Muslim, Jewish, and Christian relationships in Germany following September 11, 2001 *.
Muslims and Fear of TerrorismThe shock of the attack on New York and Washington by Muslim terrorists on September 11, 2001, radiated quickly far and wide throughout the world.
That attack, the ensuing war on terror, the second intifada and Israel's response, as well as the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, have brought about a new awareness of Islam in Germany and elsewhere. Unfortunately, concentration tends to be on the rather small number of Muslim extremists instead of on the majority of Muslims who live peacefully within German society. The German government, however, focuses on these extremists within the Muslim community because, it is believed, they represent a potential danger to German society. They are especially dangerous, say investigators, because they infiltrate the general Muslim population, presenting themselves as peaceful, pious Muslims to avoid attracting attention to themselves and their plans or actions. They are seen by security personnel in Germany as ticking time bombs that could explode at any time. (1)
There is a feeling among many Germans that, three years after September 11, 2001, the threat from extremists has not faded. (2) As a result, the government keeps the whole Muslim community under watch, including mosques. (3) The fear of terrorists has heightened since the attack by Muslim terrorists on Madrid on March 11, 2004, followed by the uncovering of plans for violence in Spain, Germany, and France and the murder in November, 2004, of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who had made a film highly critical of Islam. The German government is ever more suspicious of those who in any way appear to be sympathetic with Muslim militants, and it is willing to take preemptive action on the basis of suspicion. Wolfgang Storz, writing in the Frankfurter Rundschau, reflects the great anxiety that has spread all across Europe. There is, he says, the expectation that terror attacks are going to take place, but no one knows who the terrorists are or where they will strike. He declares: "With the danger [from the terrorists], insecurity increases in daily life. Whoever appears to be foreign now stands more quickly under suspicion, and it is more difficult than ever before for one to gain trust." (4)
The activities of Muslim terrorists and the threatening statements of some Muslim radicals burden the entire Muslim community in Germany as well as in other European countries. In addition, there is suspicion of Muslims due to their appearance, dress, (5) and traditions, as well as their isolation from German society. (6) All these characteristics mark them as outsiders. As is true of all outsiders, they frequently stand under suspicion. It is easy to believe that they are sympathetic to the views of Muslim fundamentalists and extremists. This inclination is strengthened when it is seen that many Muslims are reluctant to speak out against radical elements or to cooperate fully with government security agencies. (7) The integration of over 3,000,000 Muslims into German society would be difficult under normal circumstances, but the cloud of suspicion hanging over the community creates an obstacle to easy acceptance. (8)
A recent investigation of the King Faud Academy and Mosque complex near Bonn justifies the suspicion toward Muslims in the minds of many Germans. Sponsored by the Saudi government, the academy was opened in 1995 with the permission and expressed hope of the German government that it would promote dialogue between Germans and Arabs and between Christians and Muslims. The academy, however, was not moving toward this goal. A German television crew secretly taped a worship service at the mosque in which a teacher from the academy called the congregation to a jihad. Although a call to jihad is not necessarily a call to violence, the use of this word caused a furor in the media. Concern increased when it was learned that the academy carried on an educational program that focused in large part on the Quran and held to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, that is, one in which the world is sharply divided between those who believe and those who do not. (9) The anti-Western, antipluralistic stance of the mosque and the academy was not supportive of integration into German society or of dialogue with Jews and Christians. The school was permitted to continue its operation--but only under the guidance of a joint German-Arab committee that monitored the curriculum. At the present time the government is considering closing it. As far as is known, what occurred at the academy and mosque complex did not involve any planning or direct support of violent acts; however, the community's apparent disavowal of one of its founding purposes, that is, to be a place that would promote dialogue, raises suspicion that it gave tacit support to the goals of Muslim radicals. In any case, up to now it has not been a positive force for integration or dialogue within German society.
In summary, it can be said that the German public, media, and government have serious reservations concerning the Muslim community. (10) Klaus Haupt, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party in Saxony, observed in an interview in the Islamische Zeitung that the community's lack of openness, even its secretiveness, makes the German public suspicious. (11) The ghettoized, outsider character of the Muslim community, (12) the influence of the fundamentalist minority within it, its lack of cooperation with the German government, and its anti-Israel/antisemitic rhetoric (to be discussed below) create mistrust within German society. This negative perception of the Muslim community is widely shared by both Jews and Christians in Germany, creating an obstacle to dialogue. Nevertheless, dialogue is a critical necessity if for no other reason than the pressure of Muslim immigration. Today there are about 15-17,000,000 Muslims in Europe. By the middle of the century it is expected that the Muslim presence could number 50,000,000. Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi warns that Europe will be overwhelmed by Islam unless true dialogue and full integration take place. (13)
Muslim Initiatives
Although there are aspects of the Muslim community that trouble Jews and Christians, as well as German society in general, there are hopeful signs for a better relationship stemming from the actions taken by Muslim organizations in Germany. These societies are not sympathetic to Muslim extremists or terrorists, and they desire to serve the Muslim community and promote good relationships between Muslims and the German public. (14) On February 3, 2002, for example, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, representing about 300,000 Muslims, took an encouraging step and enacted an Islamic Charter that paves a new road for the Muslim community. It will most likely influence other Muslim organizations to follow its lead. In addition to containing statements concerning Muslim belief, the charter accepts German democracy and law as binding and holds to freedom of religion as well as freedom to change one's religion. Although there are a number of criticisms regarding the wording of the charter, (15) all in all it represents a community that is opening to German society and one that seeks dialogue with other segments of this society. It will do much to create better understanding and thus to reduce the anxiety that non-Muslims have about the Muslim community. In his introduction, Dr. Nadeem Elyas, chairperson of the council that published the charter, emphasized the need for such a statement from German Muslims following September 11, 2001. Elyas, who has long taken interest in dialogue with Jews and Christians, called on Muslims to integrate into German society and to enter into dialogue with German political and religious leaders. There is hope among a number of Muslim leaders that such a move toward integration would lead to the development of a European Islam that would display independence from Muslim leadership in Islamic homelands, which too often reflects hostility to the West. (16)
In July, 2003, an important conference, involving more than 100 Muslim leaders from Germany and other European countries, took place in Graz, Austria. According to a report in Christ im Gegenwart, it dealt with such problems as integration and the self-image of Muslims in Europe, as well as equality for women and the necessity of learning the language of their new home country. The conference agreed that there was no basic contradiction between Islam and the Western values of democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Mustafa Ceric, head of the Bosnian Muslims, addressed the conference and called upon Muslims to give up the tradition of the whole world's being the "House of Islam" and to enter into dialogue with those among whom they live. (17)
On October 3, 2004, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, together with other Muslim organizations, held hundreds of mosques open for visits from the general public. This event, which takes place every year on the Day of German Unity, dates back to 1997 and is intended to demonstrate that Muslims see themselves both as part of Germany and as open to German society.
