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Titus Stahl

University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty Member

Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Philosophy, Alumnus

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I am Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen Netherlands. I received my PhD from Macquarie (Sydney, Australia) and Frankfurt (Germany) where I also held a position as a research associate and Assistant Professor from 2006-2014.

My main interests lie in social and political philosophy. I work on theories of privacy, critical theory, theories of justice, theories of power, social ontology and German Idealism. Other topics I am interested in are theories of normativity, metaethics and practical philosophy more generally.
Supervisors: Axel Honneth and Nicholas Smith

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Books by Titus Stahl

Immanent Critique

When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such ... more When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally, continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social change, rather than merely conservatively reproducing them. Titus Stahl defends the claim that such a critique is not only possible, but also has politically powerful potential. Taking up recent developments in analytic enquiry into collective intentionality theory and in the philosophy of language, he argues that all social practices rest on structures of mutual recognition between persons that allow social theorists to reconstruct hidden norms present within these practices. Starting from a comprehensive critique of contemporary critical theory, Immanent Critique also spells out the consequences of this line of thought for the practice of social critique, for the social sciences and for political philosophy.

Recognition and Ambivalence: Judith Butler, Axel Honneth, and Beyond

by Heikki Ikäheimo and Titus Stahl

"This fascinating encounter between Judith Butler and Axel Honneth—accompanied by a terrific coll... more "This fascinating encounter between Judith Butler and Axel Honneth—accompanied by a terrific collection of critical essays—advances the theoretical conversation about the political valence of recognition, casts a clarifying eye on its past, and shows how much patient labor is required to achieve understanding across differences in philosophical approach and political perspective. Indispensable!"
Patchen Markell, Cornell University

"This book brings together a diverse array of scintillating essays from some of the most important proponents and critics of recognition theory today. One pervasive theme is the ambiguity of recognition—its dangers as well as its indispensability to human life. In this respect Recognition and Ambivalence implicitly makes Rousseau rather than Hegel into the true founder of recognition theory, while at the same time developing it in ways that illuminate such contemporary phenomena as racism, gender inequality, postcolonial domination, reification, and emancipatory social movements."
Frederick Neuhouser, author of Rousseau's Critique of Inequality: Reconstructing the Second Discourse

"Recognition and Ambivalence explores key issues regarding the merits and problems of considering the concept of recognition as a primary driver of critical social theory. By encouraging the contributors to think through the potential ambivalences, and negative impact, of such a focus, the editors have provided a uniquely valuable volume that facilitates a nuanced and qualified defense of critical recognition theory by taking us beyond the current debates that have engaged supporters and detractors."
Shane O'Neill, coauthor of Recognition Theory as Social Research: Investigating the Dynamics of Social Conflict

Edited by Heikki Ikäheimo, Kristina Lepold and Titus Stahl.

Immanente Kritik. Elemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken

This book discusses the concept of immanent critique, i. e. whether there is a form of critique w... more This book discusses the concept of immanent critique, i. e. whether there is a form of critique which neither just applies empirically accepted standards nor independently justified norms but rather reconstructs norms which are immanent to social practices.

It surveys both political theories of criticism (Walzer, Taylor, MacIntyre) and contemporary critical theories (Habermas, Honneth) for how they describe such forms of critique and develops a new model of immanent critique. For this purpose, it takes up both contemporary social ontology theories and the discussion about rule-following. The book argues that we can speak of immanent rules as far as persons can practically recognize each other as members of rule-governed practices if they attribute each other defeasible normative authority.

Finally, it describes the consequences of the adoption of such a model for our description of a practice of critique and analyzes both first-order immanent critique and the second-order critique of reification.

Einführung in die Metaethik

Die Ethik behandelt die Frage, was wir tun sollen. Die Meta-Ethik geht einen Schritt weiter: Was ... more Die Ethik behandelt die Frage, was wir tun sollen. Die Meta-Ethik geht einen Schritt weiter: Was tun wir, wenn wir sagen, wir sollten etwas tun? Diese Einführung beleuchtet das, was Ethik eigentlich ausmacht.

Inhalt u.a.: Zwei Grundpositionen: Kognitivismus und Nonkognitivismus; Zwei Grundpositionen: Internalismus und Externalismus; Die Anfänge der Metaethik; Der gegenwärtige Nonkognitivismus; Moralischer Realismus; Moralischer Konstruktivismus; Nicht-Naturwissenschaftlicher Realismus.

