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Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly

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  • Mitraille, Sébastien
  • Moreaux, Michel

Abstract

Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash- perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leader- ship over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased competition and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and competition increase due to the strategic use of inventories.

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  • Mitraille, Sébastien & Moreaux, Michel, 2011. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly," TSE Working Papers 11-249, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:24803
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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaowei Hu & Jaejin Jang & Nabeel Hamoud & Amirsaman Bajgiran, 2021. "Strategic Inventories in a Supply Chain with Downstream Cournot Duopoly," Papers 2109.06995, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    2. Lenhard, Severin, 2022. "Imperfect competition with costly disposal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    3. repec:lic:licosd:43022 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Fabio Antoniou & Raffaele Fiocco, 2019. "Strategic inventories under limited commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(3), pages 695-729, September.
    5. Lenhard, Severin, 2022. "Imperfect Competition with Costly Disposal," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264038, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Mitraille, Sébastien & Thille, Henry, 2014. "Speculative storage in imperfectly competitive markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 44-59.
    7. Sébastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2020. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 789-828, April.
    8. Severin Lenhard, 2021. "Imperfect Competition with Costly Disposal," Diskussionsschriften dp2105, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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