IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sfu/sfudps/dp20-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tax Competition in Presence of Profit Shifting

Author

Listed:
  • Steeve Mongrain

    (Simon Fraser University)

  • David Oh

    (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation)

  • Tanguy van Ypersele

    (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, EHESS, Central Marseille, AMSE, Marseille)

Abstract

The popular view is that governments should crack down on tax avoidance by multinational firms. In this paper, we analyze how anti-profit-shifting policies influence fiscal competition. Governments commit to profit shifting control effort and then set taxes on capital. Equilibrium tax rates are determined by the elasticities of the two components: profit shifting and capital mobility. Anti-profit-shifting policies decrease the elasticity of the first but increase the elasticity of the second, so that the impact of these policies on the equilibrium of the tax game is ambiguous. We show that there are cases in which laxer policies increase all equilibrium tax rates and that the country announcing laxer profit shifting policies may gain. It appears that there is not always a pure strategy equilibrium in such a fiscal competition game. We construct a mixed strategy equilibrium when the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Steeve Mongrain & David Oh & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2020. "Tax Competition in Presence of Profit Shifting," Discussion Papers dp20-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    • Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp20-04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.sfu.ca/repec-econ/sfu/sfudps/dp20-04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mongrain, Steeve & Wilson, John D., 2018. "Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 177-189.
    2. Theresa Lohse & Nadine Riedel, 2013. "Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International Income Shifting? Evidence from European Multinationals," CESifo Working Paper Series 4404, CESifo.
    3. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 306-325, April.
    4. Keen, Michael & Konrad, Kai A., . "The theory of international tax competition and coordination," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
    6. Krautheim, Sebastian & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2011. "Heterogeneous firms, ‘profit shifting’ FDI and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 122-133.
    7. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2008. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 188-201, January.
    8. Ruud A. de Mooij & Sjef Ederveen, 2008. "Corporate tax elasticities: a reader's guide to empirical findings," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 24(4), pages 680-697, winter.
    9. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons From Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 305-322, June.
    10. Thiess Buettner & Michael Overesch & Georg Wamser, 2018. "Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 553-580, June.
    11. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve & Wilson, John D., 2010. "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 249-259, March.
    12. Grubert, Harry, 2012. "Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 65(2), pages 247-281, June.
    13. Devereux, Michael P. & Griffith, Rachel, 2003. "The Impact of Corporate Taxation on the Location of Capital: A Review," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 275-292, September.
    14. Alfons Weichenrieder, 2009. "Profit shifting in the EU: evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(3), pages 281-297, June.
    15. Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Fangying Xu, 2019. "Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on secrecy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 147-160, July.
    16. De Simone, Lisa & Klassen, Kenneth J. & Seidman, Jeri K., 2022. "The effect of income-shifting aggressiveness on corporate investment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1).
    17. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2014. "What Do We Know about Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 35, pages 421-448, December.
    18. Johannesen, Niels, 2010. "Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-264, July.
    19. Ahearne, Alan G. & Griever, William L. & Warnock, Francis E., 2004. "Information costs and home bias: an analysis of US holdings of foreign equities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 313-336, March.
    20. Huizinga, Harry & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "International profit shifting within multinationals: A multi-country perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1164-1182, June.
    21. Georg Wamser, 2014. "The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt Usage – A Propensity Score Matching Approach," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 76(5), pages 764-781, October.
    22. Devereux, Michael P. & Griffith, Rachel, 1998. "Taxes and the location of production: evidence from a panel of US multinationals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 335-367, June.
    23. Hong, Qing & Smart, Michael, 2010. "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 82-95, January.
    24. Mintz, Jack & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1149-1168, June.
    25. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2008. "What problems and opportunities are created by tax havens?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 24(4), pages 661-679, winter.
    26. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
    27. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    28. James R. Hines & Eric M. Rice, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(1), pages 149-182.
    29. Egger, Peter H. & Merlo, Valeria & Wamser, Georg, 2014. "Unobserved tax avoidance and the tax elasticity of FDI," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 1-18.
