Related

Contents
350 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 350
  1. Five Steps to Understand the Mental State: A Contribution from the Economics of Emotions to the Theory of Mind.Kazuo Kadokawa - manuscript
    In recent years, the economics of emotions (EoE) field, which aims to create models of the human mind, has grown quickly. EoE models work well with simulation theory (ST), which is one of the main theories of mind. EoE models show how people's behavior and emotions change based on their knowledge and perception of others. It is hoped that by developing this model, it will be possible to quantitatively analyze not only the mental states of real others, but also the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Val Dusek' Philosophy of Technology (Arabic Translation of the Introduction and Chapters III and IV) فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق.Salah Osman - manuscript
    فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق، في إطار مشروع لترجمة الكتاب بالكامل بالاشتراك مع آخرين.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. What’s a rational self-torturer to do?Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This paper concerns Warren Quinn’s famous “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.” I argue that even if we accept his assumption that practical rationality is purely instrumental such that what he ought to do is simply a function of how the relevant options compare to each other in terms of satisfying his actual preferences that doesn’t mean that every explanation as to why he shouldn’t advance to the next level must appeal to the idea that so advancing would be suboptimal in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. A critical assessment of scientific retroduction.H. G. Solari & M. A. Natiello - manuscript
    We analyse Peirce's original idea concerning abduction from the perspective of a critical philosophy, the same philosophy in Peirce's background. Peirce's realism is directly related to reason and experience and has ties with the idea of abstraction. We show how the philosophical environment of science abruptly changed, specially for physics, in the last period of the XIX century and the initial period of the XX century, when science was divided in disciplines and set free from the control of philosophy. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. (1 other version)Metanormative Regress: An Escape Plan.Christian Tarsney - manuscript
    How should you decide what to do when you're uncertain about basic normative principles (e.g., Kantianism vs. utilitarianism)? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order" norm: e.g., "comply with the first-order norm you regard as most probable" or "maximize expected choiceworthiness". But what if you're uncertain about second-order norms too -- must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, it seems that any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty is doomed to a vicious regress. In this paper, I aim (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Plausible Permissivism.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscript
    Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer disagreement. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  7. Is there a liberal principle of instrumental transmission?Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018
    Some of our reasons for action are grounded in the fact that the action in question is a means to something else we have reason to do. This raises the question as to which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of a liberal transmission principle, which plays a prominent role in the current literature. The principle states that an agent has an instrumental reason to whenever -ing is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. The Extended Theory of Instrumental Rationality and Means-Ends Coherence.John Brunero - forthcoming - Philosophical Inquiries.
    In Rational Powers in Action, Sergio Tenenbaum sets out a new theory of instrumental rationality that departs from standard discussions of means-ends coherence in the literature on structural rationality in at least two interesting ways: it takes intentional action (as opposed to intention) to be what puts in place the relevant instrumental requirements, and it applies to both necessary and non-necessary means. I consider these two developments in more detail. On the first, I argue that Tenenbaum’s theory is too narrow (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Coherence, First-Personal Deliberation, and Crossword Puzzles.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation? According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first-personal deliberation. When we deliberate, we should merely care about the reasons or evidence we have for our attitudes. So, considerations of coherence should not show up in deliberation. In response to this argument, Worsnip (2021) argues that considerations of coherence matter for how we structure deliberation. For him, we should treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. When Things Fail to Fit Together.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Critical Notice of Alex Worsnip's 'Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality' (OUP 2021).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Extending The Realm of Reason: On The Epistemic Profile of Perceptual Experience.Paweł Grad - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    Are perceptual experiences epistemically appraisable? In this paper, I argue, contra Siegel (Rationality of perception, Oxford 2017) that they are not (§§ 2–3). I also show how the problem of hijacked experience can be solved without endorsing the view that perceptual experience is epistemically appraisable (§§ 4–5). A key idea behind my proposal is a disjunctivist view on rationalising and epistemic powers of perceptual experience.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Sensory Modality and Perceptual Reasons.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - Episteme:1-7.
