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What Happens When Countries Peg Their Exchange Rates? (The Real Side of Monetary Reforms)

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  • Sergio Rebelo

Abstract

There is a well-known set of empirical regularities that describe the experience of countries that peg their exchange rate as part of a macroeconomic adjustment program. Following the peg economies tend to experience an increase in GDP, a large expansion of production in the non-tradable sector, a contraction in tradables production, a current account deterioration, an increase in the real wage, a reduction in unemployment, a sharp appreciation in the relative price of non-tradables and a boom in the real estate market. This paper discusses how the changes in the expected behavior of fiscal policy that tend to be associated with the peg can contribute to explaining these facts.

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  • Sergio Rebelo, 1997. "What Happens When Countries Peg Their Exchange Rates? (The Real Side of Monetary Reforms)," NBER Working Papers 6168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6168
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    1. Alberto Alesina & Gerald D. Cohen & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy And Elections In Oecd Democracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-30, March.
    2. Ades, Alberto F. & Kiguel, Miguel & Liviatan, Nissan, 1993. "Exchange rate based stabilization : tales from Europe and Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1087, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Coto-Martinez, Javier & Dixon, Huw, 2003. "Profits, markups and entry: fiscal policy in an open economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 573-597, February.
    2. Robert J. Gordon, 2000. "The Aftermath of the 1992 ERM Breakup: Was There a Macroeconomic Free Lunch?," NBER Chapters, in: Currency Crises, pages 241-282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Martin Uribe, 1997. "Habit formation and the comovement of prices and consumption during exchange-rate based stabilization programs," International Finance Discussion Papers 598, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Sergio Rebelo & Carlos A. Végh, 1995. "Real Effects of Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization: An Analysis of Competing Theories," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 125-188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Javier Coto-Martinez & Juan C. Reboredo, 2004. "The Balassa-Samuelson effect in an imperfectly competitive economy: empirical evidence for G7 countries," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 19, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    6. Kamin, Steve B. & Rogers, John H., 2000. "Output and the real exchange rate in developing countries: an application to Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 85-109, February.
    7. Cunha, Alexandre, 2013. "Optimal Exchange Rate Policy and Business Cycles," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 33(1), September.
    8. Robertson, Raymond, 2003. "Exchange rates and relative wages: evidence from Mexico," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 25-48, March.
    9. K K Tang, 1998. "Property Markets and Policies in an Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model," Departmental Working Papers 1999-01, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, revised Jan 1999.
    10. Calvo, Guillermo A. & Vegh, Carlos A., 1999. "Inflation stabilization and bop crises in developing countries," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 24, pages 1531-1614, Elsevier.
    11. Jung, Yongseung, 2000. "Nominal Rigidities, Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 541-580, October.
    12. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 837-880, September.
    13. Cunha, Alexandre & Teixeira, Arilton, 2004. "The Impacts of Trade Blocks and Tax Reforms on the Brazilian Economy," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 58(3), July.
    14. Daniel M. Chin & Preston J. Miller, 1995. "Fixed vs. floating exchange rates: a dynamic general equilibrium analysis," Staff Report 194, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    15. Josip Tica, 2006. "Exchange Rate Economics in Transition Economies," Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, vol. 9(2), pages 155-170, November.
    16. Sebastian Edwards, 1999. "Crisis Prevention: Lessons from Mexico and East Asia," NBER Working Papers 7233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Coto-Martinez, J. & Reboredo, J. C., 2007. "The Relative Price of Non-traded Goods in an Imperfectly Competitive Economy: Empirical Evidence for G7 Countries," Working Papers 07/14, Department of Economics, City University London.

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    JEL classification:

    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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