WO2021109770A1 - 无线网络切换方法及设备 - Google Patents

无线网络切换方法及设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021109770A1
WO2021109770A1 PCT/CN2020/125794 CN2020125794W WO2021109770A1 WO 2021109770 A1 WO2021109770 A1 WO 2021109770A1 CN 2020125794 W CN2020125794 W CN 2020125794W WO 2021109770 A1 WO2021109770 A1 WO 2021109770A1
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Prior art keywords
access device
association
field
key
random number
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PCT/CN2020/125794
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张变玲
赖晓龙
铁满霞
王月辉
赵晓荣
李琴
张国强
杜志强
Original Assignee
西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
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Application filed by 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 filed Critical 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority to JP2022532781A priority Critical patent/JP7492215B2/ja
Priority to EP20896683.8A priority patent/EP4061038B1/en
Priority to US17/781,577 priority patent/US20220417750A1/en
Priority to KR1020227022605A priority patent/KR20220110536A/ko
Publication of WO2021109770A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021109770A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/14—Reselecting a network or an air interface
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to the field of communications, and in particular to a wireless network switching method, request device, and access device.
  • wireless communication technology has gradually become one of the mainstream communication technologies.
  • the coverage area of a wireless access device is limited. Therefore, handover of the wireless access device often occurs during the movement, and the delay generated during the handover directly affects the communication experience.
  • a mobile terminal device When a mobile terminal device accesses a wireless communication network for the first time, it needs to perform a complete initial identity authentication process with a wireless access device. This process can be referred to as initial mobile domain association.
  • the wireless access device to which the mobile terminal device associates for the first time is called the initial access device, and the mobile terminal device may be called the requesting device.
  • the requesting device and the initial access device perform identity authentication and key agreement.
  • the requesting device switches from the currently associated wireless access device to a new wireless access device during the movement process, a handover process needs to be performed, and the new wireless access device is the target access device.
  • the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 series of specifications provides a fast switching mechanism.
  • the mechanism adopts a hierarchical key scheme, specifically, the identity authentication is performed between the requesting device (Station, STA) and the authentication authorization accounting server (Authentication Authorization Accounting Server, AAA Server) and the master secret is generated Key, the master key is sent to the access point (Access Point, AP), and then it is exported hierarchically.
  • a total of 0, 1, and 2 level keys are derived during the initial authentication, and then when a network switch occurs, the first and second level keys are re-derived. Since there may be multiple access devices in the network, each time Switching needs to re-derive the first and second level keys, which complicates the network switching process and reduces the efficiency of wireless network switching.
  • the present disclosure provides a wireless network handover method.
  • the requesting device and the target access device verify the integrity check code based on the message integrity check key derived from the domain key, thereby realizing the identity of the other party.
  • the identity is authenticated, it directly uses the domain key and the random number of both parties to generate the session key, which is used to realize the secure communication between the two parties after the handover is successful.
  • the present disclosure also provides corresponding request equipment and access equipment.
  • the first aspect of the present disclosure provides a wireless network handover method, the method includes:
  • the target access device receives the first random number sent by the requesting device, the identification of the requesting device, the identification of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during the initial mobile domain association, and the first An integrity check code to obtain the corresponding domain key according to the identifier of the selected domain key, generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key, and use the message integrity check key To verify the first integrity check code;
  • the target access device When the first integrity check code is verified, the target access device adds the identity of the requesting device to the association list, generates a second random number, and based on the domain key and the first A random number and the second random number generate a session key, where the session key is used to implement secure communication between the requesting device and the target access device after a successful handover;
  • the requesting device receives the second random number sent by the target access device, the first random number sent by the target access device, the identity of the target access device, and the second integrity check code, When the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number previously sent by the requesting device, check the integrity of the message based on the domain key determined by the requesting device. The verification key verifies the second integrity check code;
  • the requesting device receives the association status code, and when the association status code indicates that the association is successful, it is determined that the handover is successful.
  • a second aspect of the present disclosure provides a requesting device, and the requesting device includes:
  • the sending module is configured to send to the target access device the first random number generated by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, and the domain key group selected by the requesting device during the initial mobile domain association The identifier of the domain key and the first integrity check code;
  • the receiving module is configured to receive the second random number, the first random number, the identity of the target access device, the second integrity check code, and the associated status code sent by the target access device.
  • the second random number is generated when the target access device passes the verification of the first integrity check code;
  • the verification module is configured to: when the association status code indicates that the association is successful, and the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number previously sent by the requesting device, according to the requesting device based on Verifying the second integrity check code by the message integrity check key determined by the domain key;
  • the generating module is configured to generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number when the second integrity check code is verified, so as to implement network switching.
  • a third aspect of the present disclosure provides an access device, and the access device includes:
  • the receiving module is configured to receive the first random number sent by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, the identification of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during the initial mobile domain association, and the second An integrity check code;
  • a generating module configured to obtain a corresponding domain key according to the identifier of the selected domain key, and generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key;
  • a verification module configured to verify the first integrity check code according to the message integrity check key
  • the generating module is further configured to, when the first integrity check code is verified, add the identity of the requesting device to the association list, generate a second random number, and based on the domain key, the Generating a session key from the first random number and the second random number, where the session key is used to implement secure communication between the requesting device and the access device after a successful handover;
  • the sending module is configured to send a second random number, the first random number, the identity of the access device, a second integrity check code, and an association status code to an access device, where the association status code is used for Identify the successful or failed association of the requesting device.
  • the requesting device can select a domain key from the domain key group generated during the initial mobile domain association, and directly generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key, and use the message integrity
  • the sex check key calculates the fields that interact with the target access device to generate the first integrity check code.
  • the target access device when the target access device receives the first random number, the identity of the requesting device, the identification of the selected domain key, and the first complete verification code sent by the requesting device, it can directly obtain the corresponding Domain key, and generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key, and use the message integrity check key to verify the first integrity check code, thereby realizing the identity of the target access device to the requesting device Authentication; when the verification is passed, the target access device adds the requesting device identity to the association list, generates a second random number, and generates a session key based on the domain key and the random numbers of the two parties, which is used to achieve all after the successful handover The secure communication between the requesting device and the target access device.
  • the requesting device can receive the first random number, the identity of the target access device, and the second integrity check code sent by the target access device.
  • the message integrity check key generated in the same way as the target access device is used to verify the second integrity check code, so as to realize the identity authentication of the target access device by the requesting device;
  • the session key is generated in the same way as the target access device.
  • the requesting device receives an association status code indicating that the association is successful, and determines that the handover is successful.
  • the requesting device and the target access device directly generate the message integrity check key through the domain key, and verify the integrity check code based on the message integrity check key, thereby realizing the identity authentication of both parties .
  • the domain key is combined with the random number of both parties to generate the session key, which simplifies the handover process and realizes a safe and efficient network handover.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a wireless network handover method in an embodiment of the disclosure
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a wireless network switching method in a wireless local area network scenario in an embodiment of the disclosure
  • FIG. 3 is a signaling flowchart of initial mobile domain association in an embodiment of the disclosure
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a process of deriving a domain key group in an embodiment of the disclosure
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of another process of deriving a domain key group in an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6A is a flowchart of a wireless network handover method in the over-the-air mode of the embodiment in FIG. 2; FIG.
  • FIG. 6B is a flowchart of the wireless network handover method in the over-the-DS mode in the embodiment of FIG. 2; FIG.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a requesting device in an embodiment of the disclosure.
  • Fig. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of an access device in an embodiment of the disclosure.
  • the access device that is, the wireless access point AP, converts the wired electrical signal into a radio signal and sends it out to form the coverage of the wireless network, and serves as the cable network and the wireless network.
  • the bridge connects the wireless network to a wired network such as Ethernet, and the requesting device STA in the wireless network coverage area can connect to the network through the AP.
  • APs can often be interconnected. As users move, STAs often need to switch between APs and maintain network connections. As the requirements for STA handover delays between APs become more and more stringent, the IEE802.11 series of specifications proposes a fast handover mechanism based on hierarchical keys. When handover needs are required, first check between STA and AAA Server. Perform identity authentication to generate the master key, and then the AAA Server sends the master key to the AP, and then derives it hierarchically. During each switching process, it is necessary to re-derive the first and second level keys, which makes the switching process more cumbersome and affects Improved switching efficiency.
  • the present disclosure proposes a wireless network switching method.
  • the STA generates a domain key group when performing initial mobile domain association.
  • the STA selects a domain key from the domain key group to generate a message integrity check Key:
  • the STA sends the identification of the selected domain key to the target AP, and the target AP obtains the domain key based on the identification, thereby generating the same message integrity check key based on the domain key.
  • both the STA and the target AP can use the message integrity check key to verify the integrity check code, thereby realizing the identity verification of the other party.
  • the session key can be directly generated based on the domain key and the random number of both parties , Used to realize network switching when the identity of the other party is confirmed to be legal. Since the domain key can be used to directly generate the session key without re-deriving the first and second level keys, the number of key derivations during the handover process is reduced, the handover process is simplified, the handover speed is accelerated, and the handover efficiency is improved.
  • the method includes:
  • the target access device receives the first random number sent by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, and the identification of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during initial mobile domain association And the first integrity check code, obtain a corresponding domain key according to the identifier of the selected domain key, and generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key.
  • the domain key group generated by the requesting device during initial mobile domain association can be used to implement wireless network handover.
  • the domain key group may include multiple domain keys, and during network switching, the requesting device can select a domain key from them for network switching. Considering security, the requesting device can select a different domain key during each handover process.
  • the first integrity check code received by the target access device is that the requesting device passes the message integrity check key, and uses the message integrity check algorithm to verify the first random number sent by the requesting device and the requesting device.
  • the fields including the identity identifier of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during the initial mobile domain association are calculated.
  • the target access device can obtain the corresponding domain key according to the identifier of the selected domain key.
  • the target access device generates a message integrity verification key based on the domain key, which is the same way that the request device generates a message integrity verification key.
  • the target access device uses the message integrity check key to verify the first integrity check code.
  • the target access device can first look up the domain key locally based on the identifier of the domain key, and when the local lookup fails, then based on the initial access device’s identity obtained from the requesting device, The identity of the device, which requests the domain key from the initial access device.
  • the target access device may first request the domain key from the initial access device when the requesting device switches to the target access device for the first time. When the requesting device switches to other access devices, then When other access devices switch back to the target access device, the target access device can obtain the domain key locally.
  • the target access device can also set a limit on the time or number of times the same domain key can be obtained. For example, the domain key cannot be obtained after it is stored locally for more than 5 minutes, or the domain key is obtained locally After the number of times reaches 3 times, it will not be available.
  • the target access device can obtain the domain key group during the first handover. In this way, in the subsequent handover process, the corresponding domain key can be directly obtained locally, and the domain key can be used to achieve Network switching.
  • the device When generating the message integrity verification key based on the domain key, the device is requested to select the domain key, and the target access device can determine the domain key through the identifier of the domain key.
  • the requesting device and the target access device specify the domain key as the base key BK, and use BK as the protocol key PK used in the authentication process.
  • the message integrity check is generated using the key derivation algorithm negotiated or preset by both parties.
  • the verification key that is, the protocol integrity key MTK, and the key derivation algorithm may be a pseudo-random algorithm or a hash algorithm.
  • the requesting device or the target access device may generate the MTK based on the PK and the selected first character string.
  • the target access device When the first integrity check code is verified, the target access device adds the identity of the requesting device to the association list, generates a second random number, and based on the domain key, The first random number and the second random number generate a session key.
  • the target access device can add the identity of the requesting device to the association list to realize the association between the target access device and the requesting device.
  • the association list may be a storage area in the target access device for storing the identity of the requesting device that has passed the identity verification.
  • the form of the association list is not limited in this disclosure.
  • the target access device also generates a second random number.
  • the target access device can generate a session key according to the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number, which is used to implement the requesting device and the second random number after a successful handover. Secure communication of the target access device.
  • the target access device can end this verification process and stop the handover.
  • the requesting device receives the second random number sent by the target access device, the first random number sent by the target access device, the identity of the target access device, and the second integrity check Code and associated status code, when the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number previously sent by the requesting device, according to the requesting device determined based on the domain key
  • the message integrity check key verifies the second integrity check code.
  • the second integrity check code received by the requesting device is the target access device based on the message integrity check key, and the message integrity check algorithm is used to verify the integrity of the target access device. Fields including the sent second random number, the first random number sent by the target access device, and the identity of the target access device are calculated. Therefore, the requesting device can determine the message integrity check key based on the domain key, and use the message integrity check key to verify the second integrity check code.
  • the second integrity check code When the second integrity check code is verified, it indicates that the requesting device has passed the identity authentication of the target access device.
  • the requesting device can use the same calculation method as the target access device, based on the domain key, the first random number and the The second random number generates the session key.
  • the target access device determines that the requesting device has passed the identity authentication and both parties have generated the session key, it sends the requesting device an association status code indicating the success or failure of the association, and the requesting device receives the association status code.
  • the status code indicates that the association is successful, and the handover is determined to be successful.
  • the requesting device can exchange data with the target access device.
  • wireless network switching method can be applied to any wireless network, including cellular networks, wireless local area networks, wireless metropolitan area networks, and so on.
  • the fields that the target access device interacts with the requesting device are the first random number, the identity of the requesting device, and the identity of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during the initial mobile domain association.
  • the first integrity check code, or the second random number, the identity of the target access device, the second integrity check code, and the associated status code can be carried in a management message used to transmit signaling information, For example, it can be carried in a management frame in a wireless local area network, in a command frame in a personal area network, and in a signaling frame in a mobile communication network.
  • management messages are original messages in the network.
  • these interactive fields are not carried in the management messages, additional data types of messages need to be added to send them separately, which will increase the number of message interactions. If these fields are carried in management messages, the number of message interactions can be reduced and the efficiency of the interaction can be improved; on the other hand, if these fields are carried in management messages, the session key and message integrity check can be obtained as soon as possible The key can protect the management message and improve the security of the management message. If it is carried in the data message, the time point for obtaining the key will be delayed, so that the management message cannot be protected.
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure provides a wireless network switching method, in which the requesting device and the target access device directly generate a message integrity check key through a domain key, and based on the message integrity check key to complete the The identity verification code is used to verify the identity of both parties.
  • the domain key is combined with the random number of both parties to generate the session key, which simplifies the handover process and realizes a safe and efficient network handover.
  • WLAN wireless local area network
  • a WLAN can include multiple APs as access devices.
  • the requesting device STA can switch from the current AP to the target AP.
  • the requesting device STA can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, and other terminal devices.
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • the requesting device STA is not limited to the above-mentioned devices.
  • the following describes a wireless network handover method provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure with reference to FIG. 2.
  • the method includes:
  • the STA sends a fast handover verification request message to the target AP.
  • the fast handover verification request message includes the MDE field and the first fast handover information element FTIE field.
  • the MDE field identifies that fast handover is supported, and it includes a mobile domain identifier MDID and fast handover capability policy information.
  • the first FTIE field includes the first random number Nonce STA generated by the STA , the identity identifier ID STA of the STA , and the identifier of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the STA during initial mobile domain association Keyname STA and the first integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK).
  • each AP in a wireless network usually broadcasts its own MDE field periodically.
