Iris Marion Young

This article intervenes in the emerging field of global citizenship studies by following in the footsteps of critical studies of national citizenship, which have shown that the seemingly neutral features of citizenship are gendered and racialized. The notion of “global citizenship” has gained currency in recent years and while there is not yet a canonized account of global citizenship, it is possible to identify the main shared features of different global citizenship accounts. While the “global” of global citizenship could denote the universality of the concept in contrast to national citizenship, this promise of inclusivity is not fulfilled. This article provides an intersectional reading of global citizenship theories and examples. Dominant global citizenship accounts, I argue, contain exclusionary and marginalizing tendencies and are biased toward a certain type of global subject whose responsibility is based on benevolence. A more inclusive and radical account of global citizenship can be built by drawing on Iris Marion Young's social connection model to rethink responsibility and by more firmly grounding it in an understanding of globalization as linked to historical and present structural inequalities.

Talk of social justice is increasingly common in the educational context of British Columbia as well as in the academic literature on education. However, specific examples of how teachers of subjects other than English and Social Studies are taking up a social justice discourse are sparse. Specifically, there is very little written on such approaches to teaching Spanish as an additional language. This exploratory research therefore aimed to understand the extent to which high school Spanish teachers in British Columbia are incorporating social justice education into their pedagogies and curricula. Through online questionnaires sent to Spanish teachers across the province, interviews with seven of these teachers, and four sets of classroom observations, the study explored perspectives on social justice education, classroom practices that evidenced a commitment to such pedagogy, and the perceived obstacles to teaching for social justice in the high school Spanish classroom.

It was found that teachers espoused a variety of definitions of social justice education but that the overwhelming majority believed in the importance of such approaches in the Spanish classroom. They evidenced an inspiring array of practices aimed at promoting social justice that could be seen as either educating about social justice, through curricula and classroom discussions, or for social justice, through democratic and anti-oppressive methodologies. It was found that many of these practices could serve to counter each of the five faces of oppression described by Young (1990): exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Unfortunately, many obstacles to social justice education were also noted, including a lack of support and resources. This study demonstrates that there is a strong interest in bringing social justice education into the high school Spanish classroom but that more must be done to support teachers in this endeavour.

The 'structural injustice' framework is an increasingly influential way of thinking about historical injustice. Structural injustice theorists argue against repara-tions for historical injustice on the grounds that our focus should be on forward-looking responsibility for contemporary structural injustice. Through the use of a case study-the Caribbean Community (CARICOM's) 10-Point Plan for reparations from 2014-I argue that this reasoning is flawed. Backward-looking reparations can be justified on the basis of state liability over time. The value of backward-looking reparations is that they ensure that historical perpetrators do not evade their reparative obligations and that affected communities are taken seriously. However, I argue that this backward-looking approach should be supplemented by a forward-looking structural injustice approach and the 'social connection model' of responsibility, which can (a) expand the scope of responsible agents and forms of injustice that warrant repair and (b) explain how citizens living now can be expected to pay for crimes of the past.

Berlin "A group behaves as a whole, and within a group individuals will enact things on behalf of the whole. And that has to do both with the individuals and their valence, their propensity, their own make-up, their social identity, the likelihood of being cast in a particular role, and the requirements of the group. So that in a group of young people, one young person might be cast as the bully, and if we could throw that kid out of the school, lo and behold, another kid starts bullying, right? So, we might want to look at bullying as something that's happening at a group level rather than just 'who are the individual kids that are bullying and how can we get them out of school.' So, that's the lens that I'm thinking about that enables us to hold both an individual and a group level perspective. Yes, there are individuals who are making choices about violence, and this is actually something that our brothers doing batterers intervention work have done really well, to say: 'Violence is a choice.' I mean, there are limits to that. But I think there's something powerful in that, that violence is not predetermined. Especially if we imagine that batterers intervention work is working with men who've been marginalized, who've been told that they are criminal because they are black, who've been told that they are criminal because they've been criminalized. So, it is powerful to say, actually, violence is a choice, and we can choose not to be violent. That is something that can be liberating. And, at the same time, I think that we can hold the idea that socially, that on a community level, we use violence instrumentally, and we draft and invite and seduce people into committing violence on all of our behalves. So, I think both things can be true, right?"

