Results for 'self-representation'

964 found
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  1. Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the (...)
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  2. Selfhood as Self Representation.Kenneth Taylor - manuscript
    This essay In this essay develops and defends the view that a “self “ is nothing but a creature that bears the property of selfhood, where bearing selfhood is, in turn, nothing but having the capacity to deploy self-representations. Self-representations, it is argued, are very special things. They are distinguished from other sorts of representations,not by what they represent – mysterious inner entities called selves, say -- but by how they represent what they represent. A self- (...) represents nothing but a living human animal but it does do in a special way. It follows that a "self" is not a thing that a living human animals has or contains within, but something a living human animal is. The view defended represents a principled middle ground between Cartesianism and Factionalism or Eliminativism about the self. (shrink)
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  3. Lotus and the Self-Representation of Afro-Asian Writers as the Vanguard of Modernity.Zeyad El Nabolsy - 2020 - Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 2020:1-26.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to show that the editors of Lotus: Afro-Asian Writings and some of the writers who contributed to it (especially Ismail Ezzedine, Anar Rzayev, Tawfick Zeyad, Abdel Aziz El-Ahwani, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Alex La Guma, Adonis, Salah Dehni, Luis Bernardo Honwana, Ghassan Kanafany, and Tozaburo Ono) attempted to reconceive of nationalism in a way that would make international solidarity constitutive of the new national projects. It is argued that this is quite different from thinking (...)
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  4. Self Consciousness, Representations, Anxiety Management. Past, Present and Future (ISPSM 2023 Web conference).Menant Christophe - manuscript
    We all agree that our human minds are results of primate evolution. We humans are self conscious. The separation of our human lineage from the chimpanzee one began about 7MY ago (pan homo split). Specificities of human self consciousness have been created during that time. Besides interesting approaches differing from the one proposed here [1], little is known about how these specificities came up [2, 3]. We propose here to address that subject with an evolutionary scenario using meaningful (...)
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  5. Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for (...)
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  6. Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW]Greg Janzen - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):155-159.
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  7. Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience.Chris Letheby & Philip Gerrans - 2017 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 3:1-11.
    Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which (...)
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  8. Self-Awareness: Acquaintance, Intentionality, Representation, Relation.Galen Strawson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):311-328.
    This paper endorses and expounds the widely held view that all experience involves pre-reflective self-consciousness or self-awareness. It argues that pre-reflective self-consciousness does not involve any sort of experience of ‘me-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’, and that all self-consciousness is essentially relational, essentially has the subject as intentional object, essentially involves representation, in particular self-representation, as well as ‘immediate acquaintance’, in particular immediate self-acquaintance; and cannot in one primordial respect involve a mistake on the (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Self-Recognition in Data Visualization: How Individuals See Themselves in Visual Representations.Dario Rodighiero & Loup Cellard - 2019 - Espacetemps.
    This article explores how readers recognize their personal identities represented through data visualizations. The recognition is investigated starting from three definitions captured by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur: the identification with the visualization, the recognition of someone in the visualization, and the mutual recognition that happens between readers. Whereas these notions were initially applied to study the role of the book reader, two further concepts complete the shift to data visualization: the digital identity stays for the present-day passport of human actions (...)
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  10. (1 other version)Evolution of representations and intersubjectivity as sources of the self. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (ASSC10 2006).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are (...)
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  11. Kant on Plants: Self-Activity, Representations, and the Analogy with Life.Tyke Nunez - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (11).
    Do plants represent according to Kant? This is closely connected to the question of whether he held plants are alive, because he explains life in terms of the faculty to act on one’s own representations. He also explains life as having an immaterial principle of self-motion, and as a body’s interaction with a supersensible soul. I argue that because of the way plants move themselves, Kant is committed to their being alive, to their having a supersensible ground of their (...)
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  12. Conscious perceptual experience as representational self-prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of (...)
