EP1766495A2

EP1766495A2 - Method and storage medium for securely exchanging and using data in a communication network

Info

Publication number: EP1766495A2
Application number: EP05769980A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Rainer Wiggers
Original assignee: Siemens AG; Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG
Current assignee: Nokia Solutions and Networks GmbH and Co KG
Priority date: 2004-07-15
Filing date: 2005-07-13
Publication date: 2007-03-28
Also published as: WO2006005763A2; WO2006005763A3

Abstract

Disclosed is a method for securely exchanging and/or using data in a communication network. According to said method, at least one storage medium (e-depot) that can be assigned to at least one user is installed in the communication network. Trusted functions by means of which data comprising associated properties (license) can be securely stored and/or processed in the storage medium (e-depot) are provided by said at least one storage medium (e-depot). At least one trusted communication device is assigned to the storage medium (e-depot), the data being further processed in accordance with the respectively associated properties (license) and the at least one assigned, trusted communication device.

Description

Method and storage medium for the secure exchange and use of information in a communication network

With constantly increasing user numbers and the increase in services and content, the Internet is currently the driving factor for further developments in information and communication technology (IT). Two areas that particularly benefit from this are the network infrastructure itself, which has to be expanded proportionally to the growth of the Internet, and the PC industry, which is facing ever-increasing demands as the complexity of applications increases.

In the case of the network infrastructure, this development is characterized, above all, by the provision of communication channels with ever greater capacities, which, in line with growing demand, may be adapted to the data volumes to be transmitted. Linked to this development is a unification of the transmission protocols used, with the intention of being able to serve all possible types of service types in the future via a uniform transport network. With the deregulation of the markets, the cost pressure on the manufacturers, in particular through a modularization and standardization of hitherto proprietary components and interfaces, increased sharply.

Further developments in the field of the PC industry have long been subject to generally known cost pressure and the increasing demands on resources such as computing power, memory expansion or also the type and scope of peripheral components such as hard disks and DVD drives. Similar to the network infrastructure, the demands on the technical components in this area are also growing steadily, interfaces have long been standardized and devices from different manufacturers are becoming ever more similar. Interesting in this context is a recent trend, in which the safety idea is placed at the center of the discussion about new products. Under the heading "TCPA", efforts are currently being made by the PC industry and vendors to provide applications or their content to modify the properties of future PCs such that secure protection of digital information (ie, applications and data ) within a platform.

Form of a disturbed communication

As the example of the PC industry shows, the development seems to have come to a point at least in this area today, at which the technical advancement through a topic such as information security gets a new focus. At present, technical solutions are sought and defined, in particular in this field, which ensure secure handling of personal data or security-relevant applications or enable copy protection of digital content. In this context, issues such as "Digital Rights Management" (DRM) or "Digital Content Management" (DCM) are currently in public discussion and are currently being discussed controversially.

From this it can be concluded that the further development of products in the IT sector is less hindered today by technical problems of the equipment used than by "relationship problems" between the actors involved, ie the users of the systems ¬ clearly exist. Similarly, the development within country ^'s PC industry can benefit operators of the network infrastructure in the future which, if they offer more solutions that makes an objective "moderation" between the individual beteilig¬ th users possible in order of the disturbed "user There is even a justified reason to assert that a technical solution to this problem is to be sought just within the network infrastructure and less at the periphery, where she is wanted today. The following cases are seen in this context as examples of a disturbed user-related communication:

- The flooding of communication devices by sending messages that the recipient as uner¬ wishes and disturbing (SPAM, advertising),

the restriction of information to a defined user group (DCM) for the production of information security or also for the protection of minors,

- The mutual distrust of business partners (or communication partners) in the course of business transactions over the Internet (eg, a child can make expensive transactions without being recognized or a business partner hides behind the anonymity of the network and does not keep the agreements that have been reached . one),

or

- the misuse of digital applications or content by the user, eg. By making copies and their improper retransmission (DRM).

It is common to all the examples mentioned that these are less technical problems of the network infrastructure or the connected devices themselves, but rather problems of the way in which these devices are used by the users. So far, an attempt has been made to counter this problem by means of corresponding "firewalls" at the periphery of the network Data is increasingly being transported in encrypted form over the transport network which is itself insecure The network infrastructure itself, however, has not dealt with this problem since it is currently available focused on providing high-performance, transparent transport channels between the respective endpoints of the network.

This restriction of the network infrastructure to the provision of technical equipment which can only provide a transparent communication channel. NEN, the users lapses themselves, which leads to the mentioned problems. The infrastructure is burdened to a large extent with data that is undesirable to the recipient, or it virtually invites users to obtain information that was not intended for them.

