Results for 'cognitive biases'

954 found
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  1. Cognitive Biases for the Design of Persuasive Technologies: Uses, Abuses and Ethical Concerns.Antonio Lieto - 2021 - ACM Distinguished Speakers - Lecture Series.
    In the last decades Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) has started to focus attention on “persuasive technologies” having the goal of changing users’ behavior and attitudes according to a predefined direction. In this talk we show how some of the techniques employed in such technologies trigger some well known cognitive biases by adopting a strategy relying on logical fallacies (i.e. forms of reasoning which are logically invalid but psychologically persuasive). In particular, we will show how the mechanisms reducible to logical (...)
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  2. Cognitive biases and the predictable perils of the patient‐centric free‐market model of medicine.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):446-456.
    This paper addresses the recent rise of the use of alternative medicine in Western countries. It offers a novel explanation of that phenomenon in terms of cognitive and economic factors related to the free-market and patient-centric approach to medicine that is currently in place in those countries, in contrast to some alternative explanations of this phenomenon. Moreover, the paper addresses this troubling trend in terms of the serious harms associated with the use of alternative medical modalities. The explanatory theory (...)
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  3. Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge: Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience.Richard L. Amoroso & Francisco Di Biase - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 4 (09).
    Recalling Thomas Nagel’s discussion concerning the difficulties associated with developing a scientific explanation for the nature of experience, Nagel states that current reductionist attempts fail by filtering out any basis for consciousness and thus become meaningless since they are logically compatible with its absence. In this article we call into question the fundamental philosophy of the mind-brain identity hypothesis of Cognitive Theory: ‘What processes in the brain give rise to awareness?’ and the associated search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (...)
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  4. Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogs of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors—i.e., cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event’s probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events, such as airplane crashes, are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The (...)
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  5. Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-19.
    Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top–down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to be (...)
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  6. Biases and fallacies.Vasco Correia - 2011 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1):107-126.
    This paper focuses on the effects of motivational biases on the way people reason and debate in everyday life. Unlike heuristics and cognitive biases, motivational biases are typically caused by the influence of a desire or an emotion on the cognitive processes involved in judgmental and inferential reasoning. In line with the ‘motivational’ account of irrationality, I argue that these biases are the cause of a number of fallacies that ordinary arguers commit unintentionally, particularly (...)
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  7. Biased against Debiasing: On the Role of (Institutionally Sponsored) Self-Transformation in the Struggle against Prejudice.Alex Madva - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:145-179.
    Research suggests that interventions involving extensive training or counterconditioning can reduce implicit prejudice and stereotyping, and even susceptibility to stereotype threat. This research is widely cited as providing an “existence proof” that certain entrenched social attitudes are capable of change, but is summarily dismissed—by philosophers, psychologists, and activists alike—as lacking direct, practical import for the broader struggle against prejudice, discrimination, and inequality. Criticisms of these “debiasing” procedures fall into three categories: concerns about empirical efficacy, about practical feasibility, and about the (...)
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  8. Intellectual Virtues and Biased Understanding.Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:97-113.
    Biases affect much of our epistemic lives. Do they affect how we understand things? For Linda Zagzebski, we only understand something when we manifest intellectual virtues or skills. Relying on how widespread biases are, J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard raise a skeptical objection to understanding so conceived. It runs as follows: most of us seem to understand many things. We genuinely understand only when we manifest intellectual virtues or skills, and are cognitively responsible for so doing. Yet (...)
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  9. Cognitive Bias, the Axiological Question and the Epistemic Probability of Theistic Belief.Dan Linford & Jason Megill - 2018 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Theistic Beliefs: Meta-Ontological Perspectives. De Gruyter. pp. 77-92.
    Some recent work in philosophy of religion addresses what can be called the “axiological question,” i.e., regardless of whether God exists, would it be good or bad if God exists? Would the existence of God make the world a better or a worse place? Call the view that the existence of God would make the world a better place “Pro-Theism.” We argue that Pro-Theism is not implausible, and moreover, many Theists, at least, (often implicitly) think that it is true. That (...)
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  10. Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):487-497.
