JP4058035B2 - Public key infrastructure system and public key infrastructure method - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a public key infrastructure system and a public key infrastructure method with a mobile device temporary issue function for promptly issuing a mobile communication terminal device that can be temporarily used in a public key infrastructure system.

  In recent years, with the advancement of IC cards (also called smart cards) and portable electronic devices, public-key cryptography infrastructures (in relation to various systems with identity verification or authority verification using PIN (Personal Identification Number) authentication, digital signatures, etc.) It is considered to apply PKI (Public Key Infrastructure).

Since it is necessary to collect and redistribute mobile devices such as IC cards when updating a private key or public key certificate using such a public key encryption infrastructure, it is time and effort to collect and redistribute mobile devices when updating A technique for eliminating the above has been disclosed (see Patent Document 1).
JP 2003-92565 A

  In the public key infrastructure, user-specific information is stored in the mobile device. Therefore, when a secondary issue of the mobile device is required, a specific worker is usually used in a safe place where entry / exit management is performed for security reasons. Is done by. For this reason, it usually takes several days to several weeks until it reaches the user's hands after applying for issuance.

  However, when authentication based on public key infrastructure is adopted in the company's in-house system and the employee ID is realized by this portable device, when the employee forgets or loses the portable device at home, the next day or There was an inconvenience that the internal system could not be used until it was reissued.

  The present invention has been made to solve the above problems, and in a public key infrastructure system, a public key infrastructure system with a mobile device temporary issue function for promptly issuing a temporarily usable mobile device. And to provide a public key infrastructure method.

  In order to solve the above-described problems, the first feature of the present invention is [i] an issuing institution device (23) for issuing a portable device for use in a public key cryptosystem, and a portable device issued by the issuing institution device. A public key infrastructure system comprising a user terminal (42) capable of inputting arbitrary contents to a device (30), wherein the first encryption / decryption for a public key cryptosystem and a common key cryptosystem Issued by the device issuance processing unit (16a) for issuing the second encryption / decryption and the portable device having the common key used in the second encryption / decryption, and [b] device issuance processing unit The public key corresponding to the user's private key and the public key corresponding to the user's private key are disclosed with respect to the mobile device that has been encrypted. A key transmission processing unit (16b) for transmitting the key certificate to the user terminal; [C] a storage device (14) for storing at least correspondence information for associating the unique information of the portable device with the user information of the portable device; and [d] identifying the unique information, user information and user identity from the user terminal. When a temporary application including information is received and the received user information and identity verification information match, the received unique information and the temporary correspondence information corresponding to the received user information with an expiration date are stored. A temporary use application reception processing unit (60) temporarily stored in the device (14), and the [e] device issuance processing unit (16a) stores the unique information of the portable device and the user information in the storage device (14). When the correspondence information exists, the mobile device (30) is issued. When the correspondence information does not exist, the unconfirmed portable device (30x) is issued. The [F] key transmission processing unit (16b) corresponds to the unique information. To the storage device (14) If not resident, or if the expiration date has expired, and summarized in that a public key infrastructure system that does not transmit the encrypted secret key and public key certificate to the user terminal.

  The first feature of the present invention is that [G] the portable device stores at least one pair of encrypted private key and secret public key certificate, and the user terminal stores the encryption stored in the unconfirmed portable device (30x). The delete command section (70) for deleting the private key and the public key certificate is set to at least one of the user terminal or the unconfirmed portable device at the time of the application from the user terminal or the temporary issue application Activated by the unconfirmed portable device deletion condition, deletes the encrypted private key and secret public key certificate in the unconfirmed portable device, [h] the unconfirmed portable device stores the common key, and the unconfirmed portable device (30x ) When the update application for updating the expiration date is received, the portable device common key update processing unit (81) for updating the common key in the unconfirmed portable device, and the storage device (14) when the update application is received. To update the common key The storage device common key update processing unit (80) may further be provided.