In the following, some terms are explained that are necessary for further understanding.

definitions

Asymmetric key pair:

In the encryption of digital content, the use of asymmetric keys is widespread and state of the art today. The term "key" in this context hides two large bit sequences (eg 2048 bits), which are related in such a way that operations on digital contents, such as the encryption and the signature, which are executed with the one part of these keys The trick with this mechanism is that for this purpose only a part of the key has to be kept protected by the user (secret or private key), whereas other part can be made public (public key). In FIG 1, the symbol is presented for a secret key. Such symbols are utilized spä¬ ter ge for the description of the e-depots for illustration. ^{1 u '}

2 shows the symbol for a public key. The attached scroll is intended to symbolize a "certificate" without which the key would be worthless Only with this certificate, which was issued by a body trustworthy for both communication partners, can the recipient assume that the message received is also valid really from the suspected, "real" transmitter comes.

Trusted platform:

A platform is a technical device that provides active functionality through hardware and software. Primitive platforms have a very limited scope of functions and can only be used for a very specific task (telephone, monitor, etc.), complex platforms, like e.g. a PC, however, are able to provide different applications. In this sense, any device of a communication network can also be referred to as a platform. By a trusted platform we mean a device whose functionality is known exactly and can not be manipulated without the user's knowledge. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG), formerly known as the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), proposes in its standards that each "trusted platform" manufacture is a single, globally unique asymmetric one Key pair receives. The secret key remains within the platform and is used for encryption or signature of data, the public key is published. The trustworthiness of the platform is guaranteed by certifying its public key by a trustworthy body (for example the manufacturer).

3 shows the general symbol for a platform, wherein the background hidden key is to indicate that in this case it is a trusted platform having the secret key of an asymmetrical key pair.

identities:

By a "real" identity we mean a certain person, in this case the role of the user or

Users, digitally generated content or even consumed by third-party content. For example, this identity can be clearly identified by means of an identity card and is authenticated to the network, for example on the basis of - a smartcard (possession),

- the input of a PiN (knowledge) and / or

- biometric data (property).

FIG. 4 shows the general symbol for an identity, whereby it should be made clear by the black color of the "photo" and the "P" as a signature that this is a "genuine" (primary) identity This symbol is clarified by the ^' hidden (secret) key ver¬ that this is a "trustworthy" identity that can build a protected Kommunikations¬ connection to technical facilities. For example, this key is securely stored on a smart card, which itself may contain active components such as a processor, and thus is also considered to be a trusted platform in the above sense.

For observance of data protection concerns, it makes sense for a user to use "secondary" identities, such as an alias, so that his or her consumption behavior or generally his or her interests can not be explored.This possibility is already present in approaches available today provided and is also used in the e-depot.

The state of the art

In the introduction, reference has already been made to the current ongoing activities in connection with the development of trustworthy platforms. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is an organization that has brought together leading hardware and software vendors to develop standards and trust-based platform mechanisms based on them. In the meantime, the first standards have been published on this topic, on which the first products will soon be based.

All currently existing standards are based on a so-called "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM). dul, which is currently offered by several manufacturers in the form of a circuit, will increasingly be integrated in trustworthy platforms. It mainly contains the following functions:

^ - Random Number Generator

A "real" random number generator needed for key generation.

^ - Cryptographic Processor

A special processor that can generate asymmetric keys (RSA), realizes encryption and decryption of data, and calculates hash functions (SHA-I) that are required for signing.

> Protected memory areas e.g. For:

Endorsement key

Asymmetrical key pair that is unique to each TPM. The secret share always remains in the TPM and is therefore based on the trustworthiness of the TPM.

Platform Configuration Register

160 bit registers in which certain states of the platform (e.g., hardware assembly) are stored. With the help of these registers, it is possible to bind certain operations, such as the decryption of data, to entirely certain states of the platform and thus only to admit them if very specific conditions are met.

The functions of a TPM can be compared with those of modern smart cards for identifying a person (eg banking), with the difference that a TPM is permanently installed in a platform. The discussion on trustworthy operating systems is also currently taking up great importance. The functioning of a trustworthy platform can now be summarized as follows: A "trusted authority" (whose identity has not yet been finally clarified) certifies a platform, such as a PC, as trustworthy It can then be verified by external communication partners so that a secure communication relationship can be established Data can be safely stored on the platform itself and applications can safely operate on it without running the risk of causing harm or self-harm As an example, such a platform could be used by providers of digital content, for example to allow music or films to be played back on a (secure) PC, without the user being able to copy this content (DRM) trustworthy platforms, it is possible for communication partners to convince themselves of this that no unauthorized manipulation has been carried out on a particular platform. This function is thus of particular interest to the operators of company networks who would like to securely integrate PCs of employees at home workplaces into their own network.

The underlying role model is shown in FIG.

However, just the last example makes it clear that the PC can either belong to the employer of a working at home employee and then should be freely accessible to an authorized ^" administrator, with which no user should have a problem, or the PC is in possession of User himself, who then already has a problem when his computer can be "remotely controlled". This approach thus has advantages especially for providers who want to secure the confidentiality of their data on external platforms (eg set top box of a "pay-τv" provider).