Further evidence that the Muslim community is working toward integration may be seen in the founding of a Muslim Academy in Berlin on June 30, 2004. (18) Both Muslims and non-Muslims, including representatives from political parties, have worked to create this academy, which will be directed by the Muslim community. It will be fully independent of the many Muslim organizations in Germany and has as its aim the creation of greater openness, transparence, and understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. The academy, together with initiatives undertaken by other organizations, is a strong force for integration. Muslim leaders point out, however, that integration into German society is not the responsibility only of Muslims. German society, especially its religious and political leadership, must also extend the hand of welcome and acceptance. (19) Until now, Muslims have not found general acceptance in German society. They are often viewed as a threatening presence, and response to them has sometimes been violent. Since September 11, 2001, especially, according to a report of the European Union, Muslims have experienced "verbal aggression and bodily attacks." (20)
Muslim and Jewish Relationships
As early as November, 1998, Ignaz Bubis, former chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, addressed the Council of Islam for the Federal Republic of Germany and urged Muslims to come together and become more active in relating to German society so that misinformation regarding Islam could be corrected. He noted that, even though there lived at that time 2,500,000 Muslims (today, 3,200,000) in Germany, the public knew less about them than it did the 75,000 Jews who then lived in the country. He invited Islamic organizations to take part in the Week of Fraternity, which up to then was celebrated only by Jews and Christians. This invitation was unanimously accepted by the various Muslim organizations. (21)
The situation today, so much influenced by post-September 11, 2001, events, is much different from the time when Bubis met with this Muslim organization. Further, the present Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially following the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, has created a deep chasm between Jews and Muslims in Germany as well as in other parts of the world. Many observers, both Jewish and Christian, believe that this conflict has strengthened the antisemitic stance of Muslims. (22)
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially, has intensified the Antisemitism of Muslims in lands dominated by Islam, as is illustrated by the recent statements of the former Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohammad, in a speech to an Islamic conference in 2003. (23) In his address, he made the classic antisemitic charge that Jews want to rule the world. Although he did not specifically mention Israel, the Jewish state was certainly not excluded from his thinking. His speech was condemned throughout the world, and some at the conference were also critical of parts of his speech, but many of those who attended applauded his words. (24) If Mohammad's attack stood alone, then this outbreak of anger at Jews and Israel would not be a serious problem. Unfortunately, however, many Muslims in Islamic lands share his views. In May, 2003, the Pew Global Attitudes Project interviewed 15,000 people in various Muslim lands. The survey revealed that most Muslims believe that Palestinians cannot achieve their full rights while Israel continues to exist. (25) Meg Mortin observed: "The conviction that no way can be found for Israel and the Palestinians to coexist is strongest in Morocco (90 percent), followed by Jordan (85 percent), the Palestinian Authority (80 percent), Kuwait (72 percent), Lebanon (65 percent), Indonesia (58 percent), and Pakistan (57 percent)." (26) On the heels of the bad news that this poll brought to Israel and to the German Jewish community came another poll, sponsored by the European Union. It revealed that 59 percent of the European public listed Israel as the greatest threat to peace in the world. (27) This poll dealt directly with Israel, but, for many--Muslims as well as non-Muslims--criticism of Israel often carries over to Jews living in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. (28)
Jews say that people should be free to criticize Israeli policies--many Jews and Israelis do so---but some criticism of Israel, they insist, is nothing less than a disguised Antisemitism. The above poll sponsored by the European Union is especially disturbing to Jews because it confirms what a number of Jews in Germany had long suspected, that is, that Germans and other Europeans favor the Palestinian cause and in large measure support the Muslim criticism of Israel. (29) In addition to the above polls, there has surfaced a study of Antisemitism in Europe commissioned by the European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia. The commission refused initially, however, to make this study public, because, it asserted, "Antisemitism" was not clearly defined. Many Jews and non-Jews believe, rather, thai the report was not released because it revealed that Muslims stood behind many of the antisemitic threats and acts taking place throughout Europe, and the commission wanted to spare Muslims from criticism. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a member of the European Union Parliament and of the Green Party in Germany, made the report available on the Internet. It revealed that the above presumption was true. (30)
Jews in Germany feel insecure today as they view this increase in Antisemitism throughout Europe. The Muslim population that frequently reflects an anti-Jewish and anti-Israel stance and the large number of non-Muslims in Europe who are sympathetic to this position cause uneasiness in the Jewish community. Jews fear that once again in a time of danger they are being left alone by the Europeans. A threatened community, as the Jewish community sees itself, tends to seek security before engaging earnestly in dialogue. Syike Tempel, following a review of terrorist acts in the world by Muslim radicals, reflected the thoughts of many Jews in Germany when she called for a firmer hand against these terrorists. She declared: "It is high time to recognize the terror network of Islamic fundamentalists has no other goal than pure destruction." (31) It is especially upsetting for Jews to watch demonstrations in which radicals communicate their hatred of Jews and of Israel. At the end of November, 2003, for example, 1,000 fundamentalist Muslims marched through the streets of Berlin. The march was peaceful, but the antisemitic, anti-lsrael message of the marchers was abundantly clear. Speakers attacked "the Zionist conspiracy against Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land." One sign, confiscated by the police, proclaimed: "Jews are murderers." The anti-West character of the march was indicated by the many pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini. (32)
Nevertheless, despite such actions by Muslim extremists and the continuing Palestinian and Israeli conflict, Muslims and Jews have sought to engage each other in dialogue. Since the Fall of 2001, for example, meetings have taken place in Kruezberg between the Jewish congregation and the Turkish Muslim community. Further, on December 11, 2003, Jews and Muslims held a meeting in that city to address the problems of prejudice and the gaps in knowledge that exist between the two dialogue partners. (33)
A leading figure among Jews who are carrying on dialogue with Muslims is Michael Wolffsohn, Professor fur Geschichte an der Hochschule der Bundeswehr in Munich. He and Tibi were honored by the Society for Western Thought in November, 2003, in Zurich, for their work in bringing about a better understanding between Jews and Muslims. (34) Wolffsohn noted that the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the European Jewish Congress have attempted to carry on dialogue with the Muslim community. This attempt, he commented, was "by no means without success." (35) Although that statement does not point to great progress, he acknowledged that there is a readiness for dialogue between Jews and Turkish Muslims. Wolffsohn observed, however, that among Jews and Muslims there is a scarcity of people well enough acquainted with their own religion to enter into significant dialogue. (36) Also, one might add, there are very few among Jews and Muslims who know enough about the religion or culture of the other to carry on a deep conversation. The great obstacle to meaningful dialogue, Wolffsohn declared, is a lack of educational training regarding the two faiths. His comments hold true also for the Christian-Muslim dialogue.
Theologically, declared Wolffsohn, Jews and Muslims stand closer to each other than Jews do to Christians. However, one big problem standing in the path of a true Jewish-Muslim dialogue, he says, is that Islam is premodern. Unlike the Jewish and Christian communities, it has not gone through the Enlightenment, which has introduced the traditions of secularism and pluralism to Western thinking. (37) Jews and Christians are, therefore, according to Wolffsohn, largely secularly oriented, whereas Muslims are mostly focused on religion. This means that it is difficult for Jews and Muslims to have full understanding and empathy for the opinions of the other or to enter into dialogue on many of the issues that face religion today.
The critical question concerning readiness for dialogue, according to Wolffsohn, is whether Jews and Muslims are ready to tolerate and accept each other. This will not occur, Wolffsohn emphasizes, until both become educated not only in their own faith but also in the faith of the other. It may also be said that progress in Jewish and Muslim relationships will move forward very slowly until there is a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that both sides believe is fair. Although events at the present time offer promise of a new relationship between the two parties, the future is by no means certain.
Muslim and Christian Relationships
The problems affecting Muslim-Jewish dialogue, namely Muslim Antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, do not attach directly to the Muslim-Christian dialogue. Nevertheless, the history of Christian and Muslim relationships is largely a negative one in which Muslims suffered under the Christian-led Crusades and then later from "Christian" colonization of Muslim lands. Even today, the reminder to mosque congregations of these past events serves to poison present-day relationships between the two communities. (38) Muslims have also contributed to bad relationships between the two religions with their jihads against non-Muslims. (39) Considering this past, says Ralf Geisler, one should not be surprised that Muslims are mistrusting of Christian interest in dialogue, for they question if this is just one new way to missionize the Muslim community. (40) Christians, however, approach the dialogue with the same hesitancy because, as M. Salim Abdullah has observed, Muslims also conceive of dialogue as an "instrument of proclamation." (41) Nevertheless, although there exists some level of mistrust between the parties at the present time, Christian and Muslim discussion is moving ahead, even if slowly and cautiously.
