CN114422588A - Safety autonomous implementing system and method for authenticating terminal access by edge internet of things agent - Google Patents
Safety autonomous implementing system and method for authenticating terminal access by edge internet of things agent Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3228—One-time or temporary data, i.e. information which is sent for every authentication or authorization, e.g. one-time-password, one-time-token or one-time-key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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Abstract
The invention discloses a security self-governing realization system and a method for terminal access authentication of an edge internet of things agent.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a security self-governing realization system and a method for authenticating terminal access by an edge Internet of things agent, belonging to the technical field of security encryption authentication.
Background
The electric power internet of things is an important component of the industrial internet, and the construction of an efficient, safe and credible sensing layer becomes an important construction work of the electric power industry. At present, edge computing provides an important technical means for data sharing and regional autonomy, mainly focuses on preprocessing service data, and still continues to use a traditional identity authentication mechanism in the aspect of security protection. However, with the access of multiple data such as voice, video, image, and the like, and with the high-frequency data acquisition and heterogeneous data storage, the edge internet of things agent device still needs to solve the key problems of security, reliability, and the like.
In a traditional identity authentication mechanism, a cloud security protection measure is high, computing resources are more, and the key management mechanism has advantages in the aspects of key management performance and security, so that a key management center is arranged at the cloud. However, in the mechanism, since the terminal (i.e., the service terminal) directly interacts with the cloud key management center, an illegal terminal can directly and maliciously attack the cloud, so that the risk of the cloud system being attacked is high, and the cloud key management center needs to provide key management service for a large number of terminals, which is heavy in load.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a safety self-governing realization system and a method for authenticating terminal access by an edge Internet of things agent, which solve the problems disclosed in the background technology.
In order to solve the technical problems, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
the safety autonomy realization system comprises an edge internet of things agent, a cloud end connected with the edge internet of things agent and a terminal accessed to the edge internet of things agent, wherein a key generation function, a signature verification function, an encryption and decryption function and a key encapsulation/decapsulation function of a cloud end key management center are sunk into the edge internet of things agent, and the edge internet of things agent is used for carrying out access authentication and secret communication on the accessed terminal.
The key generation function, the signature verification function, the encryption and decryption function and the key encapsulation/decapsulation function are realized by adopting an encryption chip, and the encryption chip is connected with the terminal and the cloud end through a hardware API (application program interface).
The key generation function, the signature verification function, the encryption and decryption function and the key encapsulation/decapsulation function are realized by software, and are connected with the terminal and the cloud end through a software API (application programming interface).
The method for authenticating the terminal access by the edge Internet of things agent is characterized in that the edge Internet of things agent is an edge Internet of things agent in a safety autonomous implementation system, and the access authentication method comprises the following steps:
receiving an ID sent by a terminal;
calling a key generation function to generate a main public key pair and a private key pair corresponding to the ID; the master public key pair comprises an encryption master public key and a signature master public key, and the private key pair comprises an encryption private key and a signature private key;
receiving an encrypted temporary key sent by a terminal;
calling an encryption and decryption function, and decrypting the encrypted temporary key by adopting an encrypted private key to obtain a temporary key;
calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the private key pair by adopting a temporary secret key, and sending the encrypted private key pair to the terminal;
receiving a message of an encrypted signature sent by a terminal;
calling an encryption and decryption function, and decrypting the encrypted and signed message to obtain a signed message;
calling a signature verification function, and verifying the signature of the signed message;
responding to the verification and sign passing, calling a key encapsulation/decapsulation function, and generating an encapsulated session key;
and calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the packaged session key, and sending the encrypted packaged session key to the terminal.
The ID is validated prior to generating the master public key pair and the private key pair.
The method for the access authentication of the edge Internet of things agent to the terminal, wherein the terminal is the edge Internet of things agent in a safe autonomous implementation system, and the access authentication method comprises the following steps:
sending the ID to the edge Internet of things agent;
receiving a main public key sent by an edge Internet of things agent; the master public key pair comprises an encryption master public key and a signature master public key;
generating a temporary key;
calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the temporary secret key by adopting the encryption main public key, and sending the encrypted temporary secret key to the edge Internet of things agent;
receiving an encrypted private key pair sent by an edge Internet of things agent;
calling an encryption and decryption function, decrypting the encrypted private key pair and obtaining a private key pair; wherein the private key pair comprises an encryption private key and a signature private key;
calling a signature verification function to sign the message;
calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the signed message, and sending the encrypted and signed message to the edge Internet of things agent;
receiving an encrypted encapsulation session key sent by an edge Internet of things agent;
calling an encryption and decryption function, and decrypting the encrypted encapsulated session key to obtain an encapsulated session key;
and calling a key encapsulation/decapsulation function to decapsulate the encapsulated session key to obtain the session key.