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  13. Body, mind and order: local memory and the control of mental representations in medieval and renaissance sciences of self.John Sutton - 2000 - In Guy Freeland & Antony Corones (eds.), 1543 And All That: word and image in the proto- scientific revolution. pp. 117-150.
    This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory and personal identity. I treat theoretical models of memory in history as specimens of the way cultural norms and artifacts can permeate ('proto')scientific views of inner processes. I apply this analysis to the topic of psychological control over one's own body, brain, and mind. Some metaphors and models for memory and mental representation signal the projection inside of external aids. Overtly at least, medieval (...)
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  14. Self, belonging, and conscious experience: A critique of subjectivity theories of consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been (...)
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  15. Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal.Katherine Dormandy - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):34-49.
    What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that (...)
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  16. Representation and the figure of the observer.Vitor Silva Tschoepke - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 9 (8):722-738.
    The theoretical use of representation faces, among others, two types of inconsistencies, namely: a representation requires the figure of the agent to which it will be representative, which leads either to circularity or to infinite return; and the resulting one, which is the difficulty in reconciling a description, in representative terms, with other more fundamental scientific categories. The proposal of the present study for the solution of these problems was the identification of a referential process starting from the (...)
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  17. Self-Concernment without Self-Reference.Roberto de Sá Pereira - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):69–84.
    This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self- concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint (2007), that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans (1982), which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I (...)
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  18. Self-deception and confabulation.William Hirstein - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.
    Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues (...)
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  19. The trajectory of self.Timothy Lane, Niall W. Duncan, Tony Cheng & Georg Northoff - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7):481-482.
    In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Humphreys [1] argue that experimental findings suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-reference serves a binding function within human cognitive economy. Contrasting their view with other functionalist positions, chiefly Dennett's [2], they deny that self is a convenient fiction and adduce findings to show that a ‘core self representation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’ helping to bind distinct types of information as well as distinct stages of psycho- logical (...)
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  20. Rationalizing Self-Interpretation.Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2015 - In Chris Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 419–447.
    A characteristic form of philosophical inquiry seeks to answer ‘what is x?’ questions. In this paper, we ask how philosophers do and should adjudicate debates about the correct answer to such questions. We argue that philosophers do and should rely on a distinctive type of pragmatic and meta-representational reasoning – a form of rationalizing self-interpretation – in answering ‘what is x?’ questions. We start by placing our methodological discussion within a broader theoretical framework. We posit a necessary connection between (...)
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  21. The role of self-touch experience in the formation of the self.Matej Hoffmann - 2017 - The Development of the Self Workshop at IEEE ICDL-EpiRob 2017.
    The human self has many facets: there is the physical body and then there are different concepts or representations supported by processes in the brain such as the ecological, social, temporal, conceptual, and experiential self. The mechanisms of operation and formation of the self are, however, largely unknown. The basis is constituted by the ecological or sensorimotor self that deals with the configuration of the body in space and its action possibilities. This self is prereflective, (...)
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  22. Self-control, Attention, and How to live without Special Motivational Powers.Sebastian Watzl - 2019 - In Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi Titus (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 272-300.
    It has been argued that the explanation of self-control requires positing special motivational powers. Some think that we need will-power as an irreducible mental faculty; others that we need to think of the active self as a dedicated and depletable pool of psychic energy or – in today more respectable terminology – mental resources; finally, there is the idea that self-control requires postulating a deep division between reason and passion – a deliberative and an emotional motivational system. (...)
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  23. The Phenomenology of Self-Projection as a Value of Intersubjectivity.Claudine Coles - 2021 - Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines 9 (2):118-144.
    Central to the discourse on the intentional structure of consciousness encompasses further forms of experience, for instance, the notion of one’s direct experience of others. In essence, one’s experience of others is materialized through intersubjective engagement which is fundamental in comprehending the relation of the Self and Other. Intersubjective engagement between the two cognizing subjects is evidently interactive negotiation of understanding, thus necessarily meditational. This paper will substantiate the meditational or reflective nature of intersubjective engagement with the phenomenology of (...)
