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The political economy of bank bailouts

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  • Behn, Markus
  • Haselmann, Rainer
  • Kick, Thomas
  • Vig, Vikrant

Abstract

In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers´ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.

Suggested Citation

  • Behn, Markus & Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Vig, Vikrant, 2016. "The political economy of bank bailouts," SAFE Working Paper Series 133, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:133
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    Cited by:

    1. Kang, Shulong & Dong, Jianfeng & Yu, Haiyue & Cao, Jin & Dinger, Valeriya, 2021. "City commercial banks and credit allocation : Firm-level evidence," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2021, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    2. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2022. "Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Tonzer, Lena, 2019. "Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-20.
    4. Athanasios Kolliopoulos, 2020. "The Determinants of Bank Bailouts in Greece: testing the extreme limits of the ÒVarieties of Financial CapitalismÓ framework," GreeSE – Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 148, Hellenic Observatory, LSE.
    5. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
    6. Gropp, Reint & Guettler, Andre & Saadi, Vahid, 2020. "Public bank guarantees and allocative efficiency," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 53-69.
    7. Koetter, Michael & Müller, Carola & Noth, Felix & Fritz, Benedikt, 2018. "May the force be with you: Exit barriers, governance shocks, and profitability sclerosis in banking," Discussion Papers 49/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    8. Bersch, Johannes & Degryse, Hans & Kick, Thomas & Stein, Ingrid, 2020. "The real effects of bank distress: Evidence from bank bailouts in Germany," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    9. John B. Taylor & Volker Wieland, 2016. "Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 147-154, July.
    10. Matthieu Chavaz & Andrew K Rose, 2019. "Political Borders and Bank Lending in Post-Crisis America," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 23(5), pages 935-959.
    11. Kang, Shulong & Dong, Jianfeng & Yu, Haiyue & Cao, Jin & Dinger, Valeriya, 2021. "City commercial banks and credit allocation: Firm-level evidence," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2021, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    12. Buch, Claudia M. & Krause, Thomas & Tonzer, Lena, 2019. "Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 160-176.
    13. Karsten Müller, 2023. "Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 295-322, November.
    14. repec:ecb:ecbdps:20199 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Kolliopoulos, Athanasios, 2020. "The determinants of bank bailouts in Greece: testing the extreme limits of the “Varieties of Financial Capitalism” framework," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 105072, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Michael Lee & Daniel Neuhann, 2018. "The Incentive Channel of Capital Market Interventions," 2018 Meeting Papers 840, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Schnabel, Isabel & Truger, Achim & Wieland, Volker, 2019. "Den Strukturwandel meistern. Jahresgutachten 2019/20 [Dealing with Structural Change. Annual Report 2019/20]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201920.
    18. repec:zbw:bofitp:2021_004 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; bailouts; state-owned enterprises; elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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