A Great Debate: Hans Morgenthau Vs. E.H. Carr

A Great Debate: Hans Morgenthau Vs. E.H. Carr By Malcolm Cayley The statement “E.H. Carr would have described Hans Morgenthau’s work as too much realism and too little utopianism to be truly valuable” rests on several assumptions. It assumes that both scholars were writing for the same purpose. It assumes congruence with the socio-political climate at the time of writing; and it also assumes both authors are using nomenclature synonymously. Any critical engagement with such a statement must first acknowledge the asymmetrical nature of such an analysis. The dilemma of filtering judgment through the lens of Carr’s ambiguous syncretism thus assumes mature thought to provide purpose, stability, and progress. The purpose of Carr’s work was to critique the mismatched attempt to domesticate the international by utopian thinkers during the interwar years. Once corrected, balanced mature thought would be capable of providing stability and progress. Morgenthau, writing after the Second World War, however, uses empiricism and logic as the dual ‘test of theory’ to answer the questions: “is the theory consistent with the facts and within itself?” (Morgenthau 1948a, 3). Thus while Carr’s work captures the utter polemics of politics in its many guises, Morgenthau’s six points form a heliocentric tautology that keeps its distance and orbits reality. The self-referential tautology is present in both works in the logical sense, but Carr’s atheoretical work incorporates a far broader and deeper understanding of the ground a theory could occupy. Morgenthau attempts to construct a theory atop this foundation but remains utopian by Carr’s standards. The essay begins by defining Carr’s specific terminology; then the essay follows Morgenthau’s six points to compare and contrast the thinking of each. The essay argues that Carr would have described Morgenthau’s work as too utopian rather than containing too much realism. Carr employs specific understandings of realism and utopianism. Hedley Bull’s laconic summary of Carr’s thought: “Utopia : reality = freewill : determinism = theory : practice = the intellectual : the bureaucrat = left : right = ethics : politics”, places the juxtaposition in crystal-clear focus (Bull 1969, 628). Carr defines utopianism as aspiration or wishing of what ought to be. Similar to Oscar Wilde’s understanding of utopia being the perpetual sailing of humanity across the sea in search of betterment: “Progress is the realisation of Utopias”, Carr understands utopian ‘wishing’ to be disconnected from the facts attributed by analysis (Wilde 1891; Carr 1939, 5-9). Creative spontaneity provides the impetus for willing another reality through rejection of the current reality (Molloy 2006, 38). Carr defines realism as analysis of what is. Analysis of the causes and effects and consequences of theorising begins once utopian wishing smashes against the barriers of existing ‘objective’ forces. Realism alone is impotent to alter any sequence of events. Barren like the surface of Mars, realism is focused on the past and reactionary: it accepts and adapts to the tendencies of existing forces throughout society (Carr 1939, 9-10). A balance of the two is found in ‘mature’ thought that combines the senility of realism with the youthful exuberance of utopian wishing. It is this “healthy thought” balance that Carr finds truly valuable because truth must come from reality (Carr 1939, 10-12). Carr thus creates a space for political science as a discipline but not a theory (Cox 2010, 524-526). Within the tensions produced by realism and utopianism, Carr maintains that a theory must be both empirical and normative: it must contain not only what is but what ought to be (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2010, 7; Carr 1939, 5). Allocating a vector to analysis through purpose finds the basis for Carr’s methodological approach fundamentally instrumental. Arguing that “the wish is the father to the thought”, Carr seeks to highlight the nature of theorising about humanity (Carr 1939, 8). A priori facts must be procured through experience and crafted from the double helix of purpose and analysis. Thus Carr’s hybrid approach seems to be a posteriori in nature (Molloy 2006, 52-53). Morgenthau’s approach, however, is purely deductive, purportedly relying on the principles of empiricism and pragmatism (Morgenthau 1948a, 3). The epistemological shift between the two authors relates to their beliefs about the nature of knowledge related to experience: knowledge seems to exist independent of experience in the case of Morgenthau; while Carr holds that knowledge comes from experience. Morgenthau’s first point argues that politics have objective laws grounded in human nature that exist external to preferences (Morgenthau 1948a, 4). Morgenthau’s argument drifts from reality at this point and becomes consumed by utopianism. It is a belief that there are objective laws regardless of the indeterminate nature of humanity (Carr 1961, 4, 7). It is also a belief that a rational theory can be developed out of “imperfect and one-sided” objective laws (Morgenthau 1948a, 4-5). Finally it is a belief that the theorist’s preferences can be separated from the theory and that truth and mere opinion can be clearly distinguished (Carr 1939, 13-14; Morgenthau 1948a, 45). Instead of following Carr’s strict advice (the intellectual thinks a priori and twists theory to practice), Morgenthau’s argument remains utopian through its naïve belief that there are objective laws that can be deciphered from the subjective-objective nature of humanity (Carr 1939, 13-15). Rather than embrace reality, Morgenthau has constructed a fanciful dream world that, like parallel lines, keeps reality in sight but at significant distance. The distance between Morgenthau’s world and reality continues in the second point: “interest is defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau 1948a, 5). Interest remains a hollow concept that can be filled with the desires of the time and place based on the notion that reason can bridge the gap between the ‘facts’ and a scientific understanding of politics (Morgenthau 1948a, 5-8). Morgenthau’s purpose here, much like the entire six points, is tautological: accepting the groundings of objectivity in human nature necessarily leads to interest using reason to distinguish between truth and opinion (Morgenthau 1948a, 5-6). This purpose, however, is based on an assumption that affirms the consequent by privileging the ends (understanding politics) over the means (reason) in a reversal of Carr’s instrumentalism. Segregating motives and ideological preferences also distorts the analysis because the human essence contains these attributes in addition to interests (Smith 1986, 102). Carr argues the purpose of political science is to “cure the sicknesses of the body politic” (Carr 1939, 3). The impetus to such purpose follows Engels’ line of thought: to fulfil a technical need of society, which is underwritten by a Kantian understanding of Reason. Reason, in Kantian thought, gives humanity the potential for freedom as a birthright because humans are things-inthemselves with the freedom of choice; freedom “also is the foundation and source of moral responsibility” (Maneli, 1978, 28-30). Reason alone cannot grasp the concept of humanity (Smith 1986, 102). Humanity is both determined by the laws of nature and capable of freedom (Maneli 1978, 28). Reason must therefore judge nature: to compel a reply to questions which are fit to a purpose (Carr 1939, 2-3). It is this subjective judgment that includes the analyst within the ‘facts’ and prevents Morgenthau’s utopian work from getting any closer to the reality it purports to inhabit (Carr 1939, 3-4; Morgenthau 1948a, 5). Morgenthau’s third point argues that interest defined as power is an ahistorical, universally-applicable category. Interest thus remains across all time and place without fixed meaning (Morgenthau 1948a, 8). This ideological belief is based on Weber’s material and ideal interests rather than pure ideas presiding over humankind (Morgenthau 1948a, 9). Application relies on a belief of the politico-cultural milieu to determine power’s content and manner (Morgenthau 1948a, 9). Power is defined as domination and covers all relational aspects; but is capable of being balanced and providing stability. Change is possible and forms of political structures may fade away, but interest defined as power is a constant in a state of being (Morgenthau 1948a, 9-10). Carr’s understanding differs considerably. Carr’s realism and utopianism, different than Hegel’s antagonistic dialectic (thesis and antithesis creating synthesis which becomes the next thesis), exist in constant tension (Molloy 2006, 38; Maneli 1978, 37-38). This state of becoming means one cannot exist without the other. For instance good can neither exist without evil nor freedom without slavery. Over time, the antagonistic tensions give rise to further refined concepts that rise from the ashes of the past; but the tension would still remain: latched to the form and content in every stage of history (Carr 1939, 4; Maneli 1978, 37-38, 42). Carr’s rationale stems from the “general decay of political thinking” during the interwar years and the apparent failures created by domestication of international politics (Morgenthau 1948b, 128). Morgenthau’s fear of the future and acceptance of structural change is opposed by Carr’s embrace of the future and the conceptualisation of politics as in a state of becoming rather than being (Molloy 2006, 51). Contra Carr’s mature thought, Morgenthau’s static, ideological