Werner Konitzer, Johanna Bach, David Palme, Jonas Balzer (Hg.), Vermeintliche Gründe. Ethik und Ethiken im Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt a. M. (Campus Verlag) 2020, 488 S. (Wissenschaftliche Reihe des Fritz Bauer Instituts), 2020
L'ouvrage réunit un choix de textes sur l'»éthique« de vingt auteurs national-socialistes, publié... more L'ouvrage réunit un choix de textes sur l'»éthique« de vingt auteurs national-socialistes, publiés entre 1920 (le »Deutschlands Schicksal« du théologien Emanuel Hirsch) et 1942 (la »Philosophie des Krieges« du philosophe August Faust). Une courte biographie et une étude concise des concepts et des thèses précèdent les morceaux choisis de chaque auteur. Une introduction générale de 70 pages propose une riche réflexion méthodologique sur la légitimité du projet, l'état de la recherche, les difficultés rencontrées, notamment dans le choix des auteurs, et la présentation de onze aspects ou concepts particulièrement représentatifs de la »morale« NS. Cette publication représente ainsi le résultat peut-être le plus
significatif d’un vaste programme de recherches sur »morale« et
NS, dont une première version avait été élaborée en 2000 par le
philosophe Werner Konitzer et l’historien Raphael Gross.
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half of the 20th century. But his legacy has been gradually challenged as further research
has demonstrated how much his philosophy cannot be dissociated from his
political engagement in support of Nazism. The publication beginning in 2014 (and still
ongoing at the time this writing) of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, written between 1931
and 1970, has been the latest evidence of the intimate relationship between
Heideggerian philosophy and Nazi ideology.
For a long time, the philosopher inspired far-right thinkers the world over, from Europe
to Russia and even Iran. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein posits national identify in a
specifically primitivist racial-cultural Volkishness. In the context of Heidegger's writings
after Hitler took power, it is clear that his pre-1933 definition of Dasein fit neatly into the
ideology of the emerging Nazi state and particularly that of the primitivist ideology of the
Sturmabtllung (SA), and the later Ahnenerbe. The incorporation of his ideas offers an easy cachet to far-right ideologies in search of a source of philosophical legitimacy.
The concept of Dasein can indeed be read as a straightforward legitimation of a Volkish
ontology: it calls for rootedness and nativity, arguing that every worldview is justified
through its being anchored by a local identity, thereby destroying any idea of
universalism. Heidegger’s language of the “end of philosophy” also fits an eschatological
vision of the end of the Western world, a requiem for a dying world, and by a domino
effect, the annunciation of the rebirth of anti-Western civilizations. The Dasein concept can then be repurposed for many different contexts: with a white-supremacist narrative for those hoping for a rebirth of the white race after its having been killed off by Western
liberalism; or in a Russian version as done by the infamous geopolitician Alexander
Dugin.
Dugin discovered Heidegger partly late in his intellectual journey. For a long time, the
Russian ideologist was focused on classic figures of pro-Nazi traditionalism such as Julius Evola, and on the whole ideological construction of Nazi esotericism, before realizing how much Heidegger could offer to his theories. After several works about Heidegger were published in Russian (and at least one translated into English), and several translations of Heidegger were published in Russian, Dugin adopted the Dasein concept in his Fourth Political Theory (2009), which, in a sense, is a tribute to Heidegger’s engagement with a “spiritual” National Socialism.
In this volume, the contributors address how the Black Notebooks have dramatically
reshuffled the deck of Heidegger studies (Richard Wolin), how Heidegger has been read
in the Soviet-Russian context (Michail Maiatsky), and how Dugin has been reading
Heidegger’s philosophy, projecting his own interpretation back into the Western far-right
world (Emmanuel Faye).
Thomas Sheehan’s attack on my book Heidegger, The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935, published in Philosophy Today under the title “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy”, addresses neither the book’s topic nor its arguments. He instead highlights a few isolated details in a sophistic and biased fashion. Moreover, his exposition is interspersed with ad personam insults not typically found in philosophical or scientific discussions, such as mocking the supposed “crass ignorance” of his opponent or even, in a second article, his alleged “cretinous readings” and portraying him as a possible “fraud”, a term that is tantamount to attack, which was rolled out at the end of a colloquium odefamation and would warrant legal action. Sheehan premediated his attack, which was rolled out at the end of a colloquium on Heidegger’s Black Notebooks in New York. He obviously had not read the Notebooks and had nothing to say about them, undoubtedly because they would have fundamentally challenged his own watered-down interpretation of the Heideggerian corpus. He thus had to create a diversion, in defiance of the most basic rules of academic exchange, as both Sidonie Kellerer and Richard Wolin pointed out at the time. The essential points of Sheehan’s critique were precisely and carefully refuted after the publication of his article by Johannes Fritsche and others. Although up to now I had been resolved not to respond to personal attacks, taking the insults of a virulent Heideggerian as a compliment to critique – one insults only what one cannot refute – I owe it to the memory of the recently deceased Professor Fritsche to take my turn to speak and to thereby pay intellectual tribute to him.
