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Doping in teams: A simple decision theoretic model
[Doping in Teams: Ein einfaches entscheidungstheoretisches Modell]

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  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team member that at least some of its members dope. That there are not many proven cases of doping in team sports could be because doping is less effective or because the incentives to cover it are higher than in individual sports.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 2017. "Doping in teams: A simple decision theoretic model [Doping in Teams: Ein einfaches entscheidungstheoretisches Modell]," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2017, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kjetil K. Haugen, 2004. "The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 67-86, February.
    2. David J. Berri & Anthony C. Krautmann, 2006. "Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 536-546, July.
    3. Alexander Dilger & Bernd Frick & Frank Tolsdorf, 2007. "Are Athletes Doped? Some Theoretical Arguments And Empirical Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 604-615, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Cheating alone and in teams," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 1/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General
    • Z22 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Labor Issues

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