  The second feature of the present invention is [a] a portable device issuing method for issuing a portable device to a user terminal capable of inputting arbitrary contents to the portable device used for the public key cryptosystem. A first encryption / decryption for public key cryptosystem, a second encryption / decryption for common key cryptosystem, and a mobile phone having a common key used in the second encryption / decryption. A step in which the device issuance processing unit (16a) issues the device; and [b] the user's private key used in the first encryption / decryption is encrypted with the common key for the issued portable device. A key transmission processing unit (16b) transmitting a public key certificate of the public key corresponding to the encrypted private key and the user's private key to the user terminal, and [c] at least information unique to the mobile device Correspondence information that associates the user information of the portable device with the storage device (14 And (d) the temporary use application reception processing unit (60) receives the temporary use application including the specific information, the user information, and the user identification information from the user terminal, and the received user information Temporarily storing in the storage device (14) temporary correspondence information in which the received unique information and the received user information are associated with an expiration date when the identity verification information matches, In the issuing step, the portable device (30) is issued when the correspondence information between the unique information of the portable device and the user information exists in the storage device (14), and the unconfirmed portable device ( 30x) and [f] transmit the encrypted private key and public key if the corresponding information corresponding to the specific information does not exist in the storage device (14) or has expired Certificate to user And summarized in that a public key infrastructure methods that do not send end to.

  According to the public key infrastructure system and the public key infrastructure method of the present invention, a portable device that can be temporarily used in a desired public key infrastructure system can be issued promptly.

  After making an application for temporary use of the anonymous card, the private key and public key certificate can be written to the anonymous card that can be used only within a predetermined validity period. Since the key / certificate acquisition process can be executed at any time within the validity period, the key and certificate can be acquired even when the key is updated during temporary use of the anonymous card.

  In addition, the encryption secret key transmitted from the issuing organization to the user terminal is encrypted with a common key unique to the anonymous card possessed by the user, so if the data is wiretapped or copied, the encryption is decrypted. Unless this is done, it is possible to make it impossible to obtain the secret key itself or write it to another card for use.

  Next, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. In the following description of the drawings, the same or similar parts are denoted by the same or similar reference numerals. However, it should be noted that the drawings are schematic.

  Further, in the following description, an IC card is used as an example of a portable device and a personal computer is used as a user terminal. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and a chip can be used as a portable device and the chip can be attached as a user terminal. It may be modified to an example using a simple mobile phone. Or you may deform | transform, when comprised integrally as a portable apparatus and a user terminal or a mobile telephone.

(Embodiment of the present invention)
(Public key infrastructure system)
As shown in FIG. 1, a public key infrastructure system 100 with a temporary issue function of a portable device according to an embodiment of the present invention is configured to issue an issuer 23 that issues an IC card 30 that is a confirmed portable device, and issue requests from the issuer. A certificate authority 22 that creates a public key certificate Cert by digitally signing certificate creation information and its own identifier, and an IC card issued by the issuing authority 23 based on the public key certificate Cert 30 and a user terminal 42 that sets the IC card 30 to be temporarily usable.

  In FIG. 1, the characters accompanying the arrows indicate the flow of information. In the following embodiment, an IC card 30 for an employee card used in a corporation or the like is assumed as a portable device, and the issuing organization 23 is installed in an employee card issuing department or the like, and the user terminal 42 The extra IC card 30 issued in advance is installed and stored in each business site (may be geographically separated from the business site of the previous issuing department). The user terminal 42 may be installed at the entrance of each business place, or may be a personal computer used by each employee (user) for business.

  In the public key infrastructure system 100, only the common key Ck is stored when the normal IC card 30 is issued. At that time, the correspondence relationship between the common key Ck, the card ID, and the user ID has already been set in the system DB 14 as a storage device, and the card is issued as a user-dedicated card with the associated user ID. This is the so-called secondary issue of cards (personalization).

  Furthermore, in addition to the above-described normal secondary issuance, the public key infrastructure system 100 issues a card ID of an IC card that has been issued in advance in a state where it is not associated with a user ID (not personalized). . The IC card in this state is hereinafter referred to as “anonymous card”. An anonymous card 30x, which is an unconfirmed portable device, is stored at each business site.

  The anonymous card 30x is temporarily associated with the employee by applying for temporary use at the user terminal 42 when the employee has lost or misplaced the IC card 30, and the employee is temporarily It can be used as an IC card that can be used for

(issuing authority)
The issuing agency 23 distributes the IC card 30 holding the common key Ck instead of the secret key Sk and the public key certificate Cert to the user when the IC card 30 is newly issued, and encrypts it so that it can be decrypted with the common key Ck. The encrypted encryption private key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert (not encrypted) are distributed to the user terminal 42 via the network 50. That is, the secret key Sk is obtained by decrypting the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] in the IC card 30.

  The system server 10x of the issuing institution 23 includes a public key generation unit 11, a common key generation unit 15, a system DB 14, a communication processing unit 16, a temporary use application reception processing unit 60, a common key update processing unit 80, and the like.

  The common key generation unit 15 generates a common key Ck for each user ID and registers it in the system DB 14.