Thomas Sheehan : l’introduction de l’insulte dans le débat sur Heidegger — In memoriam Johannes Fritsche (1949-2020)
Dans son attaque contre mon livre Heidegger, l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. Autour des séminaires inédits de 1933-1935, publiée dans Philosophy Today sous le titre « Emmanuel Faye : The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy ? », Thomas Sheehan n’aborde ni l’objet, ni les démonstrations du livre. Il monte en épingle quelques détails isolés, présentés de manière sophistique et biaisée. Surtout, il parsème son propos d’insultes ad personam que l’on n’a pas coutume de rencontrer dans les débats philosophiques ou scientifiques, moquant l’« ignorance crasse » de son adversaire ou même, dans un second article, ses « lectures crétines » et le présentant comme un possible « faussaire » (a fraud), qualificatif qui relève de la diffamation et appellerait une réponse pénale. M. Sheehan avait prémédité son attaque, qui s’était déroulée en conclusion d’un colloque à New York sur les Cahiers noirs de Heidegger. Il n’avait visiblement pas lu ces Cahiers et n’avait rien su en dire, sans doute parce que cela eût fondamentalement remis en question son interprétation édulcorée de l’œuvre heideggérienne. Il lui avait donc fallu faire diversion, au mépris des règles académiques élémentaires comme l’avaient alors souligné Sidonie Kellerer et Richard Wolin. Depuis la publication de son article, l’essentiel des critiques de M. Sheehan a été précisément réfuté par Johannes Fritsche et par d’autres. Quoique j’aie jusqu’à présent résolu de ne pas répondre aux attaques personnelles, prenant les insultes d’un heideggérien virulent pour des hommages à la critique – on n’injurie en effet que ce que l’on ne parvient pas à réfuter – je dois aujourd’hui à la mémoire du professeur Fritsche, récemment disparu, de prendre à mon tour la parole et de lui rendre un hommage intellectuel par cette réponse.
Il y a actuellement un problème pour la lecture directe en ligne du fichier pdf, mais il peut être facilement téléchargé par qui souhaite le lire.
https://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2015/04/09/a0171
half of the 20th century. But his legacy has been gradually challenged as further research
has demonstrated how much his philosophy cannot be dissociated from his
political engagement in support of Nazism. The publication beginning in 2014 (and still
ongoing at the time this writing) of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, written between 1931
and 1970, has been the latest evidence of the intimate relationship between
Heideggerian philosophy and Nazi ideology.
For a long time, the philosopher inspired far-right thinkers the world over, from Europe
to Russia and even Iran. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein posits national identify in a
specifically primitivist racial-cultural Volkishness. In the context of Heidegger's writings
after Hitler took power, it is clear that his pre-1933 definition of Dasein fit neatly into the
ideology of the emerging Nazi state and particularly that of the primitivist ideology of the
Sturmabtllung (SA), and the later Ahnenerbe. The incorporation of his ideas offers an easy cachet to far-right ideologies in search of a source of philosophical legitimacy.
The concept of Dasein can indeed be read as a straightforward legitimation of a Volkish
ontology: it calls for rootedness and nativity, arguing that every worldview is justified
through its being anchored by a local identity, thereby destroying any idea of
universalism. Heidegger’s language of the “end of philosophy” also fits an eschatological
vision of the end of the Western world, a requiem for a dying world, and by a domino
effect, the annunciation of the rebirth of anti-Western civilizations. The Dasein concept can then be repurposed for many different contexts: with a white-supremacist narrative for those hoping for a rebirth of the white race after its having been killed off by Western
liberalism; or in a Russian version as done by the infamous geopolitician Alexander
Dugin.
Dugin discovered Heidegger partly late in his intellectual journey. For a long time, the
Russian ideologist was focused on classic figures of pro-Nazi traditionalism such as Julius Evola, and on the whole ideological construction of Nazi esotericism, before realizing how much Heidegger could offer to his theories. After several works about Heidegger were published in Russian (and at least one translated into English), and several translations of Heidegger were published in Russian, Dugin adopted the Dasein concept in his Fourth Political Theory (2009), which, in a sense, is a tribute to Heidegger’s engagement with a “spiritual” National Socialism.
In this volume, the contributors address how the Black Notebooks have dramatically
reshuffled the deck of Heidegger studies (Richard Wolin), how Heidegger has been read
in the Soviet-Russian context (Michail Maiatsky), and how Dugin has been reading
Heidegger’s philosophy, projecting his own interpretation back into the Western far-right
world (Emmanuel Faye).
