journal papers by Alfredo Ferrarin
Critique, 2018
This is my reply to critics of my book Il pensare e l'io (later published in English as Thinking ... more This is my reply to critics of my book Il pensare e l'io (later published in English as Thinking and the I, Northwestern U.P. 2019) Guido Frilli and Elisa Magrì
Revue philosophique de Louvain 118: 3, 2021
Mais que les relations soient aussi réelles que quoi que ce soit dans le monde-bien plus réelles,... more Mais que les relations soient aussi réelles que quoi que ce soit dans le monde-bien plus réelles, selon ma conception, qu'elles ne le seraient si elles étaient des choses en soi mortes-c'est ce à quoi je souscris totalement.
Arkhe-logos, 2020
This is Berk ÖZCANGİLLER's Turkish translation of my 2004 essay "Hegel’s Appropriation of Aristot... more This is Berk ÖZCANGİLLER's Turkish translation of my 2004 essay "Hegel’s Appropriation of Aristotelian Intellect"
TEORIA POLITICA. NUOVA SERIE, ANNALI X 2020: 429-434, 2020
a discussion of chapters 6-8 of Remo Bodei's last book, Dominio e sottomissione. Schiavi, animali... more a discussion of chapters 6-8 of Remo Bodei's last book, Dominio e sottomissione. Schiavi, animali, macchine, Intelligenza Artificiale
Verifiche Rivista Trimestrale Di Scienze Umane, 1988
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2008
My aim in this article is to understand the role of imagination and practical judgment in Kant... more My aim in this article is to understand the role of imagination and practical judgment in Kant's moral philosophy. After a comparison of Kant with Rousseau, I explore Kant's moral philosophy itself — unlike Hannah Arendt, who finds in the enlarged mentality of the third Critique the ground for the activity of imagination in a shared world. Instead, I place the concept of moral legislation in its background, the reflection on particulars relevant to deliberation, and discuss the mutual relation of reflection and determination. Not only reflection and determination work together; imagination and judgment imply one another essentially, as interpretation of what is relevant, and as a principle of orientation in the choice of the maxim against the backdrop of a uniform and ordered world. The concepts of analogy and symbolic exhibition turn out to be crucial for how reason represents to itself the reality of ideas in the world.
EXISTENZ, vol. 14, 1, 2019
In discussing Dmitri Nikulin's book on history I start from the initial question regarding what o... more In discussing Dmitri Nikulin's book on history I start from the initial question regarding what one would like to have preserved of oneself, once one is no more. I then contrast this question with the overall argument of the book, which identifies in history a combination of names and narratives. While my first objection concerns the absence of names in much historiography, keener on privileging anonymous movements and not aimed at preserving the identity of its protagonists, I then examine the question of names to determine if it is possible at all to rescue what has been lost, and if it is always desirable to do so. I mention some examples of the possible futility of preserving names, not because I want to undermine its importance, but because I mean to stress that much of what remains of someone runs an unpredictable course and escapes one's control.
SGIR Review, vol. 3, 1-2, 2020
Estudos Kantianos [EK]
I wish to thank Serena Feloj for her generous discussion of my book. I will try to answer her que... more I wish to thank Serena Feloj for her generous discussion of my book. I will try to answer her questions by beginning with the issue of influence. Serena asks if my interpretation of Kant is indebted to phenomenology (with regard to the dependence on givenness), and later she claims, this time without questions, that I reveal a debt to Hegel’s philosophy (on the notion of form). However intriguing and fruitful I may find relating Hegel and Husserl,2 there are certain discrepancies and theoretical differences in their respective views on the relation between thought and reality that are too obvious to ignore.
