Alexandra Lianeri ed., Knowing Future Time In and Through Greek Historiography, Trends in Classics - Supplementary , 2016
This paper identifies the theoretical and methodological turning point that distinguishes modern ... more This paper identifies the theoretical and methodological turning point that distinguishes modern from ancient historiography. Since Thucydides is considered rightly to be the greatest ancient historian and Ranke is the founder of modern scientific historiography, the question about the difference between ancient and modern historiography can be personalized as asking for what Ranke revised or added methodologically to Thucydides’ achievements?
Krieger (1977, 3) puzzled at the consideration of Ranke as the "Copernicus" or "Kant" of historiography: The critical attitude to sources dates back to Thucydides. The crucial significance of original documents for historiographic reasoning had already been recognized in humanist scholarship since the fifteenth century and was defended systematically by Jean Mabillion and the Maurists in the seventeenth century. The theories and methods of philology developed in seminars in the early 19th and were applied "spectacularly" to Roman historiography by Barthold Georg Niebuhr, whom Ranke acknowledged as his mentor. I argue that modern “Rankean” historiography is distinguishable from its ancient predecessors by a special relation with the evidence. Around the turn of the 19th century, scholars from apparently different fields all began to use a form of probabilistic inference from multiple units of evidence like testimonies, languages, and texts that allowed them to obtain new knowledge of the past. Ranke’s attempt was the first successful application of this probabilistic method to historiography. Thucydides, though critical of his sources did not infer from multiple testimonies as Ranke and his successors did; therefore he did not mention his sources. (Kosso 1993, 9)
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Books by Aviezer Tucker
Historiography is neither empirical, nor self-knowledge, nor
a genre of fiction or ideology. Historiographic reasoning is
irreducible to general scientific or social science reasoning. This
Element applies Bayesian insights to explicate historiographic
reasoning as probable. It distinguishes epistemic transmission
of knowledge from evidence from the generation of detailed
historiographic knowledge from multiple coherent and
independent evidentiary inputs in three modular stages. A
history of historiographic reasoning since the late eighteenth
century demonstrates that there was a historiographic scientific
revolution across the historical sciences in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. The underdetermination of
historiography by the evidence, counterfactual historiographic
reasoning, and false reasoning and other fallacies are further
explained and discussed in terms of the probabilistic relations between the evidence and the theory.
In this witty and engaging book, Aviezer Tucker argues that the contemporary revival of authoritarian populism combines the historically familiar with new technologies to produce a highly unstable and contagious new synthesis that threatens basic liberal norms, from freedom of the press to independent judiciaries. He examines how the economic crisis blocked social mobility and thereby awakened the dark, dormant political passions exploited by demagogues such as Orban and Trump. He argues that this slide towards ‘neo-illiberal democracy’ can be countered if we hard-headedly restore a ‘liberalism without nostalgia’ which institutes policies that can dampen down populist passions and strengthen liberal institutional barriers against them.
Readers interested in current affairs, social science, history, and political and social theory will find Aviezer Tucker’s original theoretical and historical analysis incisive, innovative, and entertaining.
The transition to post-totalitarianism was the spontaneous adjustment of the rights of the late-totalitarian elite to its interests. Post-totalitarian governments faced severe scarcity in the supply of justice. Rough justice punished the perpetrators and compensated their victims. Historical theories of property rights became radical, and consequentialist theories, conservative.
Totalitarianism in Europe disintegrated but did not end. The legacies of totalitarianism in higher education meet New Public Management, totalitarian central planning under a new label. Totalitarianism divorced language from reality through the use of dialectics that identifies opposites and the use of logical fallacies to argue for ideological conclusions. I illustrate these legacies in writings of Habermas, Derrida and Žižek about democracy, personal responsibility, dissidents, and totalitarianism.
Endorsements:
“Discussion about post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has long been tethered to imprecise, ideologically driven thinking. This book reframes the conversation in a manner befitting the region’s unique history and plugs a lingering gap in political theory.”
– Benjamin Cunningham, Prague correspondent for The Economist
“’Only dissidents can save us now. This will be the one truly positive legacy of totalitarianism (maybe together with public transportation),’ writes Aviezer Tucker. His book deals with the negative aspects of this legacy, though – and there are plenty of them, not only in the East. Essential reading at a time when the history of Central and Eastern Europe seems unfinished, again.”