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  24. Self in Autism: A Predictive Perspective.Kelsey Perrykkad - 2021 - Dissertation, Monash University
    In this thesis, I investigated the self in autism using tools from philosophy and experimental cognitive science. Our self-representation shapes how we act in the world, and the feedback we receive in turn shapes how we represent ourselves. In the predictive processing framework I use, autism is characterised by differences in modelling or predicting the world under uncertainty which impacts both perception and action. Findings from the thesis show that individuals with more autistic traits are more prone (...)
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  25. "Scholarly Hypertext: Self-Represented Complexity".David Kolb - 1997 - In Kolb David (ed.), Hypertext '97, Association For Computing Machinery, 1997,. Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 29-37..
    Scholarly hypertexts involve argument and explicit selfquestioning, and can be distinguished from both informational and literary hypertexts. After making these distinctions the essay presents general principles about attention, some suggestions for self-representational multi-level structures that would enhance scholarly inquiry, and a wish list of software capabilities to support such structures. The essay concludes with a discussion of possible conflicts between scholarly inquiry and hypertext.
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  26. Representational Monetary Identity.Mirelo Deugh Ausgam Valis - 2011 - Lulu.
    Whenever debt is itself money, this money becomes a self-inflating debt principal by already being its own interest. Hence modern inflation, deflation, and eventual monetary crises. Yet why does money become debt? The concept of representational monetary identity answers to precisely this question.
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  27. The trans-species core SELF: the emergence of active cultural and neuro-ecological agents through self-related processing within subcortical-cortical midline networks.Jaak Panksepp & Georg Northoff - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):193–215.
    The nature of “the self” has been one of the central problems in philosophy and more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: Can we attribute a self to animals? Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a trans-species concept of self? What are the neural processes that underlie a possible trans-species concept of self? What are the developmental aspects and do they result in various levels of self-representation? Drawing (...)
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  28. The skill of self-control.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6251-6273.
    Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes (...)
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  29.  34
    Transcendental Self and the Feeling of Existence.Apaar Kumar - 2016 - Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (June 2016):90-121.
    In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant’s larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show that there exists a strand in Kant’s philosophy that permits us to interpret the representation of the transcendental self as a feeling of existence—as the obscurely (...)
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  30. Is Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Inextricably Linked to the Self?Elena Popa - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):420-425.
    Ganeri's [2018] discussion of mental time travel and the self focuses on remembering the past, but has less to say with respect to the status of future-oriented mental time travel. This paper aims to disambiguate the relation between prospection and the self from the framework of Ganeri's interpretation of three Buddhist views—by Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga. Is the scope of Ganeri's discussion confined to the past, or is there a stronger assumption that future thought always entails self- (...)? I argue that if mental time travel towards the past and towards the future are continuous, both past and future thought should be possible independently of self-representation. An assumption of discontinuity however would enable the employment of the self as one of the defining differences between remembering the past and imagining the future. The two options can be further contrasted on the basis of distinct ways of constructing past/future scenarios (field vs. observer perspective), modes of experiencing time (known vs. lived), and the origin of mental time travel (episodic vs. semantic memory). I further assess the compatibility of future-oriented thought with the three Buddhist views on the basis of these coordinates. (shrink)
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  31. Seven properties of self-organization in the human brain.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2020 - Big Data and Cognitive Computing 2 (4):10.
    The principle of self-organization has acquired a fundamental significance in the newly emerging field of computational philosophy. Self-organizing systems have been described in various domains in science and philosophy including physics, neuroscience, biology and medicine, ecology, and sociology. While system architecture and their general purpose may depend on domain-specific concepts and definitions, there are (at least) seven key properties of self-organization clearly identified in brain systems: 1) modular connectivity, 2) unsupervised learning, 3) adaptive ability, 4) functional resiliency, (...)