Both before and after the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, the Catholic and Protestant churches joined with Muslims to improve understanding between the two communities. (42) Christians have taken a number of steps to engage the Muslim community, even though some uneasiness exists regarding the teachings and actions of Muslim radicals and their influence among Muslims in Germany. Muslims, however, also live in the midst of anxiety. This results from being a minority in a foreign land and, especially following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, from their being perceived as a violence-prone society and, hence, having to endure the suspicions of non-Muslims. They often see themselves as the "accused" and feel under pressure to respond to questions "aimed" at them--for example, questions regarding the rights of women, violence, human rights, pluralism, and democracy. Many Muslims resist responding to questions in these areas because they feel such questioning is unfair and reflects a lack of trust. (43)
A further obstacle to dialogue is the minority immigrant status of the Muslim community, whose members represent a new and very foreign religion to "Christian" Germany. Further, as noted earlier, the community's language and customs set its members apart from German culture. This background, which for many leads to settling in ghettos, prevents them from viewing themselves as belonging to German society. Also, it hinders them from seeing themselves as equals in conversations with Christians, who represent the majority religion and have all the privileges of German citizenship--privileges that are denied to most members of the Muslim community. (44) For example, Christians as well as Jews have been granted a privileged status by the German government that entitles them to governmental support for their institutions. Among Muslims there is a feeling that they are discriminated against because, although their population in Germany stands at approximately 3,200,000, they are denied a status given to the Jewish population, who number only 100,000. Often, therefore, the relationship to Christians and Jews is one of "felt" inferiority, combined with envy. (45)
Nevertheless, for all the difficulties, the Christian church has shown great interest in Islam, as may be seen by the appearance of many books, articles, and public statements that affirm a close relationship to the Muslim community It has also cooperated with interested Muslims in establishing Muslim-Christian discussion groups. (46) Further, both the Catholic and the Protestant churches have published irenic educational materials that help the Christian community better to understand and assist Muslims who live in their neighborhoods. (47)
The Catholic Church and the wider Catholic community have taken a number of steps to improve their relationship to the Muslim community. In May, 2001, the Catholic Theological Faculty at the University of Tubingen conferred an honorary doctorate on Prince Hassan bin Talal from Jordan, who has been a leader in interreligious dialogue. Also at the university level, there have been numerous contacts between universities in Ankara, Turkey, and those in Barnberg, Tubingen, and Nurnberg, involving an exchange of professors and students. (48) In addition, the Catholic Church has affirmed that between it and Islam there exist a number of commonalities. It has declared, for example, that Muslims are "our Brothers and Sisters" and that Muslims, together with Jews and Christians, have the same spiritual father, Abraham, and believe in one God. (49) A recent statement by the Evangelical Church of Germany conveys a similar affirmation: "We meet also in Islam, as in other religions, people who are already in God's hand.... In the light of the God who is witnessed to us in the Bible, we can also discover marks [Spuren] of its truth and reality." (50)
Despite these affirmations of a close bond with Muslims, however, both the Catholic and Protestant churches of Germany underscore the significant differences existing between the Christian community and Islam. Central among these differences is the Christian community's confession of Jesus as the Son of God who is resurrected from the dead, as opposed to the Muslim belief that Jesus is a prophet who has been succeeded by Mohammed. In view of these differences, both churches pull back from joining Muslims in interreligious prayer services, although they seek to affirm their close bond with Muslims by expressing a willingness to take part with them in multireligious prayer services that observe community-wide and national events. (51) There are, however, in both communities those who believe that the differences between the two faiths are so great that they are reluctant to participate even in these services. (52) The significant differences between the two faiths caution participants in this dialogue to move slowly in approaching each other. Relationships need time to grow. As we have learned regarding the progress of Jewish and Christian relationships, in order to be successful dialogue must reflect a patient understanding of the difficulties the dialogue partner may have in taking new steps toward a closer relationship.
Such patience is much in demand when one considers an imposing obstacle to a Muslim-Christian dialogue, namely, a focus on theology, because both the Catholic and Protestant churches of Germany and Islam make absolute claims concerning truth about God. In August, 2000, the Vatican declaration Dominus Iesus appeared, which speaks of the "equal personal dignity" of the dialogue partners but denies that this equality applies to their respective teachings or to the founders of the faith. Salvation, it insists, may be found only in Christ, and it further affirms the "necessity of the [Catholic] Church for this salvation." (53) The Evangelical Church of Germany stands in basic agreement with the Catholic position. While embracing dialogue, it rejects a "neutral" view of other religions and affirms that Christians are separated from those who adhere to other religions by the fact that they have experienced the healing and caring of God (die Erfahrung der heilsamen Zuwendung Gottes) that occurs only in Jesus Christ. (54) Muslims, who adhere to similar absolutistic claims made by Islam, will hardly accept these declarations as binding truth for themselves. (55) Such views, stemming from these two Christian churches and Islam, can easily derail any dialogue between the Christian and Islamic faith communities. (56) However, Andreas Renz and Stephan Leimgruber have observed that the Jewish-Christian dialogue has experienced remarkable success despite absolute statements expressed by Christians (for example, regarding Jesus) that Jews reject. Although the relationship of Jews with Christians manifests significant differences from that of Christians with Muslims, these authors still believe that similar success could happen between Christians and Muslims. (57)
Although Christian and Muslim dialogue confronts serious problems in the area of doctrinal theology, the discussion of deeply held religious convictions should not be avoided. For over thirteen years, two women, Nigar Yardim, an Islamic theologian, and Ursula August, a pastor in the Evangelical Church of Germany, have met together in dialogue. (58) From their experiences together, they have emphasized that "religious practices and orientation must not be an appendix to dialogue," (59) because religion is the foundational shaping aspect of each community. Further, they declared that an exchange that simply emphasizes similarities and avoids a confrontation regarding differences, misunderstandings, and hurt does not bring about any significant progress in a relationship. (60) Confrontation is, therefore, essential to dialogue, but confrontation involves not only a questioning of the dialogue partner, but it also means opening up oneself and one's faith to self-criticism.
Tibi thinks that both the Catholic and Protestant churches have made a mistake in focusing on religion and theology rather than on the problems that exist between Christians and Muslims as they live out their lives in Germany. (61) It is a suggestion that makes a good deal of sense. This is not to say that theological and religious issues are to be avoided, but it is to recognize that a recently immigrated Muslim community that is attempting to order itself and adjust to a new culture and language is not fully interested or prepared to engage in theological discussion. Tibi believes that the heavy immigration of Muslims to Europe has brought a "Conflict of Civilizations" to European doorsteps. In order to deal with fundamental differences that exist between these civilizations, dialogue must deal with concrete issues such as a secular democracy, pluralism, tolerance, and human rights. (62) These are the characteristics of the Euro-Islam that he believes Muslims must adopt if they wish to be accepted into European society. (63) He speaks of dialogue as "Conflict Management" rather than "refined discourse or simply an exchange of views." (64) In dialogue, he maintains, one must take the offensive for democracy and secularity. (65)
Many of the issues that need to arise in dialogue with Muslims are not foreign to the Christian church. For example, the church has not always adjusted easily to a democratic, pluralistic, secular society, and it has sometimes resorted to violence. Further, even today women are often restricted in their freedom, which, especially in religious circles, is attributed to the view of St. Paul that women should be submissive to their husbands (Eph. 5:22-23). Also, it may be noted that it was not until Vatican II (1962-65)--after the Christian church had existed for 1,900 years!--that the Catholic Church officially declared its recognition of one's right to choose one's own religion. In dialogue with Muslims, the church's experiences in the above areas and its responses to them serve as "points of contact" with Muslim dialogue partners. (66)
The recent adoption of the Islamic Charter by the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, which accepts democratic rule and German law as binding, provides an excellent beginning point for such discussions. Nevertheless, Muslims sometimes feel that the dialogue with the Christian community takes on the character of attack against them, and they understandably take offense. Several articles in the Islamische Zeitung, for example, accuse Catholic and Protestant leaders of arrogance and an unwillingness to face their own failings. (67) To minimize the conflict in dialogue, Yardim and August believe that Christians and Muslims could easily begin discussion by concentrating on concepts that are common to both the Bible and the Qur'an, namely peace, righteousness, love, reconciliation, grace, and mercy. (68) In all likelihood, a discussion of these topics would lead to a consideration of some of the other religious and secular issues that need attention.