    Perception can provide us with a privileged source of evidence about the external world – evidence that makes it rational to believe things about the world. In Reasons First, Mark Schroeder offers a new view on how perception does so. The central motivation behind Schroeder’s account is to offer an answer to what evidence perception equips us with according to which it is what he calls world-implicating but non-factive, and thereby to glean some of the key advantages of both externalism (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    This paper offers an account of deontic normativity in terms of attributive goodness. An action is permissible for S in C just in case there is a good practical inference available to S in C that results in S performing (or intending to perform) the action. The standards of goodness for practical inferences are determined by what is a good or bad exercise of the human capacity of practical reason, which is an attributive (and not a deontic) assessment.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Robust vs Formal Normativity II, Or: No Gods, No Masters, No Authoritative Normativity.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. When Reasons Run Out.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent’s favoring and disfavoring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent’s normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favor, if not because favoring is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Review of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality[REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Mind.
    This a review of Alex Worsnip's book 'Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality'.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Who is a Reasoner?Yair Levy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper aims to make progress in understanding the nature of reasoning. Its primary goal is to spell out and defend a novel account of what reasoning might be, in terms of how reasoning contributes to settling (practical and theoretical) inquiries. Prior to spelling out this constructive proposal, however, the paper problematizes a very common picture of reasoning in an attempt to demonstrate the need for an alternative approach. The overarching argument of the paper is comprised of three stages. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Varieties of Second-Personal Reason.James H. P. Lewis - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
    The typical epistemology course begins with a discussion of the distinction between justification and knowledge and ends without any discussion of the distinction between justification and excuse. This is unfortunate. If we had a better understanding of the justification-excuse distinction, we would have a better understanding of the intuitions that shape the internalism-externalism debate. My aims in this paper are these. First, I will explain how the kinds of excuses that should interest epistemologists exculpate. Second, I will explain why the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  20. n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), The Future of Normativity. Oxford:
    We argue that there is nothing that can do the work that normative reasons are expected to do. A currently popular view is that in any given situation, a set of normative reasons (understood as a set of facts, typically about the agent’s situation) always determines the ways we prospectively should or should not respond. We discuss an example that we think shows no such collection of facts could have this normative significance. A radical response might be to dispense with (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. What Perceptualists Can Say About Reasons for Emotion.Michael Milona - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Perceptualism is a prominent theory analyzing emotions as perceptual experiences of value. A longstanding challenge to perceptualism says that emotions cannot be perceptual because they are subject to normative assessments in terms of reasons and rationality while perceptual experiences are not. I defend perceptualism from this charge. My argument begins by distinguishing two forms of normative assessment: fundamental and non-fundamental. Perceptualism is compatible with the latter (i.e., non-fundamental reasons and rationality); even sensory experiences are so assessable. I next argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Problems on the Legalization of LGBT Marriage in the Communist Block - A Preliminary Legal Review.Yang Immanuel Pachankis - forthcoming - Scientific Research Publishing.
    The article analyzes the legislative issues on equal marriage in P. R. China. It adopts a path dependency analysis on the liberal institutional order’s effects to the regime’s structural discrimination on the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) population. The research adopted a duo-lingual paradigm on Christianity with intercultural and transnational interpretations, and the research found the mis-adaption of language in the Chinese text of the United Nations charter is the key source to the suppression of the LGBT population in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Explainable AI lacks regulative reasons: why AI and human decision‑making are not equally opaque.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - AI and Ethics.
    Many artificial intelligence (AI) systems currently used for decision-making are opaque, i.e., the internal factors that determine their decisions are not fully known to people due to the systems’ computational complexity. In response to this problem, several researchers have argued that human decision-making is equally opaque and since simplifying, reason-giving explanations (rather than exhaustive causal accounts) of a decision are typically viewed as sufficient in the human case, the same should hold for algorithmic decision-making. Here, I contend that this argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. Should We Respond Correctly to Our Reasons?Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Episteme.