  The communication processing unit 16 includes a device issuance processing unit 16a and a key transmission processing unit 16b. The device issuance processing unit 16a sends a common key Ck in the system DB 14 to the card issuer 20 for each user ID, a communication function for the certificate authority 22, a function for registering the public key certificate Cert from the certificate authority 22 in the system DB 14. And the function of encrypting the secret key Sk generated by the public key generation unit 11 with the common key Ck in the system DB 14 and registering it in the system DB 14 in the state of the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk]. The key transmission processing unit 16b receives the user's card ID via the network 50 to the user terminal 42, and transmits the encrypted private key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert in the system DB 14. It has.

  The public key generation unit 11 generates a public key pair as a public key Pk / private key Sk pair for each user ID, and registers the obtained public key pair in the system DB 14 for each user ID.

The system DB 14 includes, for example, a user table shown in FIG. 2, and a user ID, user incidental information, and identity verification information are registered in the user table. Furthermore, for each user ID, at least one or more sets of public key Pk and encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] are registered as shown in block 1 and block 2 of FIG. Here, for convenience, the public key certificate Cert and its ID are also registered. Although not shown, a common key used for encryption / decryption is also registered in the user table. Further, the system DB 14 includes, for example, a card table shown in FIG. The card table stores a card ID, card-accompanying information, user ID, user ID mapping expiration date UT, common key ID, and the like as appropriate. Further, although not shown, the card expiration date VT, certificate expiration date CertVT, authentication PIN, and arbitrary user information may be stored. It should be noted that this type of modification is a design matter, and it goes without saying that this modification is included in the scope of the present invention even if the storage contents of the system DB 14 are appropriately distributed to a plurality of DBs. .

  The temporary use application reception processing unit 60 has a function of receiving a request from the user terminal 42 via the network 62 and performing processing for application. The common key update processing unit 80 has a function of receiving a card ID from the temporary use application acceptance processing unit 60 and the like and updating the common key in the system DB 14 corresponding to the card ID.

(User terminal)
The user terminal 42 includes a communication processing unit 17, a card reading / writing device (hereinafter referred to as “card R / W”) 41, a temporary use application reception processing unit 61, a deletion command unit 70, and the like.

  The card R / W 41 has a function of inputting arbitrary contents to the IC card 30 issued by the issuing agency 23 and a function of outputting arbitrary contents from the IC card 30.

  By inserting the IC card 30 into the card R / W 41, the communication processing unit 17 makes it possible to use a predetermined public key cryptosystem using the IC card 30 for an arbitrary partner computer via a network (not shown). It has a function of receiving the encrypted private key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert received from the system server 10x via the network 50 based on the function and the operation of the operator.

  The temporary use application processing unit 61 has an interface for allowing a user to input a user ID and identification information, and has a function of requesting application processing from the temporary use application reception processing unit 60 via the network 62. In addition, when using the mobile phone integrated with the portable apparatus as the user terminal 42, it is assumed that the temporary portable application can be performed by operating the anonymous portable apparatus.

  The deletion command unit 70 has a function of deleting all private keys and public key certificates in the temporary IC card 30 in accordance with a user instruction or automatic activation.

(IC card)
The IC card 30 is an IC card that can store a user's private key and public key certificate group. The IC card 30 may be a contact, non-contact, or hybrid card. In addition to the IC card 30, any portable device such as a USB token or a mobile phone can be used. As the usage form of the IC card 30, a company employee card, a user authentication card for various information services, and the like can be considered.

  The IC card 30 includes a public key encryption / decryption unit 31, a common key encryption / decryption unit 32, a memory 33, a common key update processing unit 81, and the like.

  The memory 33 stores the common key Ck, the secret key Sk, and the public key certificate Cert written in the card issuing machine 20. The public key encryption / decryption unit 31 has a function of performing encryption / decryption processing of a public key pair.

  The common key encryption / decryption unit 32 has a function of performing encryption / decryption processing of the common key Ck. The common key encryption / decryption unit 32 is for preventing leakage of the secret key Sk in the plaintext state. In the IC card 30, a usable secret key Sk is generated by decryption and stored. Outside the IC card 30, an unusable encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] is generated by encryption and output. Unlike the case where the secret key Sk is output as the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk], the common key Ck is not output outside the IC card 30. That is, the common key Ck and the IC card 30 are inseparably integrated. Specifically, the common key encryption / decryption unit 32 encrypts the secret key Sk with the common key Ck in the memory based on the read control from the user terminal 42, and the obtained encrypted secret key Ck [Sk ] To the user terminal 42, and the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] input from the user terminal 42 is decrypted with the common key Ck based on the writing control from the user terminal 42, and the obtained secret And a function of writing the key Sk into the memory.