J. M. Romero (ed.): Immanente Kritik heute (2014): Libro completo

by José Manuel Romero Cuevas, Jordi Maiso, José-Antonio Zamora Zaragoza, Titus Stahl, and Benno Herzog

Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, Sep 2014

Papers by Titus Stahl

Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account

Analyse & Kritik, 2024

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to resp... more In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to respect social norms can be explained without invoking the concept of 'joint commitment.' Her resulting account is, in one important sense, individualistic, and therefore struggles to account for widely held intuitions about the normative significance of social norms. I argue that we can rescue the notion of joint commitment from Valentini's objections, and incorporate it into a version of her account that preserves its insights.

Ideological Hope

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fcri20 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2024

The hope for a better future can, and frequently does, motivate political action. Political hope ... more The hope for a better future can, and frequently does, motivate political action. Political hope is therefore often considered a positive force. However, not all forms of political hope are beneficial. Some scholars and activists claim that some kinds of hope also function as an ideology. I argue that we can give a precise meaning to the notion of ‘ideological hope,’ and I argue that to say of a given instance of hope that it is ‘ideological’ means more than that it is irrational or immoral. I distinguish two forms of ideological hope: forms where the ideological nature of hope derives from underlying ideological beliefs and judgments, and structural forms. The case of structurally ideological hope shows that even the rational hopes of political agents can undermine their purposes by binding them to distorted political self-understandings.

Oppressive Forms of Life

Critical Horizons, 2024

Rahel Jaeggi argues that forms of life ought to be the main reference point for a critical theory... more Rahel Jaeggi argues that forms of life ought to be the main reference point for a critical theory of society because the internal normative structure of life forms allows for immanent critique. In this article, I extend her model by systematically considering the possibility of oppressive forms of life. Oppressive forms of life are clusters of practices in which subordinated groups are systematically excluded or disabled from participating in the social processes of interpretation through which the values and purposes of those very practices are determined. The possibility of oppressive forms of life poses a challenge to the method of immanent critique because it seems that any such critique must rely on immanent norms that are at least partly constituted by interpretations and that can therefore be distorted by oppression. I argue that Jaeggi’s model of immanent critique can be extended to respond to that challenge, either by recovering a constitutive form of freedom within all forms of life or by consciously adopting a partisan stance in favour of oppressed and marginalised self-understandings.

Data Autonomy and Academic Freedom

Data Autonomy Blog, University of Groningen, 2024

The increasing dependence of universities on Big Tech platforms not only raises issues of privacy... more The increasing dependence of universities on Big Tech platforms not only raises issues of privacy and cost. It also affects academic freedom. This value requires academic communities to remain in control of the shape of their own communicative infrastructure. If they are committed to academic freedom, universities cannot cede this control to Big Tech.

Beyond the Non-Ideal: Why Critical Theory Needs a Utopian Dimension

Journal of Social Philosophy

Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conc... more Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conception of what our most important political values require by reference to an imagined ideal state of affairs and that we must therefore, to some extent, engage in utopian thinking. Critical theorists, from Marx and the Frankfurt School, have traditionally been highly skeptical towards using idealizations in this way. This skepticism is mirrored by contemporary authors, such as Charles Mills. I argue that most of their critical arguments make a principled case only against ahistorical, decontextualized projects of utopian idealization, but not against ideal theorizing as such. Critical theories do not need to reject ideal theorizing. On the contrary: The method of immanent critique that is specific to critical theory allows for a conception of an ideal state of affairs that emerges from its diagnosis of social contradictions. I conclude that critical theories can (and should) incorporate some aspects of ideal theorizing and its utopian reference to a better society. Please note: Academia.edu is a commercial service that exploits the free labor of academics to extract data and generate profits. It charges academics to access each other's work, effectively enclosing the intellectual commons. We should not agree to a private party exercising dominance over our intellectual conversation. This article is also available under a Creative Commons Open-Access license at the publisher website, free of charge and without requiring registration:

Social Structure and Epistemic Privilege. Reconstructing Lukács’s Standpoint Theory

Análisis, 2023

Lukács is widely recognized as being the first critical theorist to have explicitly developed... more Lukács is widely recognized as being the first critical theorist to have explicitly developed the idea of a “standpoint theory”. According to such a theory, members of oppressed groups enjoy an epistemic privilege regarding the nature of their oppression. However, there is no agreement regarding what precise argument Lukács offers for his claims regarding the alleged epistemic privilege of the working class. Additionally, it remains unclear whether later feminist standpoint theories share any continuity with Lukács’s argument. In this analysis, I identify four arguments for the epistemic privilege of oppressed groups that could be attributed to Lukács. I argue that, although Lukács does not consistently endorse any specific argument, the most promising interpretation suggests that epistemic privilege arises from a contradiction between the norms that guide the self-understanding of such groups and the effects of the social practices they are socially obligated to engage in.

