Asanga

Mahāyāna Buddhism, hostile to any kind of conceptual construction (vikalpa), which is blamed for operating artificial delimitations within a homogenous and amorphous reality, presents its own doctrine not as a “truth” but rather as psychological “skill-in-means” (upāya), which aims at liberating humans from the illusory reality cast by their own mental discriminations. Thus, doctrine is denied all cognitive value, both in respect to a metaphysical level of reality and in respect to the mere empirical level. Its validity pertains to the psychological efficiency that it could display in the process of “counter-acting/opposing” the errors that ensnare humans. Therefore, the issue of religious truth is transferred from the cognitive sphere to the psychological and existential sphere, its value being of a rather therapeutic type.
The doctrine is considered as an antidote (pratipaksa) which has the sole role of denying the reality of the various mental constructions which create the sphere where the self inflicted human drama takes place. Thus, the doctrine is deprived not only of cognitive value but also of objectivity, its efficiency depending on the existence of some particular errors, of a particular type of bondage. The actual content of a religious teaching does not reflect an „objective truth” but rather a particular kind of error, which is denounced and rejected by the doctrine. Buddhist texts even utterly state that it is not possible to identify an own-meaning of the term „void” (sūnya), the main soteriological concept of Buddhism, which gets a sense only in association with another term, whom it could determine. Thus, religious teachings have more to do with subjective errors than with an objective truth.
Therefore, Buddhism does not hesitate to claim the voidness of its own path („the voidness of voidness” - sūnyatāsūnyatā), which is considered only as a temporary useful tool, which must be itself discarded during the process of liberation. The old school of Buddhism, Hīnayāna, is blamed for having developed an extremely elaborated psychological analysis which turned to be itself an obstacle on the path to liberation; this way, their religion itself opposed the accomplishment of the religious goal.
Mahāyāna Buddhism considers its own doctrine in a relativist, instrumental manner, rather existential and therapeutic than cognitive and metaphysical.

Keywords: Buddhism; Mahāyāna; doctrine; void; pluralism; relativism; non-cognitive religion.

Un tratado en el que, basándose en el Capítulo sobre la moralidad ética, de Niveles del bodhisatva, de Asanga, Tsong Khapa analiza en detalle la naturaleza y características de los votos de la liberación individual y del bodhisatva, en el contexto del Camino de Mahayana de la Perfección.

I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found
in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a deep renunciation of the world.

Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with 'emptiness,‘ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose.

Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of
'Oneness,‘ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks
to avoid, namely, eternalism.

I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as 'pliancy.‘ This would imply that what
Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution.

The Pātañjalayogaśāstra concludes with a description of the pinnacle of yoga practice: a state of samādhi called dharmamegha, cloud of dharma. Yet despite the structural importance of dharmamegha in the soteriology of Pātañjala yoga, the śāstra itself does not say much about this term. Where we do find dharmamegha discussed, however, is in Buddhist yogācāra, and more broadly in early Mahāyāna soteriology, where it represents the apex of attainment and the superlative statehood of a bodhisattva. Given the relative paucity of Brahmanical mentions of dharmamegha in the early common era, Patañjali appears to adopt this key metaphor from a Mahāyāna context—and to revise its primary meaning from fullness to emptiness. This article traces the early elaborations of dharmamegha in Buddhist texts, and, drawing on conceptual metaphor theory, lays out four arguments that each, in part, can account for the stark contrast in how classical yoga and yogācāra employ the superlative metaphor of dharmamegha.

