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  1. Frege on Syntax, Ontology, and Truth's Pride of Place.Colin Johnston - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):569-588.
    Frege's strict alignment between his syntactic and ontological categories is not, as is commonly assumed, some kind of a philosophical thesis. There is no thesis that proper names refer only to objects, say, or that what refers to an object is a proper name. Rather, the alignment of categories is internal to Frege's conception of what syntax and ontology are. To understand this, we need to recognise the pride of place Frege assigns within his theorising to the notion of truth. (...)
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  • The paradoxes and Russell's theory of incomplete symbols.Kevin C. Klement - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):183-207.
    Russell claims in his autobiography and elsewhere that he discovered his 1905 theory of descriptions while attempting to solve the logical and semantic paradoxes plaguing his work on the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I hope to make the connection between his work on the paradoxes and the theory of descriptions and his theory of incomplete symbols generally clearer. In particular, I argue that the theory of descriptions arose from the realization that not only can a class not be (...)
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  • Russell, His Paradoxes, and Cantor's Theorem: Part II.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):29-41.
    Sequel to Part I. In these articles, I describe Cantor’s power-class theorem, as well as a number of logical and philosophical paradoxes that stem from it, many of which were discovered or considered (implicitly or explicitly) in Bertrand Russell’s work. These include Russell’s paradox of the class of all classes not members of themselves, as well as others involving properties, propositions, descriptive senses, class-intensions and equivalence classes of coextensional properties. Part II addresses Russell’s own various attempts to solve these paradoxes, (...)
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  • The functions of Russell’s no class theory.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):633-664.
    Certain commentators on Russell's “no class” theory, in which apparent reference to classes or sets is eliminated using higher-order quantification, including W. V. Quine and (recently) Scott Soames, have doubted its success, noting the obscurity of Russell’s understanding of so-called “propositional functions”. These critics allege that realist readings of propositional functions fail to avoid commitment to classes or sets (or something equally problematic), and that nominalist readings fail to meet the demands placed on classes by mathematics. I show that Russell (...)
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  • Hierarchical Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):215-231.
    The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...)
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  • Why did Frege reject the theory of types?Wim Vanrie - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):517-536.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege seems to neglect. (...)
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  • Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants.Scott Soames - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1681-1696.
    Reply to Beaney: the closing of the historical mindIn his comments, Michael Beaney sets himself up as the arbiter of what is genuine history and what isn’t. While celebrating the outpouring of specialized scholarship on Frege, he has no patience with the enterprise outlined in the Précis, which attempts to construct a large-scale picture of the richness of the analytic tradition. That enterprise is one in which great figures of our recent past are challenged by aspects of contemporary thought, and (...)
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  • Unity through truth.Bryan Pickel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.
    Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory (...)
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  • Complex Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (2):209-230.
    The existence of complex predicates seems to support an abundant conception of properties. Specifically, the application conditions for complex predicates seem to be explained by the distribution of a sparser base of predicates. This explanatory link might suggest that the existence and distribution of properties expressed by complex predicates are explained by the existence and distribution of a sparser base of properties. Thus, complex predicates seem to legitimize the assumption of a wide array of properties. The additional properties are no (...)
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  • How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):121 - 146.
    In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the (...)
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  • Logical categories, signs, and elucidation in Frege.Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Ghent
    Frege's conception of the logical categories has vexed commentators for decades. In this dissertation, I argue that it revolves around two forms of internality. The first is the internality of its use in the expression of judgment to the sign. A proper understanding of that internality reveals how Frege's philosophical logic cannot be fit into the framework given by the contemporary syntax/semantics distinction. The second is the internality that obtains between the way in which Begriffsschrift signs stratify into different categories, (...)
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