  The common key update processing unit 81 is activated by the deletion command unit 70 and has a function of updating the common key in the anonymous IC card 30.

  The system server 10x, the user terminal 42, and the IC card 30 can be realized by causing each computer to read each program stored individually or in the same storage medium. The same applies to the following embodiments.

  The anonymity card 30x is an IC card 30 created for spare temporary use, and has the same function as the IC card 30 except that the user to be used is not specified.

(Operation of public key infrastructure system)
The public key infrastructure system 100 with the mobile device temporary issue function executes the following processing.

1. Normal IC card issue processing2. Anonymous card issue processing3. Temporary use application processing 4. Key / certificate acquisition process Card Data Deletion Processing The operation of the public key infrastructure system 100 will be described in detail in this order with reference to the drawings.

  Note that the operation of starting and ending the temporary use of the anonymous card 30x described below is based on whether or not the anonymous card 30x can be used, and whether or not the secret key Sk can be used. Should. That is, the secret key Sk of a specific user can be used only with the anonymous card 30x for which the application for temporary use has been made, and after the secret key Sk is deleted at the end of use, the anonymous card 30x or data that has flowed on the communication path Even if is used, the secret key Sk of any user cannot be used. Thereby, the issuance of the anonymous card 30x is realized without imposing special restrictions such as making the application system based on the public key infrastructure confirm the validity of the mobile device itself.

(Normal IC card issuance processing)
4 and 5 are flowcharts showing the operation of the public key infrastructure system 100 for performing a normal IC card issuance process.

(A) First, in step S11, when the private key Sk and the public key certificate Cert are newly issued, the common key generation unit 15 of the system server 10x of the issuing organization 23 performs the common key for each user ID by the operation of the operator. Ck is generated. In step S12, the common key Ck is registered in the system DB 14.

(B) In step S13, the communication processing unit 16 of the system server 10x sends the common key Ck in the system DB to the card issuing machine 20 for each user ID. In step S14, the card issuing machine 20 issues the IC card 30 corresponding to the user ID by writing the common key Ck into the memory of the IC card 30. In step S15, the IC card 30 is distributed to the user's address or residence by mail or the like. When receiving the IC card 30, the user requests the issuing organization 23 to distribute the public key certificate Cert and the private key Sk. This distribution request may be made by any method such as e-mail, telephone, mail or FAX.

(C) In step S16, when the issuing organization 23 receives this distribution request, the public key generation unit 11 generates a public key pair and sends it to the communication processing unit 16 as described above. In step S17, the communication processing unit 16 registers the public key Pk of the public key pair in the system DB for each user ID, and encrypts the secret key Sk with the common key Ck in step S18. Each user ID is registered in the system DB 14 in the state of Ck [Sk].

(D) Subsequently, as shown in FIG. 5, in step S19, the communication processing unit 16 sends a public key certificate Cert issuance request to the certificate authority 22 in the same manner as described above, and the disclosure returned in step S20. Receive key certificate Cert. In step S21, the communication processing unit 16 registers the public key certificate Cert in the system DB 14.

(E) Thereafter, in step S22, the communication processing unit 16 reads out the encrypted private key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert corresponding to the user ID in the system DB 14 and sends the network 50 to the user terminal 42. Send to.

(F) In step S23, when the user terminal 42 receives the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert, the user terminal 42 operates the user with the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert. Is input to the IC card 30. In the IC card 30, the public key certificate Cert is written in the memory in step S24, and the common key encryption / decryption unit 32 uses the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] as the common key Ck in the memory. Decrypt and write the secret key Sk obtained in step S25 into the memory. Thereby, the distribution of the private key Sk and the public key certificate Cert to the IC card 30 is completed.

  Thereafter, the user inserts the IC card 30 into the card R / W 41 of the user terminal 42, so that the usage form of the predetermined public key cryptosystem using the IC card 30 is changed to another computer (not shown) on the network 50. It becomes feasible for. The usage forms include digital signature / signature authentication and encryption / decryption by the public key encryption / decryption unit 31 for the public key pair.

(Anonymous card issuance process)
The anonymous card issuance process is compared with the normal card issuance process described above in that the user ID is not yet assigned to the card ID. It is different that it is stocked.