Beyond the Non-Ideal: Why Critical Theory Needs a Utopian Dimension

Journal of Social Philosophy, 2023

"Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a con... more "Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conception of what our most important political values require by reference to an imagined ideal state of affairs and that we must therefore, to some extent, engage in utopian thinking. Critical theorists, from Marx and the Frankfurt School, have traditionally been highly skeptical towards using idealizations in this way. This skepticism is mirrored by contemporary authors, such as Charles Mills. I argue that most of their critical arguments make a principled case only against ahistorical, decontextualized projects of utopian idealization, but not against ideal theorizing as such. Critical theories do not need to reject ideal theorizing. On the contrary: The method of immanent critique that is specific to critical theory allows for a conception of an ideal state of affairs that emerges from its diagnosis of social contradictions. I conclude that critical theories can (and should) incorporate some aspects of ideal theorizing and its utopian reference to a better society.

Intellectual Bad Conscience and Solidarity with the Underdogs

Krisis | Journal for Contemporary Philosophy, 2021

Titus Stahl, Georg [György] Lukács (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013)

Verbete sobre a filosofia de Georg [György] Lukács.

Privacy in Public: A Democratic Defense

Moral Philosophy and Politics, 2020

Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as... more Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of intentionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination.

Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity

Philosophical Papers, 2017

This article considers the question 'What makes hope rational?' We take Adrienne Martin's recent ... more This article considers the question 'What makes hope rational?' We take Adrienne Martin's recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, 'fundamental hope', is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, 'prosaic' hopes.

Collective Responsibility for Oppression

Social Theory and Practice, 2017

Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collecti... more Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups.

The Metaethics of Critical Theories

The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory, 2017

Verdinglichung als Pathologie zweiter Ordnung

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2011

Der Begriff der "Verdinglichimg" ist kein Begriff, der aus unserer Alltagssprache stammt und dess... more Der Begriff der "Verdinglichimg" ist kein Begriff, der aus unserer Alltagssprache stammt und dessen Bedeutung daher unmittelbar evident wäre. Er hat seinen Ursprung vielmehr in der Tradition kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie. Auf Grund des Pluralismus dieser Tradition lässt sich seine Bedeutung aber auch nicht durch einen Rückgriff auf eine von allen relevanten Theorien geteilte Definition klären. Deshalb muss vor der Diskussion der Vor-und Nachteile einzelner Verdinglichungstheorien die Frage gestellt werden, ob es überhaupt eine Kernbedeutung dieses Begriffs gibt, die den gemeinsamen Bezugspunkt aller Formen der Verdinglichungskritik darstellt. Im weitesten Sinne soll "Verdinglichung" zunächst heißen, dass etwas entweder zum Ding wird oder fälschlicherweise als Ding wahrgenommen oder behandelt wird, das "eigentlich" kein Ding ist. Wie sich schnell zeigt, verbergen sich jedoch in verschiedenen Anwendungsbereichen hinter dieser vagen Beschreibung höchst unterschiedliche Intuitionen. Es ist daher sinnvoll, einleitend vier Sphären zu unterscheiden, in denen dieser Begriff im Rahmen der Verdinglichungskritik Anwendung findet. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Dingen und Nicht-Dingen kennt Verwendungsweisen, die primär auf einen normativen oder sogar moralischen Unterschied abzielen. 1 Dazu gehört erstens die Unterscheidung zwischen Dingen und Personen oder Subjekten. Wie die berühmten Formulierungen von Kant nahe legen 2 , stellt eine bestimmte Behandlung von Personen einen moralischen Kategorienfehler dar, während die gleiche Behandlung im Fall von Dingen unproblematisch ist. Zu den "Dingen" muss daher nach solch einer normativ motivierten Unterscheidung all jenes zählen, das instrumentalisiert, verkauft, benutzt und zerstört werden darf 3 , während es verdinglichend ist, Personen so zu behandeln. "Verdinglichung" heißt in dieser Bedeutung folglich, Personen so zu behandeln, als hätten sie den moralischen Status bloßer Dinge. Damit verwandt ist ein zweiter Anwendungsbereich des Verdinglichungsbegriffs. Wenn von der Verdinglichung der eigenen Person gesprochen wird, ist gemeint, dass Personen ihre eigenen Fähigkeiten, Emotionen oder Werthaltungen als unverrückbar vorgegeben oder als 1

What (if anything) is ideological about ideal theory?