Dialogue by its nature is difficult. The following question always presents itself: How open, generous, and trusting or firm and demanding should one be? As noted above, Tibi has emphasized that the Christian community should be firmer and more demanding of Muslim dialogue partners. In fact, he, together with others, has been critical of the Evangelical Church of Germany for its earlier naive approach to dialogue that worked to the advantage of Muslim hardliners. (69) Today, the Evangelical Church of Germany, influenced by this criticism, takes a new and firmer approach to dialogue with Muslims. (70) No doubt the growing awareness of the influence of fundamentalists on the Muslim community--one that opposes integration and dialogue--has also influenced this tougher stance. This present approach of the church, which stands in agreement with Tibi's advice, comes to view in the following statement from the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg: Dialogue is "not the courteous, evasive dialogue of a cocktail party, but a new, confronting, frank dialogue where participants mutually, openly recognize their involvement, their 'commitment,' and listen seriously to the convictions of others." (71) This new stance was headlined in an Evangelical Church press release as "No Softy-Dialogue." Abdullah has long been associated with ecumenical activity and is deeply disappointed with this tough approach of the Evangelical Church. He wonders what can become of a dialogue that is rooted in mistrust instead of "friendship, trust, familiarity, and spontaneity." (72)
One can empathize with both the stance of the Evangelical Church and the disappointment of Abdullah. The church finds itself in the midst of a societal threat that casts suspicion on the Muslim community. Many within the Christian community share this suspicion and tend to move forward with caution, especially after the community's earlier efforts at dialogue were viewed as "too giving." However, one can appreciate the discouragement and anger of Abdullah and other Muslim leaders when their efforts at serious and honest dialogue are treated with mistrust. Unfortunately, such reform-moderate leaders in the Muslim community are in the minority. (73) At present Muslim fundamentalists, even though few in number, exercise significant influence in Germany. (74)
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a spontaneous out-flowing of goodwill by Christians and other concerned people for the Muslim community that was subjected to verbal and physical assaults. (75) This non-theological show of support and love impressed a good number of Muslims, as it would have Christians had they been on the receiving end of this concern. Also, Muslims, shortly after the September 11 attack, in an expression of openness and friendship, opened 1,300 mosques to the public. About 100,000 people responded. (76) In a dialogue that must address difficult issues that are important to German society and the Christian-Muslim relationship, such expressions of goodwill, which inspire trust, are indispensable.
Progress in dialogue is generally slow and sometimes discouraging, but those taking part in the Muslim-Christian dialogue can take heart when they consider the steps already taken in improving Muslim and Christian relationships. Although Ursula Spuler-Stegemann has taken a cautious and watchful approach to dialogue with Muslims, she sees some hopeful signs for the development of a better relationship and for attempts to take a middle way. One should not, she noted, emphasize too much "togetherness" (Gemeinsamkeit), but one should also not reach out with a "crowbar." Rather, "one should carefully nourish the little plants representing the growth together, which mostly flourish in quietness. Above all, one should not leave the field to those who misuse the dialogue politically and in actual fact strive for segregation." (77)
Further, regarding difficulties in this relationship, Christians should remind themselves that the early years of Jewish-Christian dialogue were frequently flawed by displays of mistrust and defensiveness. It has taken many years for Christians and Jews to develop the kind of trust and friendship that enables them to speak to each other with some ease about their differences. A similar amount of time, at least, is to be allotted for the development of a Muslim-Christian relationship. This must be time in which each community takes it upon itself to learn more about its own religion and that of the other. Nevertheless, imposing obstacles stand in the way of a successful Muslim-Christian dialogue, it must deal with religious and cultural differences in the context of a German society, largely "Christian," that is anxious about its safety. At the same time it needs to give attention to a Muslim community that is concerned about its identity and acceptance and is tempted to reject moderate and reform leadership in favor of the "strong" hand of fundamentalism. (78)
Addendum:
Recent Events that Affect the Muslim and Western Communities
Since this article was completed in late February, 2005, other events have occurred in Europe touching the Muslim relationship with Jews, Christians, and German society. These tend generally to support the basic assessments of my study. Here I will only summarize some of the more important events that have taken place. While this material is not footnoted, this information has had a prominent place in the media and easily can be accessed on the Internet.
An increase in the number of contacts among Muslims, Jews, and Christians in Germany, England, and France provides hope for better days ahead. On January 11, 2005, for example, following a period of some tension, the head of the Evangelical Church of Germany and two influential leaders from the Muslim community met--for the very first time. They signaled their intention to enter into a true dialogue, which consists of speaking with instead of about each other. Also, in March, 2005, leading figures from the three communities met to set up a foundation, called the "House of Abraham," which would institute a trialogue, lacking until now. Further, on April 26, 2005, one day after becoming pope, Benedict XVI promised to carry on a serious dialogue with the Muslim community. On his first trip to Germany as pope, in August, 2005, he made a similar pledge. At that time, however, after visiting a synagogue and strengthening his ties to the Jewish community, he failed, much to the disappointment of Muslims, to visit a mosque due to the "pressure of time."
Another source of encouragement is the stronger moderate voice being heard in the Muslim community. The increasing influence of Muslim women (for example, in religion and education) is playing an important role in this movement that exercises greater self-criticism, openness to dialogue, and integration, as well as a stronger public repudiation of those who advocate terrorism. The surfacing of a more moderate movement in the Muslim community provides hope that the differences between Muslims and the larger German-European society can be bridged. One can even believe that a Western form of Islam, exhibiting greater independence from that in majority-Muslim lands, has a possibility of developing. Related to this move toward moderation in the Muslim community is the Pew Global Project Report of July, 2005, which disclosed a dramatic worldwide decline in the defense of terrorism by Muslims.
Other events, however, underline the difficulty of improving relationships between Muslims and the European communities. For example, the attacks of fanatical Muslim terrorists in England and Egypt during July, 2005, confirm the distrust of Muslims among many Europeans. Added to these attacks is the violence that gripped France in more than two weeks of rioting during November, 2005. Although the cause of this rioting owed much to the dismal poverty that France has allowed to fester in immigrant neighborhoods, the fact that many youthful Muslims took part has strengthened the anxiety that many Europeans have of living among large numbers of Muslims.
Further chilling Muslim and non-Muslim relationships are the following events: The first was the controversy over caricatures of the prophet Mohammed that were published by Danish papers (January, 2005). Even though Christian leaders criticized the publication of these cartoons and moderate Muslims called for peaceful demonstrations, there was an uproar in the Muslim community worldwide that at times led to violence. Second, the German minister for family affairs, Ursula von der Lehen, plans in January, 2007, to launch an education program for family and school that will emphasize Christian values. She invited only Protestant and Catholic leaders to discussions concerning this program. Although the minister indicated that other religious groups would participate later, Jews and Muslims strongly criticized her actions for excluding them from the first--and most influential--discussions of the proposed project. Third, are three grave issues that confront world leaders, namely, the violence in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran's face-off with the United States and the European Union over the development of nuclear power.
A fourth such issue was Pope Benedict XVI's lecture on September 12, 2006, at the University of Regensburg, in which he cited a fourteenth-century Christian scholar who depicted Mohammed as exercising violence in the spread of Islam. The pope's remarks found wide approval among Germans who believed it was time someone spoke openly about what so far had been avoided in public discussion. His inclusion of the citation regarding Mohammed, however, which a number of people thought was ill-considered, provoked anger among Muslims in Germany and other countries, which at times led to verbal and physical violence. In response to this Muslim outrage, the pope took swill action. Without disavowing what he had said, he expressed his great respect for Islam and declared that this statement did not represent his thought. He then quickly made contact with Muslim leaders to establish a serious, ongoing dialogue with the Muslim community. Although this conflict has damaged Catholic-Muslim relationships, many hope that, due to the pope's conciliatory response, it may also have sparked a greater urgency for dialogue between the two communities.