  • the STA When the STA needs to access the target AP, it will carry the received MDE field broadcast by the target AP in the fast handover verification request message.
  • MacTag STA1 is the message integrity verification key generated by the STA based on the selected domain key.
  • the message integrity verification algorithm is used to verify that the fast handover verification request message is included except MacTag STA1 (MTK).
  • Other fields are generated by calculations.
  • the receiver holds the selected domain key, it can generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key, and the receiver based on the message integrity check key pair includes the fast handover verification request message except MacTag STA1 Local calculations are performed on fields other than (MTK), and the calculation result is compared with MacTag STA1 (MTK) to verify the MacTag STA1 (MTK), thereby realizing the identity authentication of the target AP to the STA.
  • the fast handover verification request message can also carry the identity ID InitAP of the initial access device.
  • the target AP does not find the selected domain key locally, it can request the domain secret from the initial AP according to ID InitAP. key.
  • the first FTIE field may also include the security capability parameter information Security Capabilities STA supported by the STA, so that the target AP can select the security capability parameter to be used accordingly.
  • Security Capabilities STA can specifically include the identity authentication suite, symmetric encryption algorithm, hash algorithm, key exchange algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm, etc. supported by the STA.
  • the target AP can select the algorithm used to generate the session key based on the above algorithm. , Such as the first key derivation algorithm.
  • the fast handover verification request message may also include a security information element field, which is used to identify the security function supported, and a security policy can be negotiated through this field.
  • the security information element field may be a WAPI security information element field, that is, WAPI[BKID].
  • S202 The target AP verifies the MacTag STA1 (MTK) based on the message integrity verification key determined by the domain key. When the verification is passed, S203 is executed.
  • MTK MacTag STA1
  • the target AP After receiving the MacTag STA1 (MTK), the target AP generates a message integrity verification key based on the domain key, and the message integrity verification key pair includes the fast handover verification request message except MacTag STA1 (MTK). Local calculation is performed on other fields other than ), and the calculation result is compared with MacTag STA1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the STA identity authentication is passed and the subsequent process can be executed. If they are inconsistent, the STA identity authentication fails and the handover can be ended. Process.
  • the target AP adds the ID STA to the association list, generates a second random number Nonce newAP , and generates a session key based on the domain key, the first random number Nonce STA, and the second random number Nonce newAP.
  • the target AP generates a session key based on the information including the domain key, Nonce STA and Nonce newAP , and uses the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected by the target access device to generate the session key. It can be used to implement secure communication between the requesting device and the target access device after the handover is successful.
  • the target AP can also increase the identity of both parties when calculating the session key to increase the complexity of the session key, thereby ensuring security, that is, the target AP according to the domain key, Nonce STA , Nonce newAP , ID STA
  • the information including ID newAP is used to calculate the session key using the first key derivation algorithm.
  • S204 The target AP sends a fast handover verification response message to the STA.
  • the fast handover verification response message includes the MDE field and the second FTIE field, and the second FTIE field includes the Nonce newAP , Nonce STA , ID newAP, and a second integrity check code MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • MacTag newAP1 is the message integrity verification key generated by the target AP based on the domain key.
  • the message integrity verification algorithm is used to perform the verification on the fields other than MacTag newAP1 (MTK) in the fast handover verification response message. Calculated.
  • the second FTIE field may also include Security Capabilities newAP , and the Security Capabilities newAP carries security capability parameters selected by the target AP, so that the STA can determine according to the Security Capabilities newAP that the target AP is generating the session secret.
  • the algorithm used when the key is the first key derivation algorithm.
  • S205 When the Nonce STA received by the STA is consistent with the Nonce STA sent by the STA, pair the MacTag newAP1 (MTK) key according to the message integrity check key determined by the STA based on the domain key. )authenticating. If the verification is passed, S206 is executed.
  • MTK MacTag newAP1
  • the STA After receiving MacTag newAP1 (MTK), the STA performs a local calculation on the fields other than MacTag newAP1 (MTK) included in the fast handover verification response message based on the message integrity check key, and compares the calculation result with MacTag newAP1 (MTK) comparison can realize the verification of MacTag newAP1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the target AP's identity authentication is passed and the subsequent process can be executed. If they are inconsistent, the target AP's identity authentication fails and the switching process can be ended. .
  • MTK MacTag newAP1
  • the STA generates the session key by using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the Security Capabilities newAP according to the information including the domain key, the Nonce STA, and the Nonce newAP.
  • the target AP verification by the fast handover message carries an indication Security Capabilities newAP
  • first STA uses the key derivation algorithm response.
  • the STA generates the session key by using the first key derivation algorithm according to the Nonce STA generated by itself, the received Nonce newAP, and the domain key.
  • the generation of the session key means that the identity authentication is completed and the subsequent handover process can be carried out.
  • the session key can be generated by the STA first, and then the session key is generated by the target AP, or the session key can be generated by the target AP first, and then the session key is generated by the STA, or both. key.
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure does not limit this.
  • the STA Before the expiration of the re-association deadline, the STA sends a re-association request message to the target AP.
  • the re-association deadline is the deadline agreed upon by both the STA and the target AP. Specifically, it may be the time when the fast handover verification request message is sent to the preset association period. For example, if the preset association period is one minute, then The re-association deadline may be one minute after sending the fast handover verification request message.
  • a WLAN may include multiple APs, and these multiple APs belong to the same basic service set.
  • the process of associating the WLAN with the target AP can be called re-association.
  • the STA may send a re-association request message before the re-association deadline, that is, the re-association deadline arrives. If the target AP does not receive the re-association request message sent by the STA before the re-association deadline arrives, Then the target AP may consider the STA to give up reassociating with the target AP. In this case, the target AP may delete the session key. When the STA subsequently requests to switch to the target AP, the above S201 to S206 are executed again to negotiate and generate the session key.
  • the re-association request message includes the MDE field and a third FTIE field, and the third FTIE field includes the Nonce STA and a third integrity check code MacTag STA2 (MTK).
  • the MacTag STA2 (MTK) is generated by the STA based on the message integrity verification key and using the message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the fields other than the MacTag STA2 (MTK) included in the re-association request message.
  • S208 The target AP sends a re-association response message to the STA.
  • the target access device After the target access device receives the re-association request message sent by the requesting device, it needs to verify the freshness and integrity of the re-association request message, and sends a re-association response message to the STA after passing the verification.
  • the target AP can verify whether the Nonce STA in the re-association request message is consistent with the Nonce STA in the fast handover verification request message. If they are consistent, it indicates that the re-association request message is fresh and the target AP can continue
  • the message integrity check key can be used to perform local calculations on the fields other than MacTag STA2 (MTK) included in the re-association request message, and compare the calculation result with MacTag STA2 ( MTK) comparison can realize the verification of MacTag STA2 (MTK). If the verification passes, the integrity verification of the re-association request message is passed, and the target AP can send a re-association response message at this time.
  • the re-association response message includes the MDE field, the association status code Status Code field, and the fourth FTIE field.
  • the Status Code field includes the association status code Status Code, which is specifically used to identify the success or failure of the association.
  • the FTIE field includes the Nonce newAP and the fourth integrity check code MacTag newAP2 (MTK).
  • MacTag newAP2 (MTK) is generated by the target AP based on the message integrity check key and using the message integrity check algorithm to calculate the fields other than MacTag newAP2 (MTK) in the re-association response message. .
  • the re-association response message indicates that the re-association is successful, that is, the Status code field value is 0, and the freshness and integrity of the re-association response message are verified, that is, the Nonce newAP consistency verification is passed, And if the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, it means that the STA is switched to the target AP. At this time, the STA and the target AP can open their respective controlled ports to exchange business data through the controlled ports.
  • the re-association response message indicates that the re-association is successful, that is, the Status code field value is 0, and the freshness and integrity of the re-association response message are verified, that is, the Nonce newAP consistency verification is passed, And if the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, it means that the STA is switched to the target AP. At this time, the STA and the target AP can open their respective controlled ports to exchange business data through the controlled ports.
  • MTK MacTag newAP2
  • the verification of MacTag newAP2 may specifically use the message integrity check key to perform local calculations on fields other than MacTag newAP2 (MTK) included in the re-association response message, and compare the calculation result with MacTag newAP2. (MTK) comparison, so as to realize the verification of MacTag newAP2 (MTK).
  • the STA and the target AP can use the negotiated session key to encrypt the session data to generate encrypted session data, and transmit the encrypted session data through the controlled port ,
  • the receiver uses the aforementioned session key to decrypt the encrypted session data, thus achieving secure communication between the STA and the target AP.
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure provides a wireless network handover method.
  • the STA selects a domain key from the domain key group generated by the initial mobility domain association, and generates a message integrity check key based on the domain key.
  • Use the message integrity check key to verify the integrity check code to realize the identity authentication between the STA and the target AP, and after the authentication is passed, the domain key is directly used to generate the session key for the network security communication after the handover .
  • the method reduces the number of key derivations, simplifies the wireless network switching process, and improves the switching efficiency.
  • the STA when the STA quickly switches to the target AP, it uses the domain key to quickly generate the session key, and the domain key can be generated through the STA's initial mobile domain association.
  • the process of initial mobile domain association and the process of generating domain keys will be described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments.
  • the initial mobile domain association process between the STA and the initial access device is as follows:
  • the STA sends a link verification request message to the initial access device, that is, the initial AP.
  • the link verification request message can add corresponding fields that need to be carried according to actual needs.
  • S302 The initial AP sends a link verification response message to the STA.
  • the link verification response message can also add corresponding fields that need to be carried according to actual needs.
  • the link verification response message may carry a link state field, and if the link state field indicates that the link verification is successful, the STA sends an association request message to the initial AP to request communication with the initial AP.
  • the AP associates, the association request message includes the MDE field and the security information element field, and the content of the MDE field is consistent with the content of the initial AP's own MDE field.
  • the initial AP After the initial AP receives the association request message, it first checks the content of the MDE field. If it matches the content of its own MDE field, the initial AP allows the STA to associate, otherwise, it rejects the association. It should be noted that, in some cases, if the MDE field is included in the association request message, but the fast handover authentication and key management suite is not specified in the security information element, the initial AP can reject the association. Among them, this association of fast handover authentication and key management suite identification needs to perform fast handover initial mobile domain association.
  • the initial AP generates an association response message according to the association result for the STA, and returns the association response message to the STA.
  • the initial AP packs the MDE field, the association status code field, and the fifth FTIE field to generate an association response message.
  • the fifth FTIE field includes the initial AP's identity ID InitAP .
  • the STA can not only obtain As a result of the association with the initial AP, the identity ID InitAP of the initial AP can also be obtained so that when the AP is switched subsequently, the domain key and the like can be requested from the initial AP according to the ID InitAP.
  • the STA and the initial AP perform an initial authentication operation.
  • the initial authentication operation is specifically implemented based on the authentication message interaction.
  • the authentication message may specifically include MDE, The security information element, the fifth FTIE field and the TIE field, where the TIE field specifically includes the reassociation deadline TIE[ReassociationDeadline] and the key lifetime TIE[Keylifetime].
  • the STA and the initial AP generate multiple fields after successful authentication
  • the domain key group formed by the key.
  • the number of domain keys in the domain key group is greater than one.
  • the initial AP may report the domain key group to the key management server (area key server, AKS).
  • AKS area key server
  • the AKS can be made to reside in the initial AP.
  • the domain key can be directly obtained from the initial AP when obtaining the domain key.
  • other APs such as the target AP to which the STA requests a handover
  • the key can be transmitted through a pre-established secure channel to ensure key security.
  • the STA and the initial AP can open their corresponding controlled ports to perform secure sessions and data transmission, as well as QoS resource allocation.
  • the STA and the initial AP can determine the base key, which can be obtained through Diffie-Hellman (DH) or SM2 exchange In the shared key mode, the base key can also be a pre-shared key. Then, the STA and the initial AP derive the extended master key EMK according to the base key using the second key derivation algorithm negotiated by the two, and the STA and the initial AP then use the identities (ID STA and ID InitAP ) and/or random numbers (Nonce STA and Nonce InitAP ) generated by the STA and the initial AP, and the extended master key EMK, to generate the domain key group.
  • ID STA and ID InitAP the identities
  • Nonce STA and Nonce InitAP Random numbers
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure provide two implementation methods. The following describes the specific implementation of the extended master key derivation.
  • STA and AP use key agreement algorithms, such as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems Diffie-Hellman (Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems Diffie- Hellman, ECDH) algorithm or SM2 algorithm is negotiated to obtain the key Z, and then the respective identities of STA and AP, the random numbers generated by STA and AP, and the second character string jointly selected by STA and AP are concatenated.
  • key agreement algorithms such as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems Diffie-Hellman (Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems Diffie- Hellman, ECDH) algorithm or SM2 algorithm is negotiated to obtain the key Z, and then the respective identities of STA and AP, the random numbers generated by STA and AP, and the second character string jointly selected by STA and AP are concatenated.
  • the result of the association and the key Z are derived using the second key derivation algorithm to obtain an extended main key (EMK), and the extended main key EMK can be specifically expressed as KDF(Z, ID STA
  • PSK pre-shared key
  • PSK can be a password. Password password, and then STA and AP can select the Key calculated by ECDH or SM2 key exchange protocol during the key negotiation process, the respective identities of STA and AP, the random numbers generated by STA and AP, and the joint selection of STA and AP.
  • PSK use the second key derivation algorithm to derive the extended master key EMK.
  • the extended master key EMK can be expressed as KDF(PSK, Key
  • the third character string) where the third character string is a fixed character string jointly selected by STA and AP, as a specific parameter derived from the extended master key, "
  • the process of generating the domain root key DRK(s) and the domain key KEY(s) is as follows:
  • DRK PRF(EMK, ID STA
  • the key label is a printable string of less than 255 bytes, indicating the purpose of the DRK, and the key label can be in the format of label-string@domain. For each DRK, its Key label is different.
  • the fourth character string is a fixed character string jointly selected by the STA and the AP as a specific parameter derived from the domain root key.
  • the domain key generation process is as follows:
  • the Key label is a printable string of less than 255 bytes, indicating the purpose of the KEY in the DRK range, and the Key label can be in the format of label-string@domain. For each KEY, the key is different.
  • the fifth character string is a fixed character string jointly selected by the STA and the AP as a specific parameter derived from the domain key. According to the needs of the application, multiple domain keys can be derived to form a domain key group.
  • each DRK and KEY has uniquely identified names DRKName and KEYName.
  • the DRKName and KEYName generation process is as follows:
  • DRKName KDF(EMKName,keylable
  • KEYName KDF(DRKName,keylable
  • ESS extended service set
  • the STA associates to an AP in a mobile domain for the first time and establishes a connection with it is called fast handover initial mobile domain association. Subsequent STAs can use the fast handover protocol to re-associate to other APs within the same mobile domain.
  • the STA executes the fast handover protocol when it switches from the currently associated AP to the target AP.
  • the wireless network handover method described in the embodiment of FIG. 2 can be specifically divided into the following two implementation modes according to different transmission modes of fast handover messages:
  • One method is the Over-the-air mode, in which the STA communicates directly with the target AP through the link verification protocol; the other method is the distributed system mode Over-the-DS, in which the STA communicates with the target AP through the currently associated AP.
