. Second, I show that the judgement that individuals in industrialized countries are morally obliged to act against climate change does not fulfil these conditions, and is thus neither beneficial nor harmful. Finally, I sketch several strategies for increasing people’s non-moral motivation to act against climate.

i JANI (Harsanyi), da bi njegov rad mo da mogao da se okvalifikuje kao kulminacija èitave zapadne filozofije morala (Singer)... 1 Po Heru, postoje dve glavne klase filozofa: klasa romantièara (koje ponekad naziva "mefistièarima") i klasa analitièara, èije je meðusobno suparništvo obele ilo ton i tokove filozofije u dvadesetom veku. Iako štošta mo e da se prigovori ovoj pojednostavljenoj klasifikaciji, ona nam mo e pomoaei da lociramo izvor Herovog opredeljenja za potonju klasu. Stoga je potrebno skrenuti pa nju na osnovnu ili najuoèljiviju karakteristiku prethodne klase, iz koje, po pretpostavci, proizlaze sve ostale njihove smutnje: odsustvo ili podreðena uloga diktuma clare et distincte -Her bi èak rekao odsustvo elje da se piše jasno. Prema analitièarima, pisati jasno i misliti racionalno znaèi oslanjati se na logiku kao na pouzdano sredstvo za razlikovanje dobrih od loših argumenata. Ujedno, to je dobro isproban metod koji nam na uverljiv naèin razotkriva opskurnosti romantièarskih (u èiju je klasu Her ubrajao, izmeðu ostalih, veaeinu marksista) i polu-romantièarskih (u èiji je tabor neoprezno stavio, na primer, Vitgenštajna) kombinacija predrasuda i retorike. 2 Kad bi se govorilo o razvoju Herove filozofije morala, to bi pre bila prièa o njegovom naporu da odbrani, proširi i poboljša vlastite ideje, nego o nameri da ih promeni ili odbaci (up. Hudson, 1988: 9). Ukratko, Herov teorijski napor bio je usmeren u pravcu zasnivanja celovitog moralnog sistema. Celovit moralni sistem èinila bi sprega dve teorije, èije elemente, meðutim, ne treba meðusobno mešati: metaetike i normativne etike (praktièna etika pripadala bi domenu primene ove dve teorije, ali mo e va iti i kao njihov raison d'être) (up. MT: 5). Drugim reèima, etiku èine njen formalni i njen supstancijalni (sadr inski) deo. Kada govorimo o formalnom delu etike, podrazumevamo metaetièki ili fundamentalni nivo moralnog mišljenja. S druge strane, kada govorimo o supstantivnom delu etike, Her sugeriše da bi na umu trebalo da imamo dva nivoa normativnog moralnog mišljenja -intuitivni i kritièki. Prema njegovoj zamisli, tri navedena nivoa, uzeta zajedno, èine strukturu moralnog mišljenja. 12 1 Videti uvodne delove èlanaka pomenutih autora u: Seanor & Fotion, eds. (1988). 2 Èitav ovaj pasus uporediti sa HC, "Comments: Introduction": 204; EPhM, "A School for Philosophers": 44; EET, "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism": 212; SOE: 2-3, 10. 8

Sobre ética y moral Algunas precisiones útiles para estudiantes de deontología jurídica Resumen: El presente trabajo no pretende ser particularmente innovador. Existen ya muchos que pretenden serlo. No existe un secreto oculto para los no iniciados. Nuestro propósito es mucho más simple, mas no menos relevante, el hacer el origen y la evolución de los términos ética y moral lo más explícito posible para los estudiantes que dan sus primeros pasos en el estudio de la deontología jurídica, un tema que a veces no recibe la atención que merece por parte de las facultades de Derecho. Quien dice origen y evolución también dice palabra, porque en el comienzo de las cosas siempre está el lenguaje, de ahí que este primer paso esté enraizado en el análisis lingüístico de la ética y la moral. No podemos pensar en un problema que pueda ser abordado antes que este si se pretende realizar un estudio serio y coherente sobre deontología. Aquí nos dedicaremos a aclarar los antecedentes etimológicos de los términos moral y ética, sus usos lingüísticos modernos, así como los contenidos conceptuales asignados a las nociones de ética descriptiva, ética normativa y, especialmente, metaética.

Constitutivism is the view that we can justify fundamental normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims merely in virtue of acting.  Constitutivists aspire to show that action has structural features—constitutive aims, principles, or standards—that are present in each instance of action and that generate substantive normative conclusions.  In showing that the authority of fundamental normative claims is sourced in our own actions, constitutivists hope to avoid familiar objections to justificatory projects in ethics. 

