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Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence

Author

Listed:
  • Bernd Hayo

    (University of Marburg)

  • Stefan Voigt

    (University of Hamburg)

Abstract

This paper studies the factors driving changes in judicial independence (JI) as incorporated in constitutions. Two indicators of constitutionally safeguarded JI are constructed. Variations in these indicators are identified based on changes in the constitutions of as many as 100 countries that occurred between 1950 and 2005. Four groups of factors are conjectured to be relevant for explaining these changes. We find only weak evidence for the insurance theory of judicial independence but strong evidence that the characteristics of individual leaders — such as how they acquired or lost power — play an important role in explaining changes in constitutionally safeguarded JI. This paper contributes not only to the literature on JI but also to the theory of endogenous constitutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2012. "Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201249, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201249
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nuno Garoupa & Rok Spruk, 2024. "Populist Constitutional Backsliding and Judicial Independence: Evidence from Turkiye," Papers 2410.02439, arXiv.org.
    2. Gutmann, Jerg & Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna & Voigt, Stefan, 2024. "Leader characteristics and constitutional compliance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    3. Katarína Šipulová & Samuel Spáč & David Kosař & Tereza Papoušková & Viktor Derka, 2023. "Judicial Self‐Governance Index: Towards better understanding of the role of judges in governing the judiciary," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 22-42, January.
    4. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2015. "The rule of law and constitutionalism in Muslim countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 351-380, March.
    5. Niclas Berggren & Jerg Gutmann, 2020. "Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 165-186, April.
    6. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2019. "The long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
    7. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2023. "Judicial independence: Why does de facto diverge from de jure?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg & Feld, Lars P., 2015. "Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 197-211.
    9. Ammons, Joshua D., 2024. "Institutional effects of nonviolent and violent revolutions," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    10. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2018. "The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence," ILE Working Paper Series 18, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    11. Jan Fałkowski & Jacek Lewkowicz, 2022. "In practice or just on paper? Some insights on using alphabetical rule to assign judges to cases," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 405-430, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imjudicial independence; constitutional change; endogenous constitutions; relevance of leaders.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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