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  1. (1 other version)Kant on Conviction and Persuasion.Gabriele Gava - 2023 - In Luigi Filieri & Sofie Møller (eds.), Kant on Freedom and Human Nature. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 135-150.
    Interpretations of Kant’s account of the forms of “taking-to-be-true” (Fürwahrhalten) have generally focused on three such forms: opinion (Meinung), belief (Glaube), and knowledge (Wissen). A second distinction that has received comparatively less attention is that between conviction (Überzeugung) and persuasion (Überredung). Kant appears to use the distinction between the subjective and the objective sufficiency of a taking-to-be-true to characterize all of these forms. However, it is impossible to account for the differences between them by relying on this latter distinction alone. (...)
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  2. Can Metaphysics Become a Science for Kant?Gabriele Gava - 2023 - In Robb Dunphy & Toby Lovat (eds.), Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 150-166.
    In this chapter, I investigate a problem for Kant’s claim that metaphysics can reach the status of science. The problem arises when one considers Kant’s account of the “architectonic unity” of metaphysics in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Attaining architectonic unity is a condition for becoming a science for any body of cognitions that purports to be such. This is achieved when the cognitions belonging to a science are systematically organized according to the “idea of reason” which lies at the (...)
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  3. Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.Gabriele Gava - 2024 - In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), The Oxford handbook of Charles S. Peirce. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 442-457.
    This chapter analyzes two short texts in which Peirce sketches out an anti-skeptical argument inspired by Kant’s refutation of idealism. The chapter will first consider why Peirce found Kant’s argument interesting and promising, given that it is often regarded as problematic and unsuccessful. It will then briefly reconstruct Kant’s refutation, highlighting its most problematic passages. Moreover, since Peirce’s own version of the argument relies on Kant’s views regarding the temporal structure of consciousness, the chapter will explain how Peirce tackles this (...)
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  4. Conceptual Analysis and the Analytic Method in Kant’s Prize Essay.Gabriele Gava - 2024 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 14 (1):164-184.
    Famously, in the essay Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (Prize Essay), Kant attempts to distance himself from the Wolffian model of philosophical inquiry. In this respect, Kant scholars have pointed out Kant’s claim that philosophy should not imitate the method of mathematics and his appeal to Newton’s “analytic method.” In this article, I argue that there is an aspect of Kant’s critique of the Wolffian model that has been neglected. Kant presents a powerful (...)
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  5. Kant on Wolff and Dogmatism.Gabriele Gava - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 299-308.
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  6. The Nature of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Architectonic Unity of Metaphysics: A Response to my Critics.Gabriele Gava - 2024 - Kantian Review 29 (1).
    I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the fact that (...)
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  7. The Origin and Validity of Root Concepts, the Place of General Logic Within Transcendental Logic and Kant’s Critique of Dogmatism: A Response to My Critics.Gabriele Gava - 2023 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 4 (3):267-282.
    In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023), I argue that the first Critique is not only a ‘propaedeutic’ to metaphysics, but actually already establishes parts of metaphysics. These parts belong to what Kant calls transcendental philosophy. Additionally, I also provide an account of Kant’s critique of dogmatism and Wolff as its main defender. In this paper, I take up Luigi Filieri’s and Davide Dalla Rosa’s invitation to further develop my characterization of transcendental philosophy and (...)
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  8. Peirce on Vital Matters and the Scientific Method.Gabriele Gava - 2023 - In Robert B. Talisse, Paniel Reyes Cárdenas & Daniel Herbert (eds.), Pragmatic Reason: Christopher Hookway and the American Philosophical Tradition. London: Routledge. pp. 95-111.
    In this paper, I try to make sense of some puzzling claims that Peirce makes in the Cambridge conferences lectures. I identify four tasks that a successful interpretation of those claims must accomplish. First, we must provide a plausible reading of the “no belief in science” thesis. Second, we must provide a compelling interpretation of the “no science in vital matters” thesis. Third, we must explain Peirce’s distinction between two forms of holding for true. Fourth, we should be able to (...)
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