Teoria , 1992
A survey of the literature of contributions on self-consciousness and the I in the Anglophone and... more A survey of the literature of contributions on self-consciousness and the I in the Anglophone and German debate until 1992
Discipline filosofiche , 2019
In this paper I discuss the notions of practice, institution and radical imaginary in Castoriadis... more In this paper I discuss the notions of practice, institution and radical imaginary in Castoriadis. In section 1 I clarify the premises of my essay by contrasting Castoriadis with contemporary social ontology and an Aristotelian concept of practice. In section 2 I approach the problem of institution by distinguishing between production and creation (the dialogue between Ricoeur and Castoriadis is the background of this distinction) and highlighting the crucial problem of the new ontology of magma with its distinctive temporality as opposed to the traditional identity logic and ontology of de-terminacy. In section 3 I deal with autonomy and the psyche, by focusing especially on Freud and the monad. In section 4 I try to identify the heart of the novelty of Castori-adis's treatment of imagination in its relation with the symbolic. I conclude in section 5 with a discussion of the meaning of representation and its internal difficulties. La figura di Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997) non gode della fortuna che a mio avviso merita. Se è avventuroso attribuire alla fama e all'opinione una razionalità retributiva cui esse evidentemente non ambiscono, si può pensare che siano le sue circostanze biografiche e storiche, inizialmente ap-partenenti a un mondo polarizzato in divisioni ideologiche irrimediabilmen-te passato, a gettare luce su alcuni motivi della mancata risonanza delle sue idee presso un pubblico allargato. Militante rivoluzionario e marxista greco, naturalizzato francese dal 1945 quando fugge dalle minacce di morte degli staliniani del suo paese, trascorre la sua vita perlopiù a Parigi, dove, dopo una tesi di dottorato su Max Weber (da Economia e società assimila il con-cetto di burocrazia che usa per comprendere la degenerazione del comuni-smo sovietico), aderisce al PCI, il partito comunista internazionalista, e dà vita, insieme a Claude Lefort e altri, alla rivista Socialisme ou barbarie, men-tre lavora come economista all'OCSE (la sua occupazione dal 1948 al 1970).
Hegel e il linguaggio. Per una bibliografia sul tema, 1987
a discussion of the bibliography on the question of Hegel and language with a comprehensive lis... more a discussion of the bibliography on the question of Hegel and language with a comprehensive list of published titles up to 1987
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2019
For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from withou... more For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physics or in the proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the arrangement that reason gives its contents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. For Kant method is the design and plan of the whole, the scientific form that guides the organization of cognitions (KrV A 707/B 736, Ak 24, 780). Likewise, Hegel writes that method is the consciousness of the form of its inner movement (WL 1, 49, SL 53, W 3 47, PhS 28). Unfortunately, Hegel never considers Kant an example or a precursor or a positive role model. It is important to ask why Hegel never takes seriously Kant’s Doctrine of Method. Why, if he shares so many central points with the Architectonic of the first Critique, does he never acknowledge Kant as a possible ally? Why does he misunderstand Kant on analysis and synthesis as he does? These are some of the questions I plan to discuss in this paper.
Hegel Bulletin, 38/1, 7–23, 2017
Modern philosophy tends to conflate subjectivity and ego (I-think, cogito, and the like). One les... more Modern philosophy tends to conflate subjectivity and ego (I-think, cogito, and the like). One lesson we can draw from Hegel is that the I emerges out of a natural and habitual state in the form of a return to itself through an opposition between self and world. In turn, Husserl has an interesting take on the anonymity of an ego-less subjectivity submerged in an affective and initially passive life out of which an ego-pole first
constitutes itself. In both, a latent, functioning subjectivity which forms an unconscious
ground is to be kept distinct from the several activities of a wakeful and self-conscious mind. I wish to compare and contrast Hegel and Husserl on this theme. The primary texts for my examination will be Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopaedia, and Husserl’s Ideas I, Ideas II, Cartesian Meditations and
Experience and Judgment.