In this article, I firstly discuss the person-affecting view of harm, distinguishing between the liability and the structural models of responsibility, and also explaining why it is unsatisfactory, from a moral point of view, to interpret a given harm as a loss with respect to a diachronic baseline. Then, I take sweatshops as an example and I entertain two further issues that are related to the assessment of harm and that are necessary for operationalising a comprehensive model of responsibility, that takes into account both liability and structural injustice. The first one is how to interpret harm when it is coexistent with a diachronic benefit and/or the parties involved in the social structures leading to harm seek to unload their responsibility by hiding behind a cooperative deadlock. The second one is how far along the chain of actions leading to harm can structural responsibility be extended.

In the years before her untimely death in 2006, Iris Marion Young published a series of influential essays in which she developed an original and farreaching account of how individuals should conceive of their responsibilities to address injustice. Her posthumously published book Responsibility for

Obstetric violence has been analyzed from various perspectives. Its
psychological effects have been evaluated, and there have been several recent
sociological and anthropological studies on the subject. But what I offer in this
paper is a philosophical analysis of obstetric violence, particularly focused on how
this violence is lived and experienced by women and why it is frequently described
not only in terms of violence in general but specifically in terms of gender violence:
as violence directed at women because they are women. For this purpose, I find
feminist phenomenology most useful as a way to explain and account for the
feelings that many victims of this violence experience and report, including feelings
of embodied oppression, of the diminishment of self, of physical and emotional
infantilization. I believe that the insights to be found in feminist phenomenology are
crucial for explaining how and why this phenomenon is different in kind from other
types of medical violence, objectification, and reification. Iris Marion Young’s
description of feminine existence under patriarchy, as conformed by a perpetual
oppressive ‘‘I cannot,’’ is at the center of my analysis. I argue that laboring bodies
are at least potentially perceived as antithetical to the myth of femininity, undermining
the feminine mode of bodily comportment under patriarchy and thereby
seriously threatening the hegemonic powers. Violence, then, appears to be necessary
in order to domesticate these bodies, to make them ‘‘feminine’’ again.

Eine Theorie der globalen Verantwortung Was wir Menschen in extremer Armut schulden © Suhrkamp Verlag suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft 2173 978-3-518-29773-5 suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft 2173 Auch zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts lebt ein großer Teil der Menschheit in bitterer Armut. Daraus ergibt sich die brennende Frage, was die Bürgerinnen und Bürger wohlhabender Länder extrem armen Menschen moralisch schulden. Valentin Beck beantwortet sie im Rahmen einer umfassenden Theorie der globalen Verantwortung. In seinem glänzend geschriebenen Buch behandelt er zentrale Fragen der Theorie globaler Gerechtigkeit, unterzieht unsere Verflechtung in globale soziale Strukturen einer detaillierten Analyse und wirft so ein neues Licht auf eine der größten moralischen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit. Wir müssen mit Blick auf den politischen und individuellen Umgang mit der Weltarmut umdenken, so lautet die zentrale Forderung dieser Studie.

This is from a symposium on Catherine Lu's Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics, published in the journal Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric.

Abstract:
This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu's theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward-looking elements. First, I examine how Lu's account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forward-looking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.

Here is the link to the issue, which has several pieces on Lu's book:
https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn

Here is a link to my article:
https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/216

part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

In order to do that, I will analyze how the transcendence/immanence distinction has been charged with masculinism and I will show how Changfoot's and Bergoffen's models avoid these charges. Inspired by their responses and by Young's use of the transcendence/immanence distinction, I will present a model, which differentiates between two senses of immanence. By introducing a distinction between ontological and imposed immanence, I hope to avoid the charges of masculinism, and at the same time avoid the shortcomings present in Changfoot's and Bergoffen's models.