Coinciding with the action of the pope in establishing conversations with Muslims was the action of the German government, which finally became convinced of the pressing need to set up dialogue with the Muslim community. Toward the end of September, 2006, Wolfgang Schauble, Minister of the Interior, arranged a conference with Muslim leaders that would plan for continuing discussion between the two parties.
One can only rejoice in the progress of relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany; nevertheless, there is a long way to go before a meaningful dialogue can emerge. Earlier efforts at dialogue, as well as those proposed by Pope Benedict XVI and the German government, have so far had limited success. They are not likely, in the near future, to erase Muslim anger and suspicions or to change the minds of Muslim extremists who would like to set up a parallel society in Germany. Further, the explosive response to the pope's remarks, added to the threats of violence and acts of terror by Muslim extremists, are alienating even moderates among non-Muslims. They fear that within Islam there is a tendency to use intimidation to stifle free speech and criticism. Germany and some other European lands are becoming less open to Muslims and more security-conscious. Several countries, including Germany, are now taking a harder line against Muslim extremism that includes consideration of new rules for those seeking citizenship, new laws for the protection of society, and the deportation of suspicious persons in the Muslim community. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project (June, 2006), Muslims view the situation in Europe, especially in Germany, as "bad," and, according to the Pew report, among Germans distrust of Muslims has increased. This general atmosphere of suspicion stands as a formidable challenge to relationships among Muslims, Jews, and Christians in Germany.
* I am grateful to Dr.Peter Fiedler, Professor fur Katholische Theologic, Padagogischen Hocbschule, Freiburg, Germany, for making important materials available to me for the preparation of this essay, which was completed on February 25, 2005
Fredrick C. Holmgren (Evangelical Covenant Church) is a Research Professor of Old Testament at North Park Theological Seminary in Chicago, where to has taught since 1960. After ordination in the Evangelical Covenant Church, he served as a pastor in New Rochelle, NY, 1952-57. His BA. is from Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI; his BD., S.TM., and ThD. (1963) arc from Union Theological Seminary (N.Y C.); he has done post-doctoral research at Hebrew Union College (Cincinnati) and in the universities at Freiburg, Heidelberg, Tubingen, Marburg, Gottingen, and Oxford. He has published some forty articles in denominational and ecumenical journals (including J.E.S. [Spring-Summer, 2001]) and in edited books. He co-edited (with George Knight) the 28-volume International Theological Commentary (Eerdmans, 1984-94), authoring the volume on Ezra-Nehemiah (1987). He edited (with Herman Schaalman) Preaching Biblical Texts: Expositions by Jewish and Christian Scholars (Eerdmans, 1995). this own books include The God Who Cares: A Christian Looks at Judaism (John Knox, 1979), and The Old Testament and the Significance of Jesus (Eerdmans, 1999). A Festcrift in his honor was published by Covenant Publication in 1997: Bradley J. Bergfalk and Paul E. Koptak, eds., To Hear and Obey: Essays in Honor of Fredrick Carlson Holmgren. He has lectured widely in the U.S. and in Europe.
(1) See, e.g., the report, "Schlafer: Tickende Zeitbomben," Stern, October 3, 2003 (www. stern.de/politik=muslime), and the comments of Dr. Bassam Tibi, a liberal Muslim who now teaches international politics in Gottingen, Germany, in "Fundamentalismus im Islam: Eine Gefahr fur den Weltfrieden?" Freiburger Rundbrief, vol. 9 (2002), p. 5.
(2) See, e.g., an interview with Otto Schily, the German secretary of the interior for Bavaria, by Hans Peter Schuetz and Georg Wedemeyer, "Wit sind massiv bedroht," Stern 29 (July 8, 2004): 48-49. Addressing the same concern over the threat from extremists is the popular but controversial book written by Udo Ulfotte, Der Krieg in unseren Stadten: Wie radikale lslamisten Deutschland unterwanderr, (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004); and that of Ganther Lachmann, Todliche Toleranz: Die Muslime und Unsere Offene Gesellschaft (Munich: Piper, 2005), pp. 58-59, 104. Lachmann declared that German society should be tolerant of a minority in its midst, but, if this tolerance is not reciprocated, then the majority community has the right and responsibility to protect itself and its foundational traditions with appropriate action.
(3) In an interview, "Begegnungen," Islamische Zeitung, August, 2004, p. 2, Dr. Rolf Gossner criticized the overreaction of the German police but declared that, in some mosques where hate and violence are preached and criminal acts are planned, these actions are justified
(4) Wolfgang Stortz, "Terrorismus: Tagliche Unsicherheit," Frankfurter Rundschau, April 6, 2004, p, 15. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Citing a poll taken in 2004, Lachmann, in Todliche Toleranz, p. 274, reported that 83% of Germans think of terror when they hear the word "Islam,"
(5) The wearing of headscarves, e.g., has emerged as a major issue in Germany and France. Although many Muslim women do not wear headscarves, those who do, say Muslim leaders, adopt the practice for religious reasons. A number of European politicians, however, believe that the headscarf in many instances is a symbol of militancy and a defiance of integration efforts. For these reasons, the wearing of headscarves by public servants is banned in six of the sixteen German states. See "Germany: Berlin Bans Scarves for Public Servants," New York Times, April 1, 2004, p. A-6. Although this ban applies also to the wearing of a cross or yarmulke, it is clear to all that it is aimed at the Muslim community. Turkey, a Muslim land, also forbids the wearing of the headscarf in public schools. Regarding the ban in France, see Elaine Sciolino, "French Assembly Votes to Ban Religious Symbols in Schools," New York Times, February 11, 2004, p. A-3.
(6) This isolation is due in part to an inability to speak German well. The general lack of competence of Muslims to handle the German language is a stumbling block to the creation of good relationships with the German public. This deficiency applies especially to older Muslims. However, Lachmann, in Todliche Toleranz, pp. 81-82, 133, lamented that young Turkish children are often not successful in school because they lack fluency in the German language. This failing, he says, dooms most of them to poverty, which, together with a strong Muslim religious upbringing, makes them easy marks for religious radicals.
(7) Gunther Beckstein, the interior secretary of Bavaria, declared that the German government has not had much cooperation from the Muslim community regarding assistance in uncovering Muslim extremists. See Silke Fauzi, Tacheles: Islam in Deutschland--An den Grenzen der Toleranz? (Hannover: Lutherisehes Verlagshaus, 2003), p. 75. This failure to cooperate may rest in part on fear of Muslim extremists. See Dominik Cziesche, "Islam: Extremisten bedrohen liberale Muslime," Spiegel 24 (May 29, 2004): 76-78.
(8) Regarding Germany, Gossner, president of the International League for Human Rights, decried the fact that the whole Muslim community must suffer because of a small number of Muslim extremists. See his comments in "Begegnungen," p. 8 (note 3, above)..
(9) See "Islamisten: Sogwirkung in der Republik," Spiegel 42 (October 13, 2003): 54-55. In other Qur'an schools in Germany, it is asserted, the same kind of program obtains. Children are set against the West and its culture, instead of being taught to live and work in a pluralistic society. See also the concern over Muslim teaching taking place in some German public schools in Richard Berstein's "Lessons of Islam in German Classrooms." New York Times, June 30, 2004, p. A-4.
(10) A number of Muslim and non-Muslim experts complain that the media and the government overplay the danger inherent in the Muslim community and are guilty of causing unnecessary anxiety, thereby making it harder for Muslims to be accepted by the German public. See, e.g., Bakir Albogai, "Islamische Welt: Selbsverstandnis in Deutschland," OST-WEST: Europaische Perspektiven, vol. 5, no. 1 (2004), pp. 6-8; and Klaus Kreitmeir, Allahs deutsche Kinder (Munich: Pattloch, 2002), pp. 21-26. One can admit that the media has a tendency to exaggerate and emphasize the negative; nevertheless, Tibi cautions that Islamic fundamentalism and its anti-Western ideology is not simply a creation of the media. See his comments in his Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003), pp. 46-55.