  • the communication between the STA and the current AP is encapsulated in an activity frame (that is, an Action frame), the current AP forwards the information to the target AP, and the message interaction between the current AP and the target AP can be encapsulated in an Extensible Encapsulation Protocol (Extensible Encapsulation Protocol, EEP) data security channel.
  • an activity frame that is, an Action frame
  • the current AP forwards the information to the target AP
  • the message interaction between the current AP and the target AP can be encapsulated in an Extensible Encapsulation Protocol (Extensible Encapsulation Protocol, EEP) data security channel.
  • EEP Extensible Encapsulation Protocol
  • the STA and the target AP adopt the over-the-air fast handover protocol, that is, the over-the-air FT protocol.
  • the STA and the target AP use the FT authentication process based on the domain key, and securely negotiate the session key by exchanging Nonce STA and Nonce AP .
  • the session key is negotiated before re-association, which can protect the subsequent re-association process and optional Resource request process.
  • the STA encapsulates the fast handover verification request message in a link verification request frame according to the link verification protocol, so as to exchange messages with the target AP.
  • the STA and the target AP use the following message interactions to implement the over-the-air fast handover process:
  • the STA sends a fast handover verification request message to the target AP, where the fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in a link verification request frame.
  • the fast handover verification request message includes an FTAA field, a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a first FTIE field, and the first FTIE field includes Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Security capabilities STA, and The first integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK), the FTAA field is used to identify that the link verification algorithm is a fast handover identity verification algorithm.
  • the frame header of the link verification request frame needs to carry the address information of the target AP, and the Source Address (SA) field of the frame header should be set to The MAC address of the STA and the Destination Address (DA) field of the frame header should be set to the Basic Service Set Identity (BSSID) of the target AP.
  • SA Source Address
  • DA Destination Address
  • the ID InitAP is mainly used to request the domain key from the initial AP according to the ID InitAP when the target AP does not find the domain key.
  • the target AP uses the value of KEYname STA and other information in the link verification request frame to find the corresponding key. If the target AP does not have a key identified by KEYname STA , it can obtain the key name corresponding to the key according to ID InitAP After receiving the new key of the STA, the target AP should delete the previous domain key with the STA.
  • the MacTag STA1 (MTK) is the message integrity check key MTK generated by the STA based on the selected domain key, and the message integrity check algorithm is used to verify that the fast handover verification request message is included except MacTag STA1 ( Fields other than MTK) are calculated.
  • the target AP uses the message integrity check key MTK to determine whether the fast handover verification request message includes the MacTag STA1 (MTK) other than MacTag STA1 (MTK). Other fields are calculated locally, and the calculation result is compared with the received MacTag STA1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the verification is passed. At this time, the target AP can execute the security capability selected by the target access device If the step of generating the session key by the first key derivation algorithm determined by the parameters is inconsistent, the verification fails, the target AP ends the handover process, and may further return prompt information to the STA.
  • the method for generating the message integrity check key MTK has been described in the embodiment in FIG. 2 and will not be repeated here.
  • the STA cannot generate the correct first message integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK) . If MacTag STA1 (MTK) is verified, it means that the STA is a legitimate STA, and the target AP has passed the authentication of the STA; if MacTag newAP1 (MTK) is not verified, it means that the STA is not a legitimate STA, and the target AP authenticates the STA’s identity Fail.
  • MacTag STA1 MTK
  • the target AP can use the target access device to select and use according to the Nonce STA , the KEYname STA , the Nonce newAP , the identity ID STA of the requesting device, and the identity ID newAP of the target access device.
  • the security capability parameter Security capabilities newAP determines the first key derivation algorithm to generate the session key.
  • the target AP carries ID newAP in the second FTIE field, which is used by the STA to calculate the session key according to the information including ID newAP.
  • the target AP should reject the link verification request. If the first FTIE field contains an invalid ID InitAP , the AP shall reject the link verification request. If the security information element in the link verification request frame contains an invalid KEYname STA and the AP has determined that it is an invalid KEYname STA , the AP shall reject the verification request. If the STA selects a unicast cipher suite in the security information element that is different from the initial mobile domain association, the AP rejects the verification request. After rejecting the verification request, the STA can retry the link verification request.
  • the target AP sends a fast handover verification response message to the requesting device STA, where the fast handover verification response message includes an FTAA field, a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a second FTIE field, where the second FTIE field includes Nonce newAP , Nonce STA , ID newAP , Security capabilities newAP1 and MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the fast handover verification response message includes an FTAA field, a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a second FTIE field, where the second FTIE field includes Nonce newAP , Nonce STA , ID newAP , Security capabilities newAP1 and MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the Nonce STA is used for consistency verification. Specifically, the STA can compare the received Nonce STA with the local Nonce STA , and if they are consistent, the verification is passed, and the STA can perform the security selection using the target AP.
  • the second FTIE field in the fast handover verification response message can also carry the second integrity check code MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the STA can verify the MacTag newAP1 (MTK) before passing the verification.
  • the step of generating a session key by using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected and used by the target access device is performed.
  • MacTag newAP1 is that the target AP uses the message integrity check key MTK pair negotiated between the target AP and the STA to include other fields in the fast handover verification response message except MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the STA uses the message integrity check key to perform calculation locally on the fields other than MacTag newAP1 (MTK) included in the fast handover verification response message , And then compare it with the received MacTag newAP1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the verification is passed, so as to realize the identity authentication between the STA and the target AP, and allow the STA to perform the subsequent steps. If it is inconsistent, the verification fails. End this switching process.
  • the domain key Since the above message integrity check key is generated based on the domain key, only a legitimate AP can obtain the domain key. If the target AP is not a legitimate AP, the domain key cannot be obtained, and the message integrity check key cannot be generated, and the second message integrity check code MacTag newAP1 (MTK) is generated based on the message integrity check key.
  • MacTag newAP1 (MTK) passes the verification, it means that the target AP is a legitimate AP, and the STA passes the identity authentication of the target AP; if MacTag newAP1 (MTK) fails the verification, it means that the target AP is not a legitimate AP, and the STA checks the target AP. The identity authentication failed.
  • the target AP indicates the first key derivation algorithm used by the STA by carrying the Security Capabilities newAP in the fast handover verification response message, and the STA uses the first key derivation algorithm to generate the all keys according to Nonce STA , Nonce newAP, and the domain key.
  • the session key The generation of the session key means that the identity authentication is completed and the subsequent handover process can be carried out.
  • the STA Before the expiration of the re-association deadline, the STA sends a re-association request message to the target AP.
  • the re-association request message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a third FTIE field.
  • the third FTIE field includes the Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Security capabilities STA, and third FTIE field. Integrity check code MacTag STA2 (MTK).
  • the MacTag STA2 (MTK) is generated by the STA based on the message integrity verification key and using the message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the fields other than the MacTag STA2 (MTK) included in the re-association request message.
  • S604 The target AP sends a re-association response message to the STA.
  • the target access device After the target access device receives the re-association request message sent by the requesting device, it needs to verify the freshness and integrity of the re-association request message, and sends a re-association response message to the STA after passing the verification.
  • the target AP can verify whether the Nonce STA in the re-association request message is consistent with the Nonce STA in the fast handover verification request message. If they are consistent, it indicates that the re-association request message is fresh and the target AP can continue
  • the message integrity check key can be used to perform local calculations on the fields other than MacTag STA2 (MTK) included in the re-association request message, and compare the calculation result with MacTag STA2 ( MTK) comparison can realize the verification of MacTag STA2 (MTK). If the verification is passed, the integrity verification of the re-association request message is passed, and the target AP can send a re-association response message at this time.
  • the re-association response message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, an associated status code Status Code field, and a fourth FTIE field.
  • the Status Code field includes an associated status code Status Code, which is specifically used to identify successful association or If it fails, the fourth FTIE field includes Nonce newAP , Nonce STA , ID newAP , Security capabilities newAP, and the fourth integrity check code MacTag newAP2 (MTK).
  • MacTag newAP2 (MTK) is generated by the target AP based on the message integrity check key and using the message integrity check algorithm to calculate the fields other than MacTag newAP2 (MTK) in the re-association response message. .
  • the re-association response message indicates that the re-association is successful, that is, the value of the Status code field is 0 (this is only an example, obviously, other ways can also be used to indicate the successful re-association)
  • the re-association response message Freshness and integrity are verified, that is, Nonce newAP consistency verification and MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification are passed, which means that the STA is switched to the target AP.
  • the STA and the target AP can open their corresponding controlled ports. To exchange business data through the controlled port.
  • the verification of MacTag newAP2 may specifically use the message integrity check key to perform local calculations on fields other than MacTag newAP2 (MTK) included in the re-association response message, and compare the calculation result with MacTag newAP2. (MTK) comparison, so as to realize the verification of MacTag newAP2 (MTK).
  • STA and AP use the over-the-DS FT protocol to interact.
  • the STA encapsulates the fields including the first FTIE field in the fast handover verification request message in an action frame (Action frame), and the STA sends the target AP to the target AP in the form of a message forwarded by the current AP.
  • a fast handover verification request message, and the fast handover verification response message sent by the target AP is received in the form of a message forwarded by the current AP.
  • the STA and AP use the following message interactions to achieve over-the-DS fast handover:
  • the STA sends a fast handover verification request message to the target AP, the fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in an FT REQUEST frame, and the fast handover verification request message includes STA address, TargetAP address, security information element fields [BKID], MDE Field and the first FTIE field, the first FTIE field includes Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Security capabilities STA, and MacTag STA1 (MTK).
  • BKID security information element fields
  • MDE Field MDE Field
  • the first FTIE field includes Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Security capabilities STA, and MacTag STA1 (MTK).
  • the STA Address field in the fast handover verification request message should be set to the MAC address of the STA, and the Target AP Address field in the fast handover verification request message should be set to the BSSID of the target AP.
  • the MacTag STA1 (MTK) is the message integrity check key MTK generated by the STA based on the selected domain key, and the message integrity check algorithm is used to verify that the fast handover verification request message is included except MacTag STA1 ( Fields other than MTK) are calculated.
  • the target AP uses the message integrity check key MTK to determine whether the fast handover verification request message includes the MacTag STA1 (MTK) other than MacTag STA1 (MTK). Other fields are calculated locally, and the calculation result is compared with the received MacTag STA1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the verification is passed. At this time, the target AP can execute the security capability selected by the target access device If the step of generating the session key by the first key derivation algorithm determined by the parameters is inconsistent, the verification fails, the target AP ends the handover process, and may further return prompt information to the STA.
  • the method for generating the message integrity check key MTK has been described in the embodiment in FIG. 2 and will not be repeated here.
  • the STA cannot generate the correct first message integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK) . If MacTag STA1 (MTK) is verified, it means that the STA is a legitimate STA, and the target AP has passed the authentication of the STA; if MacTag newAP1 (MTK) is not verified, it means that the STA is not a legitimate STA, and the target AP authenticates the STA’s identity Fail.
  • MacTag STA1 MTK
  • the target AP can use the target access device to select and use according to the Nonce STA , the KEYname STA , the Nonce newAP , the identity ID STA of the requesting device, and the identity ID newAP of the target access device.
  • the security capability parameter Security capabilities newAP determines the first key derivation algorithm to generate the session key.
  • the target AP carries ID newAP in the second FTIE field, which is used by the STA to calculate the session key according to the information including ID newAP.
  • the target AP should reject the link verification request. If the first FTIE field contains an invalid ID InitAP , the AP shall reject the link verification request. If the security information element in the link verification request frame contains an invalid KEYname STA and the AP has determined that it is an invalid KEYname STA , the AP shall reject the verification request. If the STA selects a unicast cipher suite in the security information element that is different from the initial mobile domain association, the AP rejects the verification request. After rejecting the verification request, the STA can retry the link verification request.
  • the target AP sends a fast handover verification response message to the STA.
  • the fast handover verification response message is encapsulated in an FT RESPONSE frame.
  • the fast handover verification response message includes STA address, TargetAP address, Status code, and security information element fields [BKID ], an MDE field and a second FTIE field, where the second FTIE field includes NoncenewAP, NonceSTA, ID newAP , Security capabilities newAP, and MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the target AP will set the Status code to 28 (this is only an example, obviously, other methods can also be used to indicate that the initial AP is unreachable) ), the target AP can restrict the STA from reassociating to the target AP.
  • the STA address field in the fast handover verification response message should be set to the MAC address of the STA, and the TargetAP address field in the fast handover verification response message should be set to the BSSID of the target AP.
  • the Nonce STA is used for consistency verification. Specifically, the STA can compare the received Nonce STA with the local Nonce STA . If they are consistent, the verification is passed, and the STA can perform the use of the target access device to select and use The step of generating the session key by the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter.
  • the second FTIE field in the fast handover verification response message can also carry the second integrity check code MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the STA can verify the MacTag newAP1 (MTK) before passing the verification.
  • the step of generating a session key by using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected and used by the target access device is performed.
  • MacTag newAP1 is that the target AP uses the message integrity check key MTK pair negotiated between the target AP and the STA to include other fields in the fast handover verification response message except MacTag newAP1 (MTK).
  • the STA uses the message integrity check key to perform calculation locally on the fields other than MacTag newAP1 (MTK) included in the fast handover verification response message , And then compare it with the received MacTag newAP1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the verification is passed, so as to realize the identity authentication between the STA and the target AP, and allow the STA to perform the subsequent steps. If it is inconsistent, the verification fails. End this switching process.
  • the target AP indicates the first key derivation algorithm used by the STA by carrying the Security Capabilities newAP in the fast handover verification response message, and the STA uses the first key derivation algorithm to generate the all keys according to Nonce STA , Nonce newAP, and the domain key.
  • the session key The generation of the session key means that the identity authentication is completed and the subsequent handover process can be carried out.
  • the fast handover verification response message and the fast handover verification response message are sent between the STA and the current AP through a wireless interface, and then forwarded to the target AP.
  • the frame format of the FT REQUEST frame and the FT RESPONSE frame is not limited.
  • the STA cannot start the over-the-DS authentication mode (this is only an example, obviously, other methods can also be used to indicate that the STA cannot start the over -the-DS authentication mode), the over-the-air authentication mode can be used at this time.
  • the STA Before the expiration of the re-association deadline, the STA sends a re-association request message to the target AP.
  • the re-association request message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a third FTIE field.
  • the third FTIE field includes the Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Security capabilities STA, and third FTIE field. Integrity check code MacTag STA2 (MTK).
  • the MacTag STA2 (MTK) is generated by the STA based on the message integrity verification key and using the message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the fields other than the MacTag STA2 (MTK) included in the re-association request message.
  • S614 The target AP sends a re-association response message to the STA.
  • the target access device After the target access device receives the re-association request message sent by the requesting device, it needs to verify the freshness and integrity of the re-association request message, and sends a re-association response message to the STA after passing the verification.
  • the target AP can verify whether the Nonce STA in the re-association request message is consistent with the Nonce STA in the fast handover verification request message. If they are consistent, it indicates that the re-association request message is fresh and the target AP can continue
  • the message integrity check key can be used to perform local calculations on the fields other than MacTag STA2 (MTK) included in the re-association request message, and compare the calculation result with MacTag STA2 ( MTK) comparison can realize the verification of MacTag STA2 (MTK). If the verification passes, the integrity verification of the re-association request message is passed, and the target AP can send a re-association response message at this time.