This volume gathers together six studies published in several journals, between 2013 and 2018, as individual papers. They were not conceived to form a whole but rather as independent articles. Nevertheless, in the present volume, we succeeded in grouping them into two major themes.
The first topic the volume deals with is the apparition of the phenomenon of human individuation within the wide cosmic experience. It is approached by three of the papers. The first one investigates the apparition of the human phenomenon within the cosmic consciousness, apparition which alters the peaceful and neutral character of consciousness. Human states of awareness and their subjective contents are analyzed in the second article, while the third one deals with the relation of reciprocal dependence between the human and the cosmic phenomena.
The second part of the volume is focused on the deconstruction of “knowledge”, as a cognitive issue, and its reinterpretation as a mere subjective experience, as a “whim” of the individual consciousness. Starting with the most basic descriptions and until its higher forms, such as metaphysics and religion, knowledge is considered as a psychological “game”, stirred not by the contact with an objective reality, but by the karmic predispositions of its subject. All cognitive activity, all cognitive categories, including “truth”, are reduced to mere psychological issues, either individual or collective. Even when they are collective, being shared by more individuals controlled by similar karmic tendencies, mental constructions cannot overcome their subjective nature and lack of cognitive value. Truth is rather a matter of “tuning” the mental constructions than one of “knowing” something.

After being engendered through the appropriating activity (upadana) of the mind (manas), applied to the universal experience of the storehouse consciousness (alayavijñana), the individual experience is constituted through the conjoint activity of the six "operational consciousnesses" (pravrtti vijñana): the five sensory consciousnesses and the mental consciousness (manovijñana). The brute sensory experience is projected by the five sensory consciousnesses, approximating the senses, but being rather some faculties (indriya), capacities, the potentiality of consciousness to engender some specific types of experience. In Yogacara, the sensory experience is totally devoid of concept (vikalpa), presenting itself as an amorphous flow of sensory inputs. Conceptualization is performed by the mental consciousness which, in an illusory manner, projects the categorically discriminated entities onto the sensory flow. Yogacara authors claim that the conceptually determined entities created by the mental consciousness (manovijñana) are purely fictitious, hence the mental consciousness projecting a totally illusory ontological sphere, which broadly comprises all the states of human awareness. Most of the human conscious experiences take place at the level of this conceptual sphere, this meaning that human awareness and the entire human drama involve mainly illusory entities. Therefore, conceptual experience is severely flawed, firstly, because it is produced at the level of the limited individual self (atman), and, secondly, due to its fictitious character (vitatha).

O MAHAYANA-UTTARATANTRA-SHASTRA, ou mais simplesmente UTTARATANTRA (sânscrito) (Tib.: Gyud Lama), é um texto fundamental da tradição budista Mahayana, que versa sobre o último ciclo de ensinamentos "definitivos" do Buda. A compilação original foi redigida, em verso, por Asanga (séc.IV), por inspiração do Bodhisattva Maitreya (um Buda em potência que se manifestará no futuro). A obra trata dos aspectos relativos à luminosidade, factor indissociável do conceito de vacuidade postulado pelo budismo Mahayana e Tântrico.

Una composición en la que se presentan distintas visiones del reino de la realidad, comenzando con las dos del Sutra Mahayana, las de Nagarjuna y Asanga-Vasubandhu; las dos Hinayana, las de Oyentes y realizadores solitarios, y varias no budistas como Samkhya, Vaishnava, Kalavada, etc.

Xuanzang (602–664) is famous for his legendary life, his important translation works, and also his Discourse on the Realisation of Consciousness-Only (Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, 成唯識論). This text, which is considered as a synthesis of Yogācāra thought, has been diversely interpreted by modern scholars and is still discussed, in particular about the status of external things. Nevertheless, this issue seems to be of little interest for Yogācāra thinkers compared to other topics such as the Noble Path, or else the three types of wisdom (trividhā prajñā, 三慧): learning (śruta, 聞), reasoning (cintā, 思), and cultivating (bhāvanā, 修). As emphasized in recent research, this topic represents a major issue for Buddhist practitioners. In an attempt to analyse it in Xuanzang’s Discourse, and more generally in Yogācāra thought, this paper will first discuss Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s thought on the three types of wisdom. Secondly, since it is important to replace the three types of wisdom in the general argumentation of Xuanzang’s Discourse, we will present the structure of his text which is modelled on a “path” leading progressively to Supreme Awakening. Then, we will present the main elements of the Noble Path and situate the three types of wisdom into it. Finally, we will explain that Xuanzang follows Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s conceptions and eventually confirm the importance of the three types of wisdom in Yogācāra thought.

