Insider Trading

Este artigo discute dois temas relacionados ao tratamento equitativo dos investidores no mercado de capitais: high frequency trading (HFT) e insider trading. Apresentamos duas definições de HFT e as controvérsias associadas aos serviços de co-location, venda de acesso a informação com discriminação e flash orders. Concluímos que a licitude da atividade de HFT depende de uma ponderação entre equidade e eficiência e sua qualificação como insider trading requer uma interpretação extensiva do conceito de informação relevante e uma preponderância de razões de ordem ética sobre as de ordem econômica.

Our paper examines how a firm's corporate governance relates to the liquidity (i.e., bidask spread) of its stock. In particular, we focus on how voluntary disclosure, analyst coverage, and adverse selection among investors mediate this relation. Our results show that better corporate governance, in terms of greater board independence and greater institutional monitoring, improves liquidity though more voluntary disclosure, greater analyst coverage, and lower adverse selection. The effects of these mediating mechanisms differ in magnitude. Specifically, we find that the key reason to expect better corporate governance to be associated with improved liquidity is reduced adverse selection. This finding is consistent with the argument that the first order effect of better corporate governance is to constrain agency problems such as insider trading and selective disclosure to some investors, which, in turn, could affect stock liquidity.

Many previous studies on insider trading are based on data in the U.S. capital market and conclude that insiders can earn abnormal profits. This paper examines abnormal price performance associated with insider trading in the Hong Kong stock market. We find that abnormal profits associated with insider trading are all concentrated on small firms. Trading volume does matter in determining the magnitude of those abnormal profits. Our results show that insiders of mediumsized and large firms do not earn abnormal profits. Finally, it is found that outsiders who mimic the information of insider trades associated with medium-sized and large firms cannot earn abnormal profits.

Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioural reasons (over-optimistic banks neglecting risks) and to conflicts of interest between bank shareholders/managers and debtholders/taxpayers (banks exploiting moral hazard). We test whether US banks’ stock returns in the 2007–8 financial crisis are associated with bank insiders’ sales of their own bank’s shares in the period prior to 2006Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives’ sales of shares predict bank performance during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant for the sales of independent directors and other officers. Moreover, the top-five executives’ impact is stronger for banks with higher exposure to the real estate bubble, where a one standard deviation increase of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. Finally, even though bankers in riskier banks sold more shares (furthering their own interests), they did not change their bank’s policies, for example, by reducing bank-level exposure to real estate. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders knew that their banks were taking excessive risks, which has important implications for theory, public policy and the understanding of crises, as well as a supervisory tool for early warning signals.
This is the authors’ original version. The version of record [Anticipating the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Insider Trading in Banks, Ozlem Akin, José M. Marín and José-Luis Peydró, Economic Policy, 2020, 35(102), 213-267] is available online at https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/epolic/eiaa012/5862015?redirectedFrom=fulltext
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiaa012

The phenomenon of low-balling reported in the financial press involves downward biased projections of earnings by managers or analysts, thereby artificially lowering market expectations and creating a positive earnings surprise when actual earnings are announced. This study reports that the stock market does respond to such surprises relative to analysts' reported forecasts. Further, the proportion of insider buy-transactions in the period prior to the earnings forecast is significantly higher for the sample with high positive earnings surprise than for the control sample with zero forecast errors. The study cannot distinguish whether managers or analysts are the source of the low-balling and therefore makes no statement on the legality of such insider trades.

O presente artigo busca identificar o bem jurídico penalmente tutelado pelo delito de insider trading, previsto no art. 27-D da Lei 6.385/1976, em que se encontra tipificado sob a denominação "uso indevido de informação privilegiada". Lançando mão da principiologia da dogmática penal contemporânea, o presente estudo esmiuça o conteúdo do injusto penal em seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo a fim de determinar a configuração da conduta incriminada. Desta forma, torna-se possível a análise das justificativas para a criminalização do uso de informações privilegiadas trazidas pela doutrina nacional e estrangeira. conclui-se pela insuficiência dos argumentos levantados, pois não abordam em sua totalidade todos os aspectos da prática de insider trading.

The authors thank Phil Gharghori for providing some of the data used in our regressions, Thang Do for technical assistance, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Hodgson acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council (LG A00104218).

The common view is that insider trading is always unethical and illegal. But such is not the case. Some forms of insider trading are legal. Furthermore, applying ethical principles to insider trading causes one to conclude that it is also sometimes ethical. This paper attempts to get past the hype, the press reports, and the political grandstanding to get to the truth of the matter. The author applies two sets of ethical principles -utilitarianism and rights theory -in an attempt to determine when, and in what circumstances, insider trading is ethical. The views of Henry Manne, an early proponent of insider trading, are critically examined, as are the major arguments against insider trading. Is insider trading good for the company if it is used as a form of executive compensation which makes it possible to pay lower salaries than would otherwise be the case? Does insider trading cause the stock market to work more efficiently? If insider trading does increase efficiency, is that sufficient to call for its total legalization, or are there other things to be considered? Several arguments against insider trading have been put forth over the last few decades but there are problems with all of them. One of the main arguments is the fairness argument. The problem with this argument is that different people have different definitions of unfairness. A closely related argument is the level playing field argument, which advocates wider dissemination of information so that it is less asymmetric. One problem with the level playing field argument is that it is better applied to sporting competitions than to trading in information. Some economists argue that forcing the disclosure of nonpublic information can actually result in more harm than good and must necessarily involve the violation of property rights. Other arguments examined in this chapter include the fiduciary duty argument, the problem of outside traders, the misappropriation doctrine and the restrictions that insider trading laws place on freedom of speech and press. The article concludes by setting forth some principles or guidelines to determine when insider trading should be punished and when it should not.

There is growing consensus that the insider-trading regime in the United States, the oldest in the world, is in need of reform. Indeed, three reform bills are currently before Congress, and one recently passed the House with overwhelming bipartisan support. As the U.S. considers paths to reforming its own insider trading laws, it would be remiss to ignore potential lessons from global experimentation and innovation, particularly in light of the fact that so many insider trading regimes have been recently adopted around the world.

Any such comparative study should, however, be cautious in drawing its conclusions. Reformers should pay close attention to the political, social, and economic motivations that might explain the recent trend toward near-universal adoption of insider trading regulations around the globe. Evidence suggests that at least some countries have adopted their insider trading regimes ritualistically. Regulatory ritualism occurs where great attention is paid to the institutionalization of a regulatory regime without commitment to or acceptance of the normative goals that those institutions are designed to achieve. If countries' insider trading regimes are adopted only ritualistically (e.g., to receive geopolitical carrots or to avoid geopolitical sticks), then comparative analysis should account for the fact that these regimes may not reflect its citizens' (or markets') lived experience or normative commitments.

This Article aids the effort of reforming our insider-trading laws here in the United States by considering lessons that can be learned from the global experience. Part I makes the case that the insider-trading regime in the U.S. is in need of reform. Part II charts the global rise of insider trading regulation in the twentieth century. Part III summarizes important features of representative regimes around the globe (e.g., in Japan, Europe, China, Russia, India, Canada, Australia, and Brazil). Part IV notes the trend toward universality in insider trading regulations and considers some of the moral and economic conclusions scholars and regulators have drawn from this trend. Part V identifies the problem of regulatory ritualism, and its implications for global enforcement and compliance. Part VI then turns to the constructive exercise of determining what can be learned from the global experience of regulating insider trading with an eye to reforming the American regime.

La diversidad puede considerarse en el momento actual un valor existente en la comunidad internacional, noción ésta superadora de la antigua sociedad internacional. La idea de comunidad pone de relieve que los actores comparten un conjunto de valores, entre los que se encuentra, sinduda, la diversidad intrínseca al género humano, tal y como es reconocida en el Convenio de la UNESCO y también en el Tratado de la Unión Europea. Dicha consideración tiene repercusión directa en el sistema de Derecho internacional privado, en particular, en la acción de la tradición excepción de orden público.

SEBI in its board meeting held on 19th November, 2014 has taken some major decisions related to Takeover, Insider Trading and Delisting regulations. These tough regulations will give SEBI much needed strength to tackle with wilful defaulters and wrong doers. Thus SEBI is taking firm steps to inch closer to fully safeguard the innocent small shareholders.
By- Mr. Pavan Kumar Vijay

Department of Psychology consider a moral violation to be personal if it meets Princeton University three criteria: First, the violation must be likely to cause 2 Center for the Study of Brain, serious bodily harm. Second, this harm must befall a Mind, and Behavior particular person or set of persons. Third, the harm must Princeton University not result from the deflection of an existing threat onto Princeton, New Jersey 08544 a different party. One can think of these three criteria in terms of "ME HURT YOU." The "HURT" criterion picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful violations (e.g., Summary assault rather than insider trading) while the "YOU" criterion ensures that the victim be vividly represented as Traditional theories of moral psychology emphasize an individual. Finally, the "ME" condition captures a noreasoning and "higher cognition," while more recent tion of "agency," requiring that the action spring in a work emphasizes the role of emotion. The present direct way from the agent's will, that it be "authored" fMRI data support a theory of moral judgment acrather than merely "edited" by the agent. Dilemmas that cording to which both "cognitive" and emotional profail to meet these three criteria are classified as "impercesses play crucial and sometimes mutually competisonal." As noted previously (Greene et al., 2001), these tive roles. The present results indicate that brain three criteria reflect a provisional attempt to capture regions associated with abstract reasoning and cogniwhat we suppose is a natural distinction in moral psytive control (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex chology and will likely be revised in light of future reand anterior cingulate cortex) are recruited to resolve search.

Insider trading is the negotiation in stock market misusing privileged information by people who are in exclusive position to access to such information, should be informed the market as a "relevant fact", except in an ongoing operation, on which a legitimate interest to keep
reserved is held. They are called corporate insiders.
The determination of the legal system of the international financial operations with privileged information presents certain difficulties, due the absence of a common regulation, also in the European Union.

This paper provides evidence on market surveillance from stock exchanges and securities commissions from 25 jurisdictions in North, Central and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Stock exchanges as SROs engage in a greater range of single-market surveillance of market manipulation than securities commissions, but the scope of cross-market surveillance activity is very similar among stock exchanges and securities commissions. Crossmarket surveillance is more effective with information sharing arrangements, and securities commissions are more likely to engage in information sharing than stock exchanges. The scope of cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated with trading activity, unlike the scope of single-market surveillance. The data also indicate that as at 2005, there is ample scope for jurisdictions to expand their cross-market surveillance and thereby stimulate investor confidence and trading activity.

At the heart of the debate about public versus private in the theoretical literature than in the empirical ownership lie three questions: literature. In most cases, empirical research strongly * Does competition matter more than ownership? favors private ownership in competitive markets over a * Are state enterprises more subject to welfarestate-owned counterfactual (although construction of the reducing interventions by government than private firms counterfactual is itself a problem). Theory's ambiguity are? about ownership in monopoly markets seems better * Do state enterprises suffer more from governance justified. problems than private firms do? Since the choice confronting governments is between Even if the answers to these questions favor private state ownership and privatization rather than between ownership, the question must still be asked: Do privatization and optimality, theory has left a gap that distortions in the process of privatization mean that empirical work has tried to fill. Further research is privatized firms perform worse than state enterprises? needed. Shirley and Walsh's review found greater ambiguity about the merits of privatization and private ownership This paper-a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze the effects of privatization and the role of regulation and politics. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,

Le cœur de l'ouvrage consiste en une présentation de la prohibition d'exploiter des informations d'initiés en droit américain, en droit européen ainsi que, de façon approfondie, en droit suisse. La partie de droit suisse traite autant l'interdiction du droit pénal (art. 154 LIMF) que du droit administratif (art. 142 LIMF). À cet égard, l'ouvrage couvre en particulier des thématiques brûlantes d'actualité comme la question de l'applicabilité de la prohibition au négoce de tokens cryptographiques, à l'industrie du high frequency trading, aux différentes formes de trading algorithmique ainsi qu'au short selling. Enfin, l'ouvrage se penche également sur la question du caractère justifié de l'interdiction d'exploiter des informations d'initié.

Thanks to the internet and technology, we don't have to pick up the phone and dial our brokers' phone number to buy and sell shares, but the question is that which trading platform should we use? This book provides you with what you need to look for and research, when choosing an online trading platform.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the effectiveness of insider trading enforcement actions in India and international dimensions. Design/methodology/approach – The research is based on the insider trading regulations and amendments made during the period 1992-2015. Findings – The notable observation of the study is the dearth of insider trading conviction and the paucity of prosecution for insider trading offences in India. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that surveillance and enforcement matter more than the drafting of the relevant statutes and regulations in emerging markets. Whereas, developed countries have a better record of prosecution than emerging markets. Research limitations/implications – Future research may explore the factors that hinder effective regulation and recommend new methods to increase the impact of Securities and Exchange Board of India insider trading regulation. Originality/value – The current paper presents guidance for the foreign institutional investors, regulators and market participants on insider trading regulation and prosecution in India.

This paper presents a test of the returns to stockholders over intervals surrounding 86 announcements by public corporations, bidders, of their partial acquisitions of other corporations' common stock, targets.  The filing of a Schedule 13-D by the bidder with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dis initially disclosed the partial acquisitions.  Independent publishers, for example, The Insiders' Chronicle,  which itself was later acquired by the Thomson Reuters Corporation of Canada, was the main source of announcements.  This publication promptly made public to subscribers the announcements first disclosed in the Schedule 13-D filings.

Findings were largely supportive of market efficiency, given average residuals and cumulative average residuals were found significant for the announcement months and in prior months, but did not persist beyond the announcements months.

Subsequent researchers  had the advantage of daily data to further refine and analyze
the returns to owners of targets subject to partial acquisitions.

The existence of market confidence is intrinsic to the efficient operation of the stock market, with the accuracy of pricing resting on pertinent information being available to individuals at all times. UK regulators historically relied on fines to punish and contain the market abuses, which were widely ineffectual, prompting the Financial Services Authority to issue a Statement of Intent to use its powers to enforce the statutory legislation regulating manipulation of the share market. This essay seeks to analyse the disparities between the Criminal Justice Act 1993 ('CJA 1993') and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ('FSMA 2000'), with due regard paid to the development of the essential elements of the offense by common law based on the enforcement of either statute and European Union legislation.

his study examined share returns following unexpected corporate announcements that are described as profit warnings. The study tested whether there are abnormal returns on share prices after the announcement of profit warnings. The report is based on the 56 companies quoted on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) and samples drawn from companies that have issued profit warnings. The research design used was the event study which assessed the impact of an event on the value of a firm. This research used the one hundred and fifty days event window where twenty days are prior and twenty days are after the profit warning announcement. Event study methodology, student T-test before event date and Average Abnormal Return (AAR) significance from zero were used to analyze data collected on daily stock prices. The result of this research indicates that profit warning has impact on the stock return in the NSE and the impact is negative and significant for the period of pre-warning and post-warning and on the day of actual announcement. There are also indications of information leakages where there were negative abnormal returns days before the profit warning announcements. Based on this research, the recommendation to the investors or practitioners in the NSE is that profit warning announcements are information events that influence the investment decision and should thus expect negative abnormal responses of share prices following such announcements but further studies may be commissioned to confirm or disapprove our findings.

Il contributo affronta il tema della responsabilità civile da insider trading, commentando una recente sentenza della Corte di Cassazione che ne riconosce la sussistenza. Vengono analizzati i diversi percorsi ricostruttivi attraverso cui è possibile affermare la responsabilità civile dell'insider e ne vengono discusse le principali implicazioni. Ad esito di una tale analisi, si riconosce la possibilità di configurare una responsabilità civile dell’insider a titolo precontrattuale. Viene affrontato il tema della responsabilità della società emittente per omessa diffusione dell’informazione e vengono mossi rilievi critici ad alcune statuizioni della Corte nel caso commentato, fra cui l’estensione del diritto al risarcimento a tutti i “contemporaneous traders”.

The paper posits that the regulation of insider dealing will continue to throw up a host of issues. For one, the sophistication of the financial environment within which the law and regulatory mechanisms operate, compounds the practical and legal difficulties confronting those seeking to administer and apply the law. The paper proceeds to argue that the taking of advantage of information that the other party could not obtain, is as old as human nature and that man is naturally structured to think of protecting his interest first. Consequently, the paper asserts that the problem of insiders abusing information that they obtain by virtue of the special relationship that they have with the company is not a new one. Nonetheless, while some do not see any reason why insiders who deal in the securities of the issuer with which they enjoy this privileged access to its information should not be held responsible, others hold the view that acquisition of superior information should not be discouraged, let alone be penalised. It is against this backdrop that the paper critically examines the concept of insider dealing under the Nigerian law; the mischief the law seeks to remedy; and considers relevant lessons from other jurisdictions.

La problematica connessa all’abuso di informazioni privilegiate ha suscitato negli ultimi anni molteplici riflessioni ed analisi non soltanto all’interno del dibattito giuridico, ma anche in quello politico ed economico. Sembrerebbe, oggi, prendendo in considerazione i grandi scandali finanziari che recentemente hanno investito i sistemi economici occidentali, che i reati di market abuse stiano attraversando una nuova «età dell’oro di proporzioni forse maggiori di quella che segnò i mercati degli anni ’30: la tentazione di alterare il corso dei valori non solo non è stata estirpata, ma pare aver trovato un nuovo terreno fertile nei mercati finanziari». 
Il presente lavoro si articola in tre capitoli e si pone altrettanti obiettivi. Il primo, punto di partenza da cui muove la riflessione, è quello di cercare di indagare e ricostruire le origini storiche del fenomeno di insider trading attraverso l’analisi dell’esperienza degli Stati Uniti, paese che per primo al mondo nel 1934 ha avuto l’audacia di emanare una disciplina della materia come reazione alle scandalose situazioni che si erano formate sul mercato mobiliare.
Solo attraverso l’esame della disciplina nord-americana sull’insider trading e del relativo iter giurisprudenziale risulta infatti possibile comprendere il successivo sviluppo del fenomeno in ambito europeo e nazionale.
Dopo aver passato in rassegna le tappe fondamentali dell’evoluzione della disciplina statunitense, si è poi dedicata l’ultima parte del primo capitolo allo studio del recentissimo disegno di legge noto come Insider Trading Prohibition Act, il quale rappresenterà, nell’ipotesi in cui diventi legge, una svolta significativa all’interno della normativa americana sull’insider trading, portando un po’ di ordine in un sistema costituito prevalentemente da precedenti giudiziari e che sempre più spesso è stato criticato per mancanza di determinatezza.
Nel secondo capitolo, invece, si è scelto di sottoporre a disamina la normativa eurounitaria per capire il percorso che ha condotto l’Unione europea (all’epoca ancora Comunità economica europea) e successivamente l’Italia a sviluppare una propria disciplina anti-insider trading idonea a fronteggiare un fenomeno che incominciava ormai a propagarsi anche al di là degli Stati Uniti, minacciando i mercati europei.
L’analisi si è quindi incentrata sulle fonti comunitarie: dalla prima Direttiva in materia, la n. 89/592/CEE, per poi passare alla successiva la n. 2003/6/CE ed infine all’attuale binomio normativo costituito dal Regolamento (UE) n. 596/2014 e dalla Direttiva n. 2014/57/UE.
L’indagine prosegue sul versante domestico, focalizzando l’attenzione sulle modifiche apportate alla disciplina italiana dell’abuso di informazioni privilegiate dal controverso Decreto legislativo n. 107/2018. Sul punto, il lavoro mette in luce le persistenti aporie che tuttora contraddistinguono l’insider trading nazionale rispetto a quello delineato a livello comunitario.
L’ultima parte, infine, si preoccupa di affrontare la questione più spinosa e dibattuta di tutta la normativa italiana anti-insider trading: si tratta della sistematica punitiva degli abusi di mercato caratterizzata da un assetto sanzionatorio «ipermuscolare» ed efficientista in forza del quale sul medesimo fatto incidono sia sanzioni penali (irrogate dal giudice penale), sia sanzioni amministrative (comminate dalla Consob).
Il meccanismo «a doppio binario» sul medesimo fatto è stato da tempo additato dalla dottrina come difficilmente compatibile con il principio di proporzionalità ed extrema ratio che dovrebbe orientare il ricorso al diritto criminale. Ai dubbi di legittimità della disciplina sollevati a livello interno, si sono poi aggiunti quelli sul piano convenzionale e quelli provenienti dalla Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione europea.
Proprio attraverso il raffronto tra le varie evoluzioni interpretative sul tema, si è quindi cercato di capire se e in che misura l’attuale meccanismo del cumulo sanzionatorio, penale e amministrativo, degli abusi di mercato sia o meno compatibile con il principio del ne bis in idem così come interpretato dalla Corte di Strasburgo e, a livello comunitario, dalla Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione europea.

El objetivo de este libro es enseñar cuales son los pasos idóneos para acortar el largo camino que supone "vivir del trading".
De buena fe, pienso que cada uno de los capítulos del libro suponen una rama, y que unidos crean un "todo", un grueso tronco y una buena base que va a suponer "un buen trading". Así que aconsejo al lector leer y eleer muy bien cada uno de los capítulos.

There is no clear theoretical foundation for the crime of insider trading if the liberalist of neo liberalist view of the market it is accepted. Nevertheless, almost all advanced market countries have laws against insider trading to protect investors. The article focusses on a comparative analysis between the regulation of insider trading in Australia and Italy and consequently the EU, to find that despite the different system of common law and civil law, the provisions are hermeneutically similar, which in turn raise the same set of interpretative issues. The issue, beside the low level of detection of the crime of insider trading, seems to be the repression stage.

Nosotros podemos tener la mejor metodología o el mejor sistema de trading, pero si no logramos superar nuestras limitantes internas nunca vamos a poder aprovechar el verdadero potencial de nuestra metodología. Y para poder aprovecharla necesitamos reconocer cuáles son nuestros errores y aprender a superarlos. Conocer más de los mercados no nos hace mejores traders, lo que necesitamos es conocernos más nosotros mismos.

This paper examines the stock market reaction to 167 FDA announcements of new drug approvals during the period 1980 - 1999. Using an event study methodology, the study finds that there are significant positive abnormal returns on the day of the announcement of new drug approvals. However, there is no evidence of significant positive returns prior to the announcement. Accordingly, the paper concludes that any buying pressure arising from insiders anticipating the approval announcement does not affect the value of the stock. Significant returns do not occur until after the announcement, which is consistent with the behavior of an efficient market.

Corporate governance is founded on four pillars i.e. righteousness, truth, perseverance and social justice. The companies which trade in securities are listed either in the NSE or the BSE which are the registered stock exchanges in the country. They have to regulate their activities in stock exchanges in accordance with the norms prescribed by SEBI, the stock market regulator in India.

The research paper by Julan Du and Shang-Jin Wei provides an empirical analysis quantified on the basis of a number of factors considered that can have significant impact on market volatility (including a measure of insider trading). These factors include:

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product-market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity-and debtholder, the pay-forperformance relation is lower than in widely-held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability. JEL codes: G32, G34, G38

Attorney General Barr, file under: Human Trafficking Department Complaint Number
TRN 1906-0489 DOJ TA 1197671 NCMEC TA 11749 ST FARM 49 F33 4564 AM FAM 01000914639 POLARIS 59004 NHTH 545121

In Re: Fareed Sepehry-Fard©, Sui Juris,
not the straw man FAREED
SEPEHRY-FARD©
Secured Party Creditor labeled as
"Debtor",
Appellant
v.
US TRUSTEE et. al.,

Appellee

Wall Street è una strada che occupa poco più di 1 kilometro, ma ha sempre destato l’interesse di tutto la letteratura cinematografica e non solo. I per- sonaggi che animano questo ristretto mondo sono a ascinanti e allo stesso tempo dannati: le loro azioni hanno ricadute su tutto ciò che li circonda e sono capaci di tutto.
Nel paper ho deciso di analizzare uno dei tanti film costruiti intorno al mito di questa strada: il protagonista è un giovane convinto che in quel kilometro si possano realizzare tutti i suoi desideri, primo fra tutti, divenire ricco e famoso. Finirà per essere accusato del reato di insider trading e scoprirà la verità su quel mondo tanto bramato.
Il paper analizza il film sia allacciandosi a temi giuridici che economici, per terminare con considerazioni sull’attualità del film e dei problemi evidenziati dal regista.