European Journal of Political Theory, 2022

It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This a... more It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse.

Immanent Critique

When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such ... more When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally, continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social change, rather than merely conservatively reproducing them. Titus Stahl defends the claim that such a critique is not only possible, but also has politically powerful potential. Taking up recent developments in analytic enquiry into collective intentionality theory and in the philosophy of language, he argues that all social practices rest on structures of mutual recognition between persons that allow social theorists to reconstruct hidden norms present within these practices. Starting from a comprehensive critique of contemporary critical theory, Immanent Critique also spells out the consequences of this line of thought for the practice of social critique, for the social sciences and for political philosophy.

Recognition and Ambivalence: Judith Butler, Axel Honneth, and Beyond

by Heikki Ikäheimo and Titus Stahl

"This fascinating encounter between Judith Butler and Axel Honneth—accompanied by a terrific coll... more "This fascinating encounter between Judith Butler and Axel Honneth—accompanied by a terrific collection of critical essays—advances the theoretical conversation about the political valence of recognition, casts a clarifying eye on its past, and shows how much patient labor is required to achieve understanding across differences in philosophical approach and political perspective. Indispensable!"
Patchen Markell, Cornell University

"This book brings together a diverse array of scintillating essays from some of the most important proponents and critics of recognition theory today. One pervasive theme is the ambiguity of recognition—its dangers as well as its indispensability to human life. In this respect Recognition and Ambivalence implicitly makes Rousseau rather than Hegel into the true founder of recognition theory, while at the same time developing it in ways that illuminate such contemporary phenomena as racism, gender inequality, postcolonial domination, reification, and emancipatory social movements."
Frederick Neuhouser, author of Rousseau's Critique of Inequality: Reconstructing the Second Discourse

"Recognition and Ambivalence explores key issues regarding the merits and problems of considering the concept of recognition as a primary driver of critical social theory. By encouraging the contributors to think through the potential ambivalences, and negative impact, of such a focus, the editors have provided a uniquely valuable volume that facilitates a nuanced and qualified defense of critical recognition theory by taking us beyond the current debates that have engaged supporters and detractors."
Shane O'Neill, coauthor of Recognition Theory as Social Research: Investigating the Dynamics of Social Conflict

Edited by Heikki Ikäheimo, Kristina Lepold and Titus Stahl.

Immanente Kritik. Elemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken

This book discusses the concept of immanent critique, i. e. whether there is a form of critique w... more This book discusses the concept of immanent critique, i. e. whether there is a form of critique which neither just applies empirically accepted standards nor independently justified norms but rather reconstructs norms which are immanent to social practices.

It surveys both political theories of criticism (Walzer, Taylor, MacIntyre) and contemporary critical theories (Habermas, Honneth) for how they describe such forms of critique and develops a new model of immanent critique. For this purpose, it takes up both contemporary social ontology theories and the discussion about rule-following. The book argues that we can speak of immanent rules as far as persons can practically recognize each other as members of rule-governed practices if they attribute each other defeasible normative authority.

Finally, it describes the consequences of the adoption of such a model for our description of a practice of critique and analyzes both first-order immanent critique and the second-order critique of reification.

Einführung in die Metaethik

Die Ethik behandelt die Frage, was wir tun sollen. Die Meta-Ethik geht einen Schritt weiter: Was ... more Die Ethik behandelt die Frage, was wir tun sollen. Die Meta-Ethik geht einen Schritt weiter: Was tun wir, wenn wir sagen, wir sollten etwas tun? Diese Einführung beleuchtet das, was Ethik eigentlich ausmacht.

Inhalt u.a.: Zwei Grundpositionen: Kognitivismus und Nonkognitivismus; Zwei Grundpositionen: Internalismus und Externalismus; Die Anfänge der Metaethik; Der gegenwärtige Nonkognitivismus; Moralischer Realismus; Moralischer Konstruktivismus; Nicht-Naturwissenschaftlicher Realismus.

J. M. Romero (ed.): Immanente Kritik heute (2014): Libro completo

by José Manuel Romero Cuevas, Jordi Maiso, José-Antonio Zamora Zaragoza, Titus Stahl, and Benno Herzog

Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, Sep 2014

Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account

Analyse & Kritik, 2024

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to resp... more In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to respect social norms can be explained without invoking the concept of 'joint commitment.' Her resulting account is, in one important sense, individualistic, and therefore struggles to account for widely held intuitions about the normative significance of social norms. I argue that we can rescue the notion of joint commitment from Valentini's objections, and incorporate it into a version of her account that preserves its insights.

