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Edward Moad [6]Edward Omar Moad [2]
  1. The Jinn and the Shayatin.Edward Moad - 2017 - In Benjamin W. McCraw & Arp Robert (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Demonology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 137-155.
    If by “demon” one understands an evil occult being, then its equivalent in the Islamic narrative is the intersection of the category jinn with that of the shayātīn: a demon is a shaytān from among the jinn. The literature in the Islamic tradition on these subjects is vast. In what follows, we will select some key elements from it to provide a brief summary: first on the nature of the jinn, their nature, and their relationship to God and human beings; (...)
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  2. Problem's with Aquinas' Third Way.Edward Moad - 2016 - In Robert Arp (ed.), Revisiting Aquinas’ Proofs for the Existence of God. Leiden: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 131-140.
    The object of this paper is not arguments from contingency in general, but specifically Aquinas’s ‘Third Way’ as it appears in his Summa Theologica. I will raise three objections to this argument. First, the argument depends on the premise, that if everything were contingent, then there would have been a time during which nothing exists, but this is not self-evident and no argument is given for it here. Secondly, Aquinas tells us that a key premise in this argument, that an (...)
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    A path to the Oasis: Sharī‘ah and reason in Islamic moral epistemology.Edward Omar Moad - 2005 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (3):135-148.
    I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories "Islam, Iman," and "Ihsan" are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that "shari'a" refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding of "shari'a" as simply Islamic "law," and an alternative understanding of "usul al-fiqh" as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of (...)
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  4. Moral Dilemmas.Edward Moad - 2020 - In Vibha Chaturvedi & Pragati Sahni (eds.), Understanding Ethics. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. pp. 304-314.
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  5. A Significant Difference Between al-Ghazālī and Hume on Causation.Edward Omar Moad - 2008 - Journal of Islamic Philosophy 3:22-39.
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  6. Actualism and the Distinction of Truth over Truth in a World.Edward Moad - 2008 - Sorites 20:43-48.
    Robert Adams characterizes actualism regarding possible worlds as «the view that if there are any true statements in which there are said to be nonactual possible worlds, they must be reducible to statements in which the only things there are said to be are things which there are in the actual world, and which are not identical with nonactual possibles.» In this paper, I will briefly explain actualism about possible worlds, showing that an essential pillar of the theory is the (...)
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  7. Al-Ghazali's Ethics and Natural Law Theory.Edward Moad (ed.) - 2021 - Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
    In this chapter, I will make the case that we can accurately describe Ghazali’s position as a natural law theory. Kevin Reinhart (1995), on whose translation of al-Mustaṣfā I will be depending in what follows, has also treated this topic. Though he did not specifically compare Ghazali’s position there with natural law theory, like Hourani (1985) he interprets Ghazali’s position as subjectivist on key points rendering it incompatible with natural law theory. Thus, I will begin with a prima facie case (...)
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