    The cultural transmission of theological concepts remains an underexplored topic in the cognitive science of religion (CSR). In this paper, I examine whether approaches from CSR, especially the study of content biases in the transmission of beliefs, can help explain the cultural success of some theological concepts. This approach reveals that there is more continuity between theological beliefs and ordinary religious beliefs than CSR authors have hitherto recognized: the cultural transmission of theological concepts is influenced by content (...) that also underlie the reception of ordinary religious concepts. (shrink)
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  11. When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law.Govind Persad - 2014 - Law and Ineq 32:31.
    Recent work in the behavioral sciences asserts that we are subject to a variety of cognitive biases. For example, we mourn losses more than we prize equivalently sized gains; we are more inclined to believe something if it matches our previous beliefs; and we even relate more warmly or coldly to others depending on whether the coffee cup we are holding is warm or cold. Drawing on this work, case law and legal scholarship have asserted that we have (...)
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  12. Cognitive Regeneration and the Noetic Effects of Sin: Why Theology and Cognitive Science May not be Compatible.Lari Launonen - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3).
    Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such (...)? A Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place. (shrink)
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  13. Self-reflexive cognitive bias.Joshua Mugg & Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.
    Cognitive scientists claim to have discovered a large number of cognitive biases, which have a tendency to mislead reasoners. Might cognitive scientists themselves be subject to the very biases they purport to discover? And how should this alter the way they evaluate their research as evidence for the existence of these biases? In this paper, we posit a new paradox (the ‘Self-Reflexive Bias Paradox’), which bears a striking resemblance to some classical logical paradoxes. Suppose (...)
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  14.  72
    The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Rasmus Pedersen & Danqi Wang - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-34.
    We investigate the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which what partly explains (a) why people tend to prefer negative events to be in their further future rather than their nearer future and positive events to be in their nearer future rather than their further future and (b) why people tend to prefer that negative events be located in their past not their future and that positive events be located in their future not their past, is that people tend to discount (...)
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  15. Are the States Underlying Implicit Biases Unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian Answer.Beate Krickel - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):1007-1026.
    Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski et al. (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes (...)
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  16. Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition.Stephen Gadsby - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-18.
    I introduce and discuss an underappreciated form of motivated cognition: motivational pessimism, which involves the biasing of beliefs for the sake of self-motivation. I illustrate how motivational pessimism avoids explanatory issues that plague other (putative) forms of motivated cognition and discuss distinctions within the category, related to awareness, aetiology, and proximal goals.
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  17. Dudas razonables, sesgos cognitivos y emociones en la argumentación jurídica.María G. Navarro - 2010 - Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía 5:203-214.
    Concepts as reasonable doubt, cognitive biases and emotions are now a theoretical problem for the practice of law, and the law understood as legal argumentation. From a theoretical point of view, the screenplay written by Reginald Rose, Twelve Angry Men, is an outstanding example to analyze some of these concepts, and its influence on procedural stage. Cognitive biases and informal fallacies are theoretical challenge to legal argumentation.
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  18. Metacognition and Reflection by Interdisciplinary Experts: Insights from Cognitive Science and Philosophy.Machiel Keestra - 2017 - Issues in Interdisciplinary Studies 35:121-169.
    Interdisciplinary understanding requires integration of insights from different perspectives, yet it appears questionable whether disciplinary experts are well prepared for this. Indeed, psychological and cognitive scientific studies suggest that expertise can be disadvantageous because experts are often more biased than non-experts, for example, or fixed on certain approaches, and less flexible in novel situations or situations outside their domain of expertise. An explanation is that experts’ conscious and unconscious cognition and behavior depend upon their learning and acquisition of a (...)
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  19. Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control.Michael Klenk & Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):938-961.
    We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility of moral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over their moral judgments for moral progress to occur. Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving their moral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people can exert over their (...)
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  20. A Theory of Predictive Dissonance: Predictive Processing Presents a New Take on Cognitive Dissonance.Roope Oskari Kaaronen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This article is a comparative study between predictive processing (PP, or predictive coding) and cognitive dissonance (CD) theory. The theory of CD, one of the most influential and extensively studied theories in social psychology, is shown to be highly compatible with recent developments in PP. This is particularly evident in the notion that both theories deal with strategies to reduce perceived error signals. However, reasons exist to update the theory of CD to one of “predictive dissonance.” First, the hierarchical (...)
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  21. The impact of error-consequence severity on cue processing in importance-biased prospective memory.Kristina Krasich, Eva Gjorgieva, Samuel Murray, Shreya Bhatia, Myrthe Faber, Felipe De Brigard & Marty Woldorff - forthcoming - Cerebral Cortex Communications.