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  32. Beyond embodiment : from internal representation of action to symbolic processes.Isabel Barahona da Fonseca, Jose Barahona da Fonseca & Vitor Pereira - 2012 - In Liz Stillwaggon Swan (ed.), Origins of mind. New York: Springer. pp. 187-199.
    In sensorimotor integration, representation involves an anticipatory model of the action to be performed. This model integrates efferent signals (motor commands), its reafferent consequences (sensory consequences of an organism’s own motor action), and other afferences (sensory signals) originated by stimuli independent of the action performed. Representation, a form of internal modeling, is invoked to explain the fact that behavior oriented to the achievement of future goals is relatively independent from the immediate environment. Internal modeling explains how a cognitive (...)
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  33. Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
    According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of (...)
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  34. The Self-Programming System: A Skepticism-conformed Computational Framework of the Mind (3rd edition).Fangfang Li & Xiaojie Zhang - manuscript
    How the mind works is the ultimate mystery for human beings. To answer this question, one of the most significant insights is Kant’s argument that we can only perceive phenomena but not the essence of the external world. Following this idea, we formulated a novel computational framework to model the mind based on two assumptions: 1) There is no presupposition of the existence of the external objective world and the main task of the mind is to explore, establish and utilize (...)
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  35. (1 other version)Selfless Memories.Raphaël Millière & Albert Newen - 2022 - Erkenntnis (3):0-22.
    Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while (...)
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  36. Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - Erkenntnis (y).
    Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.
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  37. Visual Self-Misperception in Eating Disorders.Stephen Gadsby - forthcoming - Perception.
    Many who suffer from eating disorders claim that they see themselves as “fat”. Despite decades of research into the phenomenon, behavioural evidence has failed to confirm that eating disorders involve visual misperception of own-body size. I illustrate the importance of this phenomenon for our understanding of perceptual processing, outline the challenges involved in experimentally confirming it, and provide solutions to those challenges.
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  38. The Status of Video Games as Self-Involving Interactive Fictions: Fuzzy Intervals and Hard Identifications.Kristina Šekrst - 2023 - Sic: Journal of Literature, Culture and Literary Translation 3.
    The goal of this paper is to see how mental and language representations are unique from a video-game perspective, using two main criteria. First, I will posit that the level of being both an interactive work of fiction and a self-involving interactive fiction belongs to a fuzzy interval and that some works – and, therefore, some video games – are more immersive than others. Second, I will observe how propositions tie the player’s representations of the real world and the (...)
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  39. An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.
    The primary goal of this paper is to provide substantial motivation for exploring an Acquaintance account of phenomenal consciousness, on which what fundamentally explains phenomenal consciousness is the relation of acquaintance. Its secondary goal is to take a few steps towards such an account. Roughly, my argument proceeds as follows. Motivated by prioritizing naturalization, the debate about the nature of phenomenal consciousness has been almost monopolized by representational theories. Among them, Self-Representationalism is by far the most antecedently promising. However, (...)
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  40. Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? Evidence of a pre-university effect.Tom Doherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    Why does female under- representation emerge during undergraduate education? At the University of Sydney, we surveyed students before and after their first philosophy course. We failed to find any evidence that this course disproportionately discouraged female students from continuing in philosophy relative to male students. Instead, we found evidence of an interaction effect between gender and existing attitudes about philosophy coming into tertiary education that appears at least partially responsible for this poor retention. At the first lecture, disproportionately few (...)
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  41. Proposal for an evolutionary approach to self-consciousness (Feb 8th 2014).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    It is pretty obvious to most of us that self-consciousness is a product of evolution. But its nature is unknown. We propose here a scenario addressing a possible evolutionary nature of self-consciousness covering the segment linking pre-human primates to humans. The scenario is based on evolutions of representations and of inter-subjectivity that could have taken place within the minds of our pre-human ancestors . We begin by situating self-consciousness relatively to other aspects of human consciousness. With the (...)