Pentru Vijnanavāda, întreaga manifestare a Universului reprezintă un „vis cosmic” ce are drept subiect realitatea ultimă. Afectat de ignoranţă, absolutul se înfăţişează sub forma unei conştiinţe cosmice şi începe a proiecta Universul. Trecând prin mai multe niveluri de determinaţie, în cele din urmă, manifestarea, iniţial unitară, se „sparge” în multiplicitatea fiinţelor, se ipostaziază în nenumărate individualităţi. La acest nivel se produce drama ontologică („căderea”) întrucât aceste ipostaze multiple ale conştiinţei se pierd în iluzia realităţii propriei individualităţi şi, pe baza acestei identităţi asumate în mod eronat, ajung să fie înlănţuite în manifestare.
Eliberarea din drama auto-indusă are loc atunci când conştiinţa înţelege şi realizează în mod direct vacuitatea identităţii individuale şi caracterul beatific al realităţii.

In Yogācara Buddhism, human being is not a simple occurrence within the Cosmos but rather an important wheel of the Cosmic mechanism. The Universe is driven by the Karmic force which is engendered by human afflicted (klista) experience. Human condition “fuels” the Universe with Karmic energy, thus maintaining its existence and dynamics.
It is not as much as in the Judeo-Christian tradition, where the Universe exists for the sake of man, but neither as in the rough Materialistic outlooks, where the Universe could have existed devoid of humans, too. In Yogācara, the ultimate subject is the Cosmos and not the individual being; nevertheless, human beings are not mere accidental (āgantuka) apparitions within the Universe, but rather some of its major mechanisms, the ones which propel the Cosmos. Thus, the dependence is mutual: men appear in the Universe but, equally, they maintain into existence the Universe.
The paper deals with the two major functioning mechanisms of the cosmic consciousness (ālayavijñāna), the outflow (nisyanda) and the karmic maturation (vipāka), proving that the outflow can’t provide more than a limited continuity of a particular manifestation. The perpetuity of the cosmic consciousness is possible only through the karmic maturation mechanisms which always involve human affliction and human subjects.

According to Vijnanavada, the idealist school of Buddhism, individual being represents an erroneous limited projection of the universal consciousness, of the storehouse consciousness (alayavijnana). The sphere of human experience does not represent a mere type of experience among many others, but a specific one which represents a “deviation” from the authentic reality.
The function of projecting the individual, when looked upon from the perspective of the universal level of the storehouse consciousness, is described as the “appropriation” (upadana) of an individual identity by the universal consciousness; when it is looked upon from the perspective of the individual himself, the function of projecting and maintaining individuality is described as “mind” (manas). In Vijnanavada, the mind represents that function of consciousness which, appropriating a determined sphere of experience as its own identity, gives birth to the individual being.
As the mind represents the very condition through which the person is projected, the personal experience automatically includes the activity of the mind. The mind is the one that, in a non-deliberate, non-conceptual manner, appropriates the person, the individual self; nevertheless, at its level, the experience of the ego is still conceptually undetermined, irrational, unconscious, instinctual, subliminal. The attachment to ego, as it is experimented at the level of the mind, manifests as irrational instincts or natural urges. Only at the level of the mental consciousness, the ego, the individual self, is rationally, conceptually depicted, acquiring a clearly determined conceptual identity.
When a certain series of factors is ascribed the status of “individual self” (atman), of “person” (pudgala), the entity thus created is nothing else but an ontological fiction. The consciousness affected by the error (viparyasa) of the individual self projects itself within a sphere of ontological illusion, a sphere wrongly identified as reality. What is truly real, i.e. the ultimate reality (dharmadhatu) and the conditional flow (pratityasamutpada) of an ideatic nature, gets out of comprehension when the person, the individual self are considered as real and the whole experience starts to be structured according to the tendencies induced by the individual identity.
The activity of the mind creates the “fundamental error” (viparysamula), the “fundamental ignorance”, its veiling activity which engenders that background ignorance affecting the human being during all his experiences. The absence of the absolute knowledge in case of the human beings is explained precisely by the fact that their experience is constituted on the basis of the experience of the mind.
The attitude of the subject towards those components of the experience that have been assumed as his own self changes and becomes one of “elevation” (unnati), of “pride” (mana). The attitude meant by these terms is that of a special importance paid to certain components of experience, due to the new status that has been ascribed to them. Once his own nature has been identified within the fleeting experience, this experience stops being only experience and illusorily becomes his own nature. He is no longer indifferent to the transformations of the experience, which are no longer mere experiences, but appear as alterations of his own nature. This way, the subject undergoes affliction (klesa), gets entrapped in his own experience. The anxiety and the suffering that characterize human existence are due to this erroneous identification of the human nature with the illusory identity appropriated by the mind.