    Prospective memory (PM) enables people to remember to complete important tasks in the future. Failing to do so can result in consequences of varying severity. Here, we investigated how PM error-consequence severity impacts the neural processing of relevant cues for triggering PM and the ramification of that processing on the associated prospective task performance. Participants role-played a cafeteria worker serving lunches to fictitious students and had to remember to deliver an alternative lunch to students (as PM cues) who would otherwise (...)
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  22. Do attitudes about and behaviors towards people who enhance their cognition depend on their looks?Charles Siegel, Clifford Ian Workman, Stacey Humphries & Anjan Chatterjee - forthcoming - PsyArXiv Preprint:1-29.
    Public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement––e.g., using stimulants like Adderall and Ritalin to improve mental functioning––are mixed. Attitudes vary by context and prompt ethical concerns about fairness, obligation, and authenticity/character. While people may have strong views about the morality of cognitive enhancement, how these views are affected by the physical characteristics of enhancers is unknown. Visible facial anomalies (e.g., scars) bear negatively on perceptions of moral character. This pre-registered study (osf[dot]io/uaw6c/) tested the hypothesis that such negative biases against (...)
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  23. (1 other version)Drawing on a Sculpted Space of Actions: Educating for Expertise while Avoiding a Cognitive Monster.Machiel Keestra - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (3):620-639.
    Philosophers and scientists have across the ages been amazed about the fact that development and learning often lead to not just a merely incremental and gradual change in the learner but sometimes to a result that is strikingly different from the learner’s original situation: amazed, but at times also worried. Both philosophical and cognitive neuroscientific insights suggest that experts appear to perform ‘different’ tasks compared to beginners who behave in a similar way. These philosophical and empirical perspectives give some (...)
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  24. Entitativity and implicit measures of social cognition.Ben Phillips - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):1030-1047.
    I argue that in addressing worries about the validity and reliability of implicit measures of social cognition, theorists should draw on research concerning “entitativity perception.” In brief, an aggregate of people is perceived as highly “entitative” when its members exhibit a certain sort of unity. For example, think of the difference between the aggregate of people waiting in line at a bank versus a tight-knit group of friends: The latter seems more “groupy” than the former. I start by arguing that (...)
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  25. Issues with the Judicial System: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach.Manish Nagireddy - manuscript
    What factors affect judicial decision-making? The legal system is of utmost importance because of its impact on our lives. Judges appear to have the most power among any social workers seeing as the precedents set in their decisions are tantamount to written law. Nevertheless, judges may be subject to certain biases, moral and cognitive alike, which influence their rulings. Looking into how morality and cognitive biases affect judges may also reveal how we as individuals handle combining (...)
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  26.  34
    The Comprehensive Human Decision-Making Equation and Holistic Free Will.Juan Chavez - manuscript
    The Comprehensive Human Decision-Making Equation presents a robust model for understanding Holistic Free Will (HFW), conceptualizing decision-making as an autonomous, non-deterministic process within a complex network of influences. This model addresses the Infinite Regress issue by portraying free will as an emergent property of interacting layers, including internal beliefs, external contexts, emotional responses, cognitive biases, and habitual tendencies. Departing from traditional linear models, the equation adopts a systemic framework where each choice reflects a cumulative utility, integrating multiple components (...)
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  27. Egocentric Bias and Doubt in Cognitive Agents.Nanda Kishore Sreenivas & Shrisha Rao - forthcoming - 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2019), Montreal, Canada, May 2019.
    Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are susceptible to. This work presents a method to model egocentric bias, the real-life tendency to emphasize one's own opinion heavily when presented with multiple opinions. We use a symmetric distribution, centered at an agent's own opinion, as opposed to the Bounded Confidence (BC) model used (...)
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  28. Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience.Filip Tvrdý - 2021 - Filozofia 76 (10):735-751.
    The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori (...)
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  29. Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value.Jacob Nebel - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):449-476.
    Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain (...)
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  30. (2 other versions)Mechanisms, Coherence, and Theory Choice in the Cognitive Neurosciences.Stephan Hartmann - 2001 - In Peter McLaughlin, Peter Machamer & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 70-80.