    It has been argued that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Recent defenses of the normativity of rationality assume that this implies that we always ought to be rational. However, this follows only if the reasons rationality requires us to correctly respond to are normative reasons. Recent meta-epistemological contributions have questioned whether epistemic reasons are normative. If they were right, then epistemic rationality wouldn’t provide us with normative reasons independently of wrong-kind reasons to be epistemically rational. This paper spells (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Are there are normative reasons to have – or refrain from having – certain emotions? The dominant view is that there are. I disagree. In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism – the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Promotionalism, Orthogonality, and Instrumental Convergence.Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-31.
    Suppose there are no in-principle restrictions on the contents of arbitrarily intelligent agents’ goals. According to “instrumental convergence” arguments, potentially scary things follow. I do two things in this paper. First, focusing on the influential version of the instrumental convergence argument due to Nick Bostrom, I explain why such arguments require an account of “promotion,” i.e., an account of what it is to “promote” a goal. Then, I consider whether extant accounts of promotion in the literature -- in particular, probabilistic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. An Epistemic Non-individualistic Point of View on Reflection: An Essay.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - forthcoming - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy:731-756.
    This essay aims to motivate an epistemic non-individualistic conception of reflection. The proposal is non-individualistic because (a) it addresses more than individual metacognitive performance and (b) it refers to a situation in which two or more people are in dialogical disagreement about the same subject matter or target proposition; (c) their dispute is based on conversational space and they are entitled to expect one another to be engaged in attempts at truth, avoidance of error, and understanding. I call this proposal (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Rationality Reunified.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    It is now standard to distinguish between two kinds of rationality: substantive rationality, which consists in holding attitudes that are substantively reasonable or justified, and structural rationality, which consists in holding attitudes that fit together in the right ways. What, if anything, unifies these two kinds of rationality? In this paper, I propose that norms of rationality arise because we are epistemically limited beings who cannot directly ensure the correctness of our attitudes. Substantive and structural rationality represent two different ways (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. "From Outside of Ethics" review, John Gibbons, *The Norm of Belief* (OUP, 2013). [REVIEW]Daniel Star - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    According to the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is epistemically rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open on Saturdays, can depend not only on the strength of the person’s evidence, but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open on Saturdays. In recent years, philosophers (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Normative Power of Resolutions.Angela Sun - forthcoming - The Monist.
    This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. Resolution-making is therefore a normative power: an ability we have to alter our normative circumstances through sheer acts of will. I argue that the reasons we incur from forming resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. Beyond Evidence in Epistemology: Introduction.Marie Van Loon, Anne Meylan & Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    This special issue arises from the observation that an exploration of the role of non-evidential considerations in epistemology through a broader lens is missing from the current landscape of philosophical research. The present collection of contributions fills this research gap by bringing together three central and much-discussed epistemological topics for which non-evidential considerations become relevant.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. (1 other version)Coherence.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    The term ‘coherence’ (and its antonym ‘incoherence’) is used in a bewildering variety of ways in epistemology (and in philosophy more broadly). This entry attempts to bring some discipline to uses of the term by offering a taxonomy of notions of coherence (and incoherence), and then surveying which of the resulting notions is (or should be) at work in the various different contexts in which it is deployed.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Appreciating Taylor’s Versions: An Aesthetic Love Story.Irene Martínez Marín - 2025 - In Brandon Polite (ed.), Taylor Swift and the Philosophy of Re-recording: The Art of Taylor's Versions. Bloomsbury.
    Internal coherence is of great importance for how we think about appreciating objects of aesthetic worth. A disagreement between what we judge to be worthy and what we affectively favor can prevent us from properly grasping its value. However, it is also assumed in the aesthetic domain that our taste changes over time, jeopardising such coherence constraint. These changes can lead to a mismatch between new aesthetic judgments and old aesthetic preferences. This chapter explores a number of issues that emerge (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Responsibility for rationality: foundations of an ethics of mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2025 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Pragmatism, truth, and cognitive agency.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1811-1824.