Ideological Hope

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fcri20 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2024

The hope for a better future can, and frequently does, motivate political action. Political hope ... more The hope for a better future can, and frequently does, motivate political action. Political hope is therefore often considered a positive force. However, not all forms of political hope are beneficial. Some scholars and activists claim that some kinds of hope also function as an ideology. I argue that we can give a precise meaning to the notion of ‘ideological hope,’ and I argue that to say of a given instance of hope that it is ‘ideological’ means more than that it is irrational or immoral. I distinguish two forms of ideological hope: forms where the ideological nature of hope derives from underlying ideological beliefs and judgments, and structural forms. The case of structurally ideological hope shows that even the rational hopes of political agents can undermine their purposes by binding them to distorted political self-understandings.

Oppressive Forms of Life

Critical Horizons, 2024

Rahel Jaeggi argues that forms of life ought to be the main reference point for a critical theory... more Rahel Jaeggi argues that forms of life ought to be the main reference point for a critical theory of society because the internal normative structure of life forms allows for immanent critique. In this article, I extend her model by systematically considering the possibility of oppressive forms of life. Oppressive forms of life are clusters of practices in which subordinated groups are systematically excluded or disabled from participating in the social processes of interpretation through which the values and purposes of those very practices are determined. The possibility of oppressive forms of life poses a challenge to the method of immanent critique because it seems that any such critique must rely on immanent norms that are at least partly constituted by interpretations and that can therefore be distorted by oppression. I argue that Jaeggi’s model of immanent critique can be extended to respond to that challenge, either by recovering a constitutive form of freedom within all forms of life or by consciously adopting a partisan stance in favour of oppressed and marginalised self-understandings.

Data Autonomy and Academic Freedom

Data Autonomy Blog, University of Groningen, 2024

The increasing dependence of universities on Big Tech platforms not only raises issues of privacy... more The increasing dependence of universities on Big Tech platforms not only raises issues of privacy and cost. It also affects academic freedom. This value requires academic communities to remain in control of the shape of their own communicative infrastructure. If they are committed to academic freedom, universities cannot cede this control to Big Tech.

Beyond the Non-Ideal: Why Critical Theory Needs a Utopian Dimension

Journal of Social Philosophy

Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conc... more Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conception of what our most important political values require by reference to an imagined ideal state of affairs and that we must therefore, to some extent, engage in utopian thinking. Critical theorists, from Marx and the Frankfurt School, have traditionally been highly skeptical towards using idealizations in this way. This skepticism is mirrored by contemporary authors, such as Charles Mills. I argue that most of their critical arguments make a principled case only against ahistorical, decontextualized projects of utopian idealization, but not against ideal theorizing as such. Critical theories do not need to reject ideal theorizing. On the contrary: The method of immanent critique that is specific to critical theory allows for a conception of an ideal state of affairs that emerges from its diagnosis of social contradictions. I conclude that critical theories can (and should) incorporate some aspects of ideal theorizing and its utopian reference to a better society. Please note: Academia.edu is a commercial service that exploits the free labor of academics to extract data and generate profits. It charges academics to access each other's work, effectively enclosing the intellectual commons. We should not agree to a private party exercising dominance over our intellectual conversation. This article is also available under a Creative Commons Open-Access license at the publisher website, free of charge and without requiring registration:

Social Structure and Epistemic Privilege. Reconstructing Lukács’s Standpoint Theory

Análisis, 2023

Lukács is widely recognized as being the first critical theorist to have explicitly developed... more Lukács is widely recognized as being the first critical theorist to have explicitly developed the idea of a “standpoint theory”. According to such a theory, members of oppressed groups enjoy an epistemic privilege regarding the nature of their oppression. However, there is no agreement regarding what precise argument Lukács offers for his claims regarding the alleged epistemic privilege of the working class. Additionally, it remains unclear whether later feminist standpoint theories share any continuity with Lukács’s argument. In this analysis, I identify four arguments for the epistemic privilege of oppressed groups that could be attributed to Lukács. I argue that, although Lukács does not consistently endorse any specific argument, the most promising interpretation suggests that epistemic privilege arises from a contradiction between the norms that guide the self-understanding of such groups and the effects of the social practices they are socially obligated to engage in.