    Let me first state that I like Antti Revonsuo’s discussion of the various methodological and interpretational problems in neuroscience. It shows how careful and methodologically reflected scientists have to proceed in this fascinating field of research. I have nothing to add here. Furthermore, I am very sympathetic towards Revonsuo’s general proposal to call for a Philosophy of Neuroscience that stresses foundational issues, but also focuses on methodological and explanatory strategies.2 In a footnote of his paper, Revonsuo complains – as many (...)
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  31. Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.
    Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...)
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  32. Consuming Fake News: Can We Do Any Better?Michel Croce & Tommaso Piazza - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (2):232-241.
    This paper focuses on extant approaches to counteract the consumption of fake news online. Proponents of structural approaches suggest that our proneness to consuming fake news could only be reduced by reshaping the architecture of online environments. Proponents of educational approaches suggest that fake news consumers should be empowered to improve their epistemic agency. In this paper, we address a question that is relevant to this debate: namely, whether fake news consumers commit mistakes for which they can be criticized and (...)
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  33. Perceptual Failure and a Life of Moral Endeavor.Barrett Emerick - 2015 - Social Philosophy Today 31:129-139.
    Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey argued that as agents engaged in a “life of moral endeavor,” we should understand ourselves and others to be moral works in progress, always possessing the potential to grow beyond and become more than the sum of our past wrongs. In this paper I follow Harvey and argue that in order to live a life of moral endeavor, it is not enough merely to know about injustice. Instead, we must engage in the (...)
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  34. Seeking the Supernatural: The Interactive Religious Experience Model.Neil Van Leeuwen & Michiel van Elk - 2019 - Religion, Brain and Behavior 9 (3):221-275.
    [OPEN ACCESS TARGET ARTICLE WITH COMMENTARIES AND RESPONSE] We develop a new model of how human agency-detection capacities and other socio-cognitive biases are involved in forming religious beliefs. Crucially, we distinguish general religious beliefs (such as *God exists*) from personal religious beliefs that directly refer to the agent holding the belief or to her peripersonal time and space (such as *God appeared to _me_ last night*). On our model, people acquire general religious beliefs mostly from their surrounding culture; (...)
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  35. Belief and Decision under Uncertainty.Sherrilyn Roush - manuscript
    This is a very short textbook on probabilistic reasoning, expected utility decision-making, cognitive biases, and self-correction, especially in application to medical examples. It also includes a chapter on concepts of health.
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  36. The moral psychology of Value Sensitive Design: the methodological issues of moral intuitions for responsible innovation.Steven Umbrello - 2018 - Journal of Responsible Innovation 5 (2):186-200.
    This paper argues that although moral intuitions are insufficient for making judgments on new technological innovations, they maintain great utility for informing responsible innovation. To do this, this paper employs the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) methodology as an illustrative example of how stakeholder values can be better distilled to inform responsible innovation. Further, it is argued that moral intuitions are necessary for determining stakeholder values required for the design of responsible technologies. This argument is supported by the claim that the (...)
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  37. Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality.Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (1):53-73.
    According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this (...)
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  38. (1 other version)Intellectual Humility and the Curse of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge.
    This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This is surprising (...)
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  39. Locke’s Diagnosis of Akrasia.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):6.
    I argue for a new interpretation of Locke’s account of akrasia. On this interpretation, akrasia occurs on Locke’s account because certain cognitive biases endemic to the human mind dispose us to privilege present over future happiness. As a result, we end up irrationally pursuing present pleasure and the removal of present pain even as we simultaneously judge that doing so runs contrary to our own greater good. In this sense, I argue that Locke seeks to diagnose akrasia by (...)
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  40. Opt‐out vaccination in school and daycare: Reconciling parental authority and obligations.Didde Boisen Andersen & Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen - 2024 - Bioethics 38 (9):816-822.
    An increasing vaccine hesitancy among parents, which has resulted in insufficient rates of immunization, provides reason to reconsider childhood vaccination practices. Studies suggest that parents' decision-making process concerning whether to vaccinate their child is highly influenced by cognitive biases. These biases can be utilized to increase vaccination uptake via changes in the choice context. This article considers childhood vaccination programmes, which involve children being vaccinated in school or daycare unless their parents actively ‘opt out’. We suggest that (...)
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  41. The truth behind conscientious objection in medicine: a reply to Clarke, Emmerich, Minerva and Saad.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (10):681-683.