Thomas Sheehan’s attack on my book Heidegger, The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935, published in Philosophy Today under the title “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy”, addresses neither the book’s topic nor its arguments. He instead highlights a few isolated details in a sophistic and biased fashion. Moreover, his exposition is interspersed with ad personam insults not typically found in philosophical or scientific discussions, such as mocking the supposed “crass ignorance” of his opponent or even, in a second article, his alleged “cretinous readings” and portraying him as a possible “fraud”, a term that is tantamount to attack, which was rolled out at the end of a colloquium odefamation and would warrant legal action. Sheehan premediated his attack, which was rolled out at the end of a colloquium on Heidegger’s Black Notebooks in New York. He obviously had not read the Notebooks and had nothing to say about them, undoubtedly because they would have fundamentally challenged his own watered-down interpretation of the Heideggerian corpus. He thus had to create a diversion, in defiance of the most basic rules of academic exchange, as both Sidonie Kellerer and Richard Wolin pointed out at the time. The essential points of Sheehan’s critique were precisely and carefully refuted after the publication of his article by Johannes Fritsche and others. Although up to now I had been resolved not to respond to personal attacks, taking the insults of a virulent Heideggerian as a compliment to critique – one insults only what one cannot refute – I owe it to the memory of the recently deceased Professor Fritsche to take my turn to speak and to thereby pay intellectual tribute to him.
Thomas Sheehan : l’introduction de l’insulte dans le débat sur Heidegger — In memoriam Johannes Fritsche (1949-2020)
Dans son attaque contre mon livre Heidegger, l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. Autour des séminaires inédits de 1933-1935, publiée dans Philosophy Today sous le titre « Emmanuel Faye : The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy ? », Thomas Sheehan n’aborde ni l’objet, ni les démonstrations du livre. Il monte en épingle quelques détails isolés, présentés de manière sophistique et biaisée. Surtout, il parsème son propos d’insultes ad personam que l’on n’a pas coutume de rencontrer dans les débats philosophiques ou scientifiques, moquant l’« ignorance crasse » de son adversaire ou même, dans un second article, ses « lectures crétines » et le présentant comme un possible « faussaire » (a fraud), qualificatif qui relève de la diffamation et appellerait une réponse pénale. M. Sheehan avait prémédité son attaque, qui s’était déroulée en conclusion d’un colloque à New York sur les Cahiers noirs de Heidegger. Il n’avait visiblement pas lu ces Cahiers et n’avait rien su en dire, sans doute parce que cela eût fondamentalement remis en question son interprétation édulcorée de l’œuvre heideggérienne. Il lui avait donc fallu faire diversion, au mépris des règles académiques élémentaires comme l’avaient alors souligné Sidonie Kellerer et Richard Wolin. Depuis la publication de son article, l’essentiel des critiques de M. Sheehan a été précisément réfuté par Johannes Fritsche et par d’autres. Quoique j’aie jusqu’à présent résolu de ne pas répondre aux attaques personnelles, prenant les insultes d’un heideggérien virulent pour des hommages à la critique – on n’injurie en effet que ce que l’on ne parvient pas à réfuter – je dois aujourd’hui à la mémoire du professeur Fritsche, récemment disparu, de prendre à mon tour la parole et de lui rendre un hommage intellectuel par cette réponse.
Il y a actuellement un problème pour la lecture directe en ligne du fichier pdf, mais il peut être facilement téléchargé par qui souhaite le lire.
https://www.taz.de/1/archiv/?dig=2015/04/09/a0171
Je recrée une session de discussion de cette note en soumettant aux observations des lecteurs une version plus élaborée de cette note. Dans la discussion qui accompagne ce texte, il est et sera également question de Hannah Arendt et de Giorgio Agamben sur Benjamin.
Answers to Peter Trawny, Donatella Di Cesare and Guillaume Payen concerning the Black Notebooks and the meaning of the concept of "Vernichtung" (annihilation/extermination) used by Martin Heidegger.
Faye thinks that Heidegger’s influence on Arendt lasted much longer than her university study (and their affair). He detects an antidemocratic stance in Arendt’s positions, e.g. in her assessment of “Jewish guilt” for the Holocaust, in the “Race Question” (on the role of Afro-Americans in American culture), and of issues in ethnicity, technology, and consumption.
Finkielkraut stressed the crucial importance of Arendt’s ideas for our contemporary self-consciousness, as well as the multiple fertile influences of Heidegger’s thought upon the current intellectual scene, particularly in France.
significatif d’un vaste programme de recherches sur »morale« et
NS, dont une première version avait été élaborée en 2000 par le
philosophe Werner Konitzer et l’historien Raphael Gross.