Results for 'Annalisa Cappiello'

15 found
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  1. Tommaso de Vio Gaetano, Pietro Pomponazzi e la polemica sull’immortalità dell’anima. Status quaestionis e nuove scoperte.Annalisa Cappiello - 2018 - Noctua 5 (1):32-71.
    A long historiographical tradition has claimed that the famous Pietro Pomponazzi’s Tractatus de immortalitate animae had been inspired by Tommaso de Vio’s Commentary on De anima – whose basic thesis was that, according to the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, the human soul was mortal – even though Pomponazzi in his entire work never mentioned Caietanus as a model. Firstly, this article frames the status quaestionis focusing on affinities and divergences between the two books and on the possible relationship and exchange (...)
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  2. Le Solutiones di Crisostomo Javelli al Defensorium di Pietro Pomponazzi. Edizione critica al esto latino.Annalisa Cappiello - 2016 - Noctua 3 (1):74-149.
    The aim of this work is to focus on the most unusual application of the Lateran bull Apostolici regiminis, the founding document of the inquisitorial legislation which regulated the teaching activity of philosophy professors by forcing them to refute any heterodox theory and to teach the doctrine of faith. In 1519, the inquisitor of Bologna Giovanni de’ Torfanni censored the book Defensorium, in which the secular Aristotelian philosopher Pietro Pomponazzi developed against his colleague Agostino Nifo a long series of arguments (...)
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  3. Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):402-415.
    Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. Building on a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), this paper offers a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. The paper explores the implications of such a solution. First, it clarifies in what sense a disagreement over hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, (...)
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  4.  41
    From Huizinga to Wittgenstein: A Philosophical Analysis of the Notions of Play, Games and Language-Games.Annalisa Sassano - 1994 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
    The main purpose of this work is presenting a philosophical analysis of the general notion of play. This analysis starts from Huizinga's definition of the "play-concept" and is extended so as to include Wittgenstein's conception of language-games. By supplementing Huizinga's definition with a distinction between "play" and "game", as the two opposite components of that concept, I carry out an investigation of some of the interesting issues raised by his book. I focus especially on the relationship between the play-phenomenon and (...)
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  5. What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.
    Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both (...)
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  6. Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.
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  7. Mapping Precariousness.Arianna Bove, Emiliana Armano & Annalisa Murgia (eds.) - 2017 - London: Routledge.
    The condition of precariousness not only provides insights into a segment of the world of work or of a particular subject group, but is also a privileged standpoint for an overview of the condition of the social on a global scale. Because precariousness is multidimensional and polysemantic, it traverses contemporary society and multiple contexts, from industrial to class, gender, family relations as well as political participation, citizenship and migration. This book maps the differences and similarities in the ways precariousness and (...)
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  8.  45
    Mythopoesis from Tenochtitlán: Annalisa D. Quagliata Blanco’s ¡Aoquic iez in Mexico! / ¡Ya México no existirá más!Byron Davies - 2024 - Millenium Film Journal 80:52-63.
    Analysis in English of Annalisa D. Quagliata Blanco’s experimental feature film ¡Aoquic iez in Mexico! /¡Ya México no existirá más! (2024).
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  9. Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.
    Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by (...)
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  10. Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):271-287.
    According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim that (...)
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  11. An analysis of bias and distrust in social hinge epistemology.Anna Pederneschi - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):258-277.
    Philosophical literature has focused on the concept of trust, but often considers distrust merely as an afterthought. Distrust however, because of its pervasive role in our everyday lives, can be quite damaging. Thus, understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for understanding our testimonial practices. In this paper I analyze whether it is rational or irrational to distrust an informant on the basis of identity bias. My aim is to show that distrust is irrational when based on negative identity bias. (...)
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  12. (1 other version)Universal hinges and the bounds of sense.Mark Fortney - 2019 - Philosophia:1-13.
    According to Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty presents a theory of hinges, and hinges have a role to play in a foundationalist epistemology (2013). Michael Williams (2005) and Annalisa Coliva (2013 ) have claimed that the hinges are not suitable to play such a role as they are not shared universally. Moyal-Sharrock has replied that a subset of the hinges is suitable to play such a role: the “universal” hinges. I argue that for Moyal-Sharrock’s reply to be sustained, she (...)
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  13. Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 1528 - In L. - & 5 H. (eds.), Non-Evidential Anti-Scepticism.
    In her book Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology (2015), Annalisa Coliva puts forward an anti-sceptical proposal based on the idea that the notion of rationality extends to the unwarrantable presuppositions “that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible” (2015: 150). These presuppositions are commonly the target of sceptical arguments, and by showing that they are on the one hand unwarrantable, but on the other are constitutive components of rationality itself, she reveals that they are beyond rational doubt and thus (...)
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  14. Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge's Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. [REVIEW]Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1):61-78.
    This is a critical notice of Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York and London: Routledge, 2021. Pp. x + 324. ISBN 978-0-367-37018-3. It discusses in some detail contributions by Nevin Climenhaga, Christos Kyriacou, Michael Hannon, Kevin Wallbridge, Annalisa Coliva, and Genia Schönbaumsfeld.
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  15. Mitopoiesis de Tenochtitlán: ¡Aoquic iez in Mexico! / ¡Ya México no existirá más!Byron Davies - 2024 - Los Experimentos.
    Spanish version of essay on the film ¡Aoquic iez in Mexico! / ¡Ya México no existirá más! (Annalisa D. Quagliata Blanco, 2024).
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