    Steve Clarke, Nathan Emmerich, Francesca Minerva and Toni Saad have offered nuanced and insightful commentaries on my paper ‘The truth behind conscientious objection in medicine’.1 I cannot, in this brief response, do justice to all of the objections and suggestions that they have raised. I have tried to focus my response on what I take to be my interlocutors’ main concerns with my Smithian account, with the hope that we can continue the conversation elsewhere. Clarke argues that both Smith and (...)
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  42. Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
    Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...)
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  43. Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and Repugnance.Rebecca Roache & Steve Clarke - 2009 - Monash Bioethics Review 28 (1):04.1-04.21.
    We consider the current debate between bioconservatives and their opponents—whom we dub bioliberals—about the moral acceptability of human enhancement and the policy implications of moral debates about enhancement. We argue that this debate has reached an impasse, largely because bioconservatives hold that we should honour intuitions about the special value of being human, even if we cannot identify reasons to ground those intuitions. We argue that although intuitions are often a reliable guide to belief and action, there are circumstances in (...)
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  44. A Routine to Develop Inferencing Skills in Primary School Children.Celso Vieira - 2023 - In Marella A. Mancenido-Bolaños, C. Alvarez-Abarejo & L. Marquez (eds.), Cultivating Reasonableness in Education. Springer. pp. 95-117.
    The chapter presents the prototyping of a thinking routine designed to foster good inference habits in children ages 6 to 11. The prototyping was developed at Ninho, an educational project for children from underprivileged households in Brazil. The thinking routines by Ritchhart and colleagues (2006) served as our starting point. Following a Virtue Education (VE) approach, we supposed that the repeated application would conduce to habituation. In addition, to increase peer-to-peer interactions, the teacher applying the routines worked as a facilitator (...)
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  45. (1 other version)Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.
    Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two (...)
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  46. Virtue Responsibilism, Mindware, and Education.Michel Croce & Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 42-44.
    Response to Steven Bland’s ‘Interactionism, Debiasing, and the Division of Epistemic Labour’ (in Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder). Biased cognition is an obvious source of epistemic vice, but there is some controversy about whether cognitive biases generate reliabilist or responsibilist epistemic vices. Bland’s argument, in a nutshell, is that since the development of cognitive biases is due to the interplay of internal psychological processes and external (i.e., environmental) conditions, it (...)
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  47. Epistemology of Disagreement, Bias, and Political Deliberation: The Problems for a Conciliatory Democracy.Jay Carlson - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1161-1171.
    In this paper, I will discuss the relevance of epistemology of disagreement to political disagreement. The two major positions in the epistemology of disagreement literature are the steadfast and the conciliationist approaches: while the conciliationist says that disagreement with one’s epistemic equals should compel one to epistemically “split the difference” with those peers, the steadfast approach claims that one can maintain one’s antecedent position even in the face of such peer disagreement. Martin Ebeling applies a conciliationist approach to democratic deliberations, (...)
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  48. A Contractarian Solution to the Experimenter’s Regress.David Teira - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):709-720.
    Debiasing procedures are experimental methods aimed at correcting errors arising from the cognitive biases of the experimenter. We discuss two of these methods, the predesignation rule and randomization, showing to what extent they are open to the experimenter’s regress: there is no metarule to prove that, after implementing the procedure, the experimental data are actually free from biases. We claim that, from a contractarian perspective, these procedures are nonetheless defensible since they provide a warrant of the impartiality (...)
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  49. Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism.Achille C. Varzi - 2011 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving nature at its joints: natural kinds in metaphysics and science. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 129–153.
    Are there any bona fide boundaries, i.e., boundaries that carve at the joints? Or is any boundary —hence any object—the result of a fiat articulation reflecting our cognitive biases and our so-cial practices and conventions? Does the choice between these two options amount to a choice between realism and wholesome relativism?
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  50. Was it Polarization or Propaganda?C. Thi Nguyen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:173-191.
    According to some, the current political fracture is best described as political polarization – where extremism and political separation infest an entire whole population. Political polarization accounts often point to the psychological phenomenon of belief polarization – where being in a like-minded groups tends to boost confidence. The political polarization story is an essentially symmetrical one, where both sides are subject to the same basic dividing forces and cognitive biases, and are approximately as blame-worthy. On a very different (...)
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