(11) See "Offnung der Gemeinden," Islamische Zeitung, July, 2004, p. 13. Haupt referred, e.g., to the secrecy involving the source of financing for large mosques built by very small Muslim congregations. Some people fear that such mosques are being financed by radical groups. Ozcan Mutlu, a member of the Green Party, also is disturbed by such secrecy, and he fears that some Muslims are attempting to build a "parallel society." Regarding the secrecy around the financing of mosques, he noted, "Whoever has interest in integration and dialogue has no secrets" (Frank Hauke, "Hauptstadt des Islam," Focus, vol. 28 [2004], p. 55).
(12) See the discussion by Lachmann, in Todliche Toleranz, pp. 72-75.
(13) Bassam Tibi, "Europa droht eine lslamisierung," Die Welt, May 28, 2002, p. 6.
(14) In 1999, the Society for Christian and Jewish Cooperation contacted thirty-four Muslim organizations in Germany and invited them to enter into dialogue. All but one of them responded positively. A number of them had already had some contact with the Jewish and Christian communities. See Rundschreiben, 2000 (no. 1), a publication of the Gesellschaft far Christlich-Judische Zusammenarbeit (Bad Nauheim: Deutscher Koordinierungs Rat, 2000), p. 1.4. Some of these organizations also have issued sharp condemnations of terror acts. Further, Muslims have taken part in street demonstrations against terrorism; see, e.g., the one in November of 2004, when about 25,000 Muslims marched in protest against terrorist acts. See "Beckstein spricht bei muslimischer Anti-TerrorKundgebung," Spiegel, November 18, 2004, at www.spiegel.de, under Archiv: "Muslime."
(15) E.g., the charter's affirmation that women and men "share the same task in life" falls short of considering women fully equal to men. See Fauzi, Tacheles, pp. 135-140, for a reproduction and critique of the charter.
(16) Tibi, who has long called for a Euro-Islam, views this as a necessary development for the Muslim community if it is to be fully accepted by the European populace. See Bassam Tibi, Kreuzzug und Djihad: Der Islam und die christliche Welt (Munich: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1999), p. 256. This step, declares M. Salim Abdullah in "Muslime in Deutschland," in Hubertus Lutterbach and Jurgen Manemann, eds., Religion und Terror (Munster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2002), p. 34, is "indispensable and absolutely essential."
(17) His comments are included in the report, "Jeder achte Europaer ist ein Moslem," Christ im Gegenwart, no. 27 (July 6, 2003), p. 228.
(18) For a fuller discussion of the establishing of the academy, which leading German newspapers hailed as a very positive step for Muslim integration, see Sulaiman Wilms, "Es bleiben offene Fragen," Islamische Zeitung, July, 2004, pp. 13-14, 18.
(19) See, e.g., Axel A. Kohler, "Wege zur Integration des Islam," Islamische Zeitung, July, 2004, p. 17, which notes that Muslims await a clear signal from the German government that indicates a readiness for cooperation. Elyas calls for integration but declares that German political leaders must develop a more open relationship with the Muslim community that involves trust and cooperation, rather than Muslim conformance or assimilation into German society. See his comments in "Muslime in Deutschland: Politiker mahnen Integrationsbereitschaft an," Stern, December 21, 2004, at www.stem.de under Archiv: "Muslime." However, Omid Nouripour, "Herberschlage," Islamische Zeitung, August, 2004, p. 14, declared that Muslims must take the first steps of integration into the larger society.
(20) See "EU Bericht: Muslime in Europa zunehmenden Anfeindungen ansgesetzt," January 2, 2004, p. 3, at www.turkischweb.com/D-Religionunterricht/seite25.htm Mr. Cem Ozdemir, a Muslim leader and a member of the liberal Green Party in Germany, has serious doubts about the acceptance of Muslims by the German public. He declared: "The majority in this society believe that a Muslim cannot be a good German citizen. I wager any amount of money that 80 percent of the Germans definitely believe that" (cited in Fauzi, Tacheles, p. 120). Tibi has also pointed to the reluctance of German society to welcome foreigners, especially those from poorer countries. See his comments in his Islamische Zuwanderung: Die gescheiterte Integration (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002), pp. 15, 24.
(21) See "Juden, Muslime und Christen: Bubis fordert zu mehr Dialog auf," at www.hagalil.com/ archiv/98/10/01bubis-0.htm. In 1997, in an earlier address to the Evangelische Studentengemeinde Bochum, Bubis declared that he could not "look away" from what was happening to Muslims. They were, he said, subjected to the same kind of misinformation and prejudice that had been circulated about Jews. See, further, Kreitmeir, Allahs deutsche Kinder, p. 256.
(22) See, e.g., Jan Feddersen and Philipp Gessler, "Wenn die Kippa were nicht passt," Die Tageszeitung, December 21, 2003, p. 4. Leonid Goldberg, chairperson of the Jewish Congregation in Wuppertal, declared that the danger to Jews from radical Muslims is greater than that from rightwing radicals. See the report in Phoenix-Pressemitteilung, January, 2004, p. 1, at www.phoenix.de/ ereig/117551.
(23) See the editorial "Islamic Anti-Semitism," New York Times, October 18, 2003, p. A-28. It is sometimes said that Muslims cannot be antisemitic because they are Semites, but this defense is simply a play on words or "eye wash," according to Tibi. See Bassam Tibi, "Der importierte Hass," in Michael Thumann, ed., Der Islam und der Westen (Berlin: Berliner Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), p. 98.
(24) The Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Maher, said that the speech was "a very, very wise assessment," and Afghan's President Hamid Karzai stated that the speech was "very correct." See "Islamic Anti-Semitism," p. A-28.
(25) It may be noted, however, that when Muslim extremist groups called for a worldwide honoring of "A Day of Rage" against Israel, a number of Muslim leaders, including Ali Kizilkaya, chairperson of the Islamic Council in Germany, distanced themselves from such a rally. According to Kizilkaya, it was not an "appropriate method of confrontation with Israel" (at yahoo de, type in "Ali Kizilkaya und Israel" and select #6, "Berlin, 350 Islamisten demonstrieren gegen Israel").
(26) See Meg Mortin, "Muslims Lament Israel's Existence," International HeraM Tribune Online, June 3, 2003, p. 4, at www.iht.com/articles/98399.html. Lachmann, in Todliche Toleranz, pp. 139-144, remarked that Muslim media from abroad have strongly influenced European Muslims toward an antisemitic, anti-Israel stance, which often includes a denial of the Holocaust. See also Yavuz Ozoguz and Gurhan Ozoguz, Wir sind "fundamentalische Islamisten" in Deutschland. Eine andere Perspektive (Nienburg: Betzel Verlag, 2003). These two brothers are leading Muslims in Germany, who have created the most influential German-language Internet site for Muslims in Germany. Although they declare that they are not against Jews (Y. and G. Ozoguz, Wit sind, pp. 190-191), they have designated Israel's founding and continuing existence as criminal (Y. and G. Ozoguz, Wir sind, p. 173; cf. p. 190).
(27) Chris McGreal, "EU Poll Sees Israel as Peace Threat," Guardian, November 3, 2003, p. 1, at www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604.1076442.00html. Many Jews believe that Antisemitism stands behind this poll, but, exercising self-criticism--a rarity in our world--Alon Liel, former head of Israel's foreign ministry, said, according to McGreal, that "Israelis would be wise to consider why Europeans might think that way."
(28) Jews sometimes contribute to the merging of "Jews" and "Israel" as one entity. The influential Jewish newspaper in Germany, Judische Allgemeine, e.g., repeatedly underscores the solidarity existing between Jews and Israel.
(29) See, e.g., the article of Konstantin yon Hammerstein et al., "Die Stimmung ist gekippt,'" Spiegel, vol. 16 (2002), p. 25. Holding the same opinion is Michael Brenner, in "Das Judentum in Europa: Geschichte und Gegengeschichte," Concilium, vol. 40, no. 2 (2004), p. 166.