    The main objection to pragmatism about knowledge is that it entails that truth-irrelevant factors can make a difference to knowledge. Blake Roeber [2018. “Anti-Intellectualism.” Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 127: 437–466] has recently argued that this objection fails. I agree with Roeber. But in this paper, I present another way of thinking about the dispute between purists and pragmatists about knowledge. I do so by formulating a new objection to pragmatism about knowledge. This is that pragmatism about knowledge entails (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Is Rationality Normative for Reasoning?James L. D. Brown - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    The reasoning view of rational normativity claims that structural rationality is normative for reasoning. Specifically, it claims that structural rationality gives us reasons to structure deliberation in ways that respect the requirements of rationality. This paper critically assesses the reasoning view. It argues that while the reasoning view might succeed in responding to arguments against the normativity of rationality, it is in tension with the motivations for thinking that rationality is normative in the first place. Moreover, proponents of the view (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Must Depression be Irrational?Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2024 - Synthese 204 (79):1-26.
    The received view about depression in the philosophical literature is that it is defined, in part, by epistemic irrationality. This status is undeserved. The received view does not fully reflect current clinical thinking and is motivated by an overly simplistic, if not false, account of depression’s phenomenal character. Equally attractive, if not more so, is a view that says depression can be instantiated either rationally or irrationally. This rival view faces challenges of its own: it appears to entail that there (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Reasons and belief.Daniel Fogal - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):323-348.
    Much recent work in epistemology has concerned the relationship between the epistemic and the practical, with a particular focus on the question of how, if at all, practical considerations affect what we ought to believe. Two main positive accounts have been proposed: reasons pragmatism and pragmatic encroachment. According to reasons pragmatism, practical (including moral) considerations can affect what we ought to believe by constituting distinctively practical (i.e., non‐epistemic) reasons for or against belief. According to pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations bear on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Coherence as Joint Satisfiability.Samuel Fullhart & Camilo Martinez - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):312-332.
    According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating various coherence requirements. Surprisingly, they have said very little about what it takes for a set of attitudes to be coherent in general. We articulate and defend a general account on which a set of attitudes is coherent just in case and because it is logically possible for the attitudes to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42. Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):939-958.
    Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent’s knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which KDTs relate knowledge and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. The Isaac Levi Prize 2023: Optimization and Beyond.Akshath Jitendranath - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (3):1-2.
    This paper will be concerned with hard choices—that is, choice situations where an agent cannot make a rationally justified choice. Specifically, this paper asks: if an agent cannot optimize in a given situation, are they facing a hard choice? A pair of claims are defended in light of this question. First, situations where an agent cannot optimize because of incompleteness of the binary preference or value relation constitute a hard choice. Second, situations where agents cannot optimize because the binary preference (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik Tollerup Junker & Thor Grünbaum - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (5):706–725.
    Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View.Marko Jurjako - 2024 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.
    In “Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View”, Marko Jurjako explores the foundational concept of normative reasons through the lens of methodological naturalism. Departing from traditional analytic or purely conceptual approaches, this philosophical inquiry navigates the terrain of reasons, rationality, and normativity—concepts with a long philosophical pedigree—within a framework rooted in our understanding of the natural and social world. By aligning the exploration with scientifically based theorizing, the book seeks a synoptic view that bridges the gap between relatively isolated (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Epistemic normativity without epistemic teleology.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):349-370.
    This article is concerned with a puzzle that arises from three initially plausible assumptions that form an inconsistent triad: (i) Epistemic reasons are normative reasons (normativism); (ii) reasons are normative only if conformity with them is good (the reasons/value‐link); (iii) conformity with epistemic reasons need not be good (the nihilist assumption). I start by defending the reasons/value‐link, arguing that normativists need to reject the nihilist assumption. I then argue that the most familiar view that denies the nihilist assumption—epistemic teleology—is untenable. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.
    The normativity of so-called “coherence” or “structural” requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip’s recent account. It first argues that Worsnip’s account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries.Olof Leffler - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2):371-404.
    Constitutivist approaches to the normativity of rationality have recently come into vogue. Unlike their moral counterparts, however, they have not been confronted with the shmagency objection. In this paper, I challenge them with two versions of the objection based on recent developments in the debate surrounding the normativity of morality. These are shmagency as modal escapability, which is based on taking sophisticated shmagents to be able to modally escape various norms, and shmagency as underdetermination, which is based on taking constitutive (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.
    A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality. On our view, it's rational to believe when it's sufficiently likely that you'd know (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  50. Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2).
    That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 350