– Aleksander Kaczorowski, editor of Aspen Review Central Europe
“In this superb and long-awaited book, Aviezer Tucker writes from a deep understanding of totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes, mainly under Communism but also elsewhere. In his vivid phrase, ‘Totalitarianism is not dead, it merely disintegrated. Its pieces are spread all over and they can be put back together again.’ Ranging from painstaking empirical documentation to acute conceptual analyses, written with passion and irony, the book will undermine the complacency and willful blindness of many Western intellectuals and politicians.”
– Jon Elster, Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University
“Aviezer Tucker does not let us forget the totalitarian past – and with good reason. In this admirably comprehensive book, he revisits the much-debated (but later ignored) notions of totalitarianism, late totalitarianism, and post-totalitarianism and offers a powerful, thought-provoking interpretation of their legacies. Tucker discusses interrelated issues in elite change, lustration, transitional justice, property rights, and the configuration of post-totalitarian thinking in a way that opens new insights for academic debates. This book is a welcome contribution to studies in both political philosophy and historical sociology.”
– András Bozóki, Professor of Political Science, Central European University
Today, Panarchist political thought is particularly relevant and interesting in the context of globalization, increased international migration, the weakening of national sovereignty, the rise of the internet "cloud" as a non-territorial locus of political and protopolitical social networks that are not geographic, the invention of cryptocurrencies that may replace national currencies, and the rise of urban centers where people of many different political identities live and work together.
This is the first volume to bring together key philosophically and politically interesting yet often overlooked Panarchist texts. From the first published translation of de Puydt seminal 1860 article to contemporary Silicon Valley political theory, the volume includes Panarchist texts from different eras, cultures and geographical regions. The amassed wealth of theoretical insight enables readers to compare different texts in this tradition of political thought and distinguish different streams and varieties within this political tradition, in comparison with Cosmopolitanism, Contractarianism, and Anarchism.
•A cutting-edge updated picture of current research in the field
•Part of the renowned Blackwell Companions series
Papers by Aviezer Tucker
Key terms: Historicism, philosophy of historiography, Physicalism, Scientism, Epistemology of Testimony, Idiographic science, Introspection, self-knowledge, Neo-Kantian philosophy.
I identify four types of origins that share family relations: Mythical, Rationalist, Genealogical, and Scientific. I distinguish between them according to six criteria: The ontology of the origins and what they transfer; how they transfer what they transfer; whether what they transfer is path dependent on the origin; teleology, do origins have a manifest destiny; value judgements about the origins, positive, negative, both, or neither; and finally, the epistemology of the inference of origins.
Inferences of origins from information rich coherences between receivers of information signals both fit more closely and explain better the range of examples that have traditionally been associated with inferences of common causes, as well as a broader scope of examples from the historical sciences. Shannon’s concept of information as reduction in uncertainty, rather than physicalist concepts of information that relate it to entropy or waves, simplifies the inferences, preempts objections, and avoids the underdetermination of conclusions that challenge models of inferences of causes from information transmissions.
In the second part of the paper I model inferences of information about common origins from information preserved in their receivers. I distinguish information poor inferences that there were some common origins of receivers from the information richer inferences of ranges of possible common origins and the information transmission channels by which they transmitted signals to receivers. Lastly and most information rich, I distinguish the inference of the defining properties of common origins. The information transmission model from origins to receivers allows the reconceptualization of the concepts of independence as absence of intersections between information channels and reliability as the preservation of information from origins in receivers. Finally, I show how inferences of origins form the epistemic basis of the historical sciences.
This article models how independent multiple coherent testimonies generate probable knowledge in historiography and jurisprudence. Individual testimonies can at most transmit their own reliabilities. Multiple independent testimonies, even unreliable but coherent and independent testimonies, can generate knowledge with higher probability than any of the testimonies. For this reason, historians, detectives, and triers search for coherent, yet independent, testimonies.
I discuss in particular the concepts of coherence between testimonies, the independence of testimonies, and their reliability. I argue that all these concepts are best understood as aspects of information flows from events to testimonies. I present a new modular model of the inference of knowledge from testimonies in three stages that fits the best practices of institutionally embedded expert historians, jurists, and detectives, who infer knowledge from multiple testimonies.
Historiography is neither empirical, nor self-knowledge, nor
a genre of fiction or ideology. Historiographic reasoning is
irreducible to general scientific or social science reasoning. This
Element applies Bayesian insights to explicate historiographic
reasoning as probable. It distinguishes epistemic transmission
of knowledge from evidence from the generation of detailed
historiographic knowledge from multiple coherent and
independent evidentiary inputs in three modular stages. A
history of historiographic reasoning since the late eighteenth
century demonstrates that there was a historiographic scientific
revolution across the historical sciences in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. The underdetermination of
historiography by the evidence, counterfactual historiographic
reasoning, and false reasoning and other fallacies are further
explained and discussed in terms of the probabilistic relations between the evidence and the theory.
In this witty and engaging book, Aviezer Tucker argues that the contemporary revival of authoritarian populism combines the historically familiar with new technologies to produce a highly unstable and contagious new synthesis that threatens basic liberal norms, from freedom of the press to independent judiciaries. He examines how the economic crisis blocked social mobility and thereby awakened the dark, dormant political passions exploited by demagogues such as Orban and Trump. He argues that this slide towards ‘neo-illiberal democracy’ can be countered if we hard-headedly restore a ‘liberalism without nostalgia’ which institutes policies that can dampen down populist passions and strengthen liberal institutional barriers against them.
Readers interested in current affairs, social science, history, and political and social theory will find Aviezer Tucker’s original theoretical and historical analysis incisive, innovative, and entertaining.
The transition to post-totalitarianism was the spontaneous adjustment of the rights of the late-totalitarian elite to its interests. Post-totalitarian governments faced severe scarcity in the supply of justice. Rough justice punished the perpetrators and compensated their victims. Historical theories of property rights became radical, and consequentialist theories, conservative.
Totalitarianism in Europe disintegrated but did not end. The legacies of totalitarianism in higher education meet New Public Management, totalitarian central planning under a new label. Totalitarianism divorced language from reality through the use of dialectics that identifies opposites and the use of logical fallacies to argue for ideological conclusions. I illustrate these legacies in writings of Habermas, Derrida and Žižek about democracy, personal responsibility, dissidents, and totalitarianism.
Endorsements:
“Discussion about post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has long been tethered to imprecise, ideologically driven thinking. This book reframes the conversation in a manner befitting the region’s unique history and plugs a lingering gap in political theory.”
– Benjamin Cunningham, Prague correspondent for The Economist
“’Only dissidents can save us now. This will be the one truly positive legacy of totalitarianism (maybe together with public transportation),’ writes Aviezer Tucker. His book deals with the negative aspects of this legacy, though – and there are plenty of them, not only in the East. Essential reading at a time when the history of Central and Eastern Europe seems unfinished, again.”
– Aleksander Kaczorowski, editor of Aspen Review Central Europe
“In this superb and long-awaited book, Aviezer Tucker writes from a deep understanding of totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes, mainly under Communism but also elsewhere. In his vivid phrase, ‘Totalitarianism is not dead, it merely disintegrated. Its pieces are spread all over and they can be put back together again.’ Ranging from painstaking empirical documentation to acute conceptual analyses, written with passion and irony, the book will undermine the complacency and willful blindness of many Western intellectuals and politicians.”
– Jon Elster, Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University
“Aviezer Tucker does not let us forget the totalitarian past – and with good reason. In this admirably comprehensive book, he revisits the much-debated (but later ignored) notions of totalitarianism, late totalitarianism, and post-totalitarianism and offers a powerful, thought-provoking interpretation of their legacies. Tucker discusses interrelated issues in elite change, lustration, transitional justice, property rights, and the configuration of post-totalitarian thinking in a way that opens new insights for academic debates. This book is a welcome contribution to studies in both political philosophy and historical sociology.”
– András Bozóki, Professor of Political Science, Central European University
Today, Panarchist political thought is particularly relevant and interesting in the context of globalization, increased international migration, the weakening of national sovereignty, the rise of the internet "cloud" as a non-territorial locus of political and protopolitical social networks that are not geographic, the invention of cryptocurrencies that may replace national currencies, and the rise of urban centers where people of many different political identities live and work together.
This is the first volume to bring together key philosophically and politically interesting yet often overlooked Panarchist texts. From the first published translation of de Puydt seminal 1860 article to contemporary Silicon Valley political theory, the volume includes Panarchist texts from different eras, cultures and geographical regions. The amassed wealth of theoretical insight enables readers to compare different texts in this tradition of political thought and distinguish different streams and varieties within this political tradition, in comparison with Cosmopolitanism, Contractarianism, and Anarchism.