(30) The report may be found at www.us-israel.org/jsource/anti-semitism/ reportcredits.html. See at this site passages that point to a significant participation of Muslims in antisemitic acts: Preface, pp. 2-3; Introduction, pp. 1-2; Analysis, pp. 1, 6; Germany, p. I. Jacques Chirac, president of France, appears to support the findings of this study. He denied that France is an antisemitic land but granted that there has been a "resurgence of anti-Semitic acts in Europe in the past three years," which, he indicates, may be in large part traced to Muslims reacting to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See the report in Expatica (France), February 13, 2004, at www.expatica.com, under "'AntiSemitic Image of France Unjust': Chirae."
(31) Sylke Tempel, "Mord als Programm," Jadische Allgemeine, August 28, 2003, p. 1. To some Jews, the danger to the Jewish community is almost as great as it was during the 1930's One should not underestimate the present threat to Jews in Germany, but the situation today is not a repetition of what occurred earlier, as Michael Berenbaum pointed out in "Our Condition Today: Nothing Like It Was Then," Chicago Jewish News, January 2-8, 2004, p. 13.
(32) See "Islamisten-Demonstration friedlich verlaufen," Welt Online, November 22, 2003, at www.welt.de/data2003/11/22/201292.html.
(33) See "Ein Dialog zwischen Juden und Muslimen in Berlin: Begegnungen zwischen Ramadan und Chanukka," January 20, 2004, at www.berlin-judentum.de/kultur/rc/ start.htm.
(34) See Irene Armbruster's interview, "Manchmal ein Dialog der Taubstumen: Im Gesprach mit Professor Michael Wolffsohn, Pionier der jadisch-islamischen Annaherung," Aufbau: Focus, at www.aufbauonline.com/2003/issue23/10.html. The discussion in the following paragraph derives from this interview. The title of the interview ("Sometimes a Dialogue of the Deaf and Dumb") indicates the difficulty that exists in Jewish-Muslim conversations.
(35) Ibid., p. 1.
(36) Agreeing with Wolffsohn, regarding Muslims, is Muhammed Kalisch, the first professor of Muslim theology in Germany (University of Manster). See his comments in "Hintergrund: Viele haben keine Ahnung vom Islam," Islamische Zeitung, November 21, 2004, at www.islamischezeitung.de, under Archiv: "Muslime."
(37) Wolffsohn's comments are especially true for Muslim fundamentalism. Tibi, now a liberal Muslim, tells of going as a very conservative Muslim to Frankfurt, Germany, for university study. There he was introduced to the European Enlightenment. Now, as a liberal Muslim, he indicates that he seeks to build a connection between Islam and the Enlightenment. See his essay, "Der Islam und der Westen: Das Wechselspiel der Feinbilder," in Hilmar Hoffmann and Wilfried F. Schoeller, eds., Wendepunkt: 11. September 2001: Terror, Islam und Demokratie (Cologne: DuMont, 2002), p. 187. See also the comments of Iflikhar H. Malik in Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and the United States (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 5-6, and his hopes that Muslims living in the West will take the lead in "linking the traditions of Islamic civilization with the humane values of Western modernity." It must be admitted, however, that the West has not always reflected these values in relating to Muslims.
(38) Lachmann, Todliche Toleranz, pp. 138-139.
(39) Tibi declared, "With the Islamic j:had conquests much blood has flowed, and Muslims have frequently brutally forced non-Muslims to their belief" (Bassam Tibi, "Selig sind die Betrogenen: Christlich-islamischer Dialog--Tauschung und westliches Wunschdenken," in Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, ed., Feindbild Christentum im Islam [Freiburg: Herder, 2004], p. 59). Further disrupting the relationship between Muslims and Christians today are the severe restrictions placed on the freedom of Christians in a number of Islamic lands. They contrast sharply with the freedom of movement and worship that Muslims have in Germany. Currently there are about 140 large mosques with minarets (seventy in Berlin alone), and another 150 are under way. See Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, "Christenverfolgen oder Christentum ohne Lobby," in Spuler-Stegemann, Feinbild Christentum, pp. 123-128; and idem, "Denn sic wissen was sie tun" (in Spuler-Stegemann, Feinbild Christentum, p. 178).
(40) See the discussion in Ralf Geisler, Das Eigene als Fremdes: Chancen und Bedingungen des christlich-islamischen Dialogs (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1997), p. 77; and Thomas Lemmen, Muslime in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), pp. 233-256.
(41) S. Salim Abdullah, "Gedanken zum christlich-islamischen Dialog," in Ralf Geisler and Holger Nollmann, eds., Muslime und ihr Glaube in kirchlicher Perspektive (Schenefeld: EB Verlag, 2003), p. 45.
(42) Faruk Sen and Hayrettin Aydin, in their Islam in Deutschland (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), pp. 115-118, point out that in Germany in the 1980's and 1990's a number of Christian-Islamic dialogue groups were formed. This new beginning in dialogue, from the Christian side, may be traced back to Vatican II (1962-65), which, under the inspiration of Pope John XXIII, gave impetus to Catholic dialogue with non-Christian religions. For information concerning the Catholic-Protestant-Orthodox dialogue with Muslims, see Andreas Renz and Stephen Leimgruber, Christen und Muslime (Munich: Kosel, 2004), pp. 81-99.
(43) See the discussion of the obstacles to dialogue in Renz and Leimgruber, Christen und Muslime, pp. 34-37; and in Geisler, Das Eigene als Fremdes, pp. 11-20, 80.
(44) Jonathan Magonet, in Abraham-Jesus-Mohammed: Interreligioser Dialog aus judischer Perspektive (Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus, 2000), pp. 23-37, contributes an excellent discussion of the risks of dialogue for the minority immigrant community, which lacks the power of the majority group. He observes that Christians often lack sensitivity regarding the insecurity that Jews and Muslims suffer when they enter into dialogue with them. Among concerns shared by these two communities is a "fear of loss of one's identity through assimilation or acculturation" (Magonet, Abraham-Jesus-Mohammed, p. 24).
(45) The Jewish community was granted this governmental status in January, 2003. The lack of a central organization for Muslims presents an obstacle to granting them this state recognition. However, one becomes aware of Muslim resentment at being excluded from the legal status granted Jews and Christians in an outburst against the chairperson of the Evangelical Church of Germany. See Malik Ozkan, "Kommentar: 'Demokratisierung des Vatikans, jetzt!'" Islamische Zeitung, January 11, 2005, at www. Islamische-zeitung.de, under Archiv: "EKD."
(46) See Johannes Ehmann, ed., Christen begegnen Muslimen: Eine Handreichung (Stuttgart: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Christlicher Kirchen in Baden-Wurttemberg, 2003), p. 7, for a listing of over thirty-three cities in Germany where dialogue groups are established.
(47) E.g., Elke Faust, Islam: Eine Weltreligion stellt sich vor (Bonn: Katholische Nachrichten-Agentur GMBH, 2003); and Ehmann, Christen begegnen Muslimen.
(48) See Stephan Leimgruber, "Die Gesellschaftliche und Religionspadagogische Bedeutung Interreligiosen Lernens," in Andreas Renz and Stephen Leimgruber, eds., Lernprozess Christen Muslime (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2002), pp. 5-7.
(49) See Renz and Leimgruber, Christen und Muslime, p. 88, for this statement, which was initially made by Pope John Paul II at a Catholic-Muslim meeting in Rome in 1985.
(50) Cited in ibid., p. 98.
(51) For statements from both the Evangelical Church of Germany and the Catholic Church, see ibid., pp. 91-92, 97-98; and Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonference, ed., Leitlinien fur multireligiose Feiern von Christen, Juden und Muslimen: Eine Handreichung der deutschen Bischofe (Bonn: Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 2003), p. 20.