The invention achieves the following beneficial effects: according to the invention, the key generation function, the signature verification function, the encryption and decryption function and the key encapsulation/decapsulation function of the cloud key management center are sunk into the edge internet of things agent, the data communication behavior of the terminal is stopped at the edge internet of things agent, the possibility of security attack on the cloud is reduced, and the load of the cloud is reduced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of functions based on a hardware cryptographic chip design;
FIG. 3 is a diagram of software design based functionality;
FIG. 4 is a functional integration diagram;
fig. 5 is a flowchart of an access authentication method.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby.
As shown in fig. 1, the secure autonomous implementation system includes an edge internet of things agent, a cloud, and a terminal, where the cloud accesses the edge internet of things agent through a secure access device and a 4G/5G/wired connection edge internet of things agent, and the terminal accesses the edge internet of things agent.
A key management center is still deployed at the cloud and is responsible for security authentication such as a root certificate of an agent of an edge internet of things and distribution and authentication of parameters and the like required by secret communication, but identity authentication service is not directly provided for the terminal; the method is characterized in that partial functions of an original key management center are deployed on an edge internet of things agent, and the partial functions mainly comprise a key generation function, a signature verification function, an encryption and decryption function and a key encapsulation function, namely the key generation function, the signature verification function, the encryption and decryption function and the key encapsulation/decapsulation function of a cloud key management center sink to the edge internet of things agent, the edge internet of things agent is a small-area central node and comprises the functions of generating a root certificate, auditing the authentication access of the edge internet of things agent and the like, and the edge internet of things agent is responsible for performing access authentication and secret communication on an accessed terminal.
The authentication access and the secret communication between the edge internet of things agent and the terminal equipment are mainly based on lightweight encryption algorithms SM7 and SM9, and considering the condition that the SM7 algorithm needs hardware to be realized, and part of the terminal equipment and the edge internet of things agent hardware resources are difficult to meet the requirements, the SM4 algorithm can be used for replacing the SM7 algorithm.
That is to say, the above functions can be realized by adopting an encryption chip according to different situations, wherein the encryption chip is connected with the terminal and the cloud end through a hardware API interface; one is realized by software, and the terminal and the cloud are connected through a software API (application program interface).
As shown in fig. 2, the hardware encryption chip is used for implementation, and mainly includes a hardware API interface, an instruction function, and a cos program, where the cos program is loaded and run in the encryption chip.
The hardware API interfaces comprise API interfaces such as SM4, SM7 encryption and decryption, SM9 signature and verification, SM9 encryption and decryption, SM9 encapsulation and decapsulation and the like, and are provided for the terminal to use in a dynamic library or static library mode; in the command function, commands of various functions such as SM4, SM7 and SM9 lightweight encryption algorithm encryption and decryption are defined, and the commands correspond to the commands of the cos program one by one; the cos program aims at the encapsulation and integration of the instruction sets of the chip-side SM4, SM7 and SM9 lightweight encryption algorithms, namely the specific implementation process of the lightweight encryption algorithms. And the terminal calls the API interface, sends an instruction to the encryption chip through the functional function, and after the cos program receives the corresponding instruction, searches the corresponding instruction set packaging function, executes the corresponding function and returns a result.
The terminal can realize the functions of light-weight encryption algorithms SM4 and SM7 encryption and decryption, SM9 signature verification, SM9 encryption and decryption, SM9 encapsulation and decapsulation and the like by calling a hardware API interface, thereby reducing the dependence of a user on an encryption chip, improving the maintainability and expandability of the light-weight encryption algorithm and improving the working efficiency of the user.
As shown in fig. 3, the software implementation mainly includes two parts: software API interface, function. The software API interface comprises the same API interfaces as the hardware API interface, such as SM4, SM7 encryption and decryption, SM9 signature and verification, SM9 encryption and decryption, SM9 encapsulation and decapsulation and the like, and is provided for users in a dynamic library or static library mode; in the function, different from the instruction function of hardware encryption, the soft encryption function directly realizes various functions of SM4, SM7, SM9 lightweight encryption algorithm encryption and decryption and the like. And calling the API interface by the user, executing the corresponding function through the function, and returning the result.
As shown in fig. 4, the edge proxy may open support multiple lightweight cryptographic authentication algorithm integrations (currently supporting SM4, SM7, and SM 9). The difference shielding of the algorithms realized by different software and hardware is realized through a group of uniform API interfaces, and the software definition of different encryption algorithms is realized by adopting a dynamic library or static library mode; a relatively fixed API interface is also provided for the application, and services such as security authentication, secret communication, key distribution and the like are provided for other applications. And for procedural differences brought by different authentication processes and different encryption algorithms, the functions are packaged into a uniform API interface to be provided for other APP calls.