Beyond the Non-Ideal: Why Critical Theory Needs a Utopian Dimension

Journal of Social Philosophy, 2023

"Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a con... more "Ideal theorists" in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conception of what our most important political values require by reference to an imagined ideal state of affairs and that we must therefore, to some extent, engage in utopian thinking. Critical theorists, from Marx and the Frankfurt School, have traditionally been highly skeptical towards using idealizations in this way. This skepticism is mirrored by contemporary authors, such as Charles Mills. I argue that most of their critical arguments make a principled case only against ahistorical, decontextualized projects of utopian idealization, but not against ideal theorizing as such. Critical theories do not need to reject ideal theorizing. On the contrary: The method of immanent critique that is specific to critical theory allows for a conception of an ideal state of affairs that emerges from its diagnosis of social contradictions. I conclude that critical theories can (and should) incorporate some aspects of ideal theorizing and its utopian reference to a better society.

Intellectual Bad Conscience and Solidarity with the Underdogs

Krisis | Journal for Contemporary Philosophy, 2021

Titus Stahl, Georg [György] Lukács (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013)

Verbete sobre a filosofia de Georg [György] Lukács.

Privacy in Public: A Democratic Defense

Moral Philosophy and Politics, 2020

Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as... more Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of intentionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination.

Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity

Philosophical Papers, 2017

This article considers the question 'What makes hope rational?' We take Adrienne Martin's recent ... more This article considers the question 'What makes hope rational?' We take Adrienne Martin's recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, 'fundamental hope', is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, 'prosaic' hopes.

Collective Responsibility for Oppression

Social Theory and Practice, 2017

Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collecti... more Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups.

The Metaethics of Critical Theories

The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory, 2017

Verdinglichung als Pathologie zweiter Ordnung

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2011

Der Begriff der "Verdinglichimg" ist kein Begriff, der aus unserer Alltagssprache stammt und dess... more Der Begriff der "Verdinglichimg" ist kein Begriff, der aus unserer Alltagssprache stammt und dessen Bedeutung daher unmittelbar evident wäre. Er hat seinen Ursprung vielmehr in der Tradition kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie. Auf Grund des Pluralismus dieser Tradition lässt sich seine Bedeutung aber auch nicht durch einen Rückgriff auf eine von allen relevanten Theorien geteilte Definition klären. Deshalb muss vor der Diskussion der Vor-und Nachteile einzelner Verdinglichungstheorien die Frage gestellt werden, ob es überhaupt eine Kernbedeutung dieses Begriffs gibt, die den gemeinsamen Bezugspunkt aller Formen der Verdinglichungskritik darstellt. Im weitesten Sinne soll "Verdinglichung" zunächst heißen, dass etwas entweder zum Ding wird oder fälschlicherweise als Ding wahrgenommen oder behandelt wird, das "eigentlich" kein Ding ist. Wie sich schnell zeigt, verbergen sich jedoch in verschiedenen Anwendungsbereichen hinter dieser vagen Beschreibung höchst unterschiedliche Intuitionen. Es ist daher sinnvoll, einleitend vier Sphären zu unterscheiden, in denen dieser Begriff im Rahmen der Verdinglichungskritik Anwendung findet. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Dingen und Nicht-Dingen kennt Verwendungsweisen, die primär auf einen normativen oder sogar moralischen Unterschied abzielen. 1 Dazu gehört erstens die Unterscheidung zwischen Dingen und Personen oder Subjekten. Wie die berühmten Formulierungen von Kant nahe legen 2 , stellt eine bestimmte Behandlung von Personen einen moralischen Kategorienfehler dar, während die gleiche Behandlung im Fall von Dingen unproblematisch ist. Zu den "Dingen" muss daher nach solch einer normativ motivierten Unterscheidung all jenes zählen, das instrumentalisiert, verkauft, benutzt und zerstört werden darf 3 , während es verdinglichend ist, Personen so zu behandeln. "Verdinglichung" heißt in dieser Bedeutung folglich, Personen so zu behandeln, als hätten sie den moralischen Status bloßer Dinge. Damit verwandt ist ein zweiter Anwendungsbereich des Verdinglichungsbegriffs. Wenn von der Verdinglichung der eigenen Person gesprochen wird, ist gemeint, dass Personen ihre eigenen Fähigkeiten, Emotionen oder Werthaltungen als unverrückbar vorgegeben oder als 1

What (if anything) is ideological about ideal theory?

European Journal of Political Theory, 2022

It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This a... more It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse.