Keywords: Buddhism, Vijnanavada, mind, manas, individual self, atman, affliction, klesa

Abstract

The thesis focuses on the relationship between Sanskrit classical grammar, Abhidharma, and the debates between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. In particular, it shows how the kāraka system, and the idea of lakṣaṇa, influence philosophical argumentation in the context of medieval Indian Buddhist thought. The kāraka system is the way in which classical Sanskrit grammarians discuss syntax, and in particular, actions and agency. Lakṣaṇa means a defining trait, or a definition, at once a scholastic tool and a fundamental way to identify existent entities.

There are five Chapters and two Appendices. Chapter One shows the close links between Sanskrit classical grammar and basic ideas in Buddhist thought, and isolates the kāraka system as being most relevant in this regard. It also show certain structural analogies between the kāraka system and certain important features of Buddhist philosophy. Chapter Two is mostly based on Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and its sub-commentary; it highlights and reconstructs the discussions on lakṣaṇa and agency found therein. Chapter Three shows how Madhyamaka understands similar issues, and what is the proper context and significance of its refutation of lakṣaṇas. Chapter Four shifts the focus upon the Madhyamaka understanding of conventional truths, and the role of the lakṣaṇas of Abhidharma, as well as of the kāraka system, within saṁvti. Chapter Five compares the Yogācāra views on the very same topics.

Appendix 1 is a translation of Prajñākaramati’s commentary to Bodhicaryāvatāra 9.1-34, a work where many of the philosophical debates discussed throughout the thesis are well represented. Appendix 2 is a photographic reproduction of a manuscript, containing an anonymous commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Lokātītastava.

Table of Contents

Abstract 2

Table of Contents 3

Introduction 8

Acknowledgements 12
Chapter 1

Sanskrit Grammar and Buddhism 14


1.1 Language analysis: nirukti and vykaraa 17

1.2 Pini 20

1.3 Buddhist grammarians 21

1.4 Defining ‘grammar’ 24

1.4.1 abdnusana 25
1.4.2 Vykaraa 28
1.4.3 stra 29
1.4.4 Stra, yoga 32
1.4.5 Lak•aa 34
1.4.6 Grammar as Śabdavidyā, in the training
of a Bodhisattva 35


1.5 The Kraka system 39

1.5.1 Vibhakti and kraka 39
1.5.2 What a kāraka is 42
1.5.3 Primary kārakas 45
1.5.4 The autonomous agent 48
1.5.5 What the agent most wishes for: karman 53
1.5.6 Kik, and Jinendrabuddhi: tathyuktam cnpstitam 57
1.6 The primary kārakas and Buddhism 59
1.6.1The kāraka system and basic Buddhist thought:
selflessness 60
1.6.2 The kāraka system and the Mahāyāna:
the purification of the three spheres 62


1.7 Continued agency and dependent arising 63

1.7.1 The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya on pratītyasamutpāda 66
1.7.2 The debate in the prasannapadā 68
1.7.3 Mādhyamika authors: more on the same issue 69


