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Found 9 results for '"fiscal federalism" "intergovernmental grants" "local taxation" ', showing 1-9
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  1. Hansjörg Blöchliger & Oliver Petzold (2009): Taxes and Grants: On the Revenue Mix of Sub-Central Governments
    Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased significantly from 31 to 33 percent while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17 percent, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant systems of most countries are much larger than required by equalization. Moreover, rather than smoothing out SCG revenue fluctuations over the cycle, grants often tend to exacerbate them. Finally, there is some evidence that grants reduce SCG tax effort, inflate SCG spending and increase SCG deficits and debt.
    RePEc:oec:ctpaab:7-en  Save to MyIDEAS
  2. Ines Helm & Jan Stuhler (2021): The Dynamic Response of Municipal Budgets to Revenue Shocks
    We study the fiscal and tax response to intergovernmental grants, exploiting quasi-experimental variation within Germany’s fiscal equalization scheme triggered by Census revisions of official population counts. ... Well-known empirical “anomalies” in public finance such as the flypaper effect are thus primarily a short-run phenomenon, while long-run fiscal behavior appears more consistent with standard theories of fiscal federalism.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9083  Save to MyIDEAS
  3. Helm, Ines & Stuhler, Jan (2021): The Dynamic Response of Municipal Budgets to Revenue Shocks
    We study the fiscal and tax response to intergovernmental grants, exploiting quasi-experimental variation within Germany's fiscal equalization scheme triggered by Census revisions of official population counts. ... Well-known empirical "anomalies" in public finance such as the flypaper effect are thus primarily a short-run phenomenon, while long-run fiscal behavior appears more consistent with standard theories of fiscal federalism.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14369  Save to MyIDEAS
  4. Stuhler, Jan & Helm, Ines (2021): The Dynamic Response of Municipal Budgets to Revenue Shocks
    We study the fiscal and tax response to intergovernmental grants, exploiting quasi-experimental variation within Germany’s fiscal equalization scheme triggered by Census revisions of official population counts. ... Well-known empirical “anomalies†in public finance such as the flypaper effect are thus primarily a short-run phenomenon, while long-run fiscal behavior appears more consistent with standard theories of fiscal federalism.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16137  Save to MyIDEAS
  5. Hansjörg Blöchliger & David King (2006): Fiscal Autonomy of Sub-Central Governments
    State and local governments in OECD countries have access to a variety of fiscal resources. ... It presents a set of fiscal autonomy indicators such as revenue and expenditure decentralisation, tax autonomy, intergovernmental grants and the stringency of fiscal rules. ... Fiscal autonomy is further reduced by a high percentage of earmarked grants. The design of fiscal federalism varies considerably across countries, and factor analysis reveals almost no correlation between different fiscal autonomy indicators. Indeed, “fiscal autonomy” appears to have several dimensions.
    RePEc:oec:ctpaab:2-en  Save to MyIDEAS
  6. Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk & Jørn Rattsø & Hanna Ågren (2006): Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending
    When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor affecting local governments; federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of local governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. ... We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.
    RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-12  Save to MyIDEAS
  7. Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva & Rattso, Jorn & Ågren, Hanna (2006): Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending
    When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor affecting local governments; federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of local governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. ... We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.
    RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2006_025  Save to MyIDEAS
  8. Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva & Rattsø, Jørn & Ågren, Hanna (2008): Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending
    When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor. Federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. ... We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:12:p:2320-2335  Save to MyIDEAS
  9. Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk & Jørn Rattsø & Hanna Ågren (2006): Using a Discontinuous Grant to Identify the Effect of Grants on Local Taxes and Spending
    When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor affecting local governments; federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of local governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. ... We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1857  Save to MyIDEAS
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