12 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Edward Hinchman [11]Edward S. Hinchman [1]
  1. Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    [The version of this paper published by Oxford online in 2019 was not copy-edited and has some sense-obscuring typos. I have posted a corrected (but not the final published) version on this site. The version published in print in 2020 has these corrections.] Which is more fundamental, assertion or testimony? Should we understand assertion as basic, treating testimony as what you get when you add an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic, treating mere assertion -- assertion without (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2. On the Risks of Resting Assured: An Assurance Theory of Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2017 - In Tom Simpson Paul Faulkner (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Trust. Oxford University Press.
    An assurance theory of trust begins from the act of assurance – whether testimonial, advisorial or promissory – and explains trust as a cognate stance of resting assured. My version emphasizes the risks and rewards of trust. On trust’s rewards, I show how an assurance can give a reason to the addressee through a twofold exercise of ‘normative powers’: (i) the speaker thereby incurs an obligation to be sincere; (ii) if the speaker is trustworthy, she thereby gives her addressee the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  3. Trust, Mistrust, and Autonomy.Edward Hinchman & Andrea Westlund - 2023 - In David Collins, Iris Vidmar Jovanović & Mark Alfano (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Trust. Lexington Books. pp. 105-121.
    Is autonomy – governing yourself – compatible with letting yourself be governed by trust? This paper argues that autonomy is not only compatible with appropriate trust but actually requires it. Autonomy requires appropriate trust because it is undermined by inappropriate mistrust. An autonomous agent treats herself as answerable for her action-guiding commitments, where answerability requires openness to the rational influence of external, critical perspectives on those commitments. This openness to correction makes one vulnerable to manipulation and can be exploited in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Can Trust Itself Ground a Reason to Believe the Trusted?Edward Hinchman - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (S6):47-83.
    Can a reason to believe testimony derive from the addressee’s trust itself or only from reliability in the speaker that the trust perhaps causes? I aim to cast suspicion on the former view, defended by Faulkner, in favor of the latter – despite agreeing with Faulkner’s emphasis on the second-personal normativity of testimonial assurance. Beyond my narrow disagreement with Faulkner lie two broader issues. I argue that Faulkner misappropriates Bernard Williams’s genealogy of testimony when he makes use of Williams’s genealogical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. ‘What on Earth Was I Thinking?’ How Anticipating Plan’s End Places an Intention in Time.Edward Hinchman - 2015 - In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 87-107.
    How must you think about time when you form an intention? Obviously, you must think about the time of action. Must you frame the action in any broader prospect or retrospect? In this essay I argue that you must: you thereby commit yourself to a specific prospect of a future retrospect – a retrospect, indeed, on that very prospect. In forming an intention you project a future from which you will not ask regretfully, referring back to your follow-through on that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Conspiracy, Commitment, and the Self.Edward Hinchman - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):526-556.
    Practical commitment is Janus-faced, looking outward toward the expectations it creates and inward toward their basis in the agent’s will. This paper criticizes Kantian attempts to link these facets and proposes an alternative. Contra David Velleman, the availability of a conspiratorial perspective (not yours, not your interlocutor’s) is what allows you to understand yourself as making a lying promise – as committing yourself ‘outwardly’ with the deceptive reasoning that Velleman argues cannot provide a basis for self-understanding. Moreover, the intrapersonal availability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Trust and Will.Edward Hinchman - 2019 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. Routledge.
    This paper treats two questions about the relation between trust and the will. One question, about trust, is whether you can trust ‘at will.’ Can you trust despite acknowledging that you lack evidence of the trustee’s worthiness of your trust? Another question, about the will, is whether you can exercise your will at all without trust – at least, in yourself. I treat the second question as a guide to the first, arguing that the role of trust in the will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Reflection, Disagreement, and Context.Edward Hinchman - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
    How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Disappointed Yet Unbetrayed: A New Three-Place Analysis of Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2021 - In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust: Foundational and Philosophical Issues. Routledge. pp. 73-101.
    This paper engages two debates about trust, deriving from two distinct questions about the nature of trust. The first asks how to define trust. Does trusting B to φ involve anything more than relying on B to φ? The second asks about the normative structure of trust. Does trust most fundamentally embody a two-place or a three-place relation? I’ll defend a new position in the second debate that yields an equally new position in the first. The standard three-place model highlights (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. The Role of Assurance in Judgment and Memory.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg & Stephen Wright (eds.), Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology.
    It’s a popular idea that memory resembles testimony insofar as each can ‘preserve’ epistemic warrant. But how does such ‘preservation’ do its epistemic work? I have elsewhere developed an assurance theory of testimonial warrant. Here, I develop an assurance theory of preservative memory. How could the ‘preservation’ of warrant through memory work through an assurance? What would even count as an intrapersonal assurance? I explain each form of preservation by contrasting the relation that preserves warrant with a pathological alternative. My (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Judging as Inviting Self-Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2007 - Center for 21st Century Studies Working Papers.
    [This draft is dated November 2007. I wrote it while I was a fellow at the Center for 21st Century Studies at UW-Milwaukee, in 2005-06, and published it only on the Center's website as a working paper. Many of the core ideas in this paper wound up in "Receptivity and the Will," Nous 2009, "Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge," Nous 2013, and "Assurance and Warrant," Philosophers' Imprint 2014 -- though formulated rather differently. What follows is the original abstract.] This working paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Review of David C. Rose, The Moral Foundations of Economic Behavior. [REVIEW]Edward S. Hinchman - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (5):607-610.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark