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A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents

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  • Michel Grabisch

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Alexis Poindron

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We study a stochastic model of anonymous influence with conformist and anti-conformist individuals. Each agent with a ‘yes' or ‘no' initial opinion on a certain issue can change his opinion due to social influence. We consider anonymous influence, which depends on the number of agents having a certain opinion, but not on their identity. An individual is conformist/anti-conformist if his probability of saying ‘yes' increases/decreases with the number of ‘yes'- agents. In order to consider a society in which both conformists and anti-conformists co-exist, we investigate a generalized aggregation mechanism based on ordered weighted averages. Additionally, every agent has a coefficient of conformism which is a real number in [-1, 1], with negative/positive values corresponding to anti-conformists/conformists. The two extreme values -1 and 1 represent a pure anti-conformist and a pure conformist, respectively, and the remaining values - so called ‘mixed' agents. We consider two kinds of a society: without mixed agents, and with mixed agents who play randomly either as conformists or anti-conformists. For both cases of the model, we deliver a qualitative analysis of convergence, i.e., find all absorbing classes and conditions for their occurence.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Grabisch & Alexis Poindron & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019. "A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02799707, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02799707
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103773
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02799707v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "A model of influence in a social network," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 69-96, July.
    2. Förster, Manuel & Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2013. "Anonymous social influence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 621-635.
    3. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 635-656, October.
    4. Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2013. "A model of influence based on aggregation functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 316-330.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2020. "A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-29, December.
    2. Michel Grabisch & Fen Li, 2020. "Anti-conformism in the Threshold Model of Collective Behavior," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 444-477, June.
    3. Alexis Poindron, 2019. "A general model of synchronous updating with binary opinions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 19024, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. Ushchev, Philip & Zenou, Yves, 2020. "Social norms in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    5. Alexis Poindron, 2019. "A general model of synchronous updating with binary opinions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02372486, HAL.
    6. GRABISCH, Michel & RUSINOWSKA, Agnieszka & VENEL, Xavier, 2022. "Diffusion in large networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    7. Sebastiano Della Lena & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2021. "Group Identity, Social Learning and Opinion Dynamics," Papers 2110.07226, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    8. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Xavier Venel, 2022. "Diffusion in large networks," Post-Print halshs-03688783, HAL.
    9. Buechel, Berno & Klößner, Stefan & Meng, Fanyuan & Nassar, Anis, 2023. "Misinformation due to asymmetric information sharing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    10. Poindron, Alexis, 2021. "A general model of binary opinions updating," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 52-76.
    11. de Vos, Wout & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2023. "Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games," Other publications TiSEM 6d555d3d-5f45-42e7-8b71-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. de Vos, Wout & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2023. "Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games," Discussion Paper 2023-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Alexis Poindron, 2019. "A general model of synchronous updating with binary opinions," Post-Print halshs-02372486, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    anti-conformism; convergence; absorbing class; opinion dynamics; influence; anonymity; anonymat; anticonformisme; classe absorbante;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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