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Taxes and Grants: On the Revenue Mix of Sub-Central Governments

Author

Listed:
  • Hansjörg Blöchliger

    (OECD)

  • Oliver Petzold

    (OECD)

Abstract

This paper analyses trends and driving forces in the revenue composition of sub-central government (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased significantly from 31 to 33 percent while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17 percent, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant systems of most countries are much larger than required by equalization. Moreover, rather than smoothing out SCG revenue fluctuations over the cycle, grants often tend to exacerbate them. Finally, there is some evidence that grants reduce SCG tax effort, inflate SCG spending and increase SCG deficits and debt. Efficiency and accountability would call for a higher share of SCG spending covered by own taxes. However, that is not easy: increasing property taxes – the most suitable tax for SCG – usually meets with strong resistance. Tax sharing arrangements where central government cedes a part of its income or consumption tax revenue could help lift the SCG tax share without increasing the total tax burden.

Suggested Citation

  • Hansjörg Blöchliger & Oliver Petzold, 2009. "Taxes and Grants: On the Revenue Mix of Sub-Central Governments," OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism 7, OECD Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:oec:ctpaab:7-en
    DOI: 10.1787/5k97b11972bn-en
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zareh Asatryan & Lars Feld & Benny Geys, 2015. "Partial fiscal decentralization and sub-national government fiscal discipline: empirical evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 307-320, June.
    2. Gobena, Lemessa Bayissa & Van Dijke, Marius, 2016. "Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 24-37.
    3. Peter Claeys, 2011. "If you want me to stay, pay," IREA Working Papers 201101, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Feb 2011.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; intergovernmental grants; local taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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