Lukács and the Frankfurt School

The work of the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs is a constant source of controversy in the history... more The work of the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs is a constant source of controversy in the history of the Frankfurt School. All leading thinkers of that theoretical tradition have struggled with Lukacs’s theory. On the one hand, it was an inspiration for their attempts to come to terms with the oppressive features of capitalist modernity. On the other hand, both its political conclusions and Lukacs’s actual philosophical submission to Soviet orthodoxy seemed to show that his theoretical framework was deeply flawed in one aspect or another.

Criticizing Social Reality from Within: Haslanger on Race, Gender, and Ideology

Krisis, 2014

Political Hope and Cooperative Community

This chapter pursues three aims: First, I propose three different roles that hope can play in pol... more This chapter pursues three aims: First, I propose three different roles that hope can play in political philosophy—one instrumental, one constitutive, and the other justificatory. I then examine three major approaches to political hope, exemplified by Bloch, Rorty, and contemporary liberal authors in order to distinguish three approaches to the justificatory question. I argue that they make opposite mistakes with regard to the importance of hope. Whereas Bloch solves the problem of justification by introducing a metaphysics to support hope, thereby adopting an overambitious concept of hope, Rorty and contemporary liberals assign it too small a role. Based on this discussion, I then argue for my own proposal; the view that, while ethical pluralism rules out any expectation that we can achieve more ambitious forms of community than political liberalism seems to allow, the requirements of justice may still require us to hope for the emergence of such forms of community.

Jenseits der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit: Anerkennung und sozialer Fortschritt

Eine gerechte Verteilung von Gütern reicht nicht aus, um eine Gesellschaft gerecht zu machen. Ger... more

John Searle (1932– )

The Cambridge Habermas Lexicon, 2019

Recognition, Ideology, and Critique

Non-Domination, Institutional Power, and Social Freedom

Beyond Plans and Practices: Law as Collective Intentional Institution of Authority

Legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, assume that the existence of legal norms is a matter of s... more Legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, assume that the existence of legal norms is a matter of social facts. Legal facts, in other words, have an exclusively social ontology. However, classical positivist accounts assume that the relevant social fact is a practice that is defined by only individual attitudes towards the law. They are therefore unable to explain how such a practice can give agents a reason to orient their behaviour towards the law. In order to solve this problem, recent positivist accounts have turned to theories of collective intentionality to explain the nature of legal practice. Using Scott Shapiro's “planning theory of law” as an example, I will argue that such attempts must fail as long as they understand collective intentionality to be established by a structure of interlocking participatory intentions. Using arguments from Margaret Gilbert, it can be shown that legal practices involve a stronger form of joint commitment. However, in order to not require an implausibly strong agreement of legal participants about the grounds of law, Gilbert's account must be modified to successfully describe existing legal practices. I will argue that a model that conceives of joint commitments as defeasible, context-dependent descriptions of authority is best suited as a foundation for a model of legal positivism.

Second Nature and Reflection. Towards a Negative Naturalism.

Ideologiekritik als Kritik sozialer Praktiken. EIne expressivistische Rekonstruktion der Kritik falschen Bewusstseins

Collective Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance

Reification as a second-order disorder of social practices

Sharing the Background

Presentation on the Inaugural Meeting of the European Network of Social Ontology in Constance, Ge... more Presentation on the Inaugural Meeting of the European Network of Social Ontology in Constance, Germany, October 2009.

Abstract:
Searle introduces the notion of the background in order to be able to provide an explanation of the human capacity to follow institutional rules without getting into Wittgenstein's regress problem. But this solution can only capture the causal aspects of rule-following neglecting the constitutive question of contextual conditions. With Wittgenstein and Heidegger, I argue, that the integration of the subject in a network of social attitudes and practices is constitutive of rule-following capacities, and against them, that it can be analysed explicitly as a network of interlocking attitudes of recognition.

Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance, and Recognition

The social ontological foundations of immanent critique

Syllabus "Critical Theory" (2015)

3rd-year BA course taught in 2015 at the University of Groningen

Syllabus "Power, Oppression, and Justice" (2015)

MA level course taught in Spring 2015 at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Netherlands

Social and Political Philosophy (Semester Ib, 2014/2015)

A syllabus for an introduction into social and political philosophy for students with a minor in ... more

Social and Political Philosophy (Semester Ia, 2014/15)

A Syllabus of an Introduction to Political Philosophy for Honours Students

Individualismus und Kollektivismus als Problem der Sozialphilosophie (Individualism and Collectivism as a Problem of Social Philosophy)

Normativität (Normativity)