(A) First, in step S31, a common key Ck is created as in step S21. In step S32, a card entry is created using the common key Ck as in step S22, and registration processing is performed. At this time, the user ID in the user table of FIG. 2 is not registered and is left empty. In step S33, the common key Ck is sent to the card issuing machine 20 as in step S23.

(B) In step S34, as in step S24, an anonymous card 30x, which is an anonymous IC card that includes the common key Ck and whose user ID is not fixed, is issued. In step S35, the issued anonymous card 30x is not distributed to the user but stocked as a spare IC card to a business office or the like.

  The anonymous card 30x issued in the above process has not yet been confirmed with anyone, and no user key can be stored. This is realized by causing the communication processing unit 16 to determine that there is no user corresponding to the specified card ID and not to return the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] and the public key certificate Cert. Therefore, in this state, even if the anonymous card 30x is in the hands of a malicious third party, the secret key of any user cannot be used, so that a certain level of security can be maintained.

(Temporary use application processing)
Next, a process of applying for temporary use of the anonymous card 30x due to reasons such as forgetting or losing the IC card 30 owned by the user will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG.

(A) First, in step S41, the user receives the anonymous card 30x from the manager of each business establishment and inserts it into the user terminal 42. In step S42, the user activates the temporary use application processing unit 61 and inputs a user ID and identification information. The personal identification information is preferably a personal identification number or the like. However, if the user terminal 42 is a personal computer of each user, an authentication key or the like set in advance may be used. The authentication key may be implicitly read from a file or the like.

(B) In step S43, the temporary use application processing unit 61 reads the card IC from the anonymous card 30x, and in step S44, transmits it to the temporary use application reception processing unit 60 of the issuing institution 23 together with the user ID and the identity confirmation information. Here, when the identification information is an authentication key, challenge response authentication may be performed with the temporary use application reception processing unit 60 instead of transmitting directly.

(C) In step S45, confirmation of the identity confirmation information and permission determination of mapping between the user ID and the card ID are performed from the information received by the temporary use application acceptance processing unit 60. As an example, for the mapping determination between the user ID and the card ID, first, it is confirmed that the first character of the card ID is 1, and then whether the business code matches the card ID is determined. This determination prevents accidental mapping of the anonymous card 30x to a user other than the original, and even if the identity verification information is leaked, other than a specific card (for example, a card stocked at an affiliated business site) It can not be used as an anonymous card 30x.

  As a method of identity verification for mapping the anonymous card 30x to the user, in addition to the commonly used password authentication and biometric authentication, there are cases where a plurality of IC cards and keys are used properly in the public key infrastructure. , They can be used as identity verification information. Specifically, the initial PIN of the IC card 30 issued to the user most recently, challenge response authentication using the secret key stored in the other IC card 30 of the user, the user set in the user terminal 42 Challenge-response authentication using a common key for authentication or a secret key, verification of the PIN code encrypted or sent to the user in plain text upon request, and the PIN code of the agent registered in advance in the issuing device system Alternatively, collation of biometric information such as fingerprints, challenge response authentication using a secret key stored in an agent's IC card registered in advance in the issuing device system, or determination by a combination of the above may be mentioned.

  Further, if the IC card 30 is used for a corporate employee ID card, it is assumed that there is a card manager, so that the card manager may be authenticated as an agent of the principal. This technique is useful when the user forgets the password or cannot use other alternative means.

  If both confirmation and determination are appropriate, in step S46, the temporary use application acceptance processing unit 60 writes the user ID and the mapping expiration date calculated by a prescribed method in the card entry corresponding to the card ID, and ends. On the other hand, if at least one of confirmation and determination is not appropriate, this process is terminated. When the process is terminated, success or failure may be transmitted to the temporary use application processing unit 61 and displayed on the user terminal 42.

  Here, the mapping expiration date may be, for example, up to 23:59 on the application reception date. Alternatively, for example, the smaller one calculated from the user application date and the prescribed effective period days may be used. Good. The mapping expiration date is used in a key / certificate acquisition process described later, and is controlled so that the key / certificate cannot be acquired using the anonymous card after the set expiration date.

(Key / certificate acquisition process)
Next, the key / certificate acquisition process will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG.

(A) In step S51, the user first inserts the anonymous card 30x into the user terminal 42, and activates the communication processing unit 17 in step S52. Subsequently, in step S53, the communication processing unit 17 reads the card ID from the anonymous card 30x. Note that these processes can be omitted by integrating with the temporary use application process. In this case, the communication processing unit 17 is automatically started from the temporary use application processing part 61, and the card ID is passed as an activation parameter. Make the configuration. In step S54, the communication processing unit 17 transmits the card ID to the communication processing unit 16 of the issuing agency 23.