1.8 Conclusion 72


Chapter 2
Abhidharma as a dictionary:
the world in Buddhist terms 74

2.1 Dharma: what upholds its own lak•aa 79
2.1.1 The four lak•aas of all compounded factors 80
2.1.2 The lakṣaṇas and sahabhūhetu 87
2.1.3 Sautrāntika criticism of the four lakṣaṇas 89
2.1.4 On definitions and characteristics:
beyond the four lak•aas 94

2.2 The seer and the knower: identifying the synchronic agent 101
2.2.1 Cak•u payati rpi 102
2.2.2 Kart• and kriy as analytical categories 108
2.2.3 A counter-position, on agency 113
2.2.4 Agents and conventional persons:
a passage from the pudgalavinicaya section 115

2.3 ‘Self’ as indirect reference 119
2.4 Conclusion 120
Chapter 3

Lakṣaṇas and the emptiness of lakṣaṇas 122


3.1 The Lokttastava and the Heart Stra:
emptiness as lack of characteristics 124

3.1.2 From the aggregates to their emptiness 125
3.1.3 The meaning of autonomy and the absence of God 129
3.1.4 Beyond the world, beyond characteristics 132

3.2 Candrakrti and lakṣaṇas 134
3.2.1 The basic status of lakṣaṇa and lakṣya 135
3.2.2 Applying the dialectic to a specific instance:
the four conditions (pratyayas) 138
3.2.3 The example of space 141

3.3 Candrakrti and the Vaibh•ika-Sautrntika divide:
instants and the emptiness of lak•aas 144

3.3.1 Madhyamaka versus the lakṣaṇas
of all compounded factors 146
3.3.2 Does disappearance exist? 147
3.3.3 Candrakīrti and momentariness 150
3.3.4 Candrakīrti’s conventions: Vaibhāṣika or Sautrāntika? 151



Chapter 4
Conventions, the world, and Madhyamaka 156

4.1 Samv•ti and Paramrtha: Candrakrti and Prajkaramati 158

4.2 Identity and difference between Mdhyamikas and cowherds:
Abhidharma and Vykaraa 164

4.2.1 Candrakrti on the svalak•aa
and Prajkaramati on svasamvedan 168
4.2.2 Are Mdhyamikas ‘satisfied with no analysis’ ? 175
4.2.3 More on Candrakrti and krakas 181

4.3 Identity and difference between Mdhyamikas
and Crvks. Paraloka, karman, and the origin of vijna
The meaning of pratipatt•bheda 185

4.4 A system of graded saṁvṛtisatya 189
4.4.1 Candrakrti and graded conventions 191
4.4.2 Three levels of teachings 191
4.4.3 Analysing space into emptiness: atoms 198
4.4.4 ntideva and Prajkaramati:
conventions and momentariness 199

4.5 Conclusions 210


Chapter 5
Comparisons with the Yogācāra 211

5.1 Twenty Verses: vijñaptimātratā as an Abhidharmic argument 212
5.1.1 The main thesis of Verse 1 212
5.1.2 An alternative translation 217
5.1.3 The proper locus of dependent arising 220
5.1.4 Real referents of a metaphor:
a comparison with the Thirty Verses 223

5.2 The importance of lakṣaṇas 227
5.2.1 The first Chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga 228
5.2.2 What has lakṣaṇas,
and what has the lakṣaṇa of no-lakṣaṇa 230


5.3 Kārakas and the irriducibility of consciousness 231
5.3.1 Consciousness as an action without agent or object 232
5.3.2 A passage from Asaṅga, on action and agents 235
5.3.3 A note on Śāntarakṣita’s position 237

5.4 The role of momentariness in Yogācāra 239
5.5 Conclusion 242

Conclusion 244

Appendix 1 | Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, 9.1-34
with Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā: English Translation 251
Note on the Translation 252
The importance of Prajñākaramati’s commentary 256


Appendix 2 | Reproduction of a Devanāgarī manuscript
containing Nāgārjuna’s Lokātītastava,
together with an anonymous commentary 336