  • the re-association response message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, an associated status code Status Code field, and a fourth FTIE field.
  • the Status Code field includes an associated status code Status Code, which is specifically used to identify successful association or If it fails, the fourth FTIE field includes Nonce newAP , Nonce STA , ID newAP , Security capabilities newAP, and the fourth integrity check code MacTag newAP2 (MTK).
  • MacTag newAP2 (MTK) is generated by the target AP based on the message integrity check key and using the message integrity check algorithm to calculate the fields other than MacTag newAP2 (MTK) in the re-association response message. .
  • the re-association response message indicates that the re-association is successful, that is, the value of the Status code field is 0 (this is only an example, obviously, other ways can also be used to indicate the successful re-association)
  • the re-association response message Freshness and integrity are verified, that is, Nonce newAP consistency verification and MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification are passed, which means that the STA is switched to the target AP.
  • the STA and the target AP can open their corresponding controlled ports. To exchange business data through the controlled port.
  • the verification of MacTag newAP2 may specifically use the message integrity check key to perform local calculations on fields other than MacTag newAP2 (MTK) included in the re-association response message, and compare the calculation result with MacTag newAP2. (MTK) comparison, so as to realize the verification of MacTag newAP2 (MTK).
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure also provide corresponding devices.
  • the following will introduce the above-mentioned devices provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure from the perspective of functional modularization. .
  • the requesting device 800 includes:
  • the sending module 710 is configured to send to the target access device the first random number generated by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, and the requesting device selected from the domain key group generated during the initial mobile domain association The identifier of the domain key and the first integrity check code;
  • the receiving module 720 is configured to receive a second random number, the first random number, the identity of the target access device, and a second integrity check code sent by the target access device, and the second random number The number is generated when the target access device passes the verification of the first integrity check code;
  • the verification module 730 is configured to: when the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number previously sent by the requesting device, determine according to the requesting device based on the domain key The message integrity check key verifies the second integrity check code;
  • a generating module 740 configured to generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number when the second integrity check code is verified;
  • the determining module 750 is configured to, when receiving the association status code sent by the target access device, if the association status code indicates that the association is successful, determine that the handover is successful.
  • the number of domain keys in the domain key group is greater than one.
  • the fields exchanged between the target access device and the requesting device are carried in a management message used to transmit signaling information.
  • the wireless network is a wireless local area network
  • the sending module 710 is specifically configured to:
  • the fast handover verification request message includes a mobile domain information element MDE field and a first fast handover information element FTIE field
  • the MDE field identifies that fast handover is supported
  • the first An FTIE field includes the first random number generated by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, the identification of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during initial mobile domain association, and the The first integrity check code;
  • the receiving module 720 is specifically configured to:
  • the fast handover verification response message includes the MDE field and a second FTIE field, and the second FTIE field includes the second random number and the first FTIE field.
  • the sending module 710 is also used to:
  • the re-association request message includes the MDE field and the third FTIE field, and the third FTIE field includes the first random Number and the third integrity check code;
  • the receiving module 720 is also used for:
  • re-association response message sent by the target access device, where the re-association response message includes the MDE field, an association status code field, and a fourth FTIE field, where the fourth FTIE field includes the second random number and The fourth integrity check code;
  • the request device 700 further includes:
  • the control module is configured to: when the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, And when the verification of the fourth integrity check code is passed, the controlled port of the requesting device is opened.
  • the second FTIE field further includes the identity of the target access device
  • the generating module 740 is specifically used for:
  • the domain key, the second random number, the identity of the requesting device, and the identity of the target access device use the security that the target access device selects and uses
  • the first key derivation algorithm determined by the capability parameter generates respective corresponding session keys.
  • the generating module 740 is further configured to encapsulate the fast handover verification request message in a link verification request frame; or,
  • the sending module is further configured to send the fast handover verification request message to the target access device in the form of a message forwarded by the current access device
  • the receiving module is further configured to receive the fast handover verification response message sent by the target access device in the form of a message forwarded by the current access device, and the fast handover verification response message is encapsulated in the activity frame.
  • the generating module 740 is further configured to:
  • the domain key group is generated according to the identities of the requesting device and the initial access device and/or the random number generated by the requesting device and the initial access device, and the extended master key.
  • the sending module 710 is further configured to:
  • the receiving module is also used for:
  • association response message sent by the initial access device, where the association response message includes the MDE field, an association status code field, and a fifth FTIE field, where the association status code field is used to identify the requesting device and the The initial access device is associated with success or failure, and the fifth FTIE field includes the identity of the initial access device;
  • the generating module is also used for:
  • association status code field identifies that the association is successful
  • the requesting device and the initial access device perform an identity authentication operation, and generate the domain key group after the authentication is successful.
  • the request device 700 further includes:
  • the release module is used to release the association relationship with the initial access device if the authentication is unsuccessful.
  • the access device 800 includes:
  • the receiving module 810 is configured to receive the first random number sent by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, the identification of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during initial mobile domain association, and The first integrity check code;
  • the generating module 820 is configured to obtain a corresponding domain key according to the identifier of the selected domain key, and generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key;
  • the verification module 830 is configured to verify the first integrity check code according to the message integrity check key
  • the generating module 820 is further configured to, when the first integrity check code is verified, add the identity of the requesting device to the association list, generate a second random number, and based on the domain key, Generating a session key from the first random number and the second random number, where the session key is used to implement secure communication between the requesting device and the access device after a successful handover;
  • the sending module 840 is configured to send a second random number, the first random number, the identity of the access device, a second integrity check code, and an association status code to the access device, where the association status code is used To identify the successful or unsuccessful association of the requesting device.
  • the fields exchanged between the access device and the requesting device are carried in a management message used to transmit signaling information.
  • the wireless network is a wireless local area network
  • the receiving module 810 is specifically configured to:
  • the fast handover verification request message includes a mobile domain information element MDE field and a first fast handover information element FTIE field
  • the MDE field identifies that fast handover is supported
  • the first The FTIE field includes the first random number generated by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, the identifier of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during initial mobile domain association, and the The first integrity check code;
  • the sending module 840 is specifically configured to:
  • the fast handover verification response message includes the MDE field, an associated status code field, and a second FTIE field
  • the second FTIE field includes the second random number and the second FTIE field.
  • the receiving module 810 is also used for:
  • re-association request message sent by the requesting device, where the re-association request message includes the MDE field and a third FTIE field, and the third FTIE field includes the first random number and a third integrity check code ;
  • the verification module 830 is also used for:
  • the sending module 840 is also used for:
  • a re-association response message is sent to the requesting device.
  • the re-association response message includes the MDE field, the association status code field, and the fourth FTIE field.
  • the FTIE field includes the second random number and the fourth integrity check code;
  • the access device 800 further includes:
  • the control module is configured to: when the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, And when the verification of the fourth integrity check code is passed, the controlled port of the access device is opened.
  • the first FTIE field further includes the identity of the initial access device
  • the access device 800 further includes:
  • the searching module is configured to, when the domain key is not found, further request the domain key from the initial access device according to the identity of the initial access device.