(B) In step S55, the key transmission processing unit 16b of the communication processing unit 16 searches the card table of the system DB 14 from the received card ID and checks whether the user ID is mapped. If it is not mapped, the process is terminated assuming that the key / certificate cannot be acquired. If it is mapped, the mapping validity period is checked in step S56. In the expiration date check, for example, it is checked whether the request reception time is within the validity period based on the time of the server machine or information from the time server.

(C) As a result of the check, if it is determined that it is outside the valid period, a mapping release process is performed. Specifically, first, in step S62, the mapped user ID is deleted, and then in step 63, the card ID is transmitted to the common key update processing unit 80. In step S64, the common key update processing unit 80 updates the common key Ck corresponding to the card ID according to a specified rule. Here, the common key update method must output the same common key as the common key update processing unit 81 built in the IC card 30. For example, it is conceivable to use the result of hashing the original common key and the card ID concatenated with the SHA-1 method. A configuration in which the common key is not updated is also conceivable. In this case, there is no need to mount the common key update processing unit 81 on the IC card 30, and there is an advantage that a system can be constructed using an IC card and an anonymous card having the same specifications. However, in this case, by obtaining a pair of the anonymous card once used by the third party and the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] transmitted thereto, the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] is transferred to the anonymous card. A structure that prevents writing and using a secret key is required.

(D) On the other hand, if it is determined by the mapping validity period check that it is within the validity period, in step S57, the communication processing unit 16 assigns all the secret keys corresponding to the user ID to the common key corresponding to the designated card ID. To create an encrypted secret key Ck [Sk]. After the creation of the encrypted secret key Ck [Sk], the secret key Sk and the public key certificate Cert are written to the anonymous card 30x in steps S58 to S61 as in steps S22 to S25 in FIG.

  With the above processing, the private key Sk and the public key certificate Cert can be written into the anonymous card only within a predetermined validity period after applying for the temporary use of the anonymous card. Since the above key / certificate acquisition process can be executed at any time within the expiration date, the key and certificate can be acquired even when the key is updated during temporary use of the anonymous card. The encrypted secret key Ck [Sk] transmitted from the key transmission processing unit 16b of the issuing organization 23 to the communication processing unit 17 of the user terminal 42 is encrypted with a common key unique to the anonymous card possessed by the user. Therefore, even if the data is wiretapped or copied, the secret key itself cannot be obtained or written to another card for use unless the encryption is decrypted.

  Note that the PIN for using the anonymous card 30x created by the above procedure is set in advance when the user changes the specified value and uses it, or it is newly created by the communication processing unit 16 and communicated. A method of writing to the IC card via the processing unit 17 and displaying it as an initial PIN on the screen is conceivable.

(Card data erasure process)
Next, the card data erasing process will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. (A) First, in step S71, when the use of the temporary anonymous card 30x is terminated, the user inserts the anonymous card 30x into the user terminal 42. In step S72, the user activates the delete command unit 70 and inputs the PIN of the anonymous card 30x. In step S73, the deletion command unit 70 of the user terminal 42 transmits the PIN to the IC card (anonymous card) 30x in which the PIN is inserted, and the anonymous card 30x verifies the PIN. (B) In step S 74, the deletion command unit 70 transmits a temporary use clear instruction to the IC card 30. In step S75, the IC card 30 first checks whether the first character of its card ID is 1. If the first character of the card ID is not 1, the process is terminated because the card is not an anonymous card.

(C) If the first character of the card ID is 1, it is determined that the card is an anonymous card, and the process proceeds to step S76 to delete all the private keys Sk and public key certificate Cert stored in the card. Further, in step S77, the common key update processing unit 81 updates the common key Ck. At this time, the common key update processing unit 81 needs to output the same common key as the common key update processing unit 80 of the issuing organization as described above.

  In the card data erasing process, the content of the anonymous card 30x is cleared only when the user gives an instruction. This is because the IC card 30 itself does not have a clock function and operates passively. In addition, when using the IC card 30 with the user terminal 42 instead of the user's instruction, it is possible to determine whether or not to be cleared by processing on the user terminal 42 side, and delete it as necessary. For example, a method is conceivable in which the expiration date is confirmed by communicating with the issuing institution 23, or the expiration date is written in the IC card 30 during the temporary use application processing and checked.

