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Why does duress undermine consent?1

Noûs 55 (2):317-333 (2019)

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  1. Exploitation’s grounding problem.Benjamin Ferguson - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-19.
    Standard accounts of what makes exploitation wrong ground its wrong in distributive unfairness: when A exploits B he wrongs her by taking a greater share of the benefits from their interaction than he ought. I argue that this standard account does not succeed; distributive unfairness is neither the sole, nor the primary wrong of exploitation. I assume that distributive unfairness is pro tanto wrong. However, I argue that in situations where transactors’ consent to a transaction is morally valid, it is (...)
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  • What is a Right?Kieran Setiya - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues for a theory of natural rights on which they are explained in terms of reasons supplied by rational consent. When B has a claim-right against A that A φ, A’s non-consent is not a reason for B not to simply make A φ. This theory solves a puzzle that defeats alternative views, including standard will and interest theories, the demand theory of rights, and the view that rights are irreducible or primitive.
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  • Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account.Sameer Bajaj & Patrick Tomlin - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):709-731.
    How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for Z because (...)
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  • Social constraints on sexual consent.Tom Dougherty - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (4):393-414.
    Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 393-414, November 2022. Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this principle, someone's consent to a sexual (...)
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  • Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion.Maximilian Kiener - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):361-389.
    This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather than the third party’s coercion taken separately, and I will specify the conditions under which consent is invalid. My view, which is a novel version of what I call a (...)
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  • Autonomy and the folk concept of valid consent.Joanna Demaree-Cotton & Roseanna Sommers - 2022 - Cognition 224 (C):105065.
    Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that (...)
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  • Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future.Tom Dougherty - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):441-461.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 2, Page 441-461, September 2021.
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  • Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding.Tom Dougherty - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (2):119-150.
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  • Contrastive Consent and Third Party Coercion.David Enoch - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).
    If Badguy threatens Goodguy with harm, and Goodguy consents to giving his money to Badguy (to avoid the harm), Goodguy’s consent is invalid because coerced. But if under Badguy’s coercive threat Goodguy proceeds to consent to paying someone else (or to hiring a bodyguard), the consent may very well be valid. The challenge is to explain this difference. In this paper I argue that the way forward is to recognize that the content of consent is contrastive – one doesn’t just (...)
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  • Coercion Without Incapacitation.William R. Tadros - 2023 - Law and Philosophy 42 (1):1-36.
    This essay examines why coerced conduct tends not to have the moral and legal consequences that non-coerced conduct often has. In it, I argue against the “incapacitation approach,” the view that coerced conduct tends not to result in the coercer acquiring a permission or an entitlement because the coercee is typically incapable of exercising her rights to change the coercer’s permissions or entitlements. After demonstrating that coercees retain the ability to exercise those rights, this article develops an alternative account: that (...)
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