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Critical Commentary on H. Morgenthau

CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON H. MORGENTHAU  UNIVERSITY: ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE: SOCIAL SCIENCES  FACULTY: MA. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  ACADEMIC YEAR: 2006-07  SEMESTER: FALL  STUDENT’S NAME: VASILEIOS KARAKASIS  STUDENT’S ID: 106605014  COURSE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IR. 511  INSTRUCTOR: MURAT ÖZBANK Hans Morgenthau, an American refugee from Nazi Germany, was one of the leading realists of the 1950’s and 1960’s and perhaps the “purest as well as the most self-conscious apostle of the realism” (Parkinson 1977, 163). Vasquez supports that “Morgenthau’s work was the single most important vehicle for establishing the dominance of the realist paradigm” in the study of international relations, especially in the United States. He wished to influence contemporary foreign policy, and much of his writing critically assessed American actions in light of his conception of the “national interest”. Morgenthau did not aspire to be a value-free scientist, detached from the world of power. On the contrary, he viewed realism largely as an interpretive guide, which would help people to “look over the shoulder” of a statesman, enabling them “to read and anticipate his very thoughts”. He also sought to use realism in order to create what he calls “science” of international politics. He was well aware that political realism was at odds with the American political traditions expecting that his ideas would be exposed in criticism. THE SIX PRINCIPLES A prolific academic and journalistic writer, Morgenthau became best known to students of international relations for his succinct statement of the “principles” of realism in the first chapter of his book Politics Among Nations. These principles presented in sharp, vigorous, accessible prose, summarize a simple yet wide ranging philosophical, theoretical, and political world-view. 1. “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” 2. “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” 3. “Power and interest are variable in content across space and time” 4. “Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of the states” 5. “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe” 6. “The difference, then between political realism and other methods is real and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere”. His emphasis on the imperatives of power, the constraints of anarchy, and the inherent flaws of man should be supplemented with factors drawn from idealism and the other traditions of international politics that Morgenthau discounts. These factors include the necessity of objective transcendent moral standards to judge relative degrees of moral and geopolitical evil, the intrinsic significance of ideology and regime type for promoting cooperation or exacerbating international conflict, and a recognition of the salutary pacifying effects of stable, liberal democracies vis-à-vis one another. STRUGGLE FOR POWER Morgenthau characterized international politics as a struggle for power and argued that it could be understood by assuming that states “think and act” in terms of interest defined as power”. International politics is a struggle for power not only of the inherent logic of a competitive realm such as a world politics, but also because of the limitless character of the lust for power which reveals a general quality of the human mind”. As Waltz points out Morgenthau is not content to see power as an instrument for the attainment of other ends in a competitive world, but regards it also as an end in itself, due to the nature of human beings. Emphasizing power as the main motive of formulating and inciting political behavior, Morgenthau finds himself exposed to criticism. What is the meaning of power? How can be power measured? What is the common criterions according to which can the power be operationalized and measured? Besides power should be directly connected with the aims for which it is used. The value and the type of power differ from each other according the national goals that are set. Overestimating the importance of power the mistake that emerges is to avoid or to not take into account other important variables. According to Hoffmann “it is impossible to classify in the same category variables that differ so much from each other like the following: power as a presumption of politics, power as criterion of politics, power as possibility and power in practice, power as sum of means and power as sum of processes”1. If Morgenthau’s reasons why world politics is a struggle for power are not entirely convincing, neither is his treatment of the concept of power itself. His definition of power was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource (based on tangible as well as intangible assets) and power as the ability to influence other’s behavior. If the latter definition is adopted, any effective action in world politics will necessarily involve power; but since this is a tautology, we will have learned nothing about the capabilities that create such influence. Is others’ behavior affected more by greater numbers of tanks, superior economic productivity, or by an attractive ideology? Unfortunately, however, theories based solely on definable power capabilities have proven to be notoriously poor at accounting for political outcomes. Morgenthau’s attempts to sever domestic from international politics and to minimize the impact of ideology on the international system rendered him less 1 R. KEOHANE NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS, New York Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 1-27 capable of understanding the moral, ideological, and geopolitical dimensions of the conflict with the Soviet Union than such quintessential Cold Warriors as President Harry Truman, Senator Henry M. Jackson, and President Ronald Reagan2. For some reasons