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On the Optimality of Financial Repression

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  • V. V. Chari
  • Alessandro Dovis
  • Patrick J. Kehoe

Abstract

When is financial repression—namely, policies that force banks to hold government debt—optimal? With commitment, such policies are never optimal because they crowd out banks’ productive investments. Without commitment, they are optimal when governments need to issue unusually large amounts of debt, such as during wartime. In such times, repression allows governments to credibly issue more debt. Repression increases credibility because when banks hold government debt, defaults dilute net worth, reduce investment, and are thus costly ex post. Forcing banks to hold debt endogenously increases these ex post costs but has ex ante costs because doing so crowds out investments.

Suggested Citation

  • V. V. Chari & Alessandro Dovis & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2020. "On the Optimality of Financial Repression," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 710-739.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704575
    DOI: 10.1086/704575
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    Cited by:

    1. Fang, Xiang & Hardy, Bryan & Lewis, Karen K., 2022. "Who Holds Sovereign Debt and Why It Matters," CEPR Discussion Papers 17338, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Acharya, Viral V. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Shim, Jack B., 2024. "Sovereign debt and economic growth when government is myopic and self-interested," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    3. Hristov, Nikolay & Hülsewig, Oliver & Kolb, Benedikt, 2024. "Macroprudential capital regulation and fiscal balances in the euro area," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    4. Martin Kliem & Alexander Kriwoluzky & Gernot J. Müller & Alexander Scheer, 2024. "Financial Repression in General Equilibrium: The Case of the United States, 1948–1974," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2075, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Kumar, Alok, 2023. "Financial market imperfections, informality and government spending multipliers," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    6. Anand, Kartik & Mankart, Jochen, 2020. "Sovereign risk and bank fragility," Discussion Papers 54/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    7. Zhu, Jun & Xu, Haokun & Zhang, Yue, 2022. "Local government debt and firm productivity: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    8. Kaiji Chen & Haoyu Gao & Patrick Higgins & Daniel F. Waggoner & Tao Zha, 2023. "Monetary Stimulus amidst the Infrastructure Investment Spree: Evidence from China's Loan‐Level Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1147-1204, April.
    9. Hausmann, Ricardo & Schetter, Ulrich, 2022. "Horrible trade-offs in a pandemic: Poverty, fiscal space, policy, and welfare," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    10. Carmen M. Reinhart & Franziska L. Ohnsorge & Kenneth S. Rogoff & M. Ayhan Kose, 2022. "The Aftermath of Debt Surges," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 637-663, August.
    11. Huang, Shuo, 2022. "The unintended consequence of local government debt: evidence from stock price crash risk," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    12. Robert A. McDowall, 2021. "Sovereign default and capital controls," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 1025-1045, September.
    13. Paolo Mauro & Jing Zhou, 2021. "$$r-g," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 197-229, March.
    14. Godwin Olasehinde-Williams & Oktay Özkan, 2022. "Is interest rate uncertainty a predictor of investment volatility? evidence from the wild bootstrap likelihood ratio approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 46(3), pages 507-521, July.
    15. Viral V. Acharya & Raghuram Rajan & Jack Shim, 2020. "When is Debt Odious? A Theory of Repression and Growth Traps," NBER Working Papers 27221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Yasin Mimir, 2023. "Fear (no more) of Floating: Asset Purchases and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Working Papers 57, European Stability Mechanism.
    17. Betz, Timm & Pond, Amy, 2023. "Democratic institutions and regulatory privileges for government debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    18. Jing, Zhongbo & Liu, Wei & Wang, Zexi & Wei, Lu & Zhang, Xuan, 2024. "Does local government debt regulation improve rural banks’ performance? Evidence from China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    19. Xiong, Jiacai & Huang, Ling & Yang, Zelin & Wang, Xin, 2024. "The impact of local government debt on entrepreneurship: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment of local debt governance reform," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 501-519.
    20. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 2021. "Revisiting speculative hyperinflations in monetary models," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 1-11, April.
    21. Swapan-Kumar Pradhan & Elod Takats & Judit Temesvary, "undated". "How does fiscal policy affect the transmission of monetary policy into cross-border bank lending? Cross-country evidence," BIS Working Papers 1226, Bank for International Settlements.
    22. Mariia A. Elkina, 2021. "Financial Repression And Transmission Of Macroeconomic Shocks In A DSGE Model With Financial Frictions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 246/EC/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    23. Ricardo Hausmann & Ulrich Schetter, 2020. "Horrible Trade-offs in a Pandemic: Lockdowns, Transfers, Fiscal Space, and Compliance," CID Working Papers 382, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    24. Li, Delong & Magud, Nicolas E. & Werner, Alejandro, 2023. "The long-run impact of sovereign yields on corporate yields in emerging markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    25. Acharya, Viral V. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Shim, Jack B., 2024. "Reprint of “Sovereign debt and economic growth when government is myopic and self-interested”," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).

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