Typically, hybrid encryption schemes use asymmetric cryptographic algorithms to transmit a key, and then use symmetric cryptographic algorithms to securely transmit messages using this key. This hybrid usage mode is suitable for situations where the message is significantly longer than the key. The system adopts a SM4, SM7 and SM9 mixed encryption scheme, and improves the security.
In the above system, the method for authenticating the terminal access by the edge internet of things agent specifically includes an edge internet of things agent side method and a terminal side method, as shown in fig. 5.
The edge internet of things agent side method comprises the following steps:
1) receiving an ID sent by a terminal;
2) carrying out validity verification on the ID (searching in an existing equipment list, if the ID exists, the ID is legal, otherwise, the ID is illegal), if the ID passes the verification, turning to 3, and if the ID does not pass the verification, rejecting the access;
3) calling a key generation function to generate a main public key pair and a private key pair corresponding to the ID; the master public key pair comprises an SM9 encrypted master public key and a signature master public key, the public key is transmitted in a transparent mode without encryption, and the private key pair comprises an SM9 encrypted private key and a signature private key;
4) receiving an encrypted SM4/SM7 temporary key sent by the terminal;
5) calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting a private key by using SM9, decrypting the encrypted temporary key, and obtaining an SM4/SM7 temporary key;
6) calling an encryption and decryption function, carrying out SM9 encryption on the private key pair by adopting an SM4/SM7 temporary key, and sending the encrypted private key pair to the terminal;
7) receiving a message of an encrypted signature sent by a terminal;
8) calling an encryption and decryption function, and carrying out SM9 decryption on the encrypted and signed message to obtain a signed message;
9) calling a signature verification function, and verifying the signature of the signed message;
10) responding to the verification and sign passing, calling a key encapsulation/decapsulation function, and generating an encapsulated session key;
11) the encryption and decryption function is invoked, the SM9 encrypts the encapsulated session key, and the encrypted encapsulated session key is transmitted to the terminal.
A terminal-side method, comprising:
21) sending the ID to the edge Internet of things agent;
22) receiving a main public key pair sent by an edge Internet of things agent; the master public key pair comprises an encryption master public key and a signature master public key;
after the terminal obtains the main public key pair, the main public key pair can be stored locally and safely, and does not need to be reapplied after being powered on and powered off again within the validity period;
23) generating SM4/SM7 temporary keys;
24) calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the SM4/SM7 temporary key by using the SM9 encrypted master public key, and sending the encrypted SM4/SM7 temporary key to the edge agent;
25) receiving an encrypted private key pair sent by an edge Internet of things agent;
26) calling an encryption and decryption function, and carrying out SM4/SM7 decryption on the encrypted private key pair to obtain a private key pair;
the terminal can be locally and safely stored after acquiring the private key pair, and does not need to reapply after being powered on and powered off again within the validity period of the private key; the terminal applies for the completion of the master public key pair and the private key pair;
27) calling a signature verification function to sign the message;
28) calling an encryption and decryption function, carrying out SM9 encryption on the signed message, and sending the encrypted and signed message to the edge Internet of things proxy;
29) receiving an encrypted encapsulation session key sent by an edge Internet of things agent;
210) calling an encryption and decryption function, and carrying out SM9 decryption on the encrypted encapsulated session key to obtain an encapsulated session key;
211) calling a key encapsulation function, and decapsulating the encapsulated session key to obtain a session key; the session key is a symmetric key for subsequent service data encryption communication, and the secure communication between the terminal and the edge Internet of things agent is realized.
By combining the steps, the authentication process between the edge Internet of things agent and the terminal equipment mainly adopts an SM9 lightweight encryption algorithm, so that the consumption of system resources is effectively reduced; only the terminal passing the authentication can be accessed, so that the possibility of illegal terminal intrusion is reduced, and the safety is improved; the method is compatible with a soft implementation mode and a hard implementation mode, supports API interface calling, is convenient to use, can be realized by software for a weak intelligent terminal, and can be adopted by both methods for an intelligent terminal.