  • the second FTIE field also includes the identity of the access device
  • the generating module 820 is specifically used for:
  • the security capability parameter selected and used by the access device is used.
  • the determined first key derivation algorithm generates respective corresponding session keys.
  • the access device is an initial access device
  • the generating module 820 is further configured to:
  • the domain key group is generated.
  • the receiving module 810 is further configured to:
  • the sending module 840 is also used for:
  • the association response message includes the MDE field, an association status code field, and a fifth FTIE field.
  • the association status code field is used to identify the requesting device and the initial connection If the association of the incoming device succeeds or fails, the fifth FTIE field includes the identity of the initial access device;
  • the generating module 820 is also used for:
  • association status code field indicates that the association is successful, an identity authentication operation is performed, and the domain key group is generated after the authentication is successful.
  • the disclosed device and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the modules is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, for example, multiple modules can be combined or integrated. To another system, or some features can be ignored, or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or modules, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the modules described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as modules may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments.
  • At least one (item) refers to one or more, and “multiple” refers to two or more.
  • “And/or” is used to describe the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three types of relationships, for example, “A and/or B” can mean: only A, only B, and both A and B , Where A and B can be singular or plural.
  • the character “/” generally indicates that the associated objects before and after are in an “or” relationship.
  • the following at least one item (a) or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of a single item (a) or a plurality of items (a).
  • At least one of a, b, or c can mean: a, b, c, "a and b", “a and c", “b and c", or "a and b and c" ", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

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Abstract

一种无线网络切换方法，在该方法中，请求设备和目标接入设备通过域密钥直接生成消息完整性校验密钥，并基于该消息完整性校验密钥对完整性校验码进行验证，从而实现双方身份鉴别，当对方身份鉴别通过时，即利用域密钥结合双方随机数生成会话密钥，简化了切换流程，实现了安全且高效的网络切换。本公开还公开了对应的请求设备和接入设备。

Description

无线网络切换方法及设备
本公开要求于2019年12月02日提交中国国家知识产权局、申请号为201911215099.6、发明名称为“无线网络切换方法及设备”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本公开中。
技术领域
本公开涉及通信领域，尤其涉及一种无线网络切换方法及请求设备、接入设备。
背景技术
随着手机、平板电脑等便携式移动终端设备的发展，无线通信技术已逐渐成为主流通信技术之一。在无线通信网络中，一个无线接入设备的覆盖范围是有限的，因此，在移动过程中往往会产生无线接入设备的切换，切换过程中产生的时延直接影响通信体验。
移动终端设备首次接入一个无线通信网络中时，需要与一个无线接入设备进行完整的初始身份鉴别过程，这个过程可称为初始移动域关联。移动终端设备首次关联的无线接入设备被称为初始接入设备，该移动终端设备可称为请求设备。在初始移动域关联过程中，请求设备和初始接入设备进行身份鉴别和密钥协商。当请求设备在移动过程中从当前关联的无线接入设备切换到新的无线接入设备时，需要执行切换过程，新的无线接入设备即为目标接入设备。
基于此，电气和电子工程师协会(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers，IEEE)802.11系列规范中提供了一种快速切换机制。在启用快速切换机制的前提下，该机制采用分级密钥方案，具体地，在请求设备(Station，STA)和验证授权记账服务器(AuthenticationAuthorizationAccounting Server，AAA Server)之间进行身份鉴别并生成主密钥，将该主密钥发送至接入点(Access Point，AP)，再进行分级导出。
具体地，在初始鉴别时共导出第0、1、2级密钥，然后在发生网络切换时，再重新导出第1、2级密钥，由于网络中可能存在多个接入设备，每次切换均需要重新导出第1、2级密钥，导致网络切换过程复杂化，降低了无线网络切换效率。
发明内容
有鉴于此，本公开提供了一种无线网络切换方法，请求设备和目标接入设备基于域密钥导出的消息完整性校验密钥对完整性校验码进行验证，从而实现对对方的身份鉴别，并在身份鉴别通过时，直接利用域密钥以及双方随机数生成会话密钥，用于切换成功后实现双方安全通信，无需重新导出第1、2级密钥，简化了切换流程，提高了切换效率。本公开还提供了对应的请求设备、接入设备。
本公开第一方面提供了一种无线网络切换方法，所述方法包括：
目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码，根据所述选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，基于所述域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，所述消息完整性校验密钥用于对所述第一完整性校验码进行验证；
当所述第一完整性校验码验证通过时，所述目标接入设备将所述请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥，所述会话密钥用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备的安全通信；
所述请求设备接收到所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述目标接入设备发送的第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识和第二完整性校验码，当所述请求设备接收的所述第一随机数与所述请求设备之前发出的所述第一随机数一致时，根据所述请求设备基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第二完整性校验码进行验证；
当所述第二完整性校验码验证通过时，基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥；
所述请求设备接收到关联状态码，当所述关联状态码标识关联成功时，确定切换成功。
本公开第二方面提供了一种请求设备，所述请求设备包括：
发送模块，用于向目标接入设备发送所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码；
接收模块，用于接收所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识、第二完整性校验码以及关联状态码，所述第二随机数是所述目标接入设备在对第一完整性校验码验证通过时所生成的；
验证模块，用于当关联状态码标识关联成功，且所述请求设备接收的所述第一随机数与所述请求设备之前发出的所述第一随机数一致时，根据所述请求设备基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第二完整性校验码进行验证；
生成模块，用于当所述第二完整性校验码验证通过时，基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥，以实现网络切换。
本公开第三方面提供了一种接入设备，所述接入设备包括：
接收模块，用于接收请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码；
生成模块，用于根据所述选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，基于所述域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥；
验证模块，用于根据所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第一完整性校验码进行验证；
所述生成模块，还用于当所述第一完整性校验码验证通过时，将所述请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥，所述会话密钥用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述接入设备的安全通信；
发送模块，用于向接入设备发送第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述接入设备的身份标识、第二完整性校验码以及关联状态码，所述关联状态码用于标识所述请求设备关联成功或者关联失败。
从以上技术方案可以看出，本公开具有以下优点：
在进行无线网络切换时，请求设备可以从初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定一域密钥，并直接根据该域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，利用该消息完整性校验密钥对与目标接入设备之间交互的字段进行计算从而生成第一完整性校验码。如此，目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的第一随机数、请求设备的身份标识、选定域密钥的标识和第一完整校验码时，可以直接根据域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，并基于该域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，利用该消息完整性校验密钥对第一完整性校验码进行验证，从而实现目标接入设备对请求设备的身份鉴别；当验证通过时，目标接入设备将请求设备身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，基于域密钥以及双方的随机数生成会话密钥，以用于在切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备的安全通信。
同理，请求设备可以在接收到目标接入设备发送的第一随机数、目标接入设备的身份标识和第二完整性校验码，当请求设备接收的第一随机数与发送的第一随机数一致时，采用与目标接入设备相同的方式生成的消息完整性校验密钥对第二完整性校验码进行验证，从而实现请求设备对目标接入设备的身份鉴别；当验证通过时，采用与目标接入设备相同的方式生成会话密钥。其中，请求设备接收到标识关联成功的关联状态码，确定切换成功。
在上述方法中，请求设备和目标接入设备通过域密钥直接生成消息完整性校验密钥，并基于该消息完整性校验密钥对完整性校验码进行验证，从而实现双方身份鉴别，当对方身份鉴别通过时，即利用域密钥结合双方随机数生成会话密钥，简化了切换流程，实现了安全且高效的网络切换。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本公开实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍。显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本公开的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本公开实施例中无线网络切换方法的流程图；
图2为本公开实施例中无线局域网场景中无线网络切换方法的流程图；
图3为本公开实施例中初始移动域关联的信令流程图；
图4为本公开实施例中一种导出域密钥组的流程示意图；
图5为本公开实施例中另一种导出域密钥组的流程示意图；
图6A为图2实施例over-the-air模式下无线网络切换方法的流程图；
图6B为图2实施例over-the-DS模式下无线网络切换方法的流程图；
图7为本公开实施例中请求设备的结构示意图；
图8为本公开实施例中接入设备的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
在无线通信网络中，以无线局域网WLAN为例，接入设备也即无线访问接入点AP，将有线电信号转换成无线电信号发送出来，形成无线网络的覆盖，并作为有线网络和无线网络的桥梁，将该无线网络接入到以太网等有线网络，处于无线网络覆盖区域的请求设备STA可以通过AP连接到网络。
为了扩大覆盖面积，常常可以将AP进行互联。随着用户的移动，STA常常需要在AP间切换并保持网络连接。随着对STA在AP之间切换时延的要求越来越严格，IEE802.11系列规范中提出了一种基于分级密钥的快速切换机制，在有切换需求时，先在STA和AAA Server之间进行身份鉴别生成主密钥，然后AAA Server将该主密钥发送至AP，再进行分级导出，每次切换过程中均需要重新导出第1、2级密钥，导致切换过程较为繁琐，影响了切换效率。
为了解决上述技术问题，本公开提出了一种无线网络切换方法。在该方法中，STA在进行初始移动域关联时生成域密钥组，当STA准备由当前AP切换至目标AP时，从域密钥组中选定一域密钥，生成消息完整性校验密钥；STA向目标AP发送选定域密钥的标识，目标AP基于该标识获得域密钥，从而基于该域密钥生成相同的消息完整性校验密钥。如此，STA和目标AP均可以利用消息完整性校验密钥验证完整性校验码，从而实现对对方的身份鉴别，当验证通过时，可以直接根据域密钥和双方随机数生成会话密钥，用于在确认对方身份合法的情况下实现网络切换。由于利用域密钥即可直接生成会话密钥，无需重新导出第1、2级密钥，因而减少了切换过程中密钥导出次数，简化了切换过程，加快了切换速度，提高了切换效率。
为了使得本公开的技术方案更加清楚、易于理解，下面结合具体实施例进行详细说明。
参见图1所示的无线网络切换方法的流程图，该方法包括：
S101：目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码，根据所述选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，基于所述域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥。
请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组可以用于实现无线网络切换。域密钥组可以包括多个域密钥，在进行网络切换时，请求设备可以从中选定一域密钥进行网络切换。考虑到安全性，请求设备可以在每次切换过程中选定不同的域密钥。
目标接入设备接收到的第一完整性校验码是请求设备通过消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识在内的字段进行计算得到的。目标接入设备可以根据选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥。目标接入设备基于域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，这与请求设备生成消息完整性校验密钥的方式相同。目标接入设备利用消息完整性校验密钥对第一完整性校验码进行验证。
在具体实现时，目标接入设备可以先根据域密钥的标识从本地查找域密钥，当本地查找失败时，再根据从请求设备获取的初始接入设备的身份标识，基于该初始接入设备的身份标识，向初始接入设备请求域密钥。
在一些可能的实现方式中，目标接入设备可以在请求设备首次切换至该目标接入设备时，先从初始接入设备请求域密钥，当请求设备切换至其他接入设备，然后再由其他接入设备切回至该目标接入设备时，该目标接入设备可以从本地获取该域密钥。当然，考虑到安全性，也可以设置对同一域密钥的获取时间或获取次数进行限制，例如，域密钥存储在本地的时间超过5分钟后则不可获取，或者域密钥在本地被获取的次数达到3次后则不可获取。
在另一些可能的实现方式中，目标接入设备可以在首次切换时获取域密钥组，如此，在后续切换过程中，可以直接从本地获取对应的域密钥，并利用该域密钥实现网络切换。
在基于域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥时，请求设备选定域密钥，目标接入设备可以通过域密钥的标识确定域密钥。请求设备和目标接入设备指定域密钥为基密钥BK，并将BK作为在鉴别过程中使用的协议密钥PK，基于PK利用双方协商或预置的密钥导出算法生成消息完整性校验密钥，也即协议完整性密钥MTK，所述密钥导出算法可以是伪随机算法或杂凑算法等。在具体实现时，请求设备或目标接入设备可以基于PK以及选定的第一字符串生成MTK。
S102：当所述第一完整性校验码验证通过时，所述目标接入设备将所述请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥。
第一完整性校验码验证通过，则表明目标接入设备对请求设备的身份鉴别通过，目标接入设备可以将请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，实现目标接入设备与请求设备的关联。其中，所述关联列表可以是所述目标接入设备中的一块存储区域，用于存储通过身份验证的请求设备的身份标识，本公开中对关联列表的形态不做限定。
此外，目标接入设备还生成第二随机数，目标接入设备可以根据域密钥、第一随机数和第二随机数生成会话密钥，用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备的安全通信。
当然，若第一完整性校验码验证失败，表明目标接入设备对请求设备的身份鉴别不通过，目标接入设备可以结束本次验证过程，停止切换。
S103：所述请求设备接收到所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述目标接入设备发送的第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识、第二完整性校验码以及关联状态码，当请求设备接收的所述第一随机数与所述请求设备之前发出的所述第一随机数一致时，根据所述请求设备基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第二完整性校验码进行验证。
与第一完整性校验码类似，请求设备接收的第二完整性校验码是目标接入设备基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述目标接入设备发送的第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识在内的字段进行计算得到的。因此，请求设备可以基于域密钥确定消息完整性校验密钥，并利用该消息完整性校验密钥对第二完整性校验码进行验证。
S104：当所述第二完整性校验码验证通过时，所述请求设备基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥。
当第二完整性校验码验证通过时，则表明请求设备对目标接入设备的身份鉴别通过，请求设备可以采用与目标接入设备相同的计算方式，根据域密钥、第一随机数和第二随机数生成会话密钥。
S105：当请求设备接收到关联状态码，当所述关联状态码标识关联成功时，确定切换成功。
具体的，目标接入设备在确定请求设备身份鉴别通过，且双方均生成会话密钥后，向请求设备发送表征关联成功或者关联失败的关联状态码，请求设备接收到该关联状态码，若关联状态码标识关联成功，则确定切换成功。请求设备可以与目标接入设备进行数据交互。
可以理解，本公开提供的无线网络切换方法可以应用于任意无线网络，包括蜂窝网络、无线局域网、无线城域网等等。
需要说明的是，目标接入设备和请求设备交互的字段如第一随机数、请求设备的身份标识、请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识、第一完整性校验码，或者是第二随机数、目标接入设备的身份标识、第二完整性校验码以及关联状态码可以携带在用于传输信令信息的管理类消息中，例如，在无线局域网中可以携带在管理 帧中，在个域网中可以携带在命令帧中，在移动通信网络中可以携带在信令帧中。一方面，管理类消息是网络中原有的消息，如果这些交互的字段不携带在管理类消息中，就需要额外增加数据类型的消息对它们进行单独发送，这样就会增加消息交互的次数，因此，这些字段若携带在管理类消息中，就可以减少消息交互的次数，提高交互的效率；另一方面，这些字段若携带在管理类消息中，可以尽早获得会话密钥和消息完整性校验密钥，就可以对管理类消息进行保护，提高了管理类消息的安全性，若携带在数据类消息中，获得上述密钥的时间点会延后，从而无法对管理类消息进行保护。
由上可知，本公开实施例提供了一种无线网络切换方法，请求设备和目标接入设备通过域密钥直接生成消息完整性校验密钥，并基于该消息完整性校验密钥对完整性校验码进行验证，从而实现双方身份鉴别，当对方身份鉴别通过时，即利用域密钥结合双方随机数生成会话密钥，简化了切换流程，实现了安全且高效的网络切换。
为了方便理解，下文以无线局域网(Wireless Local Area Network，WLAN)进行示例性说明。
WLAN中可以包括多个AP作为接入设备，请求设备STA可以由当前AP切换至目标AP，其中，请求设备STA可以为手机、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，简称PDA)、平板电脑等终端设备，当然请求设备STA不限于上述设备。
下面结合图2，说明本公开实施例提供的一种无线网络切换方法，该方法包括：
S201：STA向目标AP发送快速切换验证请求消息。
所述快速切换验证请求消息包括MDE字段以及第一快速切换信息元素FTIE字段。所述MDE字段标识支持快速切换，其包括移动域标识符MDID和快速切换能力策略信息。所述第一FTIE字段包括所述STA生成的第一随机数Nonce STA、STA的身份标识ID STA、所述STA在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识Keyname STA以及第一完整性校验码MacTag STA1(MTK)。
需要说明的是，在无线网络中每个AP通常都会周期性广播自己的MDE字段，STA在需要接入目标AP时，会在快速切换验证请求消息中携带接收到的目标AP广播的MDE字段。