This essay provides a very brief overview of constitutivism. Section one outlines the basic structure of constitutivism.  Sections two and three examine how the constitutive feature would generate normative results.  Section four considers an objection to the constitutivist theory.  Section five distinguishes between constitutivist theories that attempt to provide fully general accounts of normativity and more modest versions.  Section six asks how much normative content constitutivist theories are supposed to generate.  Section seven concludes.

Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) was a Finnish philosopher whose work covered a variety of topics from induction to modal logic and from value theory to philosophy of action. He is also widely known for his succeeding Wittgenstein as professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1948, and as one of Wittgenstein’s literary executors. Von Wright never developed a detailed ethical theory, but he made some significant attempts at providing what he believed to be parts of the crucial conceptual groundwork for moral philosophy. I shall here focus on (1) his account of the notion of the good of man in The Varieties of Goodness, (2) the analyses of moral concepts in terms of this notion, (3) von Wright’s metaethics, and (4) his pioneering work in deontic logic.

This is the first chapter of my 'Metaethics', an upper-level textbook I published with Palgrave-Macmillan in 2012.  In it I lay out the terrain before I begin to discuss various types of realism, error theory, noncognitivism, moral motivation, etc.

This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I analysis of devotion; an examination of its motivational role; and an explanation of its connection to a distinctive form of valuing, in which certain values are seen as inviolable and are rendered invulnerable to the typical effects of justificatory reflection. In the second part of the book, I assess the ethical significance of devotion, arguing that certain forms of ethically praiseworthy relationships require devotion. In the third part, I examine how devotion can easily devolve into pathological forms. I focus on fanaticism, arguing that devotion can arise from a particular form of psychological fragility that is linked to group violence. I further argue that this form of fragility can be stoked by group resentment, and that certain social groups can thus be fanatical in the sense that they encourage the emergence of individual fanatics. In the final part of the book, I ask whether there are ways of preserving some of the beneficial features of devotion while avoiding their pathologies. I investigate whether we can be devoted through irony; through affirmation; and through what I call the "Deepening Move." Each of these stances preserves a degree of flexibility and openness in the object of devotion; each one tries to preserve a form of wholehearted devotion despite this openness. (The attached file contains the introductory chapter. Email or message me if you'd like a draft of the entire book.)

This article takes the “toxic masculinity” (TM) trope as a starting point to examine recent cultural shifts in common assumptions about gender, morality, and relations between the sexes. TM is a transculturally widespread archetype, or moral trope about the kind of man one shouldn’t be. Revisiting my early fieldwork on transnational sexualities against a broader analysis of the historical, ethnographic, and evolutionary record, I describe the broad cross-cultural recurrence of similar ideal types of men and women (good and bad), and the rituals through which they are culturally encouraged and avoided. I argue that the TM trope is normatively useful if and only if it is presented alongside a nuanced spectrum of other gender archetypes (positive and negative), and discussed in the context of human universality and evolved complementariness between the sexes. I make a case for the importance of strong gender roles, and the rites and rituals through which they are cultivated as an antidote to current moral panics about oppression and victimhood.  I conclude by discussing stoic virtue models for the initiation of boys, and argue that they are compatible with the normative commitments of inclusive societies that recognize gender fluidity along the biological sex spectrum.

Che cos'è un obbligo morale? E un valore? Cosa intendiamo quando affermiamo che un'azione è buona? Come riconosciamo le norme e i doveri che pretendono di guidare il nostro comportamento? Possiamo considerare i concetti morali come parte integrante del mondo che ci circonda, e dunque descriverli con una certa pretesa di oggettività, oppure la particolare funzione conativa del discorso morale ci costringe a riconoscerne la natura proiettiva e soltanto illusoria? La metaetica è la disciplina che si occupa di dare risposte a queste ed altre domande intorno alla natura dei concetti fondamentali dell'etica. Ripercorrendo lo sviluppo storico di una disciplina relativamente recente, il volume offre un'introduzione alle teorie principali sviluppate nell'ultimo secolo. Avvalendosi di un linguaggio rigoroso ma accessibile, l'autore ricostruisce il dibattito metaetico contemporaneo prestando particolare attenzione all'analisi dei testi e della loro struttura argomentativa.

Many philosophers have noted that normative error theorists appear to be committed to saying 'Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it', which seems paradoxical. In defense of error theory, some have claimed that the word 'reason' in that statement is ambiguous between 'normative reason' and a purely descriptive sense of 'reason' that the error theorist can accept. I argue, however, that there is no descriptive sense of 'reason' that can prevent the paradox from re-emerging. Moreover, these implications of error theory probably provide good grounds for rejecting the view.