The invention takes the edge physical connection agent as a core, realizes a set of edge-end small-area local authentication mechanism, sinks a key generation function, a signature verification function, an encryption and decryption function and a key encapsulation/decapsulation function which are deployed at a cloud end into the edge physical connection agent, and takes the edge physical connection agent as a small-area central node which is responsible for the authentication access of terminal equipment which is physically accessed to realize the secret communication with the terminal equipment, and stops the data communication behavior of the terminal at the edge physical connection agent, thereby reducing the possibility of safety attack to the cloud end, greatly reducing the identity authentication service objects of a cloud end key management center, releasing the calculation load of the cloud end and reducing the load of the cloud end.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several modifications and variations can be made without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and these modifications and variations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. The safety autonomy realization system comprises an edge internet of things agent, a cloud end connected with the edge internet of things agent and a terminal accessed to the edge internet of things agent, and is characterized in that a key generation function, a signature verification function, an encryption and decryption function and a key encapsulation/decapsulation function of a cloud end key management center sink to the edge internet of things agent, and the edge internet of things agent is used for carrying out access authentication and secret communication on the accessed terminal.
2. The system according to claim 1, wherein the key generation function, the signature verification function, the encryption/decryption function, and the key/decapsulation and encapsulation function are implemented by using an encryption chip, and the encryption chip is connected to the terminal and the cloud via a hardware API interface.
3. The secure autonomous implementation system of claim 1, wherein the key generation function, the signature verification function, the encryption and decryption function, and the key encapsulation/decapsulation function are implemented by software, and the terminal and the cloud are connected through a software API interface.
4. The method for authenticating the terminal access by the edge internet of things agent is characterized in that the edge internet of things agent is the edge internet of things agent in the system of any one of claims 1-3, and the method for authenticating the terminal access comprises the following steps:
receiving an ID sent by a terminal;
calling a key generation function to generate a main public key pair and a private key pair corresponding to the ID; the master public key pair comprises an encryption master public key and a signature master public key, and the private key pair comprises an encryption private key and a signature private key;
receiving an encrypted temporary key sent by a terminal;
calling an encryption and decryption function, and decrypting the encrypted temporary key by adopting an encrypted private key to obtain a temporary key;
calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the private key pair by adopting a temporary secret key, and sending the encrypted private key pair to the terminal;
receiving a message of an encrypted signature sent by a terminal;
calling an encryption and decryption function, and decrypting the encrypted and signed message to obtain a signed message;
calling a signature verification function, and verifying the signature of the signed message;
responding to the verification and sign passing, calling a key encapsulation/decapsulation function, and generating an encapsulated session key;
and calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the packaged session key, and sending the encrypted packaged session key to the terminal.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the ID is validated before the master public key pair and the private key pair are generated.
6. The method for the access authentication of the edge internet of things agent to the terminal is characterized in that the terminal is the edge internet of things agent in the system of any one of claims 1 to 3, and the access authentication method comprises the following steps:
sending the ID to the edge Internet of things agent;
receiving a main public key sent by an edge Internet of things agent; the master public key pair comprises an encryption master public key and a signature master public key;
generating a temporary key;
calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the temporary secret key by adopting the encryption main public key, and sending the encrypted temporary secret key to the edge Internet of things agent;
receiving an encrypted private key pair sent by an edge Internet of things agent;
calling an encryption and decryption function, decrypting the encrypted private key pair and obtaining a private key pair; wherein the private key pair comprises an encryption private key and a signature private key;
calling a signature verification function to sign the message;
calling an encryption and decryption function, encrypting the signed message, and sending the encrypted and signed message to the edge Internet of things agent;
receiving an encrypted encapsulation session key sent by an edge Internet of things agent;
calling an encryption and decryption function, and decrypting the encrypted encapsulated session key to obtain an encapsulated session key;
and calling a key encapsulation/decapsulation function to decapsulate the encapsulated session key to obtain the session key.
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| US20230336538A1 (en) * | 2022-04-18 | 2023-10-19 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Automated, multi-cloud lifecycle management of digital identities of iot data originators |
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| CN112887338A (en) * | 2021-03-18 | 2021-06-01 | 南瑞集团有限公司 | Identity authentication method and system based on IBC identification password |
| CN113556307A (en) * | 2020-04-03 | 2021-10-26 | 国网上海能源互联网研究院有限公司 | Edge Internet of things agent, access gateway, Internet of things management platform and safety protection method |
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| CN113556307A (en) * | 2020-04-03 | 2021-10-26 | 国网上海能源互联网研究院有限公司 | Edge Internet of things agent, access gateway, Internet of things management platform and safety protection method |
| CN112291230A (en) * | 2020-10-26 | 2021-01-29 | 公安部第一研究所 | Data security authentication transmission method and device for terminal of Internet of things |
| CN112887338A (en) * | 2021-03-18 | 2021-06-01 | 南瑞集团有限公司 | Identity authentication method and system based on IBC identification password |
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| US20230336538A1 (en) * | 2022-04-18 | 2023-10-19 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Automated, multi-cloud lifecycle management of digital identities of iot data originators |
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