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Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen Morris

    (Yale University, Cowles Foundation)

  • Hyun Song Shin

    (University of London, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Accounting and Finance)

Abstract

Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm341, Yale School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm341
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    14. Stephen Morris, "undated". "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching," Penn CARESS Working Papers 1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2, Penn Economics Department.
    15. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. David P Myatt & Chris Wallace, "undated". "Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit," Economics Papers W31., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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    18. Antonio Ciccone & James Costain, 2004. "On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 701-713, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. In-Ho Lee & Robin Mason, 2002. "Coordination in the static and the dynamic," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000503, David K. Levine.
    2. Salvador Ortigueira, 2013. "The Rise and Fall of Centralized Wage Bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(3), pages 825-855, July.
    3. Carlo Altomonte & Gloria Gennaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2019. "Collective Emotions and Protest Vote," CESifo Working Paper Series 7463, CESifo.
    4. Paul A. Grout & Sebastien Mitraille & Silvia Sonderegger, 2008. "The Costs and Benefits of "Strangers": Why Mixed Communities Are Better," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/191, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    5. Ulrich Horst & Jos´e A. Scheinkman, 2006. "A Limit Theorem for Systems of Social Interactions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000177, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Xue, J., 2006. "Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0613, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Campos, Rodolfo G., 2013. "Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1624-1658.
    8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001309, UCLA Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Heterogeneity; Uniqueness; Global Games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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