•A cutting-edge updated picture of current research in the field
•Part of the renowned Blackwell Companions series
Key terms: Historicism, philosophy of historiography, Physicalism, Scientism, Epistemology of Testimony, Idiographic science, Introspection, self-knowledge, Neo-Kantian philosophy.
I identify four types of origins that share family relations: Mythical, Rationalist, Genealogical, and Scientific. I distinguish between them according to six criteria: The ontology of the origins and what they transfer; how they transfer what they transfer; whether what they transfer is path dependent on the origin; teleology, do origins have a manifest destiny; value judgements about the origins, positive, negative, both, or neither; and finally, the epistemology of the inference of origins.
Inferences of origins from information rich coherences between receivers of information signals both fit more closely and explain better the range of examples that have traditionally been associated with inferences of common causes, as well as a broader scope of examples from the historical sciences. Shannon’s concept of information as reduction in uncertainty, rather than physicalist concepts of information that relate it to entropy or waves, simplifies the inferences, preempts objections, and avoids the underdetermination of conclusions that challenge models of inferences of causes from information transmissions.
In the second part of the paper I model inferences of information about common origins from information preserved in their receivers. I distinguish information poor inferences that there were some common origins of receivers from the information richer inferences of ranges of possible common origins and the information transmission channels by which they transmitted signals to receivers. Lastly and most information rich, I distinguish the inference of the defining properties of common origins. The information transmission model from origins to receivers allows the reconceptualization of the concepts of independence as absence of intersections between information channels and reliability as the preservation of information from origins in receivers. Finally, I show how inferences of origins form the epistemic basis of the historical sciences.
This article models how independent multiple coherent testimonies generate probable knowledge in historiography and jurisprudence. Individual testimonies can at most transmit their own reliabilities. Multiple independent testimonies, even unreliable but coherent and independent testimonies, can generate knowledge with higher probability than any of the testimonies. For this reason, historians, detectives, and triers search for coherent, yet independent, testimonies.
I discuss in particular the concepts of coherence between testimonies, the independence of testimonies, and their reliability. I argue that all these concepts are best understood as aspects of information flows from events to testimonies. I present a new modular model of the inference of knowledge from testimonies in three stages that fits the best practices of institutionally embedded expert historians, jurists, and detectives, who infer knowledge from multiple testimonies.
Published Version:
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/10/27/new-old-fatalism/
Filmed version:
https://www.oulu.fi/centreforphilosophyofhistory/node/48724
Testimonial knowledge relies trivially on inference, perception and memory—and vice versa. (Strawson 1994) For example, the generation of knowledge from testimonies involves inferences, the subject of this article. But inference is not a basic source of testimonial knowledge. Likewise, we must use our senses to read or hear testimonies; but perceptions convey the testimonies; they are not their basic source. The inference of knowledge exclusively from multiple testimonies as basic sources allows a non-reductionist epistemology of testimonial knowledge. (Strawson 1994, 25)
I open the discussion with an analysis of the best formal epistemic modelling of the inference of knowledge from multiple testimonies. I criticize their conceptual analyses of coherence between testimonies, the independence of testimonies, and their reliability. I argue that instead of assuming independence by fiat, formal models should explain how to prove it. Instead of conditional and causal interpretations, I argue for tracing information flows. Then, I present a new alternative Bayesian three stages modular model that I argue fits the actual veritistic best practices of institutionally embedded experts who infer knowledge from multiple testimonies. Finally, I consider some of the broader implications of my epistemology of testimony for understanding social knowledge and the relations between social and individual epistemologies. I endorse Goldman’s (1999) designation of the epistemology of testimony as a vital link between individualist and social epistemologies to argue that much of social knowledge supervenes on multiple individual testimonies. Institutional expert knowledge follows implicitly or explicitly the use of the reliable methods of inference from multiple testimonies that I outline. The institutions that habitually infer knowledge mostly or even exclusively from multiple testimonies are intelligence agencies such as the CIA, police detective departments, the judicial system, investigative journalism, and the historical research institutions. Since the results of inferences from multiple testimonies are literally matters of life and death, war or peace, the conviction or acquittal of the guilty and innocent, the exposure of corruption and crime, and our knowledge of the past, the significance of the questions I attempt to answer here exceeds that of abstract issues in epistemology. The answers I propose, can serve as a normative regulative standard for best epistemic practices that can measure, criticize, and regulate the institutional practices that attempt to generate knowledge from multiple testimonies.