其中，MacTag STA1(MTK)是STA基于选定的域密钥生成的消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。当接收方持有选定的域密钥，可以基于该域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，接收方基于消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag STA1(MTK)比较，可以实现对MacTag STA1(MTK)的验证，从而实现目标AP对STA的身份鉴别。
基于此，快速切换验证请求消息中还可以携带初始接入设备的身份标识ID InitAP，如此，当目标AP在本地未查找到选定的域密钥时，可以根据ID InitAP向初始AP请求域密钥。
当然，第一FTIE字段中还可以包括所述STA支持的安全能力参数信息Security Capabilities STA，以供目标AP选择相应使用的安全能力参数。其中，Security Capabilities STA具体可以包括STA支持的身份鉴别套件、对称加密算法、杂凑算法、密钥交换算法和/或密钥导出算法等，目标AP可以基于上述算法选择生成会话密钥所采用的算法，例如第一密钥导出算法等。
在一些可能的实现方式中，快速切换验证请求消息中还可以包括安全信息元素字段，用于标识支持安全功能，通过该字段可以协商安全策略。在一个示例中，安全信息元素字段可以是WAPI安全信息元素字段，即WAPI[BKID]。
S202：目标AP基于域密钥确定的消息完整性校验密钥对MacTag STA1(MTK)进行验证。当验证通过时，执行S203。
具体的，目标AP收到MacTag STA1(MTK)后，基于域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，基于消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag STA1(MTK)比较，若一致，则STA身 份鉴别通过，可以执行后续流程，若不一致，则STA身份鉴别不通过，可以结束此次切换流程。
S203:目标AP将ID STA添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数Nonce newAP，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数Nonce STA和所述第二随机数Nonce newAP生成会话密钥。
在具体实现时，目标AP基于域密钥、Nonce STA和Nonce newAP在内的信息，利用目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥，该会话密钥可以用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备的安全通信。
进一步地，目标AP还可以在计算会话密钥时增加双方的身份标识，以增加会话密钥的复杂度，从而保障安全性，也即目标AP根据域密钥、Nonce STA、Nonce newAP、ID STA和ID newAP在内的信息，利用第一密钥导出算法计算出会话密钥。
S204：所述目标AP向所述STA发送快速切换验证响应消息。
快速切换验证响应消息包括所述MDE字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括所述Nonce newAP、Nonce STA、ID newAP以及第二完整性校验码MacTag newAP1(MTK)。
MacTag newAP1(MTK)是目标AP基于域密钥生成的消息完整性校验密钥利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述快速切换验证响应消息中除MacTag newAP1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
在一些可能的实现方式中，第二FTIE字段中还可以包括Security Capabilities newAP，所述Security Capabilities newAP携带目标AP选择使用的安全能力参数，以便于STA根据该Security Capabilities newAP确定目标AP在生成会话密钥时所采用的算法，即第一密钥导出算法。
S205：当所述STA接收的所述Nonce STA与发送的所述Nonce STA一致时,根据所述STA基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述MacTag newAP1(MTK)进行验证。验证通过，则执行S206。
具体的，STA收到MacTag newAP1(MTK)后，基于消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述快速切换验证响应消息中除MacTag newAP1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag newAP1(MTK)比较，可以实现对MacTag newAP1(MTK)的验证，若一致，则目标AP身份鉴别通过，可以执行后续流程，若不一致，则目标AP身份鉴别不通过，可以结束此次切换流程。
S206：所述STA根据包括所述域密钥、所述Nonce STA和所述Nonce newAP在内的信息，利用所述Security Capabilities newAP确定的第一密钥导出算法生成所述会话密钥。
具体地，目标AP通过在快速切换验证响应消息中携带Security Capabilities newAP指示所述STA采用的第一密钥导出算法。如此，所述STA根据自身生成的Nonce STA、接收的Nonce newAP以及所述域密钥，利用第一密钥导出算法生成所述会话密钥。其中，会话密钥的生成意味着身份鉴别完成，可以进行后续的切换过程。
在实际应用时，可以是先由STA生成会话密钥，再由目标AP生成会话密钥，也可是先由目标AP生成会话密钥，再由STA生成会话密钥，或者二者同时生成会话密钥。本公开实施例对此不作限定。
S207：在重关联截止期到达之前，所述STA向所述目标AP发送重关联请求消息。
其中，所述重关联截止期是STA和目标AP双方协商一致的截止时间，具体可以是发送快速切换验证请求消息开始计时到达预设关联周期的时间，例如，预设关联周期为一分钟，则重关联截止期可以是发送快速切换验证请求消息之后的一分钟。
可以理解，一个WLAN中可以包括多个AP，这多个AP属于同一基础服务集，当STA由该WLAN的一个AP切换到目标AP时，WLAN与目标AP关联的过程可以称之为重关联。
在身份鉴别完成之后，STA可以在重关联截止时间即重关联截止期到达之前发送重关联请求消息，若目标AP在该重关联截止期到达之前未接收到所述STA发送的重关联请求消息，则目标AP可以认为STA放弃重关联所述目标AP，在此种情形下，目标AP可以删 除会话密钥。当STA后续再请求切换至目标AP时，重新执行上述S201至S206以协商并生成会话密钥。
所述重关联请求消息包括所述MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述Nonce STA和第三完整性校验码MacTag STA2(MTK)。
其中，MacTag STA2(MTK)是STA基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述重关联请求消息中除MacTag STA2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
S208：所述目标AP向所述STA发送重关联响应消息。
所述目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的重关联请求消息后，需要对所述重关联请求消息的新鲜性和完整性进行验证，验证通过后向所述STA发送重关联响应消息。
具体地，目标AP可以验证所述重关联请求消息中所述Nonce STA与快速切换验证请求消息中所述Nonce STA是否一致，若一致，则表明该重关联请求消息是新鲜的，目标AP可以继续对MacTag STA2(MTK)进行验证，具体可以利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述重关联请求消息中除MacTag STA2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag STA2(MTK)比较，可以实现对MacTag STA2(MTK)的验证。验证通过则重关联请求消息的完整性验证通过，此时目标AP可以发送重关联响应消息。
所述重关联响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码Status Code字段和第四FTIE字段，所述Status Code字段中包括关联状态码Status Code，具体用于标识关联成功或者失败，所述第四FTIE字段包括所述Nonce newAP和所述第四完整性校验码MacTag newAP2(MTK)。
其中，MacTag newAP2(MTK)是目标AP基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述重关联响应消息中除MacTag newAP2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
S209：当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述Nonce newAP与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述Nonce newAP一致，且所述MacTag newAP2(MTK)验证通过时，所述STA和所述目标AP打开各自对应的受控端口。
具体的，若所述重关联响应消息表征重关联成功，即其中的的Status code字段值为0，且重关联响应消息的新鲜性和完整性均验证通过，也即Nonce newAP一致性验证通过，以及MacTag newAP2(MTK)验证通过，则表征STA切换至目标AP，此时STA和目标AP可以打开各自对应的受控端口，以通过该受控端口进行业务数据交互。
其中，对MacTag newAP2(MTK)的验证具体可以利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述重关联响应消息中除MacTag newAP2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag newAP2(MTK)比较，从而实现对MacTag newAP2(MTK)的验证。
需要说明的是，本公开中对STA和目标AP之间交互的各条消息中的字段顺序不做限制(下文同)。
考虑到数据在交互过程中的安全性，在后续业务数据交换过程中，STA和目标AP可以利用协商得到的会话密钥对会话数据加密生成加密会话数据，通过所述受控端口传输加密会话数据，接收方利用上述会话密钥解密所述加密会话数据，如此实现STA和目标AP之间的安全通信。
由上可知，本公开实施例提供了一种无线网络切换方法，STA从初始移动域关联生成的域密钥组中选定一域密钥，基于该域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验密钥验证完整性校验码，实现STA和目标AP的身份鉴别，并在鉴别通过后，直接利用该域密钥生成会话密钥，用于切换后的网络安全通信。该方法减少了密钥导出次数，简化了无线网络切换流程，提高了切换效率。
在图2所示实施例中，STA快速切换至目标AP时，是利用域密钥快速生成会话密钥，而域密钥的生成可通过STA进行初始移动域关联来实现。下面结合具体实施例对初始移动域关联过程以及生成域密钥的过程进行详细说明。
参见图3，STA和初始接入设备之间的初始移动域关联过程如下：
S301：STA向初始接入设备即初始AP发送链路验证请求消息。
其中，链路验证请求消息可以根据实际需要增加需要携带的相应字段。
S302：初始AP向所述STA发送链路验证响应消息。
其中，链路验证响应消息也可以根据实际需要增加需要携带的相应字段。
具体的，所述链路验证响应消息中可以携带链路状态字段，若所述链路状态字段表征链路验证成功，则所述STA向所述初始AP发送关联请求消息以请求与所述初始AP进行关联，所述关联请求消息中包括所述MDE字段和所述安全信息元素字段，所述MDE字段内容与所述初始AP在自身的MDE字段内容一致。
S303：初始AP接收到关联请求消息。
具体的，初始AP接收到关联请求消息后，先对MDE字段内容进行校验，若与自身的MDE字段内容匹配，则初始AP允许该STA关联，否则，拒绝关联。需要说明的是，在有些情况下，如关联请求消息中包含MDE字段，但安全信息元素中未指明快速切换鉴别与密钥管理套件，则初始AP可以拒绝该关联。其中，快速切换鉴别与密钥管理套件标识本次关联需要执行快速切换初始移动域关联。
S304：初始AP根据针对STA的关联结果生成关联响应消息，并将该关联响应消息返回STA。
具体地，初始AP将所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第五FTIE字段打包生成关联响应消息，所述第五FTIE字段中包括所述初始AP的身份标识ID InitAP，如此，STA不仅可以获得与初始AP的关联结果，还可以获得初始AP的身份标识ID InitAP以便后续在切换AP时可以根据该ID InitAP向初始AP请求域密钥等。
如图3所示，若所述关联结果标识关联成功，则所述STA和所述初始AP执行初始鉴别操作，初始鉴别操作具体是基于鉴别消息交互实现的，该鉴别消息中具体可以包括MDE、安全信息元素、第五FTIE字段和TIE字段，其中，TIE字段具体包括重关联截止期TIE[ReassociationDeadline]和密钥生存期TIE[Keylifetime]，STA和所述初始AP在鉴别成功后生成多个域密钥构成的域密钥组。可选的，域密钥组中域密钥的个数大于1。
进一步地，初始AP可以将域密钥组上报至密钥管理服务器(area key server，AKS)。为了提高切换效率，可以令AKS驻留在初始AP中，如此，在获取域密钥时可以直接从该初始AP中获取。此外，当其他AP(如STA请求切换的目标AP)获取域密钥时，可以通过预先建立的安全通道传输密钥，以保障密钥安全性。
需要说明的是，在初始移动域关联成功后，STA和初始AP可以打开各自对应的受控端口，进行安全会话和数据传输，以及Qos资源分配。
初始移动域关联过程中，STA与初始AP鉴别成功后，STA与初始AP可以确定基密钥，该基密钥可以是通过迪菲·赫尔曼(Diffie-Hellman，简称DH)或SM2交换获得的密钥，在共享密钥模式下该基密钥也可以是预共享密钥。然后，STA与初始AP依据基密钥利用二者协商的第二密钥导出算法导出扩展主密钥EMK，STA和初始AP再根据所述STA与所述初始AP的身份标识(ID STA和ID InitAP)和/或所述STA与所述初始AP生成的随机数(Nonce STA和Nonce InitAP)，以及所述扩展主密钥EMK，生成所述域密钥组。
针对扩展主密钥，本公开实施例提供了两种实现方式。下面对扩展主密钥导出的具体实现方式进行介绍。
一种实现方式为基于非对称密钥协商机制导出扩展主密钥，参见图4，STA和AP通过密钥协商算法，如基于椭圆曲线密码体制的迪菲·赫尔曼(Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems Diffie-Hellman，ECDH)算法或者SM2算法等协商得到密钥Z，然后将STA和AP各自的身份标识、STA和AP各自生成的随机数以及STA与AP共同选定的第二字符串级联，根据级联结果和密钥Z利用第二密钥导出算法导出得到扩展主密钥(Extended Main Key，EMK)，所述扩展主密钥EMK具体可以表示为KDF(Z，ID STA||ID InitAP||Nonce STA||Nonce InitAP||第二字符串)，其中，所述第二字符串为STA和AP共同选定的固定字符串，作为扩展主密钥导出的特定参数，“||”表示级联。
另一种实现方式为，基于预共享密钥机制导出扩展主密钥，参见图5，STA和AP预先确定一预共享密钥(Pre-Shared Key，PSK)，作为一个示例，PSK可以是密码口令password，然后STA和AP可以将密钥协商过程中利用ECDH或SM2密钥交换协议计算出的Key、STA和AP各自的身份标识、STA和AP各自生成的随机数以及STA与AP共同选定的第三字符串级联，根据级联结果和PSK利用第二密钥导出算法导出得到扩展主密钥EMK，所述扩展主密钥EMK具体可以表示为KDF(PSK，Key||ID STA||ID InitAP||Nonce STA||Nonce InitAP||第三字符串)，其中，所述第三字符串为STA和AP共同选定的固定字符串，作为扩展主密钥导出的特定参数，“||”表示级联。
在一种可能的实现方式中，基于上述扩展主密钥，生成域根密钥DRK(s)和域密钥KEY(s)的过程如下所示：
DRK＝PRF(EMK，ID STA||ID InitAP||Nonce STA||Nonce InitAP||key lable||第四字符串)
其中，Key lable是小于255字节的可打印字符串，表明该DRK的用途，Key lable可以采用label-string@domain格式。对于每个DRK，其Key lable是不同的。所述第四字符串为STA和AP共同选定的固定字符串，作为域根密钥导出的特定参数。
域密钥的生成过程具体如下所示：
KEY＝PRF(DRK，ID STA||ID InitAP||Nonce STA||Nonce InitAP||key lable||第五字符串)
其中，Key lable是小于255字节的可打印字符串，表明在DRK范围内该KEY的用途，Key lable可以采用label-string@domain格式。对于每个KEY，Key lable是不同的。所述第五字符串为STA和AP共同选定的固定字符串，作为域密钥导出的特定参数。根据应用的需要，可导出多个域密钥，即构成域密钥组。
其中，每一个DRK和KEY都有唯一标识的名称DRKName和KEYName，DRKName和KEYName生成过程具体如下所示：
DRKName＝KDF(EMKName,key lable|"EMK"|"\0"|length)，其中EMKName是对应的扩展主密钥名称；
KEYName＝KDF(DRKName,key lable|"EMK"|"\0"|length)，其中DRKName是上一步导出的域根密钥名称。
当STA在同一个扩展服务集(Extended service set，ESS)移动域范围内的AP之间切换时，可采用快速切换机制减小切换时延，保证业务数据链接的连续性。
其中，STA初次关联到一个移动域的AP，并与其建立连接的过程称为快速切换初始移动域关联，后续STA可以利用快速切换协议在同一移动域范围内重关联到其他AP。
STA从当前关联的AP切换到目标AP时执行快速切换协议，图2实施例中所述的无线网络切换方法根据快速切换消息传输方式的不同具体可分为以下两种实现方式：
一种方式为空口模式Over-the-air，STA通过链路验证协议直接与目标AP通信；另一种方式为分布式系统模式Over-the-DS，STA通过当前关联的AP与目标AP通信，具体地，STA与当前AP通信封装在活动帧(即Action帧)中，当前AP转发该信息到目标AP，当前AP与目标AP间的消息交互可封装在可扩展的封装协议(Extensible Encapsulation Protocol，EEP)数据安全通道中。
针对空口模式，具体请参见图6A，STA和目标AP采用over-the-air快速切换协议，即over-the-air FT协议。STA和目标AP使用FT鉴别流程基于域密钥，并通过交换Nonce STA和Nonce AP来安全地协商会话密钥，在重关联之前协商出会话密钥，可以保护后续的重关联过程和可选的资源请求过程。
在具体实现时，STA根据链路验证协议，将所述快速切换验证请求消息封装在链路验证请求帧中，以便与目标AP进行消息交互。如图6A所示，STA和目标AP使用如下消息交互实现over-the-air快速切换过程：
S601：STA向目标AP发送快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于链路验证请求帧中。
所述快速切换验证请求消息包括FTAA字段、安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段和第一FTIE字段，所述第一FTIE字段包括Nonce STA、ID STA、ID InitAP、KEYname STA、Security capabilites STA和第一完整性校验码MacTag STA1(MTK)，所述FTAA字段用于标识链路验证算法为快速切换身份鉴别算法。
其中，由于所述快速切换验证请求消息封装在链路验证请求帧中，链路验证请求帧的帧头需要携带目标AP的地址信息，帧头的源地址(Source Address，SA)字段应设置为STA的MAC地址，帧头的目的地址(Destination Address，DA)字段应设置为目标AP的基础服务集标识(Basic Service Set Identity，BSSID)。
链路验证请求帧中的信息元素及其子字段内容定义可参见ISO/IEC 8802-11等与安全相关的规范。
所述ID InitAP主要用于目标AP在未查找到域密钥时，根据该ID InitAP向初始AP请求域密钥。目标AP使用KEYname STA的值和所述链路验证请求帧中的其他信息查找相应的密钥，如果目标AP没有由KEYname STA标识的密钥，则可以依据ID InitAP获取该密钥密钥名称对应的域密钥，在接收到STA的新密钥后，目标AP应删除先前与该STA之间的域密钥。
其中，所述MacTag STA1(MTK)是STA基于选定的域密钥生成的消息完整性校验密钥MTK，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
当目标AP接收到携带MacTag STA1(MTK)的快速切换验证请求消息时，目标AP利用消息完整性校验密钥MTK，对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段在本地进行计算，并将计算结果与接收到的MacTag STA1(MTK)进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，此时目标AP可以执行所述利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥的步骤，若不一致，则验证失败，目标AP结束切换流程，并且可以进一步向STA返回提示信息。其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥MTK的生成方式已在图2实施例中进行了相应描述，此处不再赘述。
由于上述消息完整性校验密钥是基于域密钥生成的，因此，只有合法STA才能接入目标AP。若STA不是合法STA，也就无法获得域密钥，进而无法根据该域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，如此，STA无法生成正确的第一消息完整性校验码MacTag STA1(MTK)。若MacTag STA1(MTK)验证通过，则表明STA是合法STA，目标AP对STA的身份鉴别通过；若MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证不通过，则表明STA不是合法STA，则目标AP对STA的身份鉴别不通过。
目标AP可以根据所述Nonce STA、所述KEYname STA、所述Nonce newAP和所述请求设备的身份标识ID STA、所述目标接入设备的身份标识ID newAP，利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数Security capabilites newAP确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥。对应地，目标AP在第二FTIE字段中携带ID newAP，用于STA根据包括ID newAP在内的信息计算会话密钥。
如果目标AP收到的MDE的内容与自身的MDE字段内容不匹配，目标AP应拒绝该链路验证请求。如果第一FTIE字段中包含无效的ID InitAP，则AP应拒绝链路验证请求。如果链路验证请求帧中的安全信息元素包含一个无效的KEYname STA并且AP已经确定它是一个无效的KEYname STA，AP应该拒绝该验证请求。如果STA在安全信息元素中选择了与初始移动域关联时不同的单播密码套件，AP拒绝该验证请求。在拒绝验证请求之后，STA可以重试链路验证请求。
S602：目标AP向请求设备STA发送快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括FTAA字段、安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括Nonce newAP、Nonce STA、ID newAP、Security capabilites newAP1和MacTag newAP1(MTK)。
其中，Nonce STA用于进行一致性验证，具体地，STA可以将接收到的Nonce STA与本地Nonce STA进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，STA可以执行所述利用所述目标AP选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成所述会话密钥的步骤。
与快速切换验证请求消息类似，快速切换验证响应消息中的第二FTIE字段还可以携带第二完整性校验码MacTag newAP1(MTK)，如此，STA可以在MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证通过后，再执行所述利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥的步骤。