What is justice all about? What is the scope of the concept of justice? What issues can legitimately be evaluated in terms of justice? In her book Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young challenges the concept of justice as defined by John Rawls and used by many others in the philosophical debates that responded to Rawls’s, A Theory of Justice (1971). Is Young’s critique on the prevailing use of the concept of justice and contemporary theories of justice correct? Is her alternative understanding of the concept viable? In this paper I want to critically examine her views on the concept of justice and compare them with a close reading of John Rawls’s use of the concept of justice. The comparison of Young and Rawls will lead me to reconcile their views in terms of the central features of the concept of justice.

Dès l’origine, le corps des femmes a été placé au cœur des combats féministes. Il a toutefois été  progressivement désinvesti jusqu’à disparaître comme objet de luttes. Si le mouvement #metoo a fait l’effet d’une déflagration, c’est parce qu’il a mis au jour ce scandale que les femmes étaient restées des corps à disposition par-delà leur émancipation. Le moment important où nous sommes de réappropriation de la corporéité dans ses dimensions le plus intimes nous impose de relancer le projet d’un féminisme phénoménologique (c’est-à-dire incarné) initié par Simone de Beauvoir.

Conceptul de „dreptate socială” este, fără îndoială, unul dintre conceptele cheie ale filosofiei politice. În orice caz, el este unul dintre cele mai utilizate concepte de către filosofii politici recenţi. Bănuiala mea este că foarte puţine concepte – precum, spre exemplu, cel de „democraţie” – pot rivaliza din acest
punct de vedere conceptul de „dreptate socială”. Pe ce îmi bazez această bănuială? Pe faptul că, aşa cum se poate constata examinând cărţile sau revistele din acest domeniu, dreptatea socială este unul dintre cele mai abordate şi mai dezbătute subiecte din filosofia politică a ultimilor cincizeci de ani.
        Această situaţie nu este rezultatul întâmplării. Problema identificării principiilor organizării drepte a unei societăţi este considerată – şi, fără îndoială, este – una dintre cele mai importante probleme ale filosofiei politice. Pentru mulţi filosofi politici, ea este chiar cea mai importantă problemă a filosofiei politice, la fel cum dreptatea este cea dintâi virtute a unei „societăţi bune”. John Rawls, spre exemplu, filosoful care a avut cea mai mare contribuţie la concentrarea filosofiei politice recente pe problema dreptăţii sociale (din păcate, de multe ori în detrimentul celorlalte probleme importante ale acesteia), şi-a dezvoltat celebra sa teorie a dreptăţii sociale (şi) ca urmare a convingerii că dreptatea „este prima virtute a instituţiilor sociale, la fel cum este adevărul pentru sistemele de gândire. Oricât de elegantă sau economică ar fi, o teorie trebuie respinsă sau revizuită dacă nu este adevărată; la fel, indiferent de cât de eficiente sau bine organizate ar fi, instituţiile trebuie reformate sau abolite dacă sunt nedrepte. (…) Singurul lucru care ne permite să acceptăm o teorie eronată este lipsa uneia mai bune; în mod analog, o nedreptate este tolerabilă numai atunci când este necesară pentru a evita o nedreptate şi mai mare. Fiind primele virtuţi ale activităţilor umane, adevărul şi dreptatea sunt de necompromis”.