understanding of interest thus leaves humanity enslaved to a utopian fantasy in order to possess power. Morgenthau’s fourth point holds that while interest is a universal concept, morality is not when applied to states. The individual may sacrifice in defence of universal moral principles; but the state must stand up to evil in order to ensure national survival. In facing evil, however, the state should use prudence to make the least evil decision by weighing the consequences of various actions (Morgenthau 1948a, 10). The moral framework underpinning Morgenthau’s political realism has its roots in an Augustinian understanding of humanity (Molloy 2006, 33). Niebuhr’s organic unity holds that humanity is a spirit-creature capable of transcendence that tragically sins in the process. Transcendence is defined in relation to a personal-individual revelation and a social-historical revelation (Smith 1986, 102). Being limitless while limited, free and yet still bound causes anxiety (Smith 1986, 103). Anxiety, as the foundation of temptation and therefore original sin, has destructive and constructive aspects that tear at humanity’s position. With one foot in nature and the other without, humanity’s search for meaning places them external to reality without the ability to comprehend why (Smith 1986, 103-104). Carr argues ideas of realism and utopianism condition the ideas of actors: they are an eternal tension and actor ideas operate within this conceptual field of vision (Carr 1939). In attempting to conquer Niebuhr’s organic unity, Morgenthau’s political realism remains utopian because it is possessed by pride. Niebuhr argues pride is of power (humanity’s desire to dominate another), of knowledge (humanity’s knowledge is forever contingent: unable to discern a final cause), and of virtue (assumes relative moral standards can be absolute) (Smith 1986, 104-105). Carr falls victim to the pride of virtue; Morgenthau succumbs to pride of power and of knowledge, and thus continues to hold reality back. Morgenthau’s fifth point argues that the moral aspirations of a single state cannot be universal laws. Interest as power enables salvation from moral and political excess. It grants fairness to judge equally between states and with that fairness developing policies that respect other states (Morgenthau 1948a, 10-11). Morgenthau identifies with a transcendental ethical system that argues change is possible, escaping from Niebuhr’s understanding of humanity as possible of transcendence, while sinning tragically in the process (Smith 1986, 102-103; Kostagiannis 2013, 832). This stands in sharp contrast to Carr, who argues that moral relativism exists between states; ultimate change is unlikely due to the unresolvable tensions between utopianism and realism (Carr 1939, 20-21; Kostagiannis 2013, 832). Morgenthau’s ideological belief in interest defending against moral and political excess, being a theory developed by an intellectual, stands outside reality in an unstable quagmire of human nature (Carr 1939, 13-18). Mature thought sees theory and practice being interdependent (Carr 1939, 12-13). As the fifth part of Morgenthau’s tautology shows, utopianism attempts to use the optative mood to posit a theory to which practice should conform. The purpose of using moderate morality to moderate policy, in this sense, is the onus fact that places the ends before the means (Carr 1939, 20-21; Morgenthau 1948a, 10-11). ‘Facts’ rendered in this sense, however, can be distinguished from the reality they purport to inhabit because ethics exist in an antithetical relationship to politics (Carr 1939, 12-13). While moderate morality is possible by states when formulating policy, it is a belief that moderation is a practice rather than a theory. Creating a standardised ethical system to conform politics to is fundamentally utopian due to the antithetical relationship of ethics and politics. Morgenthau’s sixth and final point of political realism states that politics is a unique field of study that can be separated from other disciplines and the nature of humanity is a collage complied from many other parts (Morgenthau 1948a, 11-15). Morgenthau’s position here as an intellectual is utopian and completes the tautology. Real man, being a composite of economic man, religion man, and so on, has the interests of the state defined in terms of power to organise its internal logic (Morgenthau 1948a, 11). Once again this commits the sin of pride (of power and of knowledge) in Niebuhr’s understanding. Humanity can neither assume to possess teleological (final cause) knowledge nor reduce freewill to a domination of humanity over humanity (Smith 1986, 104-105). Furthermore, attempting to abstract and theorise about a part of the composite nature of humanity is unrealistic (Morgenthau 1948a, 14). Here Morgenthau is manipulating