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  1. The critical limits of phenomenology: Husserlian phenomenology as a modest metaphysics of appearance.Emiliano Diaz - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):778-800.
    Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...)
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  2. Typical Subjectivity.Emiliano Diaz - 2022 - Idealistic Studies 52 (1):1-21.
    Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...)
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  3. Transcendental Anticipation: A Reconsideration of Husserl’s Type and Kant’s Schemata.Emiliano Diaz - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (1):1-23.
    In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...)
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  4. Peripheral Experience and Epistemic Neutrality: Color at the Margins.Emiliano Diaz - 2020 - Husserl Studies 37 (1):1-17.
    I argue that Husserl’s account of passive synthesis can be developed into a phenomenology of peripheral experience. Peripheral experiences are not defined by their location in visual space but by their phenomenal and intentional character, by what these experiences are like and how they present things in the world. Further, I argue that peripheral experience is of a piece with our most basic background convictions about the world. As such, the periphery is epistemically neutral, but not therefore empty of meaning. (...)
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