In summary, the following disadvantages of today's solution result:

> The TCG model does not distinguish between the individual (user) and the platform. Although a digital content can be bound to an individual, he is bound to a platform according to TCG ideas. It is not sufficiently clear today what should happen if a user wants to change his platform and wants to take protected content to the new platform (DRM).

> The idea of understanding a platform as a whole does not seem to be sufficient, since in particular external peripherals of a PC can be critical in terms of security. Thus, it is to be expected that even the keyboard, the mouse, the monitor or even the graphics card itself must be realized as trustworthy platforms. While this scenario is of interest to the vendor, e.g. It would be contrary to the interests of the customer who would like to put the film in his collection and, in particular, does not want the supplier to be able to follow his consumer behavior.

> Today's approach contradicts the wishes of the user to make changes to his PC, such as the later expansion of the functional scope by retrofitting individual components. Flexibility then gives way to functionality. If only "closed" platforms are on the market, it would be possible to increase the amount of waste on early "battered" platforms, similar to cell phones, even in PCs.

> ^• If a user buys a product, such as music, he wants to be able to consume it at home, in the car or on his mobile phone. Today's approach contradicts this desire by trying to exclude it.

> ^■ A defective TPM can lead to the loss of all data on a platform. The subject of backup copies on other platforms is highly explosive and still under discussion.

Data protectors criticize the following features of the TPM: > The "Endorsement Key" (EK) forms the basis for all the confidentiality of the TPM and is generated by a manufacturer-specific process during manufacture and programmed into the module, only if it is ensured that the module is able to handle the EK self-generating and programming is given the confidentiality of the TPM.

> The TPM has the option of relying on so-called "Attestation Identity Keys" (AIK) for communication with external partners, ie the use of secondary identities that are used as pseudonyms for the EC It is relevant to data protection because it prevents the communication behavior of a user from being reproduced by linking it to a specific ID (such as the EC.) Sensitive in this context are all sites that are considered to be sensitive Since at least one entity has to certify the confidentiality of the AIK, at least this CA is able to perform such an ap- proach.

> The migration process, i. Mechanisms for transferring data from one platform to another are insufficiently clarified today. Here the user is still attached to the support of the manufacturer of the platform.

A solution known today describes the publication where 03/047191 Al. It describes a system and method "proving conditional access to digital content." In this approach, a "third party" is introduced (verification entity, VE), which administers licenses for certain contents. If the user wishes to access a specific content, he makes a request to the VE and then receives the necessary means, for example in the form of a key, for the access. The VE can thus check a wide range of conditions for accessing the content and for the first time unblocks the relationship between the user and the platform. In this approach, the VE plays a central role. It checks and distributes zenzen on request to the terminals (platforms). The behavior of these platforms can thus be controlled indirectly via the licenses distributed by the VE. The weak point of the approach is thus the dominant role of the VE. The user is permanently dependent on their "good will." It also remains unclear to what extent the user's privacy is preserved when dealing with the VE.

The object of the invention is thus to improve the exchange and / or use of trustworthy information. The object is achieved according to the features of patent claims 1 and 9 "

In the method according to the invention for the secure exchange and / or use of information, at least one storage medium which can be assigned to at least one user is set up in a communication network. By means of the at least one storage medium, trustworthy functions are provided, by means of which associated properties information is stored and / or processed securely in the storage medium and at least trustworthy communication means are assigned to the at least one storage medium. The information is processed as a function of the respective assigned properties and as a function of the at least one assigned, trustworthy communication device.

The essential advantage of the method according to the invention lies in the provision of trustworthy functions which enable the secure storage and processing of information, whereby the privacy of the owner is extended into the communication network and thus data protection reservations with regard to the use of user-related information be solved.

According to an advantageous development of the method according to the invention, at least one pseudo-identity is set up and administered by the trustworthy functions, by means of which at least one trustworthy communication relationship can be set up from and to the storage medium. Claim 3. The trusted functions ensure that information can be exchanged between communication partners without them being able to gain direct access to the information themselves.

Further advantageous embodiments of the method according to the invention as well as a storage medium for the secure exchange and use of information can be found in the further claims.

The process according to the invention is explained in more detail below:

The E-Depot

Basically, the storage medium or e-depot according to the invention is a technical device which, within a communication network, mediates between the interests of the communication partners involved and thus contributes to interference-free communication. It largely builds on the TCG mechanisms proposed to date, but adds a significant contribution to it by bringing the communication infrastructure itself into play rather than limiting itself to the communication endpoints.

The E-Depot can best be compared to a bank account or a securities deposit managed by a neutral, third party (the bank) and the transfer and trustworthy safekeeping of precious things (money or shares). allows. The depot itself is opened (or rented) by the user, who retains all rights and uses it in addition to the pure storage especially for the exchange of deposited contents (deposit, payment or transfer). Particularly interesting in this context is the comparison with the stock portfolio, since the user is not concerned with holding the actual paper in his hands, but rather with trad- ing in it or with the associated advantages such as dividends consume. The e-depot itself is a (technical) device that provides a secure environment to "mediate" in the traffic between communication partners, that is, it provides functionality to securely store user-related digital content and enables it like an account In addition, it also offers other communication partners the possibility to "pay in" (ie transfer) or "debit" (ie download) data as long as they do so The E-Depot itself is provided and operated by a third party, the "Operator", who has a neutral role within the communications relationship.

Thus, the operator provides the owner with a facility that extends the privacy of the owner into part of the communication network. After the Eröffnung-depot has been "opened" to the operator, the owner alone has the e-depot, the data stored on it and the access rights of other parties - see FIG. 6.

Decisive for the further understanding is a strict separation of the terms platform and identity. So far well-known approaches of the TCG make at this point only an insufficient separation. Both terms are closely linked by using e.g. It is assumed that a user has a platform that can then generate identities again in order to be able to set up different communication relationships. In this model, content is firmly bound to a particular platform, even though it was actually intended for an individual (and thus for an identity). Especially problems like "what happens when the platform is decommissioned" or "how are content between two

Transferred platforms of an owner "have not yet been finally resolved. The E-Depot is able to solve this problem by taking over the "agent function" between identities and platforms belonging to the same owner.To the communication partner, the E-Depot represents itself as one of several possible identities. The owner, however, communicates with the TMD through one of several possible platforms, and the relationship between the two groups is left to the owner alone, who can freely dispose of it within the framework of previously defined rules.

The functioning

An essential feature of the E-Depot is that it controls not only the secure storage of data or contents but also their further use. That it also provides functions that allow contents entrusted to it to be handled specifically according to the wishes of the communication partners. This is achieved by implementing the e-depot itself as a trusted platform. Its scope of functions is clearly defined and known to every user who transfers their contents to the e-depot in a "package" together with a so-called "license file". This license contains all the necessary information which the e-depot requires in order to be able to subsequently treat the contents in the sense of the user. The most important feature here is that the E-Depot is able to carry out internally cryptographic operations on the digital content without the actual contents ever leaving the E-Depot unencrypted. This functionality is equivalent to comparing it with the "stock" that is safely held in the vault without the owner even having access to the actual paper, taking the e-vault one step further and ensuring that even the operator does not is able to access the content without authorization.

As with a depot or account, the user rents the e-depot to an operator. In the initial state, the e-depot itself has no identification data and the new owner can configure it so that it only manages it and can be used. To this end, the owner first registers his platforms with the e-depot by, inter alia, transmitting their public key. Thus, the E-Depot is able to establish a secure connection to each of these platforms and exchange data afterwards. In addition, the owner may cause the e-depot to generate secondary identities. For this, the E-Depot generates a new asymmetric key pair. The secret portion remains within the e-depot and the public portion can subsequently be used for communication with an external partner or group - see FIG. 7.

The platform

Each platform managed by an e-depot must be trusted by the TCG. However, since the e-depot itself is a trustworthy platform that "belongs" to the user, he should not have a problem with it if he synchronizes his platforms periodically with the e-depot. Exchanging content between them.

As trusted platforms, the user's terminals should provide functions that allow control by the TMD. A platform is characterized by certain properties, such as possible input / output methods, characterized be certified by the manufacturer or another CA.

The secondary identity

The user uses to communicate with the outside world of secondary identities. In addition to the mechanisms defined so far within the TCG, which merely provide for the transmission of the secret key of a new identity (AIK), the term secondary identity in connection with an e-depot is broader. Here, the communication partner receives, in addition to the key, further attributes which characterize the communication relationship and which are involved by both TMDs can be interpreted. These attributes include, for example:

• name or alias of the user • secret key • date of creation

• Date of validity

• Age of the user> IdentityQOperator »Number of possible accesses

• Access rights in the TMD of the user

• Signature by TMD

The storage of content

Before content can be transferred to the e-depot, it must first be prepared for a fixed procedure. This procedure is illustrated in FIG. The contents are encrypted together with a license with the public key of the recipient (or an identity derived from it). Then the provider signs the encrypted content. On the other hand, in FIG. 8 the license is drawn on the outside of the seal, which should make it clear that its contents, contrary to the raw data, do not contain any secret information in the later sequence. Via the common encryption, the provider merely ensures that a firm link between content and license is guaranteed, which is also retained within the e-depot or later forwarding.

After the e-depot has received such a packaged data packet, it first checks the communication attributes of the relevant secondary identity and will then decrypt the packet using the secret key of the identity used. Of course, the e-depot can also check the authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the data in question. Both the content and the license are then re-encrypted and stored by the e-depot with its own secret memory key. The owner of the E-Depot can at any time have a directory of the data stored in the E-Depot displayed. Instead of the actual content, he can access the license and read it.

The license

The license contains a collection of attributes which can be interpreted by the e-depot and which can thus control the further handling of the associated content. It contains e.g. Information on whether the use of the content is tied to specific platforms, whether the number of platforms is limited, whether the content may be passed on to another e-depot or which Certified Authorities (CA) the provider trusts ,

In other words, the license contains a series of instructions and attributes which are comparable to a program code which controls further methods of the e-depot with respect to a content.

The following list contains a list of possible attributes:

• Name of the author or provider

• Date of creation

• Date of validity

• Duration of a sample »age limit of the user

• List of allowed platform types • Number of possible platforms

• List of accepted CAs • Number of possible calls • Content can be copied yes / no

• Content can be migrated yes / no

• Signature of the provider If the owner of the e-vault wishes to access content, the e-vault will use the license, which can not be changed by anyone, and will copy the content to one or more of the owner's sites, provided that they are trusted by the license , If an attribute contradicts an order of the owner, for example if he is still too young for a particular content, this can be taken into account by the e-depot and the order is not carried out. If a provider only wants to offer content as a sample, this can also be noted in the license. Then the e-depot only provides the content for a certain duration (eg only the first 10 minutes of a movie) before the attribution by the e-depot is automatically interrupted.

A special case is the saving or passing on (migrating) of contents. Also this case, which is still not solved satisfactorily today by the TCG, can be steered with the help of the license: To the security of data, which on the E-Depot, the user can acquire his own platform, which acts as a trustworthy storage medium, logging on and transferring all the data there. Since he will continue to have no access to the platform, this possibility should not be ruled out in any license. If a user wishes to pass on or resell a certain content, then this is also possible if the license permits this. Since the E-Depot itself is a trusted platform, it can even be registered with another E-Depot. The basis for this is a log file, which is created by the E-Depot with each new content and then maintained.

The log

With the inclusion of a new content in the Ξ-Depot is generated by the E-Depot simultaneously a new log, which - and this is a special aspect - is deposited with the operator for trust purposes. In this log (similar to a bank statement) all relevant operations carried out by the E-Depot with a content are marked with a time stamp. see recorded. In this case, it makes sense to encrypt the references to individual contents within the log, since the operator should not derive relevant information from them.

From the log the E-Depot can e.g. Determine on which platforms a specific content has already been transferred. Before the contents are migrated, the content could thus be "recalled" by the e-depot and subsequently released.To prevent possible manipulation by the owner, he may only have reading rights to the log himself.Put the case, the e-depot would be destroyed, all information stored in it could be retrieved with a combination of a backup of the E-Depot and the log stored at the operator.

The entry

Each content within the e-depot is represented by the following four components, collectively referred to as an "entry." These include: the encrypted content, the license, the log, and a link to a memory location. As will be explained below, the storage of the content is not locally tied to the E-Depot itself, but it is sufficient if the Ξ-Depot can use the link to access the data record within the network.

The internal structure of the E-Depot: • ...

The e-depot is abbreviated in the following part by the abbreviation TMD for "Trusted Mediation Device." It consists of the following individual components:

> A "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM), which provides the necessary basic cryptographic functions, meets today's expectations of the TCG and forms the basis for the TMD being seen as a trustworthy plat form. )> A so-called "Trusted Encryption Module" (TEM), which realizes trustworthy decryption and re-encryption of a digital content The crucial feature here is that the actual contents never leave the TEM, but only those in the Encrypted key exchanged wer¬ the.

> A "Storage Root Key" (SKK), which, when the e-

Depot is generated by the holder and is used to encrypt all data managed by the E-Depot. This key is only present within the TMD and is not visible to anyone outside.

> ^■ A "Signature Key" (SIG) or secret key of a CA (the manufacturer?) That certifies the secondary identities.

> A Trusted E-Depot Controller (TMC) that controls all active processes of the TMD, such as the licensing of digital content.

> A Trusted E-Depot Operating System (TMOS) that includes all the necessary operations of the TMD.

> A real-time clock (RTC) that is initialized by the operator.

> ^■ A RAM memory in which temporary data can be stored.

> - A FLASH memory in which the personal data for identification of the holder and important keys are permanently stored.

^ - A communication interface (CI) through which external identities (owner, operator or communication partner) contact the E-Depot.

^ - One (or more distributed) storage media (media, e.g., hard disk) for storage of content.

In order to ensure the trustworthiness of the TMD, its internal structure, its functioning and thus its operating system (TMOS) should be made public.

The opening of an e-depot (see FIG. 9)

To open a TMD, the user turns to an op- erator of their choice and identifies himself here with his ID card in accordance with an account opening at a bank. In doing so, he hands the operator a public key that represents his identity. The operator programs this public key and, if necessary, additional person-specific data, e.g. Name and date of birth, in the FLASH of the TMD and informs the future owner of the successful opening by handing him a currently valid public key of the TMD.

From now on, the owner is able to set up a secure communication connection to "his" TMD and will first completely reset the TMD.

A reset of the TMD causes the following operations: '

P The TMD continues in its original condition, ie it deletes all information except for the gespeicher¬ in memory th data of the ^owner:

> ^■ generates a new asymmetric key pair that is used to communicate with the owner and sends the public part to the owner and

> It generates a new SRC that will serve as the root key for all information stored from now on.