Bibliography 341

В книге представлена четвертая глава сочинения «Украшение из постижений» — основного текста индо-тибетского буддизма по учению о пути махаяны. В работе обсуждаются вопросы познания, психологии познания и буддийской сотериологии с точки зрения развития качеств ума и достижения совершенства понимания.
Книга содержит предисловие и введение в изучение IV  главы,  репринт тибетского текста IV главы, перевод IV главы на русский язык, сопровождаемый комментариями, извлеченными  из  авторитетных  комментариев  Харибхадры  (VIII в.) и Цзонхавы (XIV в.), а также курс лекций по IV главе «Украшения из постижений» современного тибетского  ученого  геше  Чжамьян  Кенцзэ  (1927–2006) в переводе с устного тибетского языка на русский язык. Прилагается русско-тибетско-санскритский терминологический глоссарий по IV главе.
Книга адресована тибетологам, буддологам и всем интересующимся вопросами познания и буддизма махаяны.

After being engendered through the appropriating activity (upadana) of the mind (manas), applied to the universal experience of the storehouse consciousness (alayavijnana), the individual experience is constituted through the conjoint activity of the six “operational consciousnesses” (pravrtti vijnana): the five sensory consciousnesses and the mental consciousness (manovijnana). The brute sensory experience is projected by the five sensory consciousnesses, approximating the senses, but being rather some faculties (indriya), capacities, the potentiality of consciousness to engender some specific types of experience. In Vijnanavada, the sensory experience is totally devoid of concept (vikalpa), presenting itself as an amorphous flow of sensory inputs. Conceptualization is performed by the mental consciousness which, in an illusory manner, projects the categorically discriminated entities onto the sensory flow. Vijnanavada authors claim that the conceptually determined entities created by the mental consciousness (manovijnana) are purely fictitious, hence the mental consciousness projecting a totally illusory ontological sphere, which broadly comprises all the states of human awareness. Most of the human conscious experiences take place at the level of this conceptual sphere, this meaning that human awareness and the entire human drama involve mainly illusory entities.
Therefore, conceptual experience is severely flawed, firstly, because it is produced at the level of the limited individual self (atman), and, secondly, due to its fictitious character (vitatha).

Keywords: Buddhism, Vijñanavada, mental consciousness, manovijnana, operational consciousness, pravrtti vijnana, perception, concept, category.

The thesis focuses on the relationship between Sanskrit classical grammar, Ahludharma, and the debates between Madhyamaka and Yogacara. In particular, it shows how the karaka system, and the idea of laksana, influence philosophical argumentation in the context of medieval Indian Buddhist thought. The karaka system is the way in which classical Sanskrit grammarians discuss syntax, and in particular, actions and agency. Laksana means a defining trait, or a definition, at once a scholastic tool and a fundamental way to identify existent entities. There are five Chapters and two Appendices. Chapter One shows the close links between Sanskrit classical grammar and basic ideas in Buddhist thought, and isolates the karaka system as being most relevant in this regard. It also shows certain structural analogies between the karaka system and certain important features of Buddhist philosophy. Chapter Two is mostly based on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhasya and its sub-commentary; it highlig...

В книге представлены пятая, шестая и седьмая главы сочинения "Украшение из постижений" - основного текста индо-тибетского буддизма по учению о пути махаяны. В работе обсуждаются вопросы познания, психологии познания, буддийской философии и сотериологии с точки зрения развития качеств ума и достижения совершенства понимания.

The article consists of the last two chapters of The
Discrimination between Middle and Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga), of Asanga, one of the main texts of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism. The fourth chapter  discusses on the application of the antidotes (pratipakṣa), namely on the ways the various types of defilements entrapping a human being in the world are removed. Just like chapter II, this part is highly technical, making plenty of use of the alembicated phenomenological typologies of Abhidharma. It describes the
psychological cleansing of the individual, hence being a phenomenological analysis done in a specific Abhidharma terminology. The fifth chapter deals with a topic frequently encountered in the texts of Mahāyāna: the superiority of the
path exhorted by them, against the psychological path of Hīnayāna. The path of Mahāyāna is an absolute, an „unsurpassable” (ānuttarya) path, since it consists in
the highest realization, the dissolution of the individual in the ultimate reality.
Hence it goes much further than the path preached by Hīnayāna, consisting in a gradual psychological purification of the individual, until he reaches a rather negative condition, a condition devoid of any kind of experience and suffering.

