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Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados

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  • Vicente Calabuig Alcantara

    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

We present in this work a survey on sequential bargaining models with complete information that explain inefficiencies, frequently observed and with great economic impact, such as strikes, the establishment of commitments and the intransigent position of the negotiators. Furthermore, we pose several criticisms to these models and point out possible lines of future research for the literature. En este trabajo se presenta una panorámica de los modelos de negociación secuencial con información completa que explica fenómenos ineficientes frecuentemente observados y de gran repercusión económica, tales como las huelgas, el establecimiento de compromisos previos y la posición intransigente de los negociadores. Asimismo, se plantean diversas críticas a estos modelos y se apuntan posibles líneas de investigaci6n futura para la literatura.

Suggested Citation

  • Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1997-03
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Negociación; juegos repetidos; huelgas; compromiso Bargaining; repeated games; strikes; commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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