Introduction of Uday vs State of Karnataka

The Supreme Court in Uday vs State of Karnataka, 2003, also popularly known as ‘promise to marry’ case, addressed critical issues regarding the nature of consent in sexual relations and its implications under the Criminal law. The case revolves around whether the prosecutrix’s consent to sexual intercourse based on the accused’s promise of marriage constituted a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code and whether such consent falls within the definition of rape under Section 375 of the IPC. The legal provisions of Sections 90, 375 and 376 of the IPC were analysed to determine the validity of the consent and the subsequent conviction of the accused.

Historical Context and Facts of Uday vs State of Karnataka

In the case at hand, the prosecutrix and the accused lived in Majali Gaongeri, Karnataka. The prosecutrix was a college student residing with her family. The accused was a neighbour and a friend of the prosecutrix’s brother which led to frequent visits and conversations between them.

Relationship between Prosecutrix and Accused

The accused proposed marriage to the prosecutrix who declined due to caste differences. Despite the denial, a romantic relationship developed between them. One night, the accused visited the prosecutrix while she was studying and invited her out. They went to an under-construction house where they had sexual intercourse. Initially, the prosecutrix denied but later admitted it, acknowledging that she consented based on the accused’s promise of marriage.

Promise to Marry

The accused and the prosecutrix continued their relationship, engaging in sexual intercourse. The prosecutrix became pregnant and informed the accused who promised to marry her after completing the construction of his house. The prosecutrix’s mother discovered the pregnancy, leading to family involvement.

Failure to Marry

The accused repeatedly promised marriage but failed to take action. He suggested leaving town and bearing maintenance costs but did not follow through. The prosecutrix’s brother inquired about the marriage and the accused reiterated his promises which he ultimately did not fulfil.

Filing of Complaint

The prosecutrix filed a police complaint due to the accused’s failure to marry her as promised. She gave birth to the child on May 29, 1989.

Findings of the Session Court

The matter was brought before the Sessions Court where it was held that the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her consent which amounts to the offence of rape under Section 375 of the IPC and is punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

Decision of the High Court

Aggrieved by the decision of the lower court, the accused approached the High Court of Karnataka. However, the High Court of Karnataka upheld the decision of the lower court based on the same grounds but reduced the punishment of the accused to 2 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5,000, and in default, the accused underwent further rigorous imprisonment of 6 months.

Special Leave Petition

The accused again aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court.

Issue addressed in Uday vs State of Karnataka

The main questions which was addressed in this case were-

• Whether the consent given by the prosecutrix was consent under Section 375 of the IPC?
• Does the consent given by the prosecutrix fall within the meaning of misconception of facts under Section 90 of the IPC?

Legal Provisions involved in Uday vs State of Karnataka

Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

According to Section 90 of IPC, a consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or

Consent of insane person - if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent

Consent of child - unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.

Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

A man is said to commit rape- 

who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions -

First, - Against her will

Secondly, Without her consent

Thirdly, With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt

Fourthly, With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married

Fifthly, With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent

Sixthly, With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age

Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 376 of IPC provides that-

(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Whoever

(a) being a police officer, commits rape

(i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is appointed; or

(ii) in the premises of any station house

(iii) on a woman in such police officer’s custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to such police officer

(b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public servant's custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to such public servant

(c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central or a State Government commits rape in such area

(d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women’s or children’s institution, commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution

(e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a woman in that hospital

(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman

(g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence

(h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant

(j) commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent

(k) being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits rape on such woman; or

(l) commits rape on a woman suffering from mental or physical disability

(m) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the life of a woman

(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Judgment and Impact of Uday vs State of Karnataka

The Supreme Court in this case addressed the issues of whether consent given under the misconception of fact constitutes rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and whether such consent has broader implications under Section 90 of the IPC.

The Supreme Court noted that the prosecutrix was a mature woman, studying in college, who was deeply in love with the accused. Despite being aware of the caste differences and the societal opposition to their marriage, she chose to be involved in a sexual relationship with him. The Court observed that she exercised her free will, understood the implications and did not resist the act.

In this case, the Court found no evidence to suggest that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix or that he knew the consent was based on a misconception of fact. The Court believed that the prosecutrix’s consent was influenced by her deep love for the accused rather than solely by his promise of marriage.

The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutrix had consented to the sexual intercourse willingly with full awareness of the circumstances and without misconception of fact. Thus, the appeal was allowed and the accused was acquitted of the charges under Section 376 of the IPC.

Conclusion

In Uday vs State of Karnataka, the decision of the Supreme Court underlined the complexity of determining consent in sexual offences. The Court concluded that the consent of the prosecutrix was not obtained under a misconception of fact and she was fully aware of the circumstances.

The decision of the Supreme Court to acquit the accused reflects a nuanced approach to consent highlighting the need for a thorough examination of all factors and evidence in such cases. This decision reinforces the principle that consent must be assessed in light of the full context and the awareness and intentions of the individual.