Keywords: antidotes (pratipakṣa) adverse factors (vipakṣa), Abhidharma,
Mahāyāna, Hīnayāna, ultimate reality, transcendent insight (prajñā).

This article constitutes one of a series presenting a critical edition of the Tibetan text and Japanese translation of the *Buddhānusmṛtivṛtti ascribed to Asaṅga and the *Buddhānusmṛtiṭīkā ascribed to Vasubandhu and is a continuance of my previous article. I attempted to read these two texts that survive only as Tibetan translations assuming the underlying original Sanskrit. In this article, I dealt with the interpretation of vidyācaraṇasampanna (perfected in wisdom and practice) among the ten epithets of tathāgata. I found that Jñānagarbha’s Ārya-anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇīṭīkā includes a closely related argument with the above two texts concerning the interpretation of the ten epithets. I also argued that the two texts are later than Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti and Guṇamati’s Vyākhyāyuktiṭīkā and were not written by Asaṅga or Vasubandhu.
Corrigenda: p.147: aniprāpnotīti>anuprāpnotīti

The Discrimination between Middle and Extremes is one of the major Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, usually ascribed to the Vijñānavāda tradition.
The second chapter deals with soteriological matters, being an analytical exposition of the path. The chapter shows the blending of Mahāyāna’s ontology
with the Abhidharmic phenomenological analysis, which is one of the definitory features of Vijñānavāda. It has a high level of technicality, being tributary to the very alambicated phenomenological classifications of the Abhidharmic masters.
Equally technical is the third chapter, dealing with different perspectives of considering the reality. It approaches a metaphysical issue, the reality (a properly Mahāyānist issue), by making use of some specifically Hīnayānist systems of
categories.

Keywords: obstructions, obstructions of the afflictions, obstructions of the knowable, afflictions, reality, self, object.

Volumul cuprinde trei dintre cele mai importante scrieri primare ale şcolii:
Asanga, Madhyantavibhaga (Discriminarea între mijloc şi extreme)
Vasubandhu, Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (Stabilirea existenţei unice a ideaţiilor)
Vasubandhu, Trisvabhavanirdesa (Indicaţiile referitoare la cele trei naturi)

This is chapter 12 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues that expected consequences are not a kind of consequences, but a kind of beliefs (i.e. expectations) about the future, and that virtually all varieties of consequentalism (and not just “subjective consequentialism”) appeal to such expectations rather than to actual consequences. Additionally the chapter discusses the interpretation of Buddhist ethics (Śāntideva and Asaṅga, specifically) as consequentialism.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949

"The Discrimination between Middle and Extremes is one of the
major Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, usually ascribed to the Vijñānavāda tradition, but having the particularity that the passing from the Prajñāpāramitā tradition to the classical Vijñānavāda can be easily traced within the text.
The first of the five chapters of the book deals with metaphysical matters. It exposes the theory of the three levels of reality (the ultimate reality – parinispanna svabhāva, the conditional emanation – paratantra svabhāva and the illusory conceptual level – parikalpita svabhāva), featuring each of these levels as
a particular condition of consciousness. In its second part, the text aproaches one of the classical issues in Indian metaphysics, namely the way it is possible to defend the absolutely pure and blissful character of the ultimate reality in face of
the threat represented by its association with the worldly defilements. The solution found by the Vijñānavāda authors ascribes only an accidental character
(āgantuka) to the defilements, while the purity is said to be essential (svābhāvika). Several verses delineate the features of the ultimate reality, thus linking the text to the Prajñāpāramitā tradition.

Keywords: emptiness, fulfilled own-being, construction of that which was not, interdependent own-being, affliction, constructed own-being"