also, the meaning of national interest as an essential criterion of politics it may seem obvious but it is not so illustrating in the extent that no politician, publicist or researcher can seriously support that the foreign policy should be constructed in contrast or independent from the “national interest”. It’s very difficult to give a practical meaning to this term. Politicians interpreting according to their standards, perceptions and beliefs the term of the national interest may restrict them or gain freedom that emerge from different powers. Some of them feel restricted by the authorities and policies that were exerted by their predecessors. They may interpret the national interest according to their civilization heritage, the values and the elements that were available for them during the period in which they were responsible for decision making. The perception of an objective and easily recognized national interest which would be a reliable guide and the criterion of national policy gain its meaning only during a stable period in the framework of which the participant-players try to fulfill restricted goals with restricted means, without internal back-seat drivers that are destroying every action they want to make. During a period in which the integration and the existence of some countries is in a bigger danger than other periods, we could observe that the most “irrational” actions choices may be selected as the most “reasonable” viable. Usually less imperative targets (prestige, increase of the power in a restricted area, protection of the citizens of a country that live abroad) are identified with survival questions. It’s a common phenomenon besides to use as an argument against the attempt to redefine the hierarchy of the 2 www.yale.edu/yjia/articles/Vol_1_Iss_2_Spring2006/kaufman217.pdf national goals the familiar fear of “concatenation of bad incidents” in order to distinguish those goals who are regarded as crucial for state’s integrity and survival from the others. Morgenthau’s major concept was that of balance of power which he referred to as “a necessary outgrowth of power politics”. The balance of power is for Morgenthau a “universal concept”. His desire to demonstrate the universality of this idea was lying on his attempt to explain a situation of equilibrium as well as any situation in which power struggles take place. But since Morgenthau did not regard equilibrium as inevitable, this double usage of the phrase led him into irresolvable contradictions. Without coherent definitions of “power” and “balance of power” Morgenthau was unable to create a consistent and convincing theory. The interpretations of the Morgenthau’s way of thinking do not provide a theory of international policy. He gives an image of the world which belongs to those who may construct a policy. Power politics it’s not either an interpretation. We are talking about a description of a type of political behavior which responds to the global political system. Taking this for granted, we should consider that the behavior of power politics should interpret itself and not be regarded as an interpretation power 3. Morgenthau’s conception of rationality is clearer than his view of power. Although he does not offer a formal definition in Politics among Nations, he seems to accept the conception that is standard in neoclassical economics. To say that governments act rationally in this sense means that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality (rational theory). 3 R. KEOHANE NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS, New York Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 1-27 Morgenthau explicitly acknowledged that the assumption of rationality was not descriptively accurate-indeed, one of his purposes was to instruct leaders in order to enable them to act more rationally –but he believed that it could be used as a baseline which could be tested against the actual facts, making a theory of international politics seem possible. That is, even though such an assumption is not always descriptively correct, it serves a valuable theoretical function. With it, the analyst can infer actions from interests, and thereby construct an explanatory theory of behavior. Against the baseline provided by the theory’s prediction, we can ask how “imperfections”, a lack of information, bargaining perversities, or even sheer irrationality could have made actual patterns of behavior diverge from what is expected. Morgenthau’s sophisticated use of rationality assumption consistent both with what Thucydides and those of later realists. Ye there are alternative approaches that do not sacrifice the possibility of systemic theory. One such research strategy would be to follow the notion of bounded rationality (Herbert Simon) into the study of the decision-making. Actors-subjects to bounded rationality can’t maximize their utilities, since they find it difficult to use available information to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative course of action. They therefore use shortcuts such as rules of thumb in order to achieve a satisfactory level of performance rather than an optimal one. Encouraging the reversion to practices of an older period, Morgenthau is overestimating the extent that a change is possible in the up to date international system. If the nations listen to the voices of and laws of nature why should they be encouraged to return to practices and policies that are supposed to be based on this kind of laws? Although history is giving many examples of international policy behavior that confirm his theories, there are testimonies that support different opinions. Morgenthau presenting these principles-guidelines is consciously or unconsciously demanding from them to adapt their policy to these. Therefore his theory is getting dressed with a “normative theoretical opera-cloak” failing to explain and interpret the fact why politicians in some occasions do not approve these realistic doctrines of the foreign policy.