Introduction to Metaethics

The Philosophy of Charles Taylor

Introduction to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Schelling: Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit

Summer School Critical Theory, Groningen, 2021

by Titus Stahl and Timo Jütten

Call for Applications Summer School: Critical Theory 11 – 17 July 2021, Deadline for Applicatio... more Call for Applications
Summer School: Critical Theory
11 – 17 July 2021, Deadline for Applications: 30 April 2021
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen in cooperation with the Groningen School of Critical Theory
With: Kristina Lepold (Berlin), Karen Ng, (Vanderbilt), Timo Jütten, (Essex), Lars Rensmann (Groningen ) and Titus Stahl, (Groningen )
Contact: [email protected]
More information: https://www.rug.nl/education/summer-winter-schools/critical-theory/
Note: Due to the ongoing effects of the global COVID-19 pandemic, it is not yet clear whether the summer school can be taught on location in Groningen or whether it will be conducted in an online format. Naturally, the summer school will only be taught on-campus if this is deemed safe by the Dutch public health authorities and if the vast majority of participants will be able to travel to Groningen for that purpose. When registering, you will be able to indicate whether an on-campus and/or an online option is acceptable for you. We will communicate a final decision about the format of the summer school before offering places to applicants. Please also register if you are only interested participating only or in-person, respectively.

In the case that the summer school will be conducted online, we plan to have a highly interactive format that includes one-on-one tutorials with the lecturers that integrate the personal research interests and research projects or participants, small-scale group tutorials and projects, and a variety of interactive formats in which to engage with the material and the lectures, as well as social features that allow for informal interaction.

Critical theory, in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, aims to develop a philosophical understanding and evaluation of social conflicts in contemporary societies. It engages not only with classic philosophy but also with the social sciences, psychoanalysis and aesthetics. From its start almost a century ago, it has supplied deep insights into the links between knowledge, culture and economy, as well as a distinctive philosophical method. In this summer school we will examine classic questions and contemporary debates in critical theory and their relevance for understanding crisis in present-day societies.
The summer school will feature lectures by distinguished researchers in contemporary critical theory, discussing their ongoing research projects, and roundtable workshops on selected classic texts as well as discussions of student papers. You will get acquainted with the social- philosophical methodology of critical theory and its approaches to politics and culture, specifically its contributions to the study of political and social crisis, power, ideology, mass culture, and aesthetics. Our discussions aim at inspiring new insights with societal relevance. Critical theory’s interdisciplinary engagement with philosophy will allow you to develop new perspectives for your own research.

Review: Mattias Iser, Empörung und Fortschritt: Grundlagen einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Campus, 2008), Critical Horizons

Critical Horizons, Jan 1, 2010

Review of Paul Redding: Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought

It has become a commonplace observation that recent developments in analytic philosophy amount to... more

<i>Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought</i> (review)

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2008

Paul Redding, <i>Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought</i>

Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory, 2008

Strecker, David. Logik der Macht. Zum Ort der Kritik zwischen Theorie und Praxis

Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2013

Review of Paul Redding: Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought

Schwerpunkt: Verdinglichung

by Rahel Jaeggi and Titus Stahl

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Nov 1, 2011

Der Begriff der Verdinglichung führt eine merkwürdige Doppelexistenz: Einerseits scheint er zu de... more Der Begriff der Verdinglichung führt eine merkwürdige Doppelexistenz: Einerseits scheint er zu denjenigen Begriffen zu gehören, mit denen man sich alltagssprachlich über soziale Missstände und individuelle Befindlichkeiten verständigt. In dieser Hinsicht ist er - trotz eines gewissen konjunkturellen Bedeutungsverlusts - in das kollektive Deutungsrepertoire unserer Gesellschaften eingegangen. Er steht für ein diffuses Unbehagen an Prozessen der Instrumentalisierung und Versachlichung, der Kommerzialisierung, des übermäßigen Anwachsens einer rein technischen Verfügungsgewalt und des objektivierenden Zugriffs auf die menschliche und nicht-menschliche Natur. Wenig Probleme bereitet es auch, das Unbehagen an der objektivierenden Festschreibung und der Naturalisierung sozialer Rollen und Identitäten in den Begriff der Verdinglichung zu übersetzen. Von großer (wenn auch nicht ungebrochener) suggestiver Kraft - oder auch nur: mangels Alternativen -, mag er so angesichts der unbestreitbaren Bedeutung solcher Phänomene als zeitdiagnostischer Begriff eine Zukunft haben, die von seiner theoretischen Herkunft ganz unabhängig ist.