(52) See, e.g., the comments of one Muslim dialogue participant in Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, Muslime in Deutschland (Freiburg: Herder, 2002), p. 337. Bishop Rolf Koppe of the Evangelical Church of Germany believes also that "there are 'massive differences' between Muslims and Christians in their understanding of God" (cited in Fauzi, Tacheles, p. 188). Nevertheless, see a contribution to ecumenical understanding that contains prayers from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: Martin Banschke, Walter Homolka, and Rabeya Muller, eds., Gemeinsam vor Gott (Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlag, 2004).
(53) Cited in Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonfence, Leitlinien fur multireligiose Feiern, p. 17.
(54) See "Christlicher Glaube und nicht christliche Religionen: Theologische Leitlinien," Ein Beitrag der Kammer far Theologie der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland. Herausgeben vom Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, pp. 2, 8. This text may be found online at www.ekd.de, under "Texte 77."
(55) Regarding Muslim belief, Tibi declared: "There is no equality of religions according to the Shariah [Islamic Law] in which Islam is considered the single true religion. As a result, pluralism is excluded" (cited in Fauzi, Tacheles, p. 195). Note also the comments of Christine Schirrmacher, "Frahzeit des Islam und aus der Sicht heutiger Theologen,'" in Spuler-Stegemann, Feindbild Christentum im Islam, pp. 26-34, esp. pp. 27 and 33; and those of Geisler in Das Eigene als Fremdes, pp. 79-80.
(56) In both the Christian and Muslim communities there are moderates who pull back from absolute positions, but at present they do not dominate the dialogue.
(57) See Renz and Leimgruber, Christen und Muslime, p. 119.
(58) Nigar Yardim and Ursula August, "Musliminnen und Christinnen im Dialog," in Geisler and Nollmann, Muslime und ihr Glaube, pp. 27-36.
(59) Ibid., p. 33.
(60) See, also, Omid Nouripour, "Herberschlag," Islamische Zeitung, August, 2004, p. 14.
(61) Tibi, "Selig sind die Betrogenen, p. 58. Also, Spuler-Stegemann, in Muslime in Deutschland, p. 338, counseled that Christian-Muslim dialogue should not focus on the "image of God" but on acts of piety concerning which Muslims and Christians have much in common. A similar suggestion occurs in a document coming from the Catholic Church in 1984 that recommended that conversations with Muslims include a concentration on practical life experiences (Dialog des Lebens) instead of a fine focus on theology. See Lemmen, Muslime, pp. 209-210.
(62) See Bassam Tibi, "Mittendrin--Statt nur dabei," Frankfurter Rundschau, November 24, 2004, at www.fr-aktuell.de, under Archly: "Muslime." Lachmann, in Todliche Toleranz, pp. 274-279, esp. p. 276, called on Germans to develop a critical tolerance toward the Muslim community in which there is a respect for its difference, even though German society is strongly marked by the Christian tradition, which in turn sets limits on what it can tolerate.
(63) See Bassam Tibi, In Schatten Allahs: Der Islam und Menschrechte (Dusseldorf: Ullstein, 2003), pp. 514-529; and the discussion of Karl-Josef Juschee, "Euro-Islam," Concilium, vol. 40, no. 2 (2004), pp. 181-184.
(64) Tibi, Kreuzzug und Dj'ihad, p. 257.
(65) Ibid.
(66) See the discussion in Geisler, Das Eigene als Fremdes, pp. 46-56 (quote on p. 46). Muslims also have issues that they would like to discuss with Christians and Jews, as Gunter Risse points out in "Der Islam--Religion der Gewalt oder Religion des Friedens?" Lebendiges Zeugnis, vol. 58, no. 1 (2003), p. 1. These concerns are more directly topics for discussion with the German government, because for the most part they involve issues relating to the life of the Muslim community, e.g., state support for the Muslim community that is equal to that given to the Christian and Jewish communities, Islamic education in the schools, observance of Islamic holidays, and flexible work schedules to allow for times of prayer. Nevertheless, such issues are also appropriate subjects for Muslim discussion with Jews and Christians.
(67) See Malik Ozkan's attack on Cardinal Karl Lehmann for the Catholic Church's unwillingness to discuss the lack of democracy in its own church government and the abuse of children by priests (Ozkan, "Kommentar: 'Demokratisierung'"). Also, he accuses Wolfgang Huber, chairman of the Council of the Evangelical Church of Germany, of being less than fully involved in dialogue and of being unwilling to meet with two important Muslim leaders in Germany, namely, Nadeem Elyas and Ali Kizilkaya. See also the hard-hitting article in the same paper by Aiman Mazyak, "Kommentar: Wieder diskutieren und nicht mehr diktieren," (Islamische Zeitung, January 11, 2005), who declares that there is now a crisis of trust existing between the Muslim and Christian communities.
(68) See Yardim and August, "Musliminnen und Christinnen," p. 34.
(69) See Fauzi, Tacheles, p. 192. For examples of the earlier approach of the Evangelical Church, see Spuler-Stegemann, Muslime in Deutschland, pp. 327-331, 341.
(70) A similar approach is adopted by the Catholic Church. Recently, the Vatican warned Catholic women against marrying Muslim men because of the low status of women among Muslims. Further, the Vatican called on the Muslim community to honor human rights and the freedom of people to live and believe as they desire and to observe the dignity of women. See the report in Spiegel Online, May 14, 2004, at www.spiegel.de, under "Vatikan warnt vor Mischehen."
(71) Cited in Fauzi, Tacheles, p. 171; see also pp. 170 and 175.
(72) Cited in S. Salim Abdullah, "Gedanken zum christlich-Islamischen dialog," in Geisler and Nollman, Muslime und ihr Glaube, p. 45. Abdullah's disappointment is shared by other Muslim leaders. See, e.g., the comments of All Kizilkaya, chairperson of the Council of Islam for the Federal Republic of Germany, cited in Fauzi, Tacheles, p. 149.
(73) See, e.g., Yasar Nuri Ozturk, "Die Zeit nach den Propheten," in Thumann, Der Islam und der Westen, pp. 116.
(74) See the comments of Renz and Leimgruber, Christen und Muslime, p. 223; and the report "Islam: Extremisten bedrohen liberale Muslime," Spiegel, vol. 23 (2004), pp. 76-78. Aiman A. Maryek, in "Wird der Islam in Europa (wieder) heimisch?" Islamische Zeitung, July, 2004, p. 4, agrees that Muslim fundamentalism is on the rise but attributes that, as well as the self-ghettoizing of the community, to the disappointment of many Muslims at their being rejected by non-Muslims in German society and their being treated unjustly. Tibi, in Islamische Zuwanderung, p. 24, remarked that such a person is "a sitting duck" (eine leichte Beute) for fundamentalists and extremists. On this theme see also the reference to Lachmann's discussion in note 6, above.
(75) A demonstration of support for Muslims by representatives from unions, churches, and the mayor's office against neo-Nazis' attacks took place in Dortmund on June 12, 2004. See Malik Ozkan, "Das Schuren des Generalverdachts," Islamische Zeitung, July, 2004, p. 3.
(76) See Kreitmeir, Allahs deutsche Kinder, p. 253.
(77) See Spuler-Stegemann, "Denn sic wissen was sic tun," p. 181. Although Wolf Ahmed Aries is encouraged by many initiatives taken in Muslim and Christian dialogue, he is concerned that at present the dialogue is simply "marking time" (in his "Muslime in Europa," OST-WEST, vol. 57 [2004], p. 74).
(78) See Renz and Leimgruber, in Christen und Muslime, who survey the present situation (on pp. 34-37) and soberly conclude, "A climate of anxiety, distrust, general suspicion, and accusations mark, to a great extent, the present situation" (Renz and Leimgruber, Christen und Muslime, p. 37).
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| Author: | Holmgren, Fredrick C. |
|---|---|
| Publication: | Journal of Ecumenical Studies |
| Article Type: | Report |
| Geographic Code: | 4EUGE |
| Date: | Jun 22, 2004 |
| Words: | 11678 |
| Previous Article: | Ecumenical resources. |
| Next Article: | Old wine in new bottles: liberation theology and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict *. |
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