Talks between the United States and Russia are being held in London over the situation in Crimea,... more Talks between the United States and Russia are being held in London over the situation in Crimea, with the region due to hold a referendum on Sunday that could see it secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. Jim Hughes writes that the idea being put forward by the United States and the EU that the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) could be used as an ‘off ramp’ for Russia from the crisis is misguided. He notes that the OSCE lacks credibility in Russia and that it would now be politically impossible for Moscow to back track on Crimea. Rather, the new Ukrainian government’s priority should be to prevent violence from erupting in Eastern Ukraine by offering a policy of accommodation to its Russian speaking citizens.
The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics, Aug 15, 2017
Forthcoming in Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecky eds. The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics.... more Forthcoming in Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecky eds. The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics. Routledge 2017 One of the earliest political visionaries of federalism in Eastern Europe,interwar Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, famously remarked to former socialist comrades that "we both took a ride on the same red tram, but while I got off at the stop marked Polish independence, you wish to travel to the station Socialism." (Macmillan, 2002: 208) Piłsudski's modernising vision of an intermarum (międzymorze) federation of republics under Polish hegemony from the Baltic to the Black Sea, acting as a bulwark against Russia, failed to overcome the power of nationalist particularism (Snyder, 2003) Among the many paradoxes of communism in Eastern Europe is that many socialist and communist internationalists were transformed over time into nationalists. In certain countries with multinational societies, especially the Soviet Union, great efforts were made by the ruling communist parties to recognise the political importance of national and ethnic cleavages, in the process compromising the internationalist tenets of communist ideology and its paramount attention to class-based cleavages. Although many of the nine states that formerly made up communist Eastern Europe prior to 1991 were significantly multinational in character, six were unitary states and only three were federal. One of the six unitary states-the German Democratic Republic (GDR)-was absorbed by a mutually agreed treaty into a unified federal Germany in 1990 (though without the referendum required by the German Constitution of 1949). In countries such as the Soviet Union (USSR), Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, communist parties engaged in sophisticated federal institutional engineering to recognise and embed certain national and ethnic cleavages in the organisation of state power. The three communist federal states have been generally discussed more within debates about the reasons for their systemic collapse rather than their stability over many decades, with communist federations being widely seen as being "façade" forms of federalism and otherwise unviable states because of their institutionalisation of nationalism and ethnicity. What, then, if any, is the relationship between ethnofederalism and the break-up of communist federations? The puzzle is what explains the resilience of communist federations over many decades, their breakdown in the late 1980s and early 1990s in three cases, the postcommunist survival and durability of federalism in Russia, and the continuing attraction of the concept as a conflict management device in the wider region (for example, in Russia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Federalism under Communism Communist federations were constructed following the Russian model on the basis of a Stalinist paradox which attempted to reconcile Marxism and nationalism. Stalin had spoken in 1934 of a Marxist formula with regard to cultures: that they should be "socialist in content and national in form" with the ultimate aim of building a common culture and language, but the thinking applied equally to the notion of the state. In Stalin (1913), he proposed that there should be only a small number of multicultural "regional autonomies" for the most important "crystallised units" of the
The EU has frequently presented Northern Ireland as a 'model' for conflict management, especially... more The EU has frequently presented Northern Ireland as a 'model' for conflict management, especially in the Balkans. The paper questions whether the EU had a strategic and coherent input into the Northern Ireland peace process through its Peace and Reconciliation Programs and argues that the rational logic of its actions hinged more on the goals of the Delors Commission for self-empowerment and competence expansion. Despite EU rhetoric, the development of EU conflict management instruments and policy since the late 1990s do not appear to be informed by the Northern Ireland 'model'. Indeed, that model's substantive elements-consociationalism, a lack of transitional justice, embedding sectarian structures-contravene EU norms of conflict management. The lack of transferable lesson-learning and the disjuncture between EU normative rhetoric about 'multiethnicity' and the realities of ethnic division are explored in the case of Kosovo.
Why do some groups fighting in civil wars target civilians more than others? We propose an explan... more Why do some groups fighting in civil wars target civilians more than others? We propose an explanation that challenges the current focus on material and organizational factors and instead brings back and emphasizes the role of ideology. We argue that the ideological frameworks of armed groups, whether state or non-state, condition their decisions about targeting, in some cases setting normative constraints on action even if such choice involves higher costs and risks. We examine these hypotheses using a mixed-method approach that combines a statistical analysis of newly constructed disaggregated data set on all fatalities in Northern Ireland’s conflict between 1969 and 2005 with a comparative historical study of the interaction between key ideologies and the armed groups that adopted them.
Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 2005
Despite the importance of conditionality during the current EU enlargement, there are few theoret... more Despite the importance of conditionality during the current EU enlargement, there are few theoretical or empirical studies of the concept. The study of EU enlargement conditionality is characterized by a concentration on the analysis of its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization, rather than empirically tracking clear causal relationships in policies and institution-building. Most studies tend to focus on two cumulative levels of conditionality. Firstly, they attach great salience to the broad ‘principled’ or normative conditionality established by the Copenhagen European Council in December 1993, the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which was subsequently elaborated in the Accession Partnerships for individual candidate countries from 1997. Secondly, they emphasize the ‘technical’ preconditions for the CEECs to accelerate the adoption of and adaptation to the acquis in order to fulfil all the responsibilities of membership. The speedy adoption of the acquis was the benchmark for measuring CEEC progress on accession — a condition that only Austria, Finland and Sweden, all advanced industrial countries, had previously met prior to membership. There is a wide spectrum of opinions as to whether EU conditionality has had positive or negative effects on the CEECs.
A major challenge for EU enlargement is how to communicate the benefits of membership to electora... more A major challenge for EU enlargement is how to communicate the benefits of membership to electorates. Given the weak penetration of party systems in the Central and East European countries, subnational elites have an important role in shaping voter preferences. Attitudes among subnational elites to EU enlargement are examined in three leading candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. The results are based on large-scale elite interviews conducted in 1999-2000 in key regional cities. The research demonstrates that subnational elites are disengaged not only structurally from the European integration project, since the negotiations involve the Commission and national governments, but also in their opinions. The subnational elites tend to view EU membership as a national issue and irrelevant for their level, and are poorly informed about EU activities that benefit them. The article suggests that this disengagement of subnational elites constitute...
Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, 2001
In building any home location is key. Geography is widely regarded as the single most important r... more In building any home location is key. Geography is widely regarded as the single most important reason why the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe (CEECs) can realistically aspire to inclusion in a common European home that is democratic and prosperous (Przeworski, 1991: 190–1). This hypothesis may have sound structural foundations in that those transition states that are most proximate to the vibrant democratic market economies of central and western Europe are most likely to benefit from ‘spillover’ and contagion pressures for Europeanization. Moreover, some of the CEECs contiguous with the European Union (EU) share a pre-communist historical legacy of close relations with their EU neighbouring states dating from their interwar era of independent statehood. In the immediate period after the fall of commmunism there existed a widely held perception in many of the CEECs that post-communism equated with a ‘return to Europe’, and that swift European integration would follow. In the decade after the fall of communism, however, the concept of Europe-building has been stretched by the pull of two policy agendas: first, a process of ‘deep integration’ among a historical core-group of EU states driven by a distilled notion of European exceptionalism; and, second, a process of eastward enlargement of EU membership driven by the diluted notion of a ‘wider Europe’. Thus far, the inherent tension between these alternative grand projects has been analysed, on the whole, as a macro-level problem between supranational, transnational and national institutions and elites (Wallace, 1999: 1–13).1
writes that the events of Bloody Sunday and the 'shock' of concentrated violence in the early pha... more writes that the events of Bloody Sunday and the 'shock' of concentrated violence in the early phase of the Northern Ireland conflict reverberated and shaped the conflict for the following decades. However, the violence also led to the start of a process that would result in the Good Friday Agreement.
