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Vergabe von bilateraler und multilateraler Entwicklungshilfe: Eine positive Analyse

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  • Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore
  • Schneider, Friedrich

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, welche Faktoren die Vergabe von finanziellen Hilfeleistungen an die Länder der Dritten Welt bestimmen. Die positive Analyse stellt auf die Interessen und die Einflußmöglichkeiten der beteiligten Akteure im politischen Entscheidungsprozeß ab. Zwei institutionelle Arrangements werden unterschieden: Zum einen wird die Verteilung bilateraler Hilfeleistungen untersucht, über die auf nationaler Ebene entschieden wird und die sich aus der Interaktion von Wählern, Interessengruppen, Regierung und öffentlicher Verwaltung des jeweiligen Geberlandes ergibt. Zum anderen wird die Verteilung multilateraler Hilfe untersucht, die wesentlich beeinflußt wird durch die Interaktion der Regierungsvertreter der Geberländer mit den Entscheidungsträgern in den entsprechenden internationalen Organisationen. Die anhand einer politisch-ökonomischen Analyse abgeleiteten Hypothesen werden für die zu Beginn der 80er Jahre vergebenen Hilfeleistungen von Seiten (i) der DAC-Länder insgesamt, (ii) einzelner bedeutender Gebernationen (Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Bundesrepublik Deutschland), sowie (iii) der Vereinten Nationen und anderen Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen (ohne die Weltbank) empirisch überprüft. Die ökonometrische Untersuchung vermag einige der aufgestellten Hypothesen zu stützen: So richtet sich die Verteilung der bilateralen Hilfeleistungen vorwiegend an den politischen und teilweise auch an den wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Interessen der nationalen Regierungen sowie an der Vergabepolitik in der Vergangenheit aus. Dagegen beachten die untersuchten internationalen Organisationen bei der Vergabe von multilateraler Hilfe stärker die Bedürftigkeit eines Empfängerlandes gegenüber den Eigeninteressen der Geberländer.

Suggested Citation

  • Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore & Schneider, Friedrich, 1989. "Vergabe von bilateraler und multilateraler Entwicklungshilfe: Eine positive Analyse," Discussion Papers, Series II 89, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:89
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