reality to construct a theory that will conform practice to theory based on the notion that individual statesmen, in the heat of the moment, are capable of performing mental gymnastics to satisfy the conditions of a theory (Carr 1939, 1213; Morgenthau 1948a, 14). Political realism stands in contrast to the legalist-moral approach that attempts to use law or morality to govern the actions of statesmen (Morgenthau 1948a, 12). However, as Neville Chamberlain quoted in Carr argues: general principles, like interests, are not policy and do not dictate particular situations (Carr 1939, 20). Law or morality may very well influence the everyday actions of statesmen regardless if it should not. This renders political realism to be limited in its explanatory capabilities and utopian in nature. Carr’s purported syncretic position by advocating a third way through the use of mature thought, which balances realism and utopianism, is ambiguous (Booth 1991, 531). A description of such a balance is largely absent and is thus utopian, by Carr’s own description, in itself. The nascent discipline of political science is still immature and thus prone to favour aspiration over analysis (Morgenthau 1948a, 128-129). The misunderstanding comes from Carr’s interpretation of Mannheim: utopias work against the status quo while ideologies maintain the status quo (Brincat 2009, 586). However, Carr’s understanding of realism and utopianism is a process in constant tension: forever becoming. Morgenthau’s blueprint utopianism assumes an endpoint: a state of being. Interests standardise actor behaviour through analysis of discourse that is purportedly based on objectivity (Brincat 2009, 582). It is this fixed-state understanding, despite Morgenthau’s transcendental ethics, that disconnects political realism from reality and launches it far afield into Carr’s understanding of utopianism. Carr’s favouritism of realism is based on its ability to compel the reflection on empirical non-ideal aspects of the world; as well as distaste for the interbellum liberal project spearheaded by Woodrow Wilson (Morgenthau 1948b, 132). Furthermore, Carr’s distaste of all utopian projects is a common strawman that relies on ambiguous polemics and fails to distinguish within the category (Booth 1991, 531). Morgenthau’s use of Weber’s ideal type definition of interests means that the universal ideology of interests – being both material and ideal – is too abstract and metaphysical to be grounded in reality (Brincat 2009, 585). Laying the foundation of a discipline and refusing to transgress these artificial boundaries is, as Mannheim argues, merely a “defence mechanism” against questioning the assumptions made rather than “psychological resistance” against the theory (Brincat 2009, 586; Morgenthau 1948a, 15). In conclusion, Carr would have described Morgenthau’s work to be too utopian rather than containing too much realism. A balance of the immobile thought of old age and the naivety of youth must be found in mature thought. Realism and utopianism are a tension that continues to delineate space for the generation of possible theories. Reality, determinism, practice, bureaucrats, the political right, and politics all form the empirical aspects of realism; utopia, freewill, theory, the intellectual, the political left, and ethics all form the normative aspects of utopianism. Although Morgenthau’s work is purportedly based on empiricism and pragmatism, the first point assumes objectives laws can be discerned from human nature. It assumes that a rational theory can be constructed from this indeterminate source. It also assumes the theorist can be separated from the analysis. Morgenthau’s flip of Carr’s instrumentalism places the ends of politics before reason, the means to get to this understanding. The ahistorical and universal nature of interest is an ideological belief that disconnects humanity from reality. Morgenthau assumes states should use prudence when formulating policy and choose the action with the least evil consequence; but this utopian ideal might not translate into practice. Morgenthau’s work fails to escape from pride of power and knowledge; moral and political excess might still occur regardless. Amalgamating humanity, then attempting to abstract individual elements is unrealistic. General principles do not give a policy in a definitive sense. Finally, ideal type, blueprint understandings are unrealistic. Thus Morgenthau’s work contains too much utopianism to be truly valuable according to Carr’s mature thought. References Brincat, S. 2009. “Reclaiming the Utopian Imaginary in IR Theory.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35 No.1, pp. 581-609. Booth, K. 1991.”Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67 No. 3, pp. 527-545. 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