How the EU conceptualizes the causes and dynamics of conflict should, in theory, shape its policy... more How the EU conceptualizes the causes and dynamics of conflict should, in theory, shape its policy responses. The EU's conceptualization and understanding of the drivers of conflicts and how they should be prevented or managed is elaborated in the European Security Strategy. From this document it is clear that the EU's conflict management strategy is founded on a linkage between security and development. This document's understanding of violent conflict is informed by an array of liberal approaches that emphasize the economic causes of conflict, the role of political and economic development in managing conflict, and the importance of addressing the EU's self-interest in achieving security and other goals through conflict management. There is an implicit acknowledgement of the two dominant paradigms that emerged from the collapse of Communism, the end of the Cold War and the global rise of violent conflicts in the 1990s. First, Democratic (or Liberal) Peace Theory, which holds that democracies do not go to war against each other and that democracy promotion will prevent conflict, for as the EU strategy puts it: 'The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states' (European Council, 2003). Second, the 'conflict trap' paradigm that is advocated by the World Bank, which correlates civil wars with economic failures in development policy and proposes an agenda of measures to correct them (Bigombe et al., 2000; Collier et al., 2003). The European Security Strategy aspires to creating an EU strategic culture of 'early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention', but it is somewhat contradictory in identifying what approaches are of paramount importance to delivering this goal. On the one hand, the document reflects an underlying tension between a 'hard' 'security first' approach to conflict management and more nuanced political and economic intervention. The term 'security' is used in the document across the spectrum of 'hard' and 'soft' interpretations, from the maximalist 'hard' understanding that associates 'security' with the absence of war and the ending of violent conflict by military means, to more 'soft'
Ethnicity and territory in the former Soviet Union: …, 2002
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or sy... more This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution , reselling , loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Page 1. 5. Sub-National Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Between Transition and European... more Page 1. 5. Sub-National Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Between Transition and Europeanization Gwendolyn Sasse, James Hughes & Claire Gordon 1. INTRODUCTION ... 13; 268270; Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, How Europe Matters. ...
Studies of EU conditionality assume one basic premise: that it exists and works because there is ... more Studies of EU conditionality assume one basic premise: that it exists and works because there is a power asymmetry which enables the Commission to impose the adoption of the acquis on the CEECs as a precondition of their entry to the Union. Thus this literature posits that there are clear causal relationships in the use of conditionality to ensure policy or institutional outcomes. Existing studies of enlargement conditionality analyse its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization. This article, however, takes a policy-tracking approach to analyse how conditionality was actually put into operation in policy-making and institution-building in the fields of regional policy and regionalization in the CEECs. The research draws on interviews conducted with officials in the Commission and in CEEC delegations in Brussels to illustrate the views of key actors, and to examine the interactions between the Commission and the candidate countries. By studying the policy process, the article demonstrates the fluid nature of conditionality, the inconsistencies in its application by the Commission over time, and the weakness of a clear-cut causal relationship between conditionality and outcome in this policy area. By charting the changes in the Commission's approach over time, and illustrating the diverse responses of the CEECs, this study confirms the need for a more nuanced approach to the concept of EU conditionality, and argues for a logic of differentiation in the study of its impact on the CEECs. *The authors would like to thank Eiko Thielemann, Waltraud Schelkle and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The research was funded under the ESRC's 'One Europe or Several?' programme, project no. L213252030, project title: 'Elites and Institutions in Regional and Local Governance in Central and Eastern Europe'.
Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 2005
Studies of transition generally focus more on the immediate events and processes and less on the ... more Studies of transition generally focus more on the immediate events and processes and less on the historical background which shapes it. Nevertheless, historical legacies and the extent to which a transition state has a ‘usable past’ are generally recognized as having an important bearing on the transition outcome.1 The term ‘historical legacy’ and the issue of ‘usability’ are, however, not systematically researched in the study of transition. Paradoxically, the more routinely employed concepts of ‘path dependency’ and ‘initial starting conditions’ tend to focus on the predetermining effects of decisions taken at the outset of the transition process rather than exploring the influence of historically rooted factors which may be equally important.2 Moreover, it is also important to take into account not only whether a ‘usable past’ is present in a particular case but also whether the elites that drive the transition process are willing to draw on it. The decisional calculus of elites is of central importance in transition studies as successful reforms are viewed as being largely dependent on the attitudes and behaviour of elites and how differences between elite segments are negotiated in the ‘games’ of transition.3
It has long been accepted by historians that the conjuncture of grain crises of 1927-1929 marked ... more It has long been accepted by historians that the conjuncture of grain crises of 1927-1929 marked a turning point during which the Soviet Union descended into the tumult of Stalin’s “revolution from above.“ There is, however, no agreement as to what caused this outcome. Was the country pushed down this road as a deliberate act of policy by Stalin to enhance his dictatorial power? Did bolshevik ideology, which favored rapid industrialization and bureaucratic centralized state control, predetermine the end result? Did the sequence of events in this period generate an uncontrollable dynamic of crises and conflict between strengthening state power and societal, particularly peasant, resistance? To reach a more definitive answer to these fundamental questions I have undertaken a case study of a pivotal policy development of this period, one which bridged the crucial transition from NEP to “dekulakization”: the so-called “Ural-Siberian method” or “social influence” method of grain collection.