From now on, the owner can freely dispose of the TMD. So probably the owner as well as the TMD possess from now on a secret communication relation, on the basis of which the further safe use of the TMD can take place.

The role of the owner

After successful initialization of the TMD, the owner can carry out further configuration steps. Essential components of the configuration include the registration of platforms and the generation of secondary identities.

With the registration of new platforms the owner announces a special terminal about his public key at the TMD. Provided that the platform is equipped with a key trusted by the TMD, it will contact the platform and get all the necessary technical features of the platform. _UJ

In creating secondary identities, the owner requests the TMD to create a new "identity object," including a new asymmetric key pair used for the communication relationships of that identity, and a new network address provided by the operator. In addition, a secondary identity can also inherit properties of the owner, such as his age, if this should play a role in the transactions. Once all platforms and identities have been set up, the owner can use the TMD in a variety of ways. He can store or retrieve data there, he can access data provided by other communication partners or provide data for them themselves. in the

In the "normal" operating case, the information within the TMD appears merely as a further file system within a platform of the owner.

10 The role of the operator

The operator provides the TMD and integrates it into its communication network. Depending on the application, he can TMD certain properties, such. the maximum number

15 platforms or identities which it is intended to support. With the opening of the TMD, he hands over control to his owner. From now on, it ensures its operation within the network and assigns new network addresses to the TMD on request, if they generate a new identity

20 would like.

Another important function of the operator is the fiduciary maintenance of the log. In it, all operations of the TMD are recorded chronologically. These files can be used to

25 Depot track all previous operations, which may be important for future operations, depending on the licenses. Using the logs, for example, can also the content "■ an e-depots always restore ^'from a previously made Datensi¬ insurance without the owner manipulations

30 can make.

Thus, only the operator is able to link owners and their communication relationships with each other. Since die¬ ses a very sensitive, for data protection relevant aspect 35 (see above), have this similar new to the "bank ^secrecy" to define rules to ensure that such information can not be misused or determined only in criminal cases can be. Another important role which could be assigned to the operator is that of maintaining a national law. The internet is globally available today and content is made available worldwide. This is accompanied today by a certain powerlessness of national concerns with regard to compliance with national laws. For example, if the case that a content is subject to an age restriction, which may vary from country to country, this could be noted in the license. The operator would then have the task of telling TMD the appropriate age limit.

The application fields

In the following, a number of possible applications are listed that are supported or only made possible by the TMD. This list is certainly still incomplete, but already shows how versatile the TMD can be used:

1. Restricting communication to the circle of acquaintances: By virtue of the fact that the owner of the TMD communicates with the aid of secondary identities, he can make these available to his communicating partners. Properties that define the type and scope of the communication can be assigned to these identities. Should a communication partner misuse an identity and e.g. For advertising or SPAM purposes, the holder can simply delete this identity and thus block access to his TMD.

2. Data backup of sensitive data:

The owner of the TMD can at any time make backups of his local data and save them securely on the TMD. The spatial separation between two storage locations alone is helpful, for example. in the case of a haverie in one place, to restore the data to the other ("money that is on the bank can not be lost at home.").

3. Location-independent access: Without having content on a particular platform The owner can access the data that is important to him or her via his TMD.

4. Consumption on sample:

The provider of a content can use the associated license to achieve that the content can be consumed at previously specified conditions "for the sample." Possible conditions for this can be, for example, the duration or the number of uses. In this case, the TMD does not transmit the relevant content as a whole but only transfers part of the content to the relevant platform.

5. Controlled disclosure of content:

Independently of the platform, the owner of a TDM may freely dispose of the use of content, as long as this component is part of the license. That He can consume a once acquired content on several platforms, but also give it away or sell it. For this purpose, the TMD ensures that the content has previously been deleted on all relevant platforms of the owner before it releases the content for forwarding to another TMD. Due to the fixed connection between content and license, the author can be sure that the contents are not copied inappropriately.

6. External access to specific content:

As part of a secondary identity, the owner may also grant his communication partners access to content residing in his e-depot. In this case, the partner is able to download current contents from this e-depot as needed.

7. 24-hour service

The TMD is online 24 hours a day (contrary to the computer technology of most users). Since it itself has its own processor, it is also conceivable that it performs certain services for the user around the clock. It is conceivable that it reacts to certain events and automatically sends a message to a platform (eg mobile phone) or that this processor is instructed by the user to initiate active processes in the network, such as the continent. Continuous acquisition of measured values.

New business models

In accordance with the above-mentioned application terms, new business models can be developed with the help of the e-depot, which should in particular be of interest to the operator. This takes the operator of the E-depot true one "• Mittlerfunkti¬ on ^'' between the communication partners in the network by taking a neutral position and in case of any disputes arising as a" trustee "of the log objek¬ tive information made available can.

The following business models are conceivable, for example:

1. The rental of the e-depot by the operator to the user. Different tariffs could be selected according to storage space size and / or number of possible platforms and / or identities. Additional rates could be defined for on-the-go access.