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  42. Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation.Galen Barry - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):5.
    This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes (...)
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  43. Modelling ourselves: what the debate on the Free Energy Principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation.Matthew Sims & Giovanni Pezzulo - 2021 - Synthese 1 (1):30.
    Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a nor- mative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., repre- sentational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpre- tations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to dis- (...)
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  44. Representation of Violence from Imaginary to Symbolic: Identity Formation in John Banville's "The Book of Evidence".Oğuzhan Ayrım - 2023 - Bitig Journal of Faculty of Letters 3 (6):14-27.
    This article proposes to read John Banville’s The Book of Evidence, a crime story narrated from the protagonist’s first-person gaze, from a Lacanian perspective by referring to his mirror stage theory. As an extension of testimonial literature, the novel is deemed to be a narrative of introspective self-examination, thus introducing a creation of “the self” paralleling the text. The protagonist’s mnemonic narrative is accompanied by the idea of an alternative world of not only self-expression but also (...)-depiction and presentation, as in Lacan’s Imaginary. This self-creation, however, may not be as innocent as it seems. The reason for this is that although the mirror phase involves a transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, it presupposes the role of the other, biologically (m)other, in order to accustom the subject to the law of society. However, just because the protagonist, Freddie, mentions his mother’s presence as “nothing,” there is no soothing force for his adaptation to societal laws. Here, Freddie is subject to what Lacan sees as a minor prototype who lives in a society and yet is attached to his own rules, which is the first principle of male violence associated with this novel. Therefore, this article also tries to find answers for Freddie’s performance of male violence within the axis of psychoanalytic postulations elaborated on Lacan’s identity theory. (shrink)
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  45. From Homo-economicus to Homo-virtus: A System-Theoretic Model for Raising Moral Self-Awareness.Julian Friedland & Benjamin M. Cole - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 155 (1):191-205.
    There is growing concern that a global economic system fueled predominately by financial incentives may not maximize human flourishing and social welfare externalities. If so, this presents a challenge of how to get economic actors to adopt a more virtuous motivational mindset. Relying on historical, psychological, and philosophical research, we show how such a mindset can be instilled. First, we demonstrate that historically, financial self-interest has never in fact been the only guiding motive behind free markets, but that markets (...)
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  46. Handedness, self-models and embodied cognitive content.Holger Lyre - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):529–538.
    The paper presents and discusses the “which-is-which content of handedness,” the meaning of left as left and right as right, as a possible candidate for the idea of a genuine embodied cognitive content. After showing that the Ozma barrier, the non-transferability of the meaning of left and right, provides a kind of proof of the non-descriptive, indexical nature of the which-is-which content of handedness, arguments are presented which suggest that the classical representationalist account of cognition faces a perplexing problem of (...)
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  47. Can't Kant Cognize His Empirical Self? Or, a Problem for (almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-158.
    Kant seems to think of our own mental states or representations as the primary objects of inner sense. But does he think that these states also inhere in something? And, if so, is that something an empirical substance that is also cognized in inner sense? This chapter provides textual and philosophical grounds for thinking that, although Kant may agree with Hume that the self is not ‘given’ in inner sense exactly, he does think of the self as cognized (...)
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  48. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: (1) in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; (2) in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational (...)
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  49. Othered body, obscene self(ie): A Sartrean reading of Kim Kardashian-West.Elese Dowden - 2017 - Hecate 43 (2):117-130.
    In this existential reading of Kim Kardashian-West's International Women's Day selfie of 2016, I focus on the rise of selfie culture and public discourse around emerging digital representations of women's bodies. The selfie is a relatively new phenomenon, and is particularly curious because of the subject/object paradox it creates; in taking a selfie, a person asserts control over their own image, but at the same time, becomes object in their own gaze. My argument is that selfies, like other assertions of (...)
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  50. Memory: A Self-Referential Account.Jordi Fernández - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...)
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