    30. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Profit Shifting Despite Symmetric Tax Rates? A Note on the Role of Tax Enforcement," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 97-108, March.
    31. Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Helen Windischbauer & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2008. "Thin-Capitalization Rules and Company Responses Experience from German Legislation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2456, CESifo.
    32. Desai, Mihir A. & Foley, C. Fritz & Hines, James Jr., 2006. "Do tax havens divert economic activity?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 219-224, February.
    33. Jost H. Heckemeyer & Michael Overesch, 2017. "Multinationals’ profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(4), pages 965-994, November.
    34. Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2012. "Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 146-148.
    35. Egger, Peter H. & Wamser, Georg, 2015. "The impact of controlled foreign company legislation on real investments abroad. A multi-dimensional regression discontinuity design," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 77-91.
    36. Jost H. Heckemeyer & Michael Overesch, 2017. "Multinationals profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(4), pages 965-994, November.
    37. Michael Overesch & Georg Wamser, 2010. "Corporate tax planning and thin-capitalization rules: evidence from a quasi-experiment," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 563-573.
    38. Buettner, Thiess & Overesch, Michael & Schreiber, Ulrich & Wamser, Georg, 2012. "The impact of thin-capitalization rules on the capital structure of multinational firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 930-938.
    39. Matthias Dischinger & Bodo Knoll & Nadine Riedel, 2014. "The role of headquarters in multinational profit shifting strategies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(2), pages 248-271, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Haufler, Andreas & Schindler, Dirk, 2023. "Attracting profit shifting or fostering innovation? On patent boxes and R&D subsidies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sebastian Beer & Ruud de Mooij & Li Liu, 2020. "International Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Review Of The Channels, Magnitudes, And Blind Spots," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 660-688, July.
    2. Thiess Buettner & Michael Overesch & Georg Wamser, 2018. "Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 553-580, June.
    3. Hsun Chu, 2014. "Tax Enforcement Policy and the Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Tax Havens," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(3), pages 304-321, July.
    4. Shafik Hebous, 2014. "Money at the Docks of Tax Havens: A Guide," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(3), pages 458-485, September.
    5. Zarko Y. Kalamov, 2023. "Internal debt and welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 196-224, February.
    6. Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2016. "Wages and International Tax Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 893-923, November.
    7. Ropponen, Olli, 2021. "Interest Limitation Rules and Business Cycles: Empirical Evidence," ETLA Working Papers 90, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    8. Pieretti, Patrice & Pulina, Giuseppe, 2020. "Does eliminating international profit shifting increase tax revenue in high-tax countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 717-727.
    9. Sven Stöwhase, 2013. "How Profit Shifting May Increase the Tax Burden of Multinationals: A Simple Model with Discrete Investment Choices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 185-207, April.
    10. Krautheim, Sebastian & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2011. "Heterogeneous firms, 'profit shifting' FDI and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1-2), pages 122-133, February.
    11. Hayato Kato & Hirofumi Okoshi, 2022. "Economic Integration And Agglomeration Of Multinational Production With Transfer Pricing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1325-1355, August.
    12. Johannesen, Niels, 2022. "The global minimum tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    13. Egger, Peter H. & Merlo, Valeria & Wamser, Georg, 2014. "Unobserved tax avoidance and the tax elasticity of FDI," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 1-18.
    14. Jean Hindriks & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2021. "Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 487-509, June.
    15. Martin Simmler, 2014. "Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal debt financing on capital accumulation," Working Papers 1424, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    16. Andreas Haufler & Mohammed Mardan & Dirk Schindler, 2016. "Optimal Policies against Profit Shifting: The Role of Controlled-Foreign-Company Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 5850, CESifo.
    17. Overesch Michael, 2016. "Steuervermeidung multinationaler Unternehmen: Die Befunde der empirischen Forschung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 129-143, July.
    18. George R. Zodrow, 2019. "Capital Mobility and Capital Tax Competition," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 18, pages 543-570, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    19. Marko Köthenbürger & Federica Liberini & Michael Stimmelmayr, 2018. "Is it just Luring Reported Profit? The Case of European Patent Boxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 7061, CESifo.
    20. Marko Koethenbuerger & Federica Liberini & Michael Stimmelmayr, 2019. "(Un)Intended Effects of Preferential Tax Regimes: The Case of European Patent Boxes," EconPol Working Paper 29, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax competition; Profit shifting; International taxation; Capital mobility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp20-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Working Paper Coordinator (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/desfuca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.