The main current methodologies of the epistemology of testimony are conceptual-using thought experiments to explicate concepts (e.g. Lackey 2008; Goldberg 2010, cf. Tucker 2012b) and formal—applying probabilistic methods to build models (Bovens and Hartmann 2003; Olsson 2005; Shogenji 2007). The absence of fruitful communications between conceptual and formal epistemology is lamentable (cf. Hendricks 2006, 151-165) particularly because the conceptual and formal approaches have reached inconsistent conclusions. Conceptual thought experiments focus on the transmission of epistemic properties by single testimonies, ignoring or even denying that multiple testimonies can generate more reliable beliefs, knowledge, than any single testimony. Most formal models show that multiple testimonies can generate knowledge that is more reliable than any single testimony and attempt to model formally this inference, but the models make often unjustified and unrealistic assumptions and their conceptual interpretations are weak. Bovens and Hartmann (2003, 129-130), for example, recognized the weakness of making implausible assumptions to facilitate model building.
My alternative methodology is to model the best practices of the experts who specialize in inferring knowledge from testimonies, following Goldman’s (1999) recommendation that social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony model veritistic, truth conducive, institutional epistemic practices because the institutionalized best practices of experts are probably close to the best possible practices. The institutional experts who generate knowledge mostly, if not exclusively, from multiple testimonies are detectives, intelligence analysts, historians, and investigative journalists. Goldman (2004) considered the institutional and epistemic practices of the FBI. Brittan (1994) and Tucker (2004), moreover, noted the close relation between the epistemology of testimony and the philosophy of historiography. Detectives as historians have been considered by philosophers at least since Collingwood. (1956, 266-274)
Krieger (1977, 3) puzzled at the consideration of Ranke as the "Copernicus" or "Kant" of historiography: The critical attitude to sources dates back to Thucydides. The crucial significance of original documents for historiographic reasoning had already been recognized in humanist scholarship since the fifteenth century and was defended systematically by Jean Mabillion and the Maurists in the seventeenth century. The theories and methods of philology developed in seminars in the early 19th and were applied "spectacularly" to Roman historiography by Barthold Georg Niebuhr, whom Ranke acknowledged as his mentor. I argue that modern “Rankean” historiography is distinguishable from its ancient predecessors by a special relation with the evidence. Around the turn of the 19th century, scholars from apparently different fields all began to use a form of probabilistic inference from multiple units of evidence like testimonies, languages, and texts that allowed them to obtain new knowledge of the past. Ranke’s attempt was the first successful application of this probabilistic method to historiography. Thucydides, though critical of his sources did not infer from multiple testimonies as Ranke and his successors did; therefore he did not mention his sources. (Kosso 1993, 9)
Costica Bradatan, Dying for Ideas: The Dangerous Lives of the Philosophers. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
From the Aspen Review
Michael Žantovský
Grove Press, 2014, 512 pp., $30
Václav Havel, the dissident playwright who became the last President of Czechoslovakia and the first President of the Czech Republic, was loved and admired more than understood. His admirers squeezed him into boxes that did not quite fit him. An absurd playwright in the tradition of Ionesco and Becket, Havel would have appreciated the irony of ending up as the main character in somebody else’s funeral.
One imagines Nicholas II is not the role model Putin sought to emulate.
Regardless, the two autocrats’ strategic choices on the European geopolitical map may have entangled their destinies. The current crisis in Ukraine may be Putin’s 1917.
Two Possible Futures for Putin, Russia and Ukraine
Since the ancient Greeks Populism has been associated with political passions that demagogues manipulate. Passions can trump people’s own best interests. As La Bruyere put it back in the 17th century: “Nothing is easier for passion than to overcome reason, but the greatest triumph is to conquer one’s own interest.”
Liberal constitutions were designed or evolved to constrain political passions. This has been the purpose of the separation of powers, checks and balances, and institutions like the judiciary, the professional civil service, and the central bank. Populist governments must conduct interminable wars of attrition against these liberal institution. Populist governments strive for absolute powers that can unleash unconstrained passions.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/10/23/fifty-shades-czech-populism/
When experience is not retained in memory, the results are permanent political and personal infancy. We make then the kind of mistakes children do, because they have little experience to instruct them—and it is therefore no coincidence that much of current populist politics, in Europe and the United States both, appears infantile.
Populists appear childish not just in their impetuous mannerisms, but because they display no historical depth, no learning from experience.