Talks between the United States and Russia are being held in London over the situation in Crimea,... more Talks between the United States and Russia are being held in London over the situation in Crimea, with the region due to hold a referendum on Sunday that could see it secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. Jim Hughes writes that the idea being put forward by the United States and the EU that the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) could be used as an ‘off ramp’ for Russia from the crisis is misguided. He notes that the OSCE lacks credibility in Russia and that it would now be politically impossible for Moscow to back track on Crimea. Rather, the new Ukrainian government’s priority should be to prevent violence from erupting in Eastern Ukraine by offering a policy of accommodation to its Russian speaking citizens.
The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics, Aug 15, 2017
Forthcoming in Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecky eds. The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics.... more Forthcoming in Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecky eds. The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics. Routledge 2017 One of the earliest political visionaries of federalism in Eastern Europe,interwar Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, famously remarked to former socialist comrades that "we both took a ride on the same red tram, but while I got off at the stop marked Polish independence, you wish to travel to the station Socialism." (Macmillan, 2002: 208) Piłsudski's modernising vision of an intermarum (międzymorze) federation of republics under Polish hegemony from the Baltic to the Black Sea, acting as a bulwark against Russia, failed to overcome the power of nationalist particularism (Snyder, 2003) Among the many paradoxes of communism in Eastern Europe is that many socialist and communist internationalists were transformed over time into nationalists. In certain countries with multinational societies, especially the Soviet Union, great efforts were made by the ruling communist parties to recognise the political importance of national and ethnic cleavages, in the process compromising the internationalist tenets of communist ideology and its paramount attention to class-based cleavages. Although many of the nine states that formerly made up communist Eastern Europe prior to 1991 were significantly multinational in character, six were unitary states and only three were federal. One of the six unitary states-the German Democratic Republic (GDR)-was absorbed by a mutually agreed treaty into a unified federal Germany in 1990 (though without the referendum required by the German Constitution of 1949). In countries such as the Soviet Union (USSR), Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, communist parties engaged in sophisticated federal institutional engineering to recognise and embed certain national and ethnic cleavages in the organisation of state power. The three communist federal states have been generally discussed more within debates about the reasons for their systemic collapse rather than their stability over many decades, with communist federations being widely seen as being "façade" forms of federalism and otherwise unviable states because of their institutionalisation of nationalism and ethnicity. What, then, if any, is the relationship between ethnofederalism and the break-up of communist federations? The puzzle is what explains the resilience of communist federations over many decades, their breakdown in the late 1980s and early 1990s in three cases, the postcommunist survival and durability of federalism in Russia, and the continuing attraction of the concept as a conflict management device in the wider region (for example, in Russia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Federalism under Communism Communist federations were constructed following the Russian model on the basis of a Stalinist paradox which attempted to reconcile Marxism and nationalism. Stalin had spoken in 1934 of a Marxist formula with regard to cultures: that they should be "socialist in content and national in form" with the ultimate aim of building a common culture and language, but the thinking applied equally to the notion of the state. In Stalin (1913), he proposed that there should be only a small number of multicultural "regional autonomies" for the most important "crystallised units" of the
The EU has frequently presented Northern Ireland as a 'model' for conflict management, especially... more The EU has frequently presented Northern Ireland as a 'model' for conflict management, especially in the Balkans. The paper questions whether the EU had a strategic and coherent input into the Northern Ireland peace process through its Peace and Reconciliation Programs and argues that the rational logic of its actions hinged more on the goals of the Delors Commission for self-empowerment and competence expansion. Despite EU rhetoric, the development of EU conflict management instruments and policy since the late 1990s do not appear to be informed by the Northern Ireland 'model'. Indeed, that model's substantive elements-consociationalism, a lack of transitional justice, embedding sectarian structures-contravene EU norms of conflict management. The lack of transferable lesson-learning and the disjuncture between EU normative rhetoric about 'multiethnicity' and the realities of ethnic division are explored in the case of Kosovo.
Why do some groups fighting in civil wars target civilians more than others? We propose an explan... more Why do some groups fighting in civil wars target civilians more than others? We propose an explanation that challenges the current focus on material and organizational factors and instead brings back and emphasizes the role of ideology. We argue that the ideological frameworks of armed groups, whether state or non-state, condition their decisions about targeting, in some cases setting normative constraints on action even if such choice involves higher costs and risks. We examine these hypotheses using a mixed-method approach that combines a statistical analysis of newly constructed disaggregated data set on all fatalities in Northern Ireland’s conflict between 1969 and 2005 with a comparative historical study of the interaction between key ideologies and the armed groups that adopted them.
Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 2005
Despite the importance of conditionality during the current EU enlargement, there are few theoret... more Despite the importance of conditionality during the current EU enlargement, there are few theoretical or empirical studies of the concept. The study of EU enlargement conditionality is characterized by a concentration on the analysis of its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization, rather than empirically tracking clear causal relationships in policies and institution-building. Most studies tend to focus on two cumulative levels of conditionality. Firstly, they attach great salience to the broad ‘principled’ or normative conditionality established by the Copenhagen European Council in December 1993, the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which was subsequently elaborated in the Accession Partnerships for individual candidate countries from 1997. Secondly, they emphasize the ‘technical’ preconditions for the CEECs to accelerate the adoption of and adaptation to the acquis in order to fulfil all the responsibilities of membership. The speedy adoption of the acquis was the benchmark for measuring CEEC progress on accession — a condition that only Austria, Finland and Sweden, all advanced industrial countries, had previously met prior to membership. There is a wide spectrum of opinions as to whether EU conditionality has had positive or negative effects on the CEECs.
A major challenge for EU enlargement is how to communicate the benefits of membership to electora... more A major challenge for EU enlargement is how to communicate the benefits of membership to electorates. Given the weak penetration of party systems in the Central and East European countries, subnational elites have an important role in shaping voter preferences. Attitudes among subnational elites to EU enlargement are examined in three leading candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. The results are based on large-scale elite interviews conducted in 1999-2000 in key regional cities. The research demonstrates that subnational elites are disengaged not only structurally from the European integration project, since the negotiations involve the Commission and national governments, but also in their opinions. The subnational elites tend to view EU membership as a national issue and irrelevant for their level, and are poorly informed about EU activities that benefit them. The article suggests that this disengagement of subnational elites constitute...
Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, 2001
In building any home location is key. Geography is widely regarded as the single most important r... more In building any home location is key. Geography is widely regarded as the single most important reason why the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe (CEECs) can realistically aspire to inclusion in a common European home that is democratic and prosperous (Przeworski, 1991: 190–1). This hypothesis may have sound structural foundations in that those transition states that are most proximate to the vibrant democratic market economies of central and western Europe are most likely to benefit from ‘spillover’ and contagion pressures for Europeanization. Moreover, some of the CEECs contiguous with the European Union (EU) share a pre-communist historical legacy of close relations with their EU neighbouring states dating from their interwar era of independent statehood. In the immediate period after the fall of commmunism there existed a widely held perception in many of the CEECs that post-communism equated with a ‘return to Europe’, and that swift European integration would follow. In the decade after the fall of communism, however, the concept of Europe-building has been stretched by the pull of two policy agendas: first, a process of ‘deep integration’ among a historical core-group of EU states driven by a distilled notion of European exceptionalism; and, second, a process of eastward enlargement of EU membership driven by the diluted notion of a ‘wider Europe’. Thus far, the inherent tension between these alternative grand projects has been analysed, on the whole, as a macro-level problem between supranational, transnational and national institutions and elites (Wallace, 1999: 1–13).1
writes that the events of Bloody Sunday and the 'shock' of concentrated violence in the early pha... more writes that the events of Bloody Sunday and the 'shock' of concentrated violence in the early phase of the Northern Ireland conflict reverberated and shaped the conflict for the following decades. However, the violence also led to the start of a process that would result in the Good Friday Agreement.