      Conceptul de „dreptate socială” este, însă, şi unul dintre cele mai controversate concepte ale filosofiei politice. Foarte puţine aspecte legate de acest concept nu sunt înconjurate de controverse şi dezbateri argumentative. Cred că nu greşesc dacă afirm că există doar trei astfel de aspecte. Primul este acela că
dreptatea, fie ca virtute individuală, fie ca virtute a unei societăţi, constă, în esenţă, în a da fiecăruia ceea ce i se cuvine (sau ceea ce i se datorează, ceea ce este îndreptăţit să primească). Al doilea este acela că, spre deosebire de conceptul de „dreptate distributivă”, introdus în vocabularul filosofic încă de Aristotel,
conceptul de „dreptate socială” este unul mult mai recent, utilizat pentru prima dată abia în prima jumătate a secolului XIX. În sfârşit, al treilea este acela că dreptatea socială nu trebuie confundată cu dreptatea legală sau retributivă (dreptatea în pedepsirea celor vinovaţi de infracţiuni).
      Unii autori ar introduce pe lista aspectelor necontroversate legate de conceptul de „dreptate socială” şi un al patrulea aspect. Mă refer la ideea că dreptatea socială se distinge în mod clar de caritate. Este adevărat, cei mai mulţi filosofi operează o astfel de distincţie. De obicei, caritatea este prezentată ca o
virtute morală privată şi strict voluntară faţă de ceilalţi membri ai societăţii, în vreme ce dreptatea este prezentată ca o virtute sau o datorie morală a cărei respectare poate fi impusă (enforced) în mod legitim de către stat. Există însă şi filosofi care au contestat, mai mult sau mai puţin explicit, legitimitatea şi semnificaţia morală a acestei distincţii. Doi dintre aceşti filosofi sunt Allen Buchanan şi Jeremy Waldron. Ambii au încercat să arate că, de fapt, şi respectarea exigenţelor carităţii poate fi uneori impusă în mod legitim din punct de vedere moral de către stat. Buchanan a făcut chiar mai mult: a încercat să demonstreze caracterul problematic al tuturor modalităţilor prin care filosofii politici au încercat să traseze o distincţie netă între dreptatea socială şi caritate.
        Unele dintre cele mai importante controverse declanşate de conceptul de „dreptate socială” sunt cele legate de definirea, de specificarea şi de legitimitatea acestui concept. Prima este, în esenţă, o controversă în privinţa răspunsului la următoarea întrebare: care este cadrul conceptual care surprinde cel mai
bine trăsătura fundamentală a dreptăţii şi nedreptăţii sociale? A doua este o controversă în privinţa exigenţelor sau a principiilor „corecte” sau „adecvate” ale dreptăţii sociale. În sfărşit, a treia este o controversă pe marginea acceptabilităţii apelului la conceptul de „dreptate socială”.
      În cea mai mare parte a capitolului de faţă prezint pe scurt principalele idei, poziţii şi argumente invocate de filosofii politici recenţi în cadrul fiecăreia dintre aceste controverse. Pentru a respecta specificul unui capitol introductiv, am încercat să fiu cât mai imparţíal în prezentarea lor. Există însă şi locuri în care am exprimat sau măcar am sugerat propriile mele opinii. Sper totuşi că acest lucru nu îl va împiedica prea mult pe cititor să caute să-şi formeze şi să-şi întemeieze cât mai solid propriile sale opinii cu privire la chestiunile în dispută.

The literature on social justice, and social justice movements themselves, routinely ignore nonhuman animals as legitimate subjects of social justice. Yet, as with other social justice movements, the contemporary animal liberation movement has as its focus the elimination of institutional and sys-temic domination and oppression. In this paper, I explicate the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the contemporary animal rights movement, and situate it within the framework of social justice. I argue that those committed to social justice – to minimizing violence, exploitation, domination, objectifi-cation, and oppression – are equally obligated to consider the interests of all sentient beings, not only those of human beings.

Il s'agit de penser le corps des femmes au prisme de la double expérience vécue de l’aliénation et de l’émancipation selon une démarche phénoménologique inscrite dans le sillage de Iris Marion Young. Camille Froidevaux-Metterie analyse notamment le mouvement #metoo comme une étape de la dynamique de réappropriation par les femmes de leur corps dans ses dimensions intimes qu'elle appelle le "tournant génital du féminisme". 
Explorant les thématiques corporelles féminines (maternité et non-désir d’enfant, menstruations et ménopause, seins et normes esthétiques, organes génitaux, sexualité et plaisir), elle montre que le temps est venu de réclamer pour tous ses sujets la liberté et l’égalité qui forment le cœur du projet féministe.

What responsibilities do individuals have for global injustices, such as sweatshop labor? Iris Marion Young sought to answer this question with her " social connection model " of responsibility. She argues that all individuals " connected " to structural injustice share political responsibility (as opposed to moral or legal responsibility) to collectively struggle against it. The theory was inspired by the anti-sweatshop movement, which recognized that consumers felt responsible for the working conditions of distant garment workers, even though they do nothing morally wrong when purchasing clothes. The social connection model is intuitively appealing and popular because it can explain why there is a responsibility for structural injustices like sweatshop labor, which falls short of guilt and blame, and takes structure seriously. However, Young left several gaps in the theory. One such gap is that she does not explain what she means by " connection " to structural injustice. Three potential definitions of connection arise in Young's work— what I call existential, dependent and causal connection—but Young does not unpack or defend any version in detail. In this article, I aim to clarify these different meanings of connection and assess their plausibility within Young's own framework. I argue that the most appropriate and consistent way to understand connection to structural injustice is that individuals reproduce the background conditions in which they act. Young's conception of reproduction of background conditions is thus elaborated and defended as the relevant form of connection that generates political responsibility.

A Senior Project in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Bachelor of the Arts degree in the Gallatin School of Individualized Study. This paper moves through the film genre theory of tech-noir, and discusses the feminist propensities of the hybrid genre through the two case studies of Blade Runner and Ex Machina.

En 2005, Iris Marion Young publie On Female Body Experience. « Throwing like a girl » and other essays. L’ouvrage rassemble huit textes rédigés entre 1980 et 2005 qui forment ensemble le corpus de son féminisme phénoménologique. Il s’agit pour elle d’explorer « ces expériences corporelles ordinaires par lesquelles la plupart des femmes s’identifient spécifiquement en tant que femmes », tout en repérant et dénonçant les contraintes qui pèsent sur les femmes et qui limitent tout à la fois leurs opportunités et leur liberté. Toute l’originalité de la démarche de Iris Marion Young se condense dans ce défi : tenir ensemble l’analyse de la subjectivité féminine (concept de corps vécu) et la compréhension des mécanismes sociaux qui entretiennent la domination masculine (notion de genre).

In much of the contemporary situation for trans* persons, authority over identity has been given to, or perhaps taken by, arbiters of the medico-legal discourse. These identity "experts" have become the gatekeepers for sex reassignment and gender designation. Alternatively, many theorists argue that identity is exclusively about first-person appeals to one's own sense of oneself. I show here that neither of these accounts does justice to our experience. Instead, drawing upon Hans Georg Gadamer's notion of horizons, I outline a position where first-person and thirdperson accounts of the meaning of the body can meet somewhere in the middle. Such a position, characterized by a hermeneutics of the body, mediates between the phenomenological first-person while still recognizing the third-person view of the body as relevant. Approaching the body through a hermeneutic process allows us to find a place where we can all be open to different performances of gender and different particular bodily actions that recognize the bodies of us all as a combination of sedimented styles of action within social discourses.

Operative intentionality is a practical directedness that gives meaning to objects in the world prior to conscious reflection. This chapter first traces the development of the concept from its roots in Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl to its most detailed articulation in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The chapter then argues that this notion has opened phenomenology to fields such as gender, critical race, queer, and disability studies because it raises the question of whether mental structure is universal across bodies. Theoretical contributions by Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, Judith Butler, Iris Marion Young, S. Kay Toombs, Lewis Gordon, and others are considered in light of this claim.

On Iris Marion Young's “social connection model” of responsibility, individuals bear political responsibility to collectively organize against structural injustices to which they are connected. After situating Young's theory in relation to the global distributive justice and global poverty debates, I ask: what is ‘structural injustice”? What does “connection” to injustice consist of and why does it matter? How does the social connection model of responsibility differ from standard conceptions of responsibility? And what is “political responsibility”?

In social justice education a tension sometimes emerges between the complex ideas we want participants
to grapple with and the relatively straightforward activities we use to communicate those
ideas.We adapt learning activities to meet participants’ evolving needs and to communicate emerging
theories and analyses, but sometimes adjusting an activity’s content is not enough; the activity’s very
structure can contradict our stated frameworks and undermine the content we wish to convey. In
this article I explore two activities commonly used for teaching about systems of oppression whose
structures inadvertently support linear, single-issue thinking, and largely fail to account for intersectionality,
despite educators’ best efforts to incorporate more complex content. I describe an alternative
activity, structured around Iris Marion Young’s The Five Faces of Oppression, that can be used to
teach about multiple, interlocking systems of oppression while highlighting rather than obscuring the
specificity of interrelationships among those systems.