Europe wants a free trade agreement with the United States to allow exports of unconventionally produced American liquefied natural gas and crude oil from shale to substitute for Russian imports. But Europe has another route to energy security: follow the United States in developing domestic shale gas and tight oil resources.
These plans are reminiscent of the last stage of the arms race during the Cold War in the eighties. Today’s pipeline wars are quickly becoming obsolete because of new economic and technological realities.
The purview of the philosophy of history in the middle of the previous century included problems such as: Is history inevitable? Is history cyclical, progressive, regressive, or directionless? What is the role of the individual, or “hero,” in history? Does history repeat itself? Can we learn from history? Totalitarian ideologies held that history is inevitable. Large impersonal forces such as race and class determine history, reduced to pseudo-scientific caricatures of biology or economics. The totalitarian concept of history was cyclical. History repeats itself as the continuous drama of class or racial conflict. If history is necessary, there is nothing to learn from it; it will happen anyway whether we understand the process or not. At most, the birth pangs of history will be shorter. Liberals retorted that history is contingent. Individual choices matter. Modernization pushes history in a progressive direction and though history does not repeat itself (“some people believe that history repeats itself, others read the Economist”), there is much that can be learned from history, especially from its mistakes and wrong turns. They set out to construct a political, social and global order that would intuitionally prevent the repetitions of the mistakes of the first half of the twentieth century.
Liberal philosophy of history entered a “post-historical” phase when it came to believe that historical progress is inevitable, individuals do not matter for history, and history does not repeat itself and therefore there is nothing to learn from it. Studying history and the philosophy of history were perceived as redundant at best and regressive if they get in the way of the modernizing agenda of constructing a modern world of technology and progress by studying computer science, engineering, and business.
The economic 2007/8 and political 2016/7 mark “Santayana’s revenge,” the return of history to those who denied it. Contemporary populism is entirely ahistorical, not just in its total ignorance of the mistakes of the past that it attempts to reproduce Sisyphus-like, but in an apparent absence of historical consciousness. The rhetoric implies that they believe recent history was regressive yet contingent on the actions of individual leaders. On the other political extreme, a cyclical and inevitable view of history spreads that foresees cycles of economic freedom, prosperity and globalization, followed by crisis and authoritarian and nationalist backlash for the past couple of hundred years. Accordingly, contemporary populism cannot be resisted by individuals, but at best be moderated of incorporated in a populist leftist agenda to imitate the populist right.
I argue for contingent and directionless history. History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. Following Santayana, I argue for a virtue of ethics of historical knowledge. Though I still believe in the value of the epistemic inquiry into our knowledge of the past, in the philosophy of historiography, to which I have devoted most of my past efforts, I believe that our moral engagement as philosophers of history warrants a reexamination of the questions I mentioned above that were largely abandoned in the fifties of the previous century.
Dr. Tucker discusses the themes of his piece in the UnPopulist, “Along with Ukraine, Putin is Destroying Putinism.” He draws a parallel between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, arguing that similarly to how the 1968 invasion lead to the end of communism as an ideology, the invasion of Ukraine will lead to the end of “Putinism,” what he describes as a “witches’ brew of authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, nationalism, reactionary social values, illiberalism, anti-internationalism and anti-Americanism.”
Recorded June 15 2020.
Christopher Ingold Lecture Theatre,
Christopher Ingold Chemistry Building,
20 Gordon Street,
University College London,
London WC1H 0AJ
The UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies presents:
THE ART OF THE IMPOSSIBLE: CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY AND DISSENT FROM HAVEL TO THE PRESENT
→ Resources
→ Interviews
→ Article: Aviezer Tucker: Our Knowledge of the Past
Hugo Holbling in Interviews
Content:
Krzysztof Brzechczyn, A Transformation of the Privileges of the Authorities into Property Rights or a Transformation of the Types of Class Rule?"
Dragoş Petrescu, "Limits of democratic consolidation: Subversion of reason as a post-totalitarian syndrome"
Michał Kwiecień, " The Hereditary Diseases of Post-Totalitarianism"
Cristina Petrescu, "Simulated Change: Totalitarianism and what Comes Next"
Grzegorz Greg Lewicki, Legacies, zombies and the need of long-term basis for short-term foresight"
Rafał Paweł Wierzchosławski , "Dissidents and Nomads in [not only] Post-Totalitarian Countries – Why Are There so Many Problems If Things Are Going so Well?"
Aviezer Tucker Harvard University)," Why 'Legacies' Matter: Reply to readings of 'Legacies;"