Verifiche 46: 1, 239-53, 2017
Reply to critics
Giornale di metafisica 39: 2, 2017
In this paper I try to dispel some ambiguities concerning the notion of intuition and advance a t... more In this paper I try to dispel some ambiguities concerning the notion of intuition and advance a thesis on its necessity. After an introduction (§ 1) in which I
briefly talk about the ostracism that intuition has suffered in many areas of modern philosophy, in the first part (sections 2-4) I work toward a closer definition of
it. I isolate at least three different meanings of the term relevant for our discussion. In the second part (§ 5) I give an historical reconstruction to show how we pass from a noetic (especially in Plato and Aristotle) to a sensible (esp. in Kant) understanding of intuition. My thesis is simple enough: intuition is not the other
of thinking (rationality, philosophy, concepts) but its indispensable complement.
Rivista di Estetica , 2012
a discussion of Maurizio Ferraris's Documentalità
review of Koziak on Aristotle, Thumos and Gender
Kant-Yearbook, 2016
In this paper I want to compare and contrast Kant and Hegel on reason. While both emphasize the c... more In this paper I want to compare and contrast Kant and Hegel on reason. While both emphasize the close connection between reason and its ends, motivations and needs, and denounce a futile understanding of reason as a formal, instrumental, or simply logical reasoning, they diverge on how to interpret rea-son's restlessness, teleology and life. After a section illustrating some uncritical assumptions widespread among readings of Kant, I move to a treatment of their respective views on reason's self-realization (the relation between thought and the I, concepts and intuitions, faith and history), and conclude by showing the main differences in their respective understandings of method, dialectic, limit and ideas.
Uploads
journal papers by Alfredo Ferrarin
constitutes itself. In both, a latent, functioning subjectivity which forms an unconscious
ground is to be kept distinct from the several activities of a wakeful and self-conscious mind. I wish to compare and contrast Hegel and Husserl on this theme. The primary texts for my examination will be Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopaedia, and Husserl’s Ideas I, Ideas II, Cartesian Meditations and
Experience and Judgment.
briefly talk about the ostracism that intuition has suffered in many areas of modern philosophy, in the first part (sections 2-4) I work toward a closer definition of
it. I isolate at least three different meanings of the term relevant for our discussion. In the second part (§ 5) I give an historical reconstruction to show how we pass from a noetic (especially in Plato and Aristotle) to a sensible (esp. in Kant) understanding of intuition. My thesis is simple enough: intuition is not the other
of thinking (rationality, philosophy, concepts) but its indispensable complement.
constitutes itself. In both, a latent, functioning subjectivity which forms an unconscious
ground is to be kept distinct from the several activities of a wakeful and self-conscious mind. I wish to compare and contrast Hegel and Husserl on this theme. The primary texts for my examination will be Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopaedia, and Husserl’s Ideas I, Ideas II, Cartesian Meditations and
Experience and Judgment.
briefly talk about the ostracism that intuition has suffered in many areas of modern philosophy, in the first part (sections 2-4) I work toward a closer definition of
it. I isolate at least three different meanings of the term relevant for our discussion. In the second part (§ 5) I give an historical reconstruction to show how we pass from a noetic (especially in Plato and Aristotle) to a sensible (esp. in Kant) understanding of intuition. My thesis is simple enough: intuition is not the other
of thinking (rationality, philosophy, concepts) but its indispensable complement.
I temi di questo volume sono la scoperta dell’immaginazione in Aristotele, il concetto magmatico di essere come «aver da essere» in Merleau-Ponty, la creazione nel mondo sociale e storico, l’immaginario istituente politico greco e moderno, l’immaginario in Freud. Insieme ci restituiscono il concetto di immaginario sociale come è stato introdotto in filosofia da Castoriadis.
But exactly what is his presumed overcoming of an egological perspective? In
this paper I would like to show the role of recognition in intersubjectivity in Hegel’s
philosophy. My thesis is twofold: first, intersubjectivity, self-consciousness and recognition
are quite distinct notions; second, self-consciousness is not the result of recognition,
so that all attempts at grounding a universal self-consciousness on the Chapter
on the struggle between lord and bondsman in the Phenomenology of Spirit cannot
make good on their promise.