具体地，MacTag newAP1(MTK)是目标AP利用其与所述STA之间协商的消息完整性校验密钥MTK对包括所述快速切换验证响应消息中除MacTag newAP1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的，STA在接收到快速切换验证响应消息后，利用消息完整性校验密钥，对包括所述快速切换验证响应消息中除MacTag newAP1(MTK)之外的其他字段在本地进行计算，然后将其与接收到的MacTag newAP1(MTK)进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，从而实现STA对目标AP之间的身份鉴别，允许STA执行后续步骤，若不一致，则验证不通过，可以结束本次切换流程。
由于上述消息完整性校验密钥是基于域密钥生成的，因此，只有合法AP才能获得域 密钥。若目标AP不是合法AP则无法获得域密钥，也就无法生成消息完整性校验密钥并基于该消息完整性校验密钥生成第二消息完整性校验码MacTag newAP1(MTK)。换言之，若MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证通过，则表明目标AP是合法AP，STA对目标AP身份鉴别通过；若MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证不通过，则表明目标AP不是合法AP，则STA对目标AP的身份鉴别不通过。
目标AP通过在快速切换验证响应消息中携带Security Capabilities newAP指示所述STA采用的第一密钥导出算法，STA根据Nonce STA、Nonce newAP以及所述域密钥，利用第一密钥导出算法生成所述会话密钥。其中，会话密钥的生成意味着身份鉴别完成，可以进行后续的切换过程。
S603：在重关联截止期到达之前，所述STA向所述目标AP发送重关联请求消息。
所述重关联请求消息包括安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述Nonce STA、ID STA、ID InitAP、KEYname STA、Security capabilites STA和第三完整性校验码MacTag STA2(MTK)。
其中，MacTag STA2(MTK)是STA基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述重关联请求消息中除MacTag STA2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
S604：所述目标AP向所述STA发送重关联响应消息。
所述目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的重关联请求消息后，需要对所述重关联请求消息的新鲜性和完整性进行验证，验证通过后向所述STA发送重关联响应消息。
具体地，目标AP可以验证所述重关联请求消息中所述Nonce STA与快速切换验证请求消息中所述Nonce STA是否一致，若一致，则表明该重关联请求消息是新鲜的，目标AP可以继续对MacTag STA2(MTK)进行验证，具体可以利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述重关联请求消息中除MacTag STA2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag STA2(MTK)比较，可以实现对MacTag STA2(MTK)的验证。验证通过则重关联请求消息的完整性验证通过，此时目标AP可以发送重关联响应消息。
所述重关联响应消息包括安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段、关联状态码Status Code字段和第四FTIE字段，所述Status Code字段中包括关联状态码Status Code，具体用于标识关联成功或者失败，所述第四FTIE字段包括Nonce newAP、Nonce STA、ID newAP、Security capabilites newAP和所述第四完整性校验码MacTag newAP2(MTK)。
其中，MacTag newAP2(MTK)是目标AP基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述重关联响应消息中除MacTag newAP2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
S605：当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述Nonce newAP与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述Nonce newAP一致，且所述MacTag newAP2(MTK)验证通过时，所述STA和所述目标AP打开各自对应的受控端口。
具体的，若所述重关联响应消息表征重关联成功，即其中的的Status code字段值为0(此处仅为举例，显然也可以用其他方式表征重关联成功)，且重关联响应消息的新鲜性和完整性均验证通过，也即Nonce newAP一致性验证通过，以及MacTag newAP2(MTK)验证通过，则表征STA切换至目标AP，此时STA和目标AP可以打开各自对应的受控端口，以通过该受控端口进行业务数据交互。
其中，对MacTag newAP2(MTK)的验证具体可以利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述重关联响应消息中除MacTag newAP2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag newAP2(MTK)比较，从而实现对MacTag newAP2(MTK)的验证。
针对分布式系统模式，STA和AP采用over-the-DS FT协议进行交互。STA将所述快速切换验证请求消息中包括所述第一FTIE字段在内的字段封装于活动帧(Action帧)中，并且所述STA通过当前AP转发消息的形式向所述目标AP发送所述快速切换验证请求消息，以及通过所述当前AP转发消息的形式接收所述目标AP发送的所述快速切换验证响应消息。
具体请参见图6B，STA和AP使用如下消息交互实现over-the-DS快速切换：
S611：STA向目标AP发送快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于FT REQUEST帧中，所述快速切换验证请求消息包括STA address、TargetAP address、安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段和第一FTIE字段，所述第一FTIE字段包括Nonce STA、ID STA、ID InitAP、KEYname STA、Security capabilites STA和MacTag STA1(MTK)。
其中，所述快速切换验证请求消息中的STA Address字段应设置为STA的MAC地址，所述快速切换验证请求消息中的Target AP Address字段应设置为目标AP的BSSID。
其中，所述MacTag STA1(MTK)是STA基于选定的域密钥生成的消息完整性校验密钥MTK，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
当目标AP接收到携带MacTag STA1(MTK)的快速切换验证请求消息时，目标AP利用消息完整性校验密钥MTK，对包括所述快速切换验证请求消息中除MacTag STA1(MTK)之外的其他字段在本地进行计算，并将计算结果与接收到的MacTag STA1(MTK)进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，此时目标AP可以执行所述利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥的步骤，若不一致，则验证失败，目标AP结束切换流程，并且可以进一步向STA返回提示信息。其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥MTK的生成方式已在图2实施例中进行了相应描述，此处不再赘述。
由于上述消息完整性校验密钥是基于域密钥生成的，因此，只有合法STA才能接入目标AP。若STA不是合法STA，也就无法获得域密钥，进而无法基于该域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，如此，STA无法生成正确的第一消息完整性校验码MacTag STA1(MTK)。若MacTag STA1(MTK)验证通过，则表明STA是合法STA，目标AP对STA的身份鉴别通过；若MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证不通过，则表明STA不是合法STA，则目标AP对STA的身份鉴别不通过。
目标AP可以根据所述Nonce STA、所述KEYname STA、所述Nonce newAP和所述请求设备的身份标识ID STA、所述目标接入设备的身份标识ID newAP，利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数Security capabilites newAP确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥。对应地，目标AP在第二FTIE字段中携带ID newAP，用于STA根据包括ID newAP在内的信息计算会话密钥。
如果目标AP收到的MDE的内容与自身的MDE字段内容不匹配，目标AP应拒绝该链路验证请求。如果第一FTIE字段中包含无效的ID InitAP，则AP应拒绝链路验证请求。如果链路验证请求帧中的安全信息元素包含一个无效的KEYname STA并且AP已经确定它是一个无效的KEYname STA，AP应该拒绝该验证请求。如果STA在安全信息元素中选择了与初始移动域关联时不同的单播密码套件，AP拒绝该验证请求。在拒绝验证请求之后，STA可以重试链路验证请求。
S612：目标AP向STA发送快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息封装于FT RESPONSE帧中，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括STA address、TargetAP address、Status code、安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括NoncenewAP、NonceSTA、ID newAP、Security capabilites newAP和MacTag newAP1(MTK)。
如果目标AP收到的快速切换验证请求消息中携带的ID InitAP对应的初始AP不可达，则目标AP将Status code设置为28(此处仅为举例，显然也可以用其他方式表征初始AP不可达)，目标AP可限制STA重新关联到该目标AP。
所述快速切换验证响应消息中的STA address字段应设置为STA的MAC地址，并且所述快速切换验证响应消息中的TargetAP address字段应设置为目标AP的BSSID。
其中，Nonce STA用于进行一致性验证，具体地，STA可以将接收到的Nonce STA与本地Nonce STA进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，STA可以执行所述利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成所述会话密钥的步骤。
与快速切换验证请求消息类似，快速切换验证响应消息中的第二FTIE字段还可以携带第二完整性校验码MacTag newAP1(MTK)，如此，STA可以在MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证通过后，再执行所述利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成会话密钥的步骤。
具体地，MacTag newAP1(MTK)是目标AP利用其与所述STA之间协商的消息完整性校验密钥MTK对包括所述快速切换验证响应消息中除MacTag newAP1(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的，STA在接收到快速切换验证响应消息后，利用消息完整性校验密钥，对包括所述快速切换验证响应消息中除MacTag newAP1(MTK)之外的其他字段在本地进行计算，然后将其与接收到的MacTag newAP1(MTK)进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，从而实现STA对目标AP之间的身份鉴别，允许STA执行后续步骤，若不一致，则验证不通过，可以结束本次切换流程。
由于上述消息完整性校验密钥是基于域密钥生成的，因此，只有合法AP才能获得域密钥，若目标AP不是合法AP则无法获得域密钥，也就无法生成消息完整性校验密钥并基于该消息完整性校验密钥生成第二消息完整性校验码MacTag newAP1(MTK)。换言之，若MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证通过，则表明目标AP是合法AP，STA对目标AP身份鉴别通过，若MacTag newAP1(MTK)验证不通过，则表明目标AP不是合法AP，则STA对目标AP的身 份鉴别不通过。
目标AP通过在快速切换验证响应消息中携带Security Capabilities newAP指示所述STA采用的第一密钥导出算法，STA根据Nonce STA、Nonce newAP以及所述域密钥，利用第一密钥导出算法生成所述会话密钥。其中，会话密钥的生成意味着身份鉴别完成，可以进行后续的切换过程。
所述快速切换验证响应消息和所述快速切换验证响应消息在STA和当前AP之间通过无线接口发送，然后被转发到目标AP。
需要说明的是，本实施例中对上述FT REQUEST帧和FT RESPONSE帧的帧格式不做限制。
需要说明的是，目标AP的MDE字段包含的Fast BSS Transition over DS设置为0时，STA不能启动over-the-DS鉴别模式(此处仅为举例，显然也可以用其他方式表征STA不能启动over-the-DS鉴别模式)，此时可以采用over-the-air鉴别模式。
S613：在重关联截止期到达之前，所述STA向所述目标AP发送重关联请求消息。
所述重关联请求消息包括安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述Nonce STA、ID STA、ID InitAP、KEYname STA、Security capabilites STA和第三完整性校验码MacTag STA2(MTK)。
其中，MacTag STA2(MTK)是STA基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述重关联请求消息中除MacTag STA2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
S614：所述目标AP向所述STA发送重关联响应消息。
所述目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的重关联请求消息后，需要对所述重关联请求消息的新鲜性和完整性进行验证，验证通过后向所述STA发送重关联响应消息。
具体地，目标AP可以验证所述重关联请求消息中所述Nonce STA与快速切换验证请求消息中所述Nonce STA是否一致，若一致，则表明该重关联请求消息是新鲜的，目标AP可以继续对MacTag STA2(MTK)进行验证，具体可以利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述重关联请求消息中除MacTag STA2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag STA2(MTK)比较，可以实现对MacTag STA2(MTK)的验证。验证通过则重关联请求消息的完整性验证通过，此时目标AP可以发送重关联响应消息。
所述重关联响应消息包括安全信息元素字段[BKID]、MDE字段、关联状态码Status Code字段和第四FTIE字段，所述Status Code字段中包括关联状态码Status Code，具体用于标识关联成功或者失败，所述第四FTIE字段包括Nonce newAP、Nonce STA、ID newAP、Security capabilites newAP和所述第四完整性校验码MacTag newAP2(MTK)。
其中，MacTag newAP2(MTK)是目标AP基于消息完整性校验密钥，利用消息完整性校验算法对包括所述重关联响应消息中除MacTag newAP2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行计算生成的。
S615：当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述Nonce newAP与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述Nonce newAP一致，且所述MacTag newAP2(MTK)验证通过时，所述STA和所述目标AP打开各自对应的受控端口。
具体的，若所述重关联响应消息表征重关联成功，即其中的的Status code字段值为0(此处仅为举例，显然也可以用其他方式表征重关联成功)，且重关联响应消息的新鲜性和完整性均验证通过，也即Nonce newAP一致性验证通过，以及MacTag newAP2(MTK)验证通过，则表征STA切换至目标AP，此时STA和目标AP可以打开各自对应的受控端口，以通过该受控端口进行业务数据交互。
其中，对MacTag newAP2(MTK)的验证具体可以利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述重关联响应消息中除MacTag newAP2(MTK)之外的其他字段进行本地计算，将计算结果与MacTag newAP2(MTK)比较，从而实现对MacTag newAP2(MTK)的验证。
以上为本公开实施例提供的无线网络切换方法的具体实现方式，基于此，本公开实施例还提供了对应的设备，下面将从功能模块化的角度，对本公开实施例提供的上述设备进行介绍。
参见图7所示的请求设备的结构示意图，该请求设备800包括：
发送模块710，用于向目标接入设备发送所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码；
接收模块720，用于接收所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识和第二完整性校验码，所述第二随机数是所述目标接入设备在 对第一完整性校验码验证通过时所生成的；
验证模块730，用于当所述请求设备接收的所述第一随机数与所述请求设备之前发出的所述第一随机数一致时，根据所述请求设备基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第二完整性校验码进行验证；
生成模块740，用于当所述第二完整性校验码验证通过时，基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥；
确定模块750，用于当接收到所述目标接入设备发送的关联状态码时，若所述关联状态码表征关联成功，则确定切换成功。
可选的，所述域密钥组中域密钥的个数大于1。
可选的，所述目标接入设备和所述请求设备交互的字段携带在用于传输信令信息的管理类消息中。
可选的，所述无线网络为无线局域网；
所述发送模块710具体用于：
向所述目标接入设备发送快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息包括移动域信息元素MDE字段以及第一快速切换信息元素FTIE字段，所述MDE字段标识支持快速切换，所述第一FTIE字段包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识以及所述第一完整性校验码；
所述接收模块720具体用于：
接收所述目标接入设备发送的快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括所述MDE字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识以及所述第二完整性校验码；
所述发送模块710还用于：
在重关联截止期到达之前，向所述目标接入设备发送重关联请求消息，所述重关联请求消息包括所述MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述第一随机数和第三完整性校验码；
所述接收模块720还用于：
接收所述目标接入设备发送的重关联响应消息，所述重关联响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第四FTIE字段，所述第四FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数和第四完整性校验码；
所述请求设备700还包括：
控制模块，用于当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述第二随机数与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述第二随机数一致，且所述第四完整性校验码验证通过时，打开所述请求设备的受控端口。
可选的，所述第二FTIE字段中还包括所述目标接入设备的身份标识；
则所述生成模块740具体用于：
根据所述第一随机数、所述域密钥、所述第二随机数和所述请求设备的身份标识、所述目标接入设备的身份标识，利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成各自对应的会话密钥。
可选的，所述生成模块740还用于将所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于链路验证请求帧中；或者，
将所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于活动帧；
其中，若所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于所述活动帧，则所述发送模块还用于以通过当前接入设备转发消息的形式向所述目标接入设备发送所述快速切换验证请求消息，以及所述接收模块还用于以通过所述当前接入设备转发消息的形式接收所述目标接入设备发送的所述快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息封装于所述活动帧。
可选的，所述生成模块740还用于：
在与初始接入设备关联成功后，根据非对称密钥协商机制或预共享密钥机制确定的基密钥，利用第二密钥导出算法导出扩展主密钥；
根据所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备的身份标识和/或所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备生成的随机数，以及所述扩展主密钥，生成所述域密钥组。
可选的，所述发送模块710还用于：
向初始接入设备发送关联请求消息，所述关联请求消息中包括所述MDE字段，所述MDE字段内容与所述初始接入设备自身的MDE字段内容一致；
所述接收模块还用于：
接收所述初始接入设备发送的关联响应消息，所述关联响应消息中包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段以及第五FTIE字段，所述关联状态码字段用于标识所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备关联成功或者失败，所述第五FTIE字段中包括所述初始接入设备的身份标识；
所述生成模块还用于：
若所述关联状态码字段标识关联成功，则所述请求设备和所述初始接入设备执行身份鉴别操作，并在鉴别成功后生成所述域密钥组。
可选的，所述请求设备700还包括：
解除模块，用于若鉴别不成功，则解除与所述初始接入设备的关联关系。
接下来，参见本公开实施例提供的接入设备的结构示意图，该接入设备800包括：
接收模块810，用于接收请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码；
生成模块820，用于根据所述选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，基于所述域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥；
验证模块830，用于根据所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第一完整性校验码进行验证；
所述生成模块820，还用于当所述第一完整性校验码验证通过时，将所述请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥，所述会话密钥用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述接入设备的安全通信；
发送模块840，用于向接入设备发送第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述接入设备的身份标识、第二完整性校验码以及关联状态码，所述关联状态码用于标识所述请求设备关联成功或者关联失败。
可选的，所述接入设备和所述请求设备交互的字段携带在用于传输信令信息的管理类消息中。
可选的，所述无线网络为无线局域网；
所述接收模块810具体用于：