2. Temporary "lending" of digital content (applications, music, film ...) by the provider to the user or "consumption on a sample basis".

3. Temporary sample of platforms by the user (test run for advertising purposes ...).

4. Providers could, for advertising purposes, instead of the user rent additional resources (e.g., memory) to the operator to view their content with their customers.

5. Users could legally resell content even if they no longer want to use it.

6. Electronic commerce could be facilitated in general. In the future, transactions via the e-depot could be carried out according to the "counter principle": the user makes a request to the provider, who replies with an offer ( zenz) and places the product on the "sales counter" (ie to the sample in the e-depot) The user tests the offer and the performance and decides The entire process is recorded chronologically in the log and could, in the event of a dispute by an independent body ( ie an observer) by the operator.

7. Even beyond that, the idea is to give the operator either direct access to his own bank account and thus to initiate an automatic payment upon the initiation of an order via a "trustworthy third party" or the same with the operator The last case is particularly interesting because functions of the E-Depot and the bank account are mixed with each other here.

In the following, the peculiarities of the E-Depot will be clarified exemplarily using an application scenario:

A user orders a film from a provider over the Internet. In the classic case according to the prior art, the user pays with his credit card, passes his credit card number and registers his platform (terminal or smartcard) with the provider. The provider (or his deputy) encrypts the content platform-specific (with the public key of the platform) and transmits the encrypted content together with a license file * '(rights object) to the user. The user's access to the content is tied to his "ownership of a registered platform". If the user wants to port the content to another platform, he must first register it with the provider and then have the content re-encrypted.

In the method according to the invention, the user orders a film from the internet provider by using a pseudo-identity which he himself previously created in the Ξ-depot. For this, the user contacts the provider's e-depot and transfers necessary data, such as credit card number and identification data of the pseudo identity (public key). It is important that this data can be provided by the user himself with a license with which he can control, for example, that his credit card number is used by the e-depot of the provider only for an account debit (trust controlled operation controlled as a license). and not to the provider itself! The provider himself can convince himself of the trusted data of the user (or his E-Depots) based on the transferred data and encrypt the film only after a successful payment, which is made and confirmed by his own e-depot, with the public key and issue. This means that the provider is only informed about the result of an operation and not about the data used by the operation (credit card number) of the user.

With the transfer of the content to the pseudo identity this is automatically stored in the e-depot of the user, from now on, the user decides (under the license of the provider) on which platforms he consumes the content, or he is even able to forward the content to the e-deposit of a friend, in which his E-Depot also copies all rights associated with it into the E-Depot of the friend. The provider is no longer needed for this, but can nevertheless be assured that its content will not be misused (ie contrary to its license).

The realization As already mentioned many times, the E-Depot itself constitutes a trustworthy platform, which itself has a TPM and is certificated by a CA (eg by the manufacturer). This requirement is an important part of this concept. The following "Chain of Trust" makes this connection clear: a) The TCG defines general mechanisms for the realization of trustworthy platforms Affected platforms are certified by a CA, thus the user of it can be assumed to function in accordance with its intended purpose.

b) The TMD itself can be realized as such a platform whose functionality is clearly defined. The CA confirms this with a certificate and the users (i.e., owners and communication partners) can trust it.

c) The generation of secondary identities represents a crucial functionality of the TMD. Provided that (b) holds, any secondary identity can also be certified representative of the CA by the TMD. For this purpose, the TMD would have to contain a secret key of the CA (for example of the manufacturer), which can be used in this case. However, this should not be a problem, as the manufacturer should trust his platform, which he underlines by this measure only once again.

The relationship shown solves a privacy problem in a very elegant way because the TMD owner does not have to make a new request to the CA for each secondary identity.

Under the conditions mentioned, the TMD itself is rela¬ tively small. It could, for example, be an integrated circuit which, similar to the TPM, contains all security-relevant functions (functionalities of the TMD) In addition, the TMD would still need to have access to at least one memory (eg hard disk) on which the contents are stored Since data is stored encrypted on the storage medium, its position in the system is "uncritical" and a hard disk could even be split between several TMDs Some contents could be stored at distributed locations in the network, others could be safely stored even by the user In such a scenario, it would be up to the TMD to provide a list of links manage, in which the addresses of the respective Speicherbe¬ rich are listed.

Of course, this arrangement consisting of TMD and storage medium (or media) could be placed at any point within a communication network if only sufficient transport routes to the users are provided. As an advantage, however, it is advisable to place this arrangement as close as possible to the owner, since he practically uses his TMD as

10 would like to use widening its locally existing information technology. The greatest acceptance of the facility would be achieved if the owner would have to pay a monthly rent for this, but access to the TMD can be done for free. This goal can best be realized if

In the future, the TMD would be defined as part of an access network.

