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A Coasean Approach to Bank Resolution Policy in the Eurozone

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  • Gregory Connor
  • Brian O’Kelly

Abstract

The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal coresponsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible bonds. We argue that the “dilute-in” of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Connor & Brian O’Kelly, 2012. "A Coasean Approach to Bank Resolution Policy in the Eurozone," FMG Special Papers sp214, Financial Markets Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.
    2. Agnieszka Trzcinska, 2015. "The Impact of the New Resolution Regime on Public Support to Banks (Udzial sektora publicznego w kosztach ratowania bankow w swietle nowych przepisow w zakresie restrukturyzacji i uporzadkowanej likwi," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 13(55), pages 120-133.
    3. ap Gwilym, Rhys & Kanas, Angelos & Molyneux, Philip, 2013. "U.S. prompt corrective action and bank risk," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 239-257.

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