接收所述请求设备发送的快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息包括移动域信息元素MDE字段以及第一快速切换信息元素FTIE字段，所述MDE字段标识支持快速切换，所述第一FTIE字段包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识以及所述第一完整性校验码；
所述发送模块840具体用于：
向所述请求设备发送快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述接入设备的身份标识以及所述第二完整性校验码；
所述接收模块810还用于：
接收所述请求设备发送的重关联请求消息，所述重关联请求消息包括所述MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述第一随机数和第三完整性校验码；
所述验证模块830还用于：
验证所述重关联请求消息中所述第一随机数与快速切换验证请求消息中所述第一随机数是否一致，若一致，则利用所述消息完整性校验密钥验证第三完整性校验码，
所述发送模块840还用于：
所述第三完整性校验码验证通过后，向所述请求设备发送重关联响应消息，所述重关联响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第四FTIE字段，所述第四FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数和第四完整性校验码；
所述接入设备800还包括：
控制模块，用于当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述第二随机数与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述第二随机数一致，且所述第四完整性校验码验证通过时，打开所述接入设备的受控端口。
可选的，所述第一FTIE字段中还包括初始接入设备的身份标识；
所述接入设备800还包括：
查找模块，用于在未查找到所述域密钥时，还根据所述初始接入设备的身份标识向所 述初始接入设备请求所述域密钥。
可选的，所述第二FTIE字段中还包括所述接入设备的身份标识；
则所述生成模块820具体用于：
根据所述第一随机数、所述域密钥、所述第二随机数和所述请求设备的身份标识、所述接入设备的身份标识，利用所述接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成各自对应的会话密钥。
可选的，所述接入设备为初始接入设备，所述生成模块820还用于：
根据非对称密钥协商机制或预共享密钥机制确定的基密钥，利用第二密钥导出算法导出扩展主密钥；
根据双方的身份标识和/或双方生成的随机数，以及所述扩展主密钥，生成所述域密钥组。
可选的，所述接收模块810还用于：
在初始接入阶段，接收所述请求设备发送的关联请求消息，所述关联请求消息中包括所述MDE字段，所述MDE字段内容与所述初始接入设备自身的MDE字段内容一致；
所述发送模块840还用于：
向所述请求设备发送关联响应消息，所述关联响应消息中包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段以及第五FTIE字段，所述关联状态码字段用于标识所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备关联成功或者失败，所述第五FTIE字段中包括所述初始接入设备的身份标识；
所述生成模块820还用于：
若所述关联状态码字段标识关联成功，则执行身份鉴别操作，并在鉴别成功后生成所述域密钥组。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本公开所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述模块的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个模块可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或模块的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的模块可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为模块显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
应当理解，在本公开中，“至少一个(项)”是指一个或者多个，“多个”是指两个或两个以上。“和/或”，用于描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，“A和/或B”可以表示：只存在A，只存在B以及同时存在A和B三种情况，其中A，B可以是单数或者复数。字符“/”一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。“以下至少一项(个)”或其类似表达，是指这些项中的任意组合，包括单项(个)或复数项(个)的任意组合。例如，a，b或c中的至少一项(个)，可以表示：a，b，c，“a和b”，“a和c”，“b和c”，或“a和b和c”，其中a，b，c可以是单个，也可以是多个。
以上所述，以上实施例仅用以说明本公开的技术方案，而非对其限制；尽管参照前述实施例对本公开进行了详细的说明，本领域的普通技术人员应当理解：其依然可以对前述各实施例所记载的技术方案进行修改，或者对其中部分技术特征进行等同替换；而这些修改或者替换，并不使相应技术方案的本质脱离本公开各实施例技术方案的精神和范围。

Claims (26)

  1. 一种无线网络切换方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标接入设备接收到请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码，根据所述选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，基于所述域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥，所述消息完整性校验密钥用于对所述第一完整性校验码进行验证；
    当所述第一完整性校验码验证通过时，所述目标接入设备将所述请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥，所述会话密钥用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备的安全通信；
    所述请求设备接收到所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述目标接入设备发送的第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识和第二完整性校验码，当所述请求设备接收的所述第一随机数与所述请求设备之前发出的所述第一随机数一致时，根据所述请求设备基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第二完整性校验码进行验证；
    当所述第二完整性校验码验证通过时，基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥；
    所述请求设备接收到关联状态码，当所述关联状态码标识关联成功时，确定切换成功。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述域密钥组中域密钥的个数大于1。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标接入设备和所述请求设备交互的字段携带在用于传输信令信息的管理类消息中。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述无线网络为无线局域网；所述方法具体包括：
    所述请求设备向所述目标接入设备发送快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息包括移动域信息元素MDE字段以及第一快速切换信息元素FTIE字段，所述MDE字段标识支持快速切换，所述第一FTIE字段包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识以及所述第一完整性校验码；
    所述目标接入设备向所述请求设备发送快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括所述MDE字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识以及所述第二完整性校验码；
    在重关联截止期到达之前，所述请求设备向所述目标接入设备发送重关联请求消息，所述重关联请求消息包括所述MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述第一随机数和第三完整性校验码；
    所述目标接入设备验证所述重关联请求消息中所述第一随机数与快速切换验证请求消息中所述第一随机数是否一致，若一致，则利用所述消息完整性校验密钥验证第三完整性校验码，验证通过后，向所述请求设备发送重关联响应消息，所述重关联响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第四FTIE字段，所述第四FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数和第四完整性校验码；
    当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述第二随机数与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述第二随机数一致，且所述第四完整性校验码验证通过时，所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备打开各自对应的受控端口。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一FTIE字段中还包括初始接入设备的身份标识；
    所述目标接入设备在未查找到所述域密钥时，还根据所述初始接入设备的身份标识向所述初始接入设备请求所述域密钥。
  6. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二FTIE字段中还包括所述目标接入设备的身份标识；
    则所述请求设备和所述目标接入设备根据所述第一随机数、所述域密钥、所述第二随机数和所述请求设备的身份标识、所述目标接入设备的身份标识，利用所述目标接入设备 选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成各自对应的会话密钥。
  7. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于链路验证请求帧中；或者，
    所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于活动帧；
    其中，若所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于所述活动帧，则所述请求设备以通过当前接入设备转发消息的形式向所述目标接入设备发送所述快速切换验证请求消息，以及以通过所述当前接入设备转发消息的形式接收所述目标接入设备发送的所述快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息封装于所述活动帧。
  8. 根据权利要求1至7任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备与初始接入设备关联成功后，根据非对称密钥协商机制或预共享密钥机制确定的基密钥，利用第二密钥导出算法导出扩展主密钥；
    所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备再根据双方的身份标识和/或双方生成的随机数，以及所述扩展主密钥，生成所述域密钥组。
  9. 根据权利要求1至7任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述请求设备和初始接入设备通过如下方式进行初始移动域关联：
    所述请求设备向初始接入设备发送关联请求消息，所述关联请求消息中包括所述MDE字段，所述MDE字段内容与所述初始接入设备自身的MDE字段内容一致；
    所述初始接入设备向所述请求设备发送关联响应消息，所述关联响应消息中包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段以及第五FTIE字段，所述关联状态码字段用于标识所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备关联成功或者失败，所述第五FTIE字段中包括所述初始接入设备的身份标识；
    若所述关联状态码字段标识关联成功，则所述请求设备和所述初始接入设备执行身份鉴别操作，并在鉴别成功后生成所述域密钥组。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    若鉴别不成功，则所述请求设备解除与所述初始接入设备的关联关系。
  11. 一种请求设备，其特征在于，包括：
    发送模块，用于向目标接入设备发送所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码；
    接收模块，用于接收所述目标接入设备发送的第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识和第二完整性校验码，所述第二随机数是所述目标接入设备在对第一完整性校验码验证通过时所生成的；
    验证模块，用于当所述请求设备接收的所述第一随机数与所述请求设备之前发出的所述第一随机数一致时，根据所述请求设备基于所述域密钥确定的所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第二完整性校验码进行验证；
    生成模块，用于当所述第二完整性校验码验证通过时，基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥；
    确定模块，用于当接收到所述目标接入设备发送的关联状态码时，若所述关联状态码表征关联成功，则确定切换成功。
  12. 根据权利要求1所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述域密钥组中域密钥的个数大于1。
  13. 根据权利要求1所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述目标接入设备和所述请求设备交互的字段携带在用于传输信令信息的管理类消息中。
  14. 根据权利要求1所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述无线网络为无线局域网；
    所述发送模块具体用于：
    向所述目标接入设备发送快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息包括移动域信息元素MDE字段以及第一快速切换信息元素FTIE字段，所述MDE字段标识支持快速切换，所述第一FTIE字段包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识以及所述第一完整性校验码；
    所述接收模块具体用于：
    接收所述目标接入设备发送的快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括所述MDE字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述目标接入设备的身份标识以及所述第二完整性校验码；
    所述发送模块还用于：
    在重关联截止期到达之前，向所述目标接入设备发送重关联请求消息，所述重关联请求消息包括所述MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述第一随机数和第三完整性校验码；
    所述接收模块还用于：
    接收所述目标接入设备发送的重关联响应消息，所述重关联响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第四FTIE字段，所述第四FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数和第四完整性校验码；
    所述请求设备还包括：
    控制模块，用于当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述第二随机数与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述第二随机数一致，且所述第四完整性校验码验证通过时，打开所述请求设备的受控端口。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述第二FTIE字段中还包括所述目标接入设备的身份标识；
    则所述生成模块具体用于：
    根据所述第一随机数、所述域密钥、所述第二随机数和所述请求设备的身份标识、所述目标接入设备的身份标识，利用所述目标接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成各自对应的会话密钥。
  16. 根据权利要求14所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述生成模块还用于将所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于链路验证请求帧中；或者，
    将所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于活动帧；
    其中，若所述快速切换验证请求消息封装于所述活动帧，则所述发送模块还用于以通过当前接入设备转发消息的形式向所述目标接入设备发送所述快速切换验证请求消息，以及所述接收模块还用于以通过所述当前接入设备转发消息的形式接收所述目标接入设备发送的所述快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息封装于所述活动帧。
  17. 根据权利要求11至16任一项所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述生成模块还用于：
    在与初始接入设备关联成功后，根据非对称密钥协商机制或预共享密钥机制确定的基密钥，利用第二密钥导出算法导出扩展主密钥；
    根据所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备的身份标识和/或所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备生成的随机数，以及所述扩展主密钥，生成所述域密钥组。
  18. 根据权利要求11至16任一项所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述发送模块还用于：
    向初始接入设备发送关联请求消息，所述关联请求消息中包括所述MDE字段，所述MDE字段内容与所述初始接入设备自身的MDE字段内容一致；
    所述接收模块还用于：
    接收所述初始接入设备发送的关联响应消息，所述关联响应消息中包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段以及第五FTIE字段，所述关联状态码字段用于标识所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备关联成功或者失败，所述第五FTIE字段中包括所述初始接入设备的身份标识；
    所述生成模块还用于：
    若所述关联状态码字段标识关联成功，则所述请求设备和所述初始接入设备执行身份鉴别操作，并在鉴别成功后生成所述域密钥组。
  19. 根据权利要求18所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述请求设备还包括：
    解除模块，用于若鉴别不成功，则解除与所述初始接入设备的关联关系。
  20. 一种接入设备，其特征在于，包括：
    接收模块，用于接收请求设备发送的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识和第一完整性校验码；
    生成模块，用于根据所述选定的域密钥的标识获取对应的域密钥，基于所述域密钥生成消息完整性校验密钥；
    验证模块，用于根据所述消息完整性校验密钥对所述第一完整性校验码进行验证；
    所述生成模块，还用于当所述第一完整性校验码验证通过时，将所述请求设备的身份标识添加至关联列表，生成第二随机数，并基于所述域密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数生成会话密钥，所述会话密钥用于切换成功后实现所述请求设备和所述接入设备的安全通信；
    发送模块，用于向接入设备发送第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述接入设备的身份标识、第二完整性校验码以及关联状态码，所述关联状态码用于标识所述请求设备关联成功或者关联失败。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的接入设备，其特征在于，所述接入设备和所述请求设备交互的字段携带在用于传输信令信息的管理类消息中。
  22. 根据权利要求20所述的接入设备，其特征在于，所述无线网络为无线局域网；
    所述接收模块具体用于：
    接收所述请求设备发送的快速切换验证请求消息，所述快速切换验证请求消息包括移动域信息元素MDE字段以及第一快速切换信息元素FTIE字段，所述MDE字段标识支持快速切换，所述第一FTIE字段包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数、所述请求设备的身份标识、所述请求设备在初始移动域关联时生成的域密钥组中选定的域密钥的标识以及所述第一完整性校验码；
    所述发送模块具体用于：
    向所述请求设备发送快速切换验证响应消息，所述快速切换验证响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第二FTIE字段，所述第二FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数、所述第一随机数、所述接入设备的身份标识以及所述第二完整性校验码；
    所述接收模块还用于：
    接收所述请求设备发送的重关联请求消息，所述重关联请求消息包括所述MDE字段和第三FTIE字段，所述第三FTIE字段包括所述第一随机数和第三完整性校验码；
    所述验证模块还用于：
    验证所述重关联请求消息中所述第一随机数与快速切换验证请求消息中所述第一随机数是否一致，若一致，则利用所述消息完整性校验密钥验证第三完整性校验码，
    所述发送模块还用于：
    所述第三完整性校验码验证通过后，向所述请求设备发送重关联响应消息，所述重关联响应消息包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段和第四FTIE字段，所述第四FTIE字段包括所述第二随机数和第四完整性校验码；
    所述接入设备还包括：
    控制模块，用于当所述关联状态码字段标识重关联成功，所述重关联响应消息中的所述第二随机数与所述快速切换验证响应消息中的所述第二随机数一致，且所述第四完整性校验码验证通过时，打开所述接入设备的受控端口。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的接入设备，其特征在于，所述第一FTIE字段中还包括初始接入设备的身份标识；
    所述接入设备还包括：
    查找模块，用于在未查找到所述域密钥时，还根据所述初始接入设备的身份标识向所述初始接入设备请求所述域密钥。
  24. 根据权利要求22所述的接入设备，其特征在于，所述第二FTIE字段中还包括所述接入设备的身份标识；
    则所述生成模块具体用于：
    根据所述第一随机数、所述域密钥、所述第二随机数和所述请求设备的身份标识、所述接入设备的身份标识，利用所述接入设备选择使用的安全能力参数确定的第一密钥导出算法生成各自对应的会话密钥。
  25. 根据权利要求20至24任一项所述的接入设备，其特征在于，所述接入设备为初始接入设备，所述生成模块还用于：
    根据非对称密钥协商机制或预共享密钥机制确定的基密钥，利用第二密钥导出算法导出扩展主密钥；
    根据双方的身份标识和/或双方生成的随机数，以及所述扩展主密钥，生成所述域密钥组。
  26. 根据权利要求20至24任一项所述的接入设备，其特征在于，所述接收模块还用于：
    在初始接入阶段，接收所述请求设备发送的关联请求消息，所述关联请求消息中包括所述MDE字段，所述MDE字段内容与所述初始接入设备自身的MDE字段内容一致；
    所述发送模块还用于：
    向所述请求设备发送关联响应消息，所述关联响应消息中包括所述MDE字段、关联状态码字段以及第五FTIE字段，所述关联状态码字段用于标识所述请求设备与所述初始接入设备关联成功或者失败，所述第五FTIE字段中包括所述初始接入设备的身份标识；
    所述生成模块还用于：
    若所述关联状态码字段标识关联成功，则执行身份鉴别操作，并在鉴别成功后生成所述域密钥组。
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