IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gue/guelph/2010-04..html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Large Trader in Bubbles and Crashes: an Application to Currency Attacks

Author

Listed:
  • Mei Li

    (Department of Economics,University of Guelph)

  • Frank Milne

    (Department of Economics,Queen's University)

Abstract

Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) study stock market bubbles and crashes in a dynamic model with a continuum of rational small traders. We introduce a large trader into their model and apply it to currency attacks. In an attack against a fixed exchange rate regime with a gradually overvaluing currency, traders lack common knowledge about the time when the overvaluation starts. Meanwhile, they need to coordinate to break a peg. In such a setup, both the inability of traders to synchronize their attack and their incentive to time the collapse of the regime lead to the persistent overvaluation of the currency. We find that the presence of a large trader with perfect information will accelerate the collapse of the regime and alleviate currency overvaluation. However, if a large trader has incomplete information, the presence of a large trader may accelerate or delay the collapse of the regime ex post, depending on the size of his wealth and the precision of his information. More specifically, we find that a large trader with both a large amount of wealth and very noisy information can greatly delay the collapse of the regime ex post. Moreover, we find that the presence of a large trader with incomplete information can greatly increase the unpredictability about the time when the regime collapses, implying the difficulty for traders to time the collapse.

Suggested Citation

  • Mei Li & Frank Milne, 2010. "A Large Trader in Bubbles and Crashes: an Application to Currency Attacks," Working Papers 1004, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2010-04.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2010/2010-04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gara Minguez-Afonso, 2007. "Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 81-112, March.
    2. Broner, Fernando A., 2008. "Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 592-605, April.
    3. Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 173-204, January.
    4. Celine Rochon, 2006. "Devaluation without common knowledge," OFRC Working Papers Series 2006fe03, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    5. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    6. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 87-113.
    7. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel & Lasse H. Pedersen, 2009. "Carry Trades and Currency Crashes," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2008, Volume 23, pages 313-347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti & Nouriel Roubini, 2002. "The Role of Large Players in Currency Crises," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 197-268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-560, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    10. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818728, October.
    11. Christophe Chamley, 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 603-621, June.
    12. Celine Rochon, 2006. "Devaluation without common knowledge," Economics Series Working Papers 2006-FE-03, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    13. Bannier, Christina E., 2005. "Big elephants in small ponds: Do large traders make financial markets more aggressive?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1517-1531, November.
    14. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524131, October.
    15. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818735, October.
    16. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524124, October.
    17. Rochon, Celine, 2006. "Devaluation without common knowledge," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 470-489, December.
    18. Mathias Dewatripont & Lars Peter Hansen & Stephen Turnovsky, 2003. "Advances in economics and econometrics :theory and applications," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9557, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    19. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818742, October.
    20. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524117, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mei Li & Frank Milne, 2007. "The Role Of Large Players In A Dynamic Currency Attack Game," Working Paper 1148, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    3. Li, Mei & Milne, Frank, 2014. "The role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 590-620.
    4. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2006. "Dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 141-158, January.
    5. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(3), pages 711-756, May.
    6. Zwart, Sanne, 2007. "The mixed blessing of IMF intervention: Signalling versus liquidity support," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 149-174, July.
    7. , & ,, 2013. "Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    8. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2009. "Coordination failure among multiple lenders and the role and effects of public policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 183-198, June.
    9. Morris, Stephen, 2014. "Coordination, timing and common knowledge," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 306-314.
    10. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2013. "Investment complementarities, coordination failure, and the role and effects of public investment policy," Discussion Paper Series 589, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and financial stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 518-557.
    12. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
    13. Mei Li, 2013. "Investment complementarities, coordination failure, and systemic bankruptcy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 767-788, October.
    14. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2005. "Unique equilibrium in a dynamic model of crises with frictions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4907, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    16. Gaëtan Le Quang, 2017. ""Taking Diversity into Account": the Diversity of Financial Institutions and Accounting Regulation," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    17. Liu, Xuewen & Mello, Antonio S., 2011. "The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 491-506.
    18. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Heterogeneous Information and the Benefits of Public Information Disclosures (October 2005)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 283, UCLA Department of Economics.
    19. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Liquidity Black Holes," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18.
    20. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Large Trader; Bubbles and Crashes; Currency Attack;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2010-04.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stephen Kosempel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/degueca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.