10 shows an example of such a realization within an Ethernet-based DSLAM. In addition to the obligatory structures already known today, consisting of xDSL modules to which the subscriber lines are connected, and central components which bundle the traffic between several access modules, another component could be installed in the future, including several TMDs

25 modules and possibly the associated storage medium could contain. The user could then easily record a direct, unprotected connection to the network (path 1), or access his TMD (path 2). Here he could either directly access its contents or by means of a secondary

30 Identity establish a protected connection to the network. In addition, for example, the implementation of the TMD module within a network termination device (for example an xDSL modem) is conceivable, which is installed locally at the user but nevertheless counted to the area of jurisdiction of the network operator

35 can.

The PC application

In order to control the e-depot, the owner needs a new PC application that can handle all functions of the TMD in a user-friendly way. terstützt. Here, one can imagine an application which combines essential parts of the following functions:

»Creating and managing secondary identities • Creating and managing platforms

• Mail program (equivalent to Outlook), in which the user himself comes into contact with the outside world via more than one identity. That all mails are assigned to the corresponding identities. E-mails of unknown identities are either rejected immediately or placed in a separate category. • File management (according to Explorer) with the innovation that it adapts to the properties of the platform used by the user or that the file management also takes into account the secondary identities of its communication currently used by the user. • Identity-specific Internet Browser • Mechanisms for configuring the TMC (24h services)

In summary, it can be said that the user with this new PC application takes a specific role, which is defined by the platform used and the current secondary identity of the user.

In summary, the invention relates to the idea of a new technical device with the name "E-Depot", which is to be used within the 'infrastructure of a communications network and realizes there a trustworthy intermediary function between the interests of communication partners is a trusted one

Platform used for secure storage of digital content (documents, applications, media, etc.). It provides trustworthy operations which ensure that these contents can be exchanged between the communication partners without them themselves gaining direct access to the contents. For this purpose, each content is provided by the author with a license that controls all other operations of the E-Depot with respect to this content. can. An important operation in this case is a trustworthy, combined decryption and encryption of a content in which the content itself remains untouched. In addition, the e-depot offers operations that extend the privacy of the owner into the communications network, thereby solving privacy-related reservations with regard to the use of user-related digital content.

List of abbreviations

AIK Attestation Identity Key (inside TPM)

CA Certified Authority CI Communication Interface

DCM Digital Contents Management

DRM Digital Rights Management

DSLAM (x) DSL Access Multiplexer

EK Endorsement Key (inside TPM) IT Information Technology

LAN Local Area Network

PC Personal Computer

PIN Personal Identification Number

RTC Real Time Clock SAN Storage Area Network

SIG Signature Key

SRK Storage Root Key

TCG Trusted Computing Group

TCPA Trusted Computing Platform Alliance TEM Trusted Encryption Module

TPM Trusted Platform Module

TMC Trusted E-Depot Controller

TMD Trusted E-Depot Device (= E-Depot)

TMOS Trusted E-Depot Operating System VE Verification Entity

WAN Wide ^' Αrea Network IJ%

Claims

claims

1. A method for the secure exchange and / or use of information in a communication network, in which at least one storage medium (e-depot) is set up in the communication network, which can be assigned to at least one user (user), in which by the at least one storage medium (E-Depot) trusted functions (FLASH, TPM, TEM, TMC) are provided by which

- assigned properties (license) information safely stored in the storage medium (e-depot) and / or processed,

at least one trusted communication device (platform A, B) supports the at least one storage medium (E)

Depot),

the information is processed as a function of the respectively assigned properties (license) and as a function of the at least one assigned, trustworthy communication device (platform A, B).

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the at least one storage medium (e-depot) is controlled and / or managed by the at least one user.

3. The method of claim 1 or 2, ' ^f characterized in that by the trusted functions (FLASH, TPM, TEM, TMC) at least one pseudo identity (Identity A, B, C) is set up and managed, via which at least one trusted communication relationship from and / or to the storage medium (E-Depot) can be set up.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized

the at least one communication relationship is established from and / or to at least one further storage medium arranged in the communication network.

5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that the information is transmitted and processed as a function of the respectively zuge¬ associated properties (license) in the context of at least one communication relationship.

6. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 5, characterized in that the device of the at least one pseudo identity is performed by generating at least one asymmetric key pair.

7. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 6, characterized in that the at least one pseudo identity is assigned at least one network address.

8. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the assignment of the at least one Kommunikationsseinrich- device to the at least one storage medium (E_Depot) by transmitting the public key of the at least one communication device to the at least one Speicherme¬ medium (E_Depot).

9. Storage medium for the secure exchange and / or use of information in a communication network, wherein at least one in a communication network eingichte¬ tes storage medium (E-Depot) is the at least one user assignable, with functional means (FLASH, TPM, TEM, TMC ) for the provision of trustworthy functions, by which

- assigned properties (license) having information stored securely in the at least one storage medium (e-depot) and / or processed,

at least one trusted communication device is assigned to the storage medium (e-depot),

the information is processed as a function of the respectively assigned properties (license) and as a function of the at least one assigned, trustworthy communication device.