  Further, if the portable device is not the IC card 30 but has a built-in clock function, it may be deleted in the own device by the function in the portable device.

  The anonymous card 30x whose contents are cleared by the above card data erasure process cannot be decrypted even if the common key Ck is changed and the encrypted secret key Ck [SK] is input again. The key cannot be reset. Therefore, unauthorized use by a malicious third party can be prevented by eavesdropping on the encrypted secret key or obtaining and analyzing the anonymous card 30x used in the past. The anonymous card 30x can be updated by making a temporary use application again.

  When updating the temporary use, when the user inserts the anonymous card 30x into the card R / W 41 of the user terminal 42 in FIG. 1 and applies for the update on the user terminal 42, the common use of the anonymous card 30x in FIG. The key update processing unit 81 updates the common key. At the same time, the common key update processing unit 80 receives an update application for updating the expiration date of the anonymous card 30x through the temporary use application acceptance processing unit 60 of the issuing organization 23, and updates the common key in the system DB 14 To do.

  The update process may be activated only once when it is first determined in the key transmission processing unit 16b of the issuing institution 23 that the expiration date of the user ID mapping of the anonymous card 30x has expired. According to this, since it is not necessary to regularly perform update management, the update timing can be realized appropriately and simply.

  In order to update the common key, information including the currently stored common key and card ID may be input, and a new common key may be generated based on the value converted by the one-way hash function. This makes it possible to easily create a common key.

(Example of change)
The temporary application for issuing an anonymous card is usually executed when the IC card 30 is lost / damaged or forgotten at home. If it is clear that the IC card 30 has been lost / damaged, a reissue application is required. Therefore, when the user terminal 42 applies for issuance of an anonymous card to the issuing institution 23, it is possible to simultaneously accept revocation of the public key certificate Cert and reissue of the normal card 30 that can be used after the expiration of the anonymous card It is preferable that At that time, the current valid public key certificate Cert corresponding to the user applying at the time of acceptance will be revoked, a new private key Sk and public key certificate Cert will be issued, and a normal card will be reissued at a later date In addition, the valid period of mapping is determined by the conditions set for reissue. As a result, a normal card reissuance application can also be made at the time of an anonymous card issuance application, and after the expiration date of the anonymous card, it can be smoothly transferred to a normal card.

  When the public key certificate Cert is immediately revoked at the time of acceptance, the use of the private key Sk included in the IC card 30 lost by the user can be prohibited.

  Since a new public key certificate Cert is issued immediately, the latest public key certificate Cert is obtained immediately by writing the private key Sk and the public key certificate Cert to the IC card 30x. Can do.

1 is a structural diagram showing a structure of a public key infrastructure system according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a figure which shows the data structure of the user table of system DB. It is a figure which shows the data structure of the card table of system DB. It is a flowchart which shows normal card | curd issuance processing operation by a public key infrastructure system. It is a flowchart which shows normal card | curd issuance processing operation by a public key infrastructure system. It is a flowchart which shows the anonymous card | curd issuance processing operation by a public key infrastructure system. It is a flowchart which shows the temporary use application process operation | movement by a public key infrastructure system. It is a flowchart which shows the key / certificate acquisition processing operation by a public key infrastructure system. It is a flowchart which shows the card data deletion processing operation by a public key infrastructure system.

Explanation of symbols

10x ... system server 11 ... public key generation unit 14 ... system DB
DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 15 ... Common key production | generation part 16 ... Communication processing part 16a ... Device issuing process part 16b ... Key transmission processing part 17 ... Communication processing part 20 ... Card issuing machine 22 ... Certification authority 23 ... Issuing authority 30x ... Anonymity card 30 ... IC card 31 ... public key encryption / decryption unit 32 ... common key encryption / decryption unit 33 ... memory 41 ... card R / W
DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 42 ... User terminal 50 ... Network 60 ... Temporary use application reception process part 61 ... Temporary use application reception process part 62 ... Network 70 ... Deletion command part 80 ... Common key update process part 81 ... Common key update process part 100 ... Public key infrastructure system

Claims (6)