In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance, and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves in their own privileged racial specificity, and they misrecognize others in their own marginal racial specificity. Such misrecognition preserves the cultural imperialism of Australia's dominant social imaginary—a means of oppression that perpetuates epistemic insensitivity. Bringing this dual misrecognition to light best captures the indignity that is suffered by the victims of the aforementioned epistemic injustices. I argue that it is only when we truly recognize difference in its own terms, shifting the dominant social imaginary, that 'mainstream Australians' can do their part in bringing about a just society.

El presente artículo se propone extraer los fundamentos teórico-prácticos de la voz de la reconocida filósofa política y feminista: Iris Marion Young (1949-2006) una de las teóricas de la justicia en el discurso político feminista contemporáneo más relevantes, principalmente con el fin de situarlos en pleno centro y diálogo con el feminismo en el marco de una democracia que reflexiona las injusticias estructurales globalmente articuladas. Se centra en recoger y analizar las premisas fundamentales que Young presenta de la democracia comunicativa en su artículo titulado “La democracia y el ‘otro’: más allá de la democracia deliberativa” y su concepción de justicia, bajo un enfoque hermenéutico que permita unificar un punto común a partir de la multiplicidad de experiencias de desigualdad que sufre tanto la mujer como ciudadana y como sujeto humano de derechos concreto como las diversas figuras del colectivo LGTBIQ+. Desde una aproximación feminista que facilite avances hacia la igualdad, ambos fundamentos serán asumidos para desarrollar una propuesta centrada en mostrar de qué manera, si la filosofía pretende describir la realidad radical y auténtica del ser humano, ha de trabajar en la tarea de revelar cómo las formas de violencia y las distintas experiencias vitales en las vidas personales y públicas de las mujeres -así como distintos miembros del colectivo LGTBQ+- mantienen una misma condición estructural: la discriminación.

The general failure of assimilation policies in the Western countries and the growth in the demand for recognition from different people whose identity is ignored have enabled the continuation of various debates within the multiculturalism as an identity politics. Considering the approaches advocating multiculturalism, it is seen that libertarian and communitarian approaches are brought forward as two dominant approaches. While the libertarian approach gives priority to individual rights, the communitarian approach argues that the priority should be given to community and group rights. Both approaches base their claims on different reasons in this context. In this study, firstly, it will be emphasized why identity has become such a foreground nowadays, then it will be focused on the relationship between this and multiculturalism in the context of libertarian and communitarian approaches, and the main paradoxes in these approaches. So, it is aimed to contribute to the scientific literature on this subject by making a unique evaluation in a critical perspective on the dominant in multiculturalism. As the libertarian approach in terms of multiculturalism has included various paradoxes, such as over identification basic human principles like equality and freedom as individual-centered to liberalism and criticism of higher social formations at this point, the communitarian approach that places community and group identities to forefront, and ignores individual differences among them has also various paradoxes in itself.

Eine der grundsätzlichen Thesen von Maurice Merleau-Ponty lautet, dass unser Zur-Welt-Sein nicht ausgehend von der Instanz des Bewusstseins, sondern ausgehend von der Instanz der Leibes zu verstehen ist. Auch wenn Merleau-Ponty aus dieser These selbst kaum politische Konsequenzen gezogen hat, sind seine Überlegungen doch im Feld der politischen Philosophie von einer ganzen Reihe von Theoretikerinnen und Theoretikern aufgenommen worden, von denen ich im Folgenden zwei aufgreifen möchte: Iris Marion Young und Judith Butler. Beide, so werden ich zeigen, knüpfen in ihren Überlegungen nicht nur direkt an Merleau-Pontys Überlegungen am, um zu zeigen inwiefern der Leib sowohl Objekt als auch Subjekt des politischen Handelns ist, zugleich auch entwickeln beide dessen Überlegungen in entscheidenden Hinsichten weiter: Während uns Young vor Augen führt, dass die Persistenz von politischen Machtverhältnissen ausgehend von der Eigensinnigkeit des Leibes verstanden werden kann, zeigt uns Judith Butler ausgehend von der Idee der Geschichtlichkeit der Leibes, dass dieser als ein Ort von transformativen Möglichkeiten verstanden werden kann. Ausgehend von diesen Anknüpfungen an Merleau-Ponty durch Young und Butler werde ich abschließend argumentieren, dass ‚Weltlichkeit’, ‚Eigensinnigkeit’ und ‚Geschichtlichkeit’ drei wesentliche Momente einer Politik der Leiblichkeit sind.