How the EU conceptualizes the causes and dynamics of conflict should, in theory, shape its policy... more How the EU conceptualizes the causes and dynamics of conflict should, in theory, shape its policy responses. The EU's conceptualization and understanding of the drivers of conflicts and how they should be prevented or managed is elaborated in the European Security Strategy. From this document it is clear that the EU's conflict management strategy is founded on a linkage between security and development. This document's understanding of violent conflict is informed by an array of liberal approaches that emphasize the economic causes of conflict, the role of political and economic development in managing conflict, and the importance of addressing the EU's self-interest in achieving security and other goals through conflict management. There is an implicit acknowledgement of the two dominant paradigms that emerged from the collapse of Communism, the end of the Cold War and the global rise of violent conflicts in the 1990s. First, Democratic (or Liberal) Peace Theory, which holds that democracies do not go to war against each other and that democracy promotion will prevent conflict, for as the EU strategy puts it: 'The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states' (European Council, 2003). Second, the 'conflict trap' paradigm that is advocated by the World Bank, which correlates civil wars with economic failures in development policy and proposes an agenda of measures to correct them (Bigombe et al., 2000; Collier et al., 2003). The European Security Strategy aspires to creating an EU strategic culture of 'early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention', but it is somewhat contradictory in identifying what approaches are of paramount importance to delivering this goal. On the one hand, the document reflects an underlying tension between a 'hard' 'security first' approach to conflict management and more nuanced political and economic intervention. The term 'security' is used in the document across the spectrum of 'hard' and 'soft' interpretations, from the maximalist 'hard' understanding that associates 'security' with the absence of war and the ending of violent conflict by military means, to more 'soft'
Ethnicity and territory in the former Soviet Union: …, 2002
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or sy... more This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution , reselling , loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Page 1. 5. Sub-National Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Between Transition and European... more Page 1. 5. Sub-National Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Between Transition and Europeanization Gwendolyn Sasse, James Hughes & Claire Gordon 1. INTRODUCTION ... 13; 268270; Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, How Europe Matters. ...
Studies of EU conditionality assume one basic premise: that it exists and works because there is ... more Studies of EU conditionality assume one basic premise: that it exists and works because there is a power asymmetry which enables the Commission to impose the adoption of the acquis on the CEECs as a precondition of their entry to the Union. Thus this literature posits that there are clear causal relationships in the use of conditionality to ensure policy or institutional outcomes. Existing studies of enlargement conditionality analyse its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization. This article, however, takes a policy-tracking approach to analyse how conditionality was actually put into operation in policy-making and institution-building in the fields of regional policy and regionalization in the CEECs. The research draws on interviews conducted with officials in the Commission and in CEEC delegations in Brussels to illustrate the views of key actors, and to examine the interactions between the Commission and the candidate countries. By studying the policy process, the article demonstrates the fluid nature of conditionality, the inconsistencies in its application by the Commission over time, and the weakness of a clear-cut causal relationship between conditionality and outcome in this policy area. By charting the changes in the Commission's approach over time, and illustrating the diverse responses of the CEECs, this study confirms the need for a more nuanced approach to the concept of EU conditionality, and argues for a logic of differentiation in the study of its impact on the CEECs. *The authors would like to thank Eiko Thielemann, Waltraud Schelkle and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The research was funded under the ESRC's 'One Europe or Several?' programme, project no. L213252030, project title: 'Elites and Institutions in Regional and Local Governance in Central and Eastern Europe'.
Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 2005
Studies of transition generally focus more on the immediate events and processes and less on the ... more Studies of transition generally focus more on the immediate events and processes and less on the historical background which shapes it. Nevertheless, historical legacies and the extent to which a transition state has a ‘usable past’ are generally recognized as having an important bearing on the transition outcome.1 The term ‘historical legacy’ and the issue of ‘usability’ are, however, not systematically researched in the study of transition. Paradoxically, the more routinely employed concepts of ‘path dependency’ and ‘initial starting conditions’ tend to focus on the predetermining effects of decisions taken at the outset of the transition process rather than exploring the influence of historically rooted factors which may be equally important.2 Moreover, it is also important to take into account not only whether a ‘usable past’ is present in a particular case but also whether the elites that drive the transition process are willing to draw on it. The decisional calculus of elites is of central importance in transition studies as successful reforms are viewed as being largely dependent on the attitudes and behaviour of elites and how differences between elite segments are negotiated in the ‘games’ of transition.3
It has long been accepted by historians that the conjuncture of grain crises of 1927-1929 marked ... more It has long been accepted by historians that the conjuncture of grain crises of 1927-1929 marked a turning point during which the Soviet Union descended into the tumult of Stalin’s “revolution from above.“ There is, however, no agreement as to what caused this outcome. Was the country pushed down this road as a deliberate act of policy by Stalin to enhance his dictatorial power? Did bolshevik ideology, which favored rapid industrialization and bureaucratic centralized state control, predetermine the end result? Did the sequence of events in this period generate an uncontrollable dynamic of crises and conflict between strengthening state power and societal, particularly peasant, resistance? To reach a more definitive answer to these fundamental questions I have undertaken a case study of a pivotal policy development of this period, one which bridged the crucial transition from NEP to “dekulakization”: the so-called “Ural-Siberian method” or “social influence” method of grain collection.
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