And issuer equipment for issuing a portable device for use in public key cryptography composed of a mobile device that will be issued by the issuer equipment, user terminal capable of inputting any content to the portable device public A key infrastructure system, wherein the issuing institution apparatus is
First encryption / decryption unit of the public key cryptosystem, with a common key to be used by the second encryption / decryption unit and the second encryption / decryption unit for the common key cryptosystem wherein A device issue processing unit for issuing a mobile device;
With respect to the portable device issued by the device issuance processing unit, an encrypted secret key obtained by encrypting a user secret key used in the first encryption / decryption unit with the common key, and A key transmission processing unit that transmits a public key certificate of a public key corresponding to the user's private key to the user terminal;
Said credential of the user, and the portable device stores at least to a storage device corresponding information to the corresponding user information of the specific information and the portable device,
Receiving the temporary use application including the specific information, the user information and the user identification information from the user terminal, and the received user information and the user information stored in the storage device; A temporary use application reception processing unit that temporarily stores in the storage device temporary correspondence information in which the received unique information and the received user information are associated with an expiration date if they match the identity verification information ;
The device issuance processing unit issues a portable device when the storage device includes unique information of the portable device and the correspondence information of the user information, and the unique information of the portable device is stored in the storage device. issue the undetermined portable device to the user information to a said portable device when it is present there is no the correspondence information is left undetermined,
The key transmission processing unit includes the correspondence information corresponding to the unique information of the portable device received from the user terminal in the storage device, or the unique information of the unconfirmed portable device received from the user terminal. If the temporary correspondence information corresponding to is present in the storage device and the expiry date of the temporary correspondence information has not expired, the encrypted secret key for storing in the portable device or the unconfirmed portable device And a public key infrastructure system, wherein the public key certificate is transmitted to the user terminal . The portable device stores at least one set of the encrypted private key and the public key certificate ;
The user terminal includes a deletion command unit that deletes the encrypted private key and the public key certificate stored in the unconfirmed portable device,
The deletion command unit is activated by an unconfirmed portable device deletion condition set in at least one of the user terminal or the unconfirmed portable device at the time of the application from the user terminal or the temporary issue application, and the unconfirmed portable device The public key infrastructure system according to claim 1, wherein the encryption private key and the public key certificate are deleted. The unconfirmed portable device is:
Storing the common key;
Upon receiving an update application for updating the expiration date of the unconfirmed portable device, the portable device further includes a portable device common key update processing unit that updates the common key in the unconfirmed portable device,
2. The public key infrastructure according to claim 1, further comprising: a storage device common key update processing unit that updates the common key in the storage device when receiving the update application. system. Issuing agency device is a portable device issuing method for issuing the portable device to a user terminal that can input arbitrary content to the portable device for use in public key cryptography,
The issuing agency device is:
First encryption / decryption unit of the public key cryptosystem, with a common key to be used by the second encryption / decryption unit and the second encryption / decryption unit for the common key cryptosystem wherein A step in which the device issue processing unit issues the portable device;
With respect to the issued mobile device, the user's private key used in the first encryption / decryption unit is encrypted with the common key, and the user's private key A key transmission processing unit transmitting a public key certificate of a corresponding public key to the user terminal; and
Storing at least identification information of the user and correspondence information that associates the unique information of the portable device with the user information of the portable device in a storage device;
The temporary use application reception processing unit receives the temporary use application including the specific information, the user information, and the user identification information from the user terminal, and the received user information and identification information are stored in the storage device. Temporarily storing in the storage device temporary response information in which the received unique information and the received user information are associated with an expiration date when the user information matches the identity verification information. Prepared,
The issuing step issues a portable device when the storage device has unique information of the portable device and the correspondence information of the user information, and the unique information of the portable device exists in the storage device If the correspondence information does not exist, issue the unconfirmed portable device that is the portable device and the user information remains unconfirmed,
In the transmitting step, the correspondence information corresponding to the unique information of the portable device received from the user terminal exists in the storage device, or the unique information of the unconfirmed portable device received from the user terminal. If the corresponding temporary response information is present in the storage device and the expiration date of the temporary response information has not expired, the encrypted secret key for storage in the portable device or the unconfirmed portable device; A public key infrastructure method, wherein the public key certificate is transmitted to the user terminal . The deletion command unit of the user terminal deletes the encrypted private key and the public key certificate stored in the unconfirmed portable device,
The deleting step is started by an instruction from the user terminal or an unconfirmed portable device deletion condition set in the user terminal or the unconfirmed portable device at the time of the temporary issue application, The public key infrastructure method according to claim 4, wherein all of the encrypted private key and the public key certificate are deleted. When receiving an update application for updating the expiration date of the unconfirmed portable device, the portable device common key update processing unit of the unconfirmed portable device updates the common key in the unconfirmed portable device; ,
5. The public key according to claim 4, further comprising: a common key update processing unit in the storage device of the issuing institution apparatus that updates the common key in the storage device when the update application is received. Foundation method.

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