As popular food writers and activists urge consumers to express their social, political, and ethical commitments through their food choices, the imperative to ‘vote with your fork’ has become a common slogan of emerging food movements in the US. I interrogate the conception of responsibility embedded in this dictate, which has become a de facto model for how to comport ourselves ethically with respect to food. I argue that it implicitly endorses a narrow and problematic understanding of responsibility. To contextualize this claim, I utilize Iris Marion Young’s critique of a “liability model” of responsibility to demonstrate that voting with one’s fork is insufficient as model for taking responsibility for food-related injustices. Instead, I suggest that Young’s social connection model of responsibility is best suited for taking stock of responsibility for food and agriculture related injustices since they are structural and systemic ones. I conclude that although consumer choices and purchases may be important dimensions of our conduct with respect to food and eating, imagining responsibility to be centered on this type of conduct—consumer behavior—is detrimental to attempts to develop a more just food system.

En este trabajo analizaremos brevemente ciertas concepciones de la
ciudadanía para luego ceñirnos al punto de los DDHH en cuestiones
de género, particularmente en torno a derechos (no) reproductivos.
Allí, se propondrá un análisis sobre cómo los espacios dialógicosque
debe propiciar el Estado- deben ser los que definan y legitimen
normativas en esas áreas permitiendo que las diferencias no socaven
la igualdad y la libertad de los sectores vulnerables.

Le féminisme a produit bien plus qu'une dynamique d'égalisation des conditions féminine et masculine, il a profondément transformé nos sociétés occidentales en initiant un double processus de féminisation du social et de masculinisation de l’intime.
Par-delà les mécanismes qui nourrissent les inégalités, les discriminations et les violences, il faut ainsi pouvoir repérer que nous sommes en train de vivre une mutation à l'échelle de l'histoire humaine : la convergence des genres se dessine qui annonce l’advenue d’un individu générique.
Dans l’horizon d’un monde devenant neutre et égalitaire, la condition incarnée de nos existences revêt un nouveau sens. Affranchie des déterminismes tant naturels que culturels, la sexuation des corps se conçoit désormais au prisme de la singularité, comme un projet relevant de la libre volonté individuelle.
Pour les femmes qui n’ont longtemps été que des corps, il s’agit d’éprouver une condition  paradoxale, écartelée entre aliénation et libération. Analyser les modalités de l’expérience vécue du féminin, c’est alors définir ce dernier comme un rapport à soi, au monde et aux autres qui passe spécifiquement par le corps.

This paper aims to analyze feminist views on citizenship through comparing three political theorists, Chantal Mouffe, Carole Pateman and Iris Marion Young. It particularly discusses their understanding of “the democratic”. All three feminist theorists share the criticism of the patriarchal construction of citizenship, but their ways to overcome male/female inequality differ. Mouffe argues that the essentialized identity of women is not compatible with her project of radical and plural democracy. She criticizes Pateman and Young on the grounds that they have essentialist ideas. Pateman, who pursuits democratization in which women are to be citizens as women who are equal yet sexually different beings from men, regards such a label “essentialist” as irrelevant. Mouffe also criticizes the essentialist implication in Young’s politics of difference which makes an issue of domination by the mainstream and oppression of marginalized social groups including women. However, like Mouffe, Young is well aware of postmodern warnings against essentializing group identity. Here is the main question of this paper: how do their notions of “what is democratic” differ? This paper attempts to evaluate the relevance of Mouffe’s criticism of Pateman and Young through the comparison of their conceptions of democratic citizenship. By examining the cross-purposes of their arguments, this paper investigates what “the democratic” constitutes for each of them.

Through exploring some of the foundational and structural aspects of the experience of home from a feminist perspective, this article will draw from Iris Marion Young's reflections on home, female experience and embodiment to argue that home is central to our ontological and subjective constitution. While acknowledging that home can be a problematic concept in the socio-political realm, particularly for feminist thinkers, this article contends that a feminist reading of the phenomenology of home is crucial to understanding some of the foundational features of human subjectivity. In doing so, it will explore aspects of some existing phenomenologi-cal accounts of home and dwelling which posit that home is an ontological structure, outlining a feminist phenomenology of home that explores three interwoven aspects: (1) home as forming an ontological ground of human subjectivity; (2) home as a gendered space; (3) and pregnant embodiment as the " first home. " Dans cet article, nous explorerons quelques aspects fondamentaux de l'expérience du « chez-soi » dans une perspective féministe, ins-pirée par les réflexions d'Iris Marion Young à propos du chez-soi, de l'expérience féminine et du corps vécu. Nous affirmerons que le chez-soi est au centre de notre constitution ontologique et subjective. Tout en prenant acte du caractère problématique du « chez-soi » dans le champ sociopolitique, et ce, tout particulièrement pour les philosophes féministes, nous soutiendrons qu'une approche fé-ministe de la phénoménologie du « chez-soi » est nécessaire pour comprendre plusieurs aspects fondamentaux de la subjectivité hu-maine. Pour ce faire, nous présenterons d'abord quelques théories phénoménologiques existantes du chez-soi et de l'habitation [dwel-ling] qui considèrent le chez-soi comme une structure ontologique. Ensuite, nous insisterons sur trois aspects entrelacés d'une phéno-ménologie féministe du chez-soi : (1) le chez-soi comme fondation ontologique de la subjectivité humaine; (2) le chez-soi comme un espace genré; et (3) l'expérience corporelle d'être enceinte comme le « premier chez-soi ». 102 Symposium, vol. 21 no. 2 (Fall/Automne 2017)

In this paper, I will investigate the potential of what I term Merleau-Ponty's 'situated phenomenology' for an investigation of normality from within and from without. First, I will argue that the concept of situation in the Phenomenology of Perception demarcates Merleau-Ponty's turn from a mere epistemological to a concrete critical phenomenology. Second, I will apply Merleau-Ponty's concept of situation as being situated and as being in situation to an investigation of normality. In doing so, I endeavor to differentiate between lived and represented normality, a difference which in turn corresponds to an operative (immanent) and established (external) normativity. A situated account of normality thereby combines a phenomenological and a genealogical perspective. My aim is to provide a toolkit to investigate the intertwinement of represented and lived normality, that is, of being situated and being in situation.

The concept of "structural injustice" has a long intellectual lineage, but Iris Marion Young popularised the term in her late work in the 2000s. Young's theory tapped into the zeitgeist of the time, providing a credible way of thinking about transnational and domestic injustices, illuminating the importance of political, economic and social structures in generating injustice, theorising the role of individuals in perpetuating structural injustice and the responsibility of everyone to try to correct it. Young’s theory has inspired secondary and novel research. In this paper, I outline the main topics in this recent literature: what structural injustice is, responsibility for structural injustice, acting on responsibility, avoiding responsibility, and historical injustice. I conclude by noting how the influence of structural injustice theory is spreading beyond the confines of political theory. Any field that is concerned with structural inequalities, disadvantage or oppression, can utilize structural injustice theory.

The present paper represents a detailed analysis of the proposals made by Sylvia Walby in “The Future of Feminism”. The structure of the article follows two main directions, according to Walby’s discourse, respectively feminism outside the state and feminism inside the state/transnational institutions. The first direction will focus on feminist theories and will canvass their present forms and also the postfeminist trends. The second direction will examine feminist projects which have entered into the transnational and state policies – gender mainstreaming, affirmative action, equality of treatment, reconfiguration of the human rights. Another important section will be dedicated to inequalities within the family and how can gender policies correct them and why Walby omits this aspect from her analysis. The nature of gender inequalities shall be presented both from the point of view of distributive theories as well as the standpoint of the theory of